Between nationalisation and globalisation: male same-sex politics in post-war Japan by Kawasaka, Kazuyoshi
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
i 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between Nationalisation and 
Globalisation: 
Male Same-Sex Politics in Post-War 
Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Kazuyoshi KAWASAKA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, September 
2015 
 
  
ii 
ii 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in 
part to another University for the award of any other degree. 
 
 
Signature:............................................. 
  
iii 
iii 
Acknowledgements  
 
It is not easy for anyone to write a doctor thesis, but I persevered to complete my study 
about nationalism. Between 2011 and 2016, I developed this study while I was observing 
two countries I deeply relate to – Japan and England – leaning towards nationalism and 
xenophobia. Japan has dramatically changed since the Great East Japan earthquake and 
tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011 as if people are trying to look 
away from their unforgettable loss and uncontrollable forces of nature and nuclear 
technology through nationalism. Perhaps, people might have needed to hold on to 
something stable and a nation has become the object of people’s desperate desire. In any 
case, from the opposite side of the Eurasia continent, I kept looking at how Japanese 
society has changed from what I remembered in a very short period. At the same time, I 
have lived as a foreign student in England and I experienced with surprise and anxiety 
how the public sentiment was turning anti-immigrant under the Tories’ austerity agenda 
and political campaigns. This study was also a challenge for me to understand how 
suddenly national politics and people’s minds can change, and to find hope for a better 
future. 
 
I would like to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to my University of Sussex 
supervisor Sally R. Munt, who gave me invaluable advice and inspiration during my Ph. 
D. research. Her encouragement really helped me, especially when giving me direction 
and casting a critical eye over my early research. She also helped me adapt to life in 
England which is the first country I have lived in outside of Japan. 
 
I would also like to thank Shimizu Akiko of the University of Tokyo. She has introduced 
me Feminist and Queer Theory and taught me how to apply Critical Theory to my own 
life. Without knowing her, I would not have chosen to learn Queer Studies for my Ph. D. 
study. 
 
Finally thank you to my family, who provided me with help and patience to allow me to 
complete my thesis. 
 
 
Kazuyoshi Kawasaka 
  
iv 
iv 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
KAZUYOSHI KAWASAKA  
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
BETWEEN NATIONALISATION AND GLOBALISATION: 
MALE SAME-SEX POLITICS IN POST-WAR JAPAN 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis employs an approach of discourse analysis on male homosexuality in post-
war Japan from the viewpoint of the tense relations between Japanese cultural 
nationalism and the globalisation/Westernisation, along with the shifts of discourses of 
sexuality in the United States and the UK. Through analysing the discourses of 
sexuality in post-war Japan, I will theoretically indicate the historical and political 
relationship between problems of gender and sexuality, and national problems such as 
national identity between Japanese and Western cultures, ideal image of the nation, and 
its modern development. Firstly, I argue the works of Mishima Yukio (1925-1970), who 
is one of the representative writers in post-war Japan, especially famous for his gay-
themed works and far-right political activism including his attempt of coup d’état. Then, 
I explore the political dynamics of gay shame in Japan, focusing on Togo Ken (1932-
2012), a pioneer of Japanese gay activism who had challenged national elections since 
1971 as an openly homosexual candidate. Next, I discuss how the AIDS crisis has 
changed the discourses of sexuality and the sense of national and cultural borders in 
Japan. I then discuss the Japanese homonormativity in the 2000s, analogous to Lisa 
Duggan’s new homonormativityin the US context. Finally, I analyse Japanese ‘LGBT’ 
political phenomena under the transnational influence of the Obama administration’s 
LGBT-friendly policy in the contemporary Japan, and point out problems under the 
influences of ‘global’ LGBT activism in contemporary Japanese society. 
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Introduction: Sexual Politics and Contradictory Narratives in Modern 
Japan	
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study explores how senses of cultural or national differences, or tension between 
Japanese nationalism and the presence of the West, have defined the sexual politics of 
male homosexuals in post-war Japan. Since its modernisation, Japanese sexual culture 
has often been discussed based on questions of whether it is a continuation of Japanese 
tradition or as a result of modernisation, or whether it is ‘indigenous’ culture or a 
‘Westernised’ one. This way of asking aims to accent (un)changes in Japanese sexuality, 
constituting narratives that already presuppose the answers: either a narrative of ‘from 
“federal Japanese” to “Westernised Japan”’ or one of ‘looking for unique sexual habits in 
Japan which resist transformations of Westernisation’. Both narratives are based on 
temporality, which supposes that Japan is heading towards Westernisation or 
modernisation; therefore, the only question would be to what extent the project of 
Japanese Westernisation has achieved or failed. However, these analyses fail to explore 
the fundamental question that enables those narratives: Why is it so important to 
presuppose a tense relationship between Japanese uniqueness and Western 
modernisation in order to analyse gender, sexuality and politics in modern Japan? 
 In this research, I will change the question to analyse the sexual politics of male 
homosexuals in post-war Japan, focusing on the process rather than on the result. That is, 
I will investigate sexual politics in post-war Japan not by the question, ‘is it the result of 
Japanese tradition or of Western influence?’, but by the question of, ‘how have the 
dualism between Japanese tradition/national uniqueness and 
Westernisation/modernisation stimulated sexual politics and transformed it in post-war 
Japan?’ Focusing on the political dynamism associated with dualism between Japanese 
tradition/national uniqueness and Westernisation/modernisation, I will explore a more 
complicated process of sexual politics, rather than just ordering their political results, 
along with three political contexts. 
Firstly, I will explore how the dualism between Japanese tradition/national 
uniqueness and Westernisation/modernisation defines relationships between Japanese 
nationalism and the sexual politics of male homosexuals. The dualism between Japanese 
tradition/national uniqueness and Westernisation/modernisation has often been utilised to 
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characterise male same-sex sexuality; either it is a part of Japanese traditional sexuality, 
for example the offspring of samurai’s same-sex sexual conduct, or as a result of Western 
cultural influence. These different characterisations closely associate with discourses of 
inclusion or exclusion of cultural nationalism. In this research, I will focus on Japanese 
nationalism in order to reveal the dynamism of political inclusions and exclusions, which 
is the foundation of politics through nationalism. Focusing on the imaginary national 
boundary, along with sexual politics in post-war Japan, I will try to analyse the frame of 
politics that conditions its members, means, purpose and historical and social contexts, 
as well as individual experiences, including personal emotions such as pride or shame. 
Secondly, I will focus on discursive strategies of sexual politics to intervene in social 
issues in Japan. Cultural authority can occasionally be a useful political tool to attract 
social attention. Analysing discourses on sexual education in pre-war Japan, Sabine 
Frühstück points out that ‘the West’ had rhetorical and political functions: ‘“The West” 
was used as a synonym for certain claims to truth and the importance of scientific 
knowledge in general’ (Frühstück 2003, p.80). However, the cultural authority of ‘the 
West’ has not been stable in Japan, for instance, as ‘the West’ was perceived as ‘the foreign’ 
and understood as the source of danger, especially during the global AIDS crisis. In other 
contexts, calling for Japanese cultural nationalism can work well for another purpose, 
rather than using ‘the West’. Thus, in analysing sexual politics in post-war Japan, I will 
discuss the way in which the dualism between Japan and ‘the West’ enables particular 
political strategies for sexual minorities in each activism, and will emphasise how those 
political strategies have changed associated with changes in their situations. 
Thirdly, analysing sexual politics through the dualism between Japan and ‘the West’, 
I will contextualise Japanese situations within international phenomena. Responding to 
the growth of international sexual politics in the 21st century, Ken Plummer (2015) 
pursues the possibilities of ‘cosmopolitan sexuality’ and international global movements. 
However, his view is still rooted in Euro-American centrism. For example, he writes 
about the historical development of the women’s movements as ‘moving largely from 
being Western-focused to being international’ (p.77). When we argue about ‘international 
global movements’ in the context of movements outside of the West, not only is this 
narrative inapplicable but also the Euro-American centric narrative itself has been one of 
the targets of activism. In this research, I will discuss international sexual politics from 
the viewpoint of post-war Japan and how the internationalisation of sexual politics has 
transformed Japanese political situations. 
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 Through these viewpoints, this research aims to discuss male same-sex 
sexuality in Japan as sexual politics struggling and/or associating with the normative 
culture and politics in Japanese society, not just as a result of Japanese tradition or 
modernisation. In the following sections in this chapter I will discuss how the dualism 
between Japan and ‘the West’ has affected ideas of sexuality during modernisation in 
Japan, even as an essential factor to consider sexual politics in Japan. 
 
2. Japanese or Western Culture? Contradictory Discourses and Narratives on 
Sexual Politics in Japan 
 
2-1. Contradictory Discourses on Sexual Politics in Japan  
 
Japanese sexuality has often been an object of Orientalism outside of Japan. Mark 
McLelland (2003), an Australian historian writing on Japanese sexual minorities, 
criticises the Western perspective on Japanese sexuality as a kind of Orientalism, which 
emphasises the social oppression of sexual minorities and applies a coming-out narrative 
– a narrative strongly connected to activism in Anglophone societies – to the people in 
Japanese society, where the history of sexual minorities is different from that of the West1. 
On the other hand, Japan is sometimes caricatured as a place that has an overly liberated, 
quirkily developed, sexual culture dominated by technology and pornography. The 
Guardian (online) reports that many young Japanese men are not interested in a 
relationship with a woman any more, or even in having sex, as they are devoting their 
passions to virtual worlds: ‘Japanese women have become stronger socially and 
economically at the very same time that Japanese men have become more mole-ish and 
fully absorbed in virtual worlds, satiated by the very technological wizardry their 
forebears foisted upon them, and even preferring it to reality’ (Kelts 2011). Such Japanese 
sexual imagery indicates the dystopian future in which ‘feminism’ goes ‘too far’, as the 
article’s title, ‘Japan Leads the Way in Sexless Love’, suggests. The author of the article 
worries: ‘By 2009, the Japanese male’s lack of ambition, sexually or otherwise, had 
become a media meme. With the latest reports in Japan, of men who can’t get it up for 
real women who won’t get married or have kids, the mutual gender-chill phenomenon 
                                                
1 For his argument about the social and cultural differences in sexual politics between 
Japan and the West, see his article ‘Is there a Japanese “gay identity”?’ (2000). 
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has become mainstream. It may be the future, but is it really Japanese?’ (Kelts 2011). 
Although Japan is far from being a society gender-equality, coming 105th out of 136 
countries in the World Economic Forum’s annual ranking of gender-equal countries in 
2013, Japanese stereotypes – bizarre sexual cultures and technology – stimulate 
imaginary projections of the human future. These contradictory sexual stereotypes of 
Japan – premodern oppression and postmodern liberation – are cultural phenomena not 
only seen outside Japan. Indeed, there are many similar sexual stereotypes within Japan 
as well. In discussing Japanese sexual politics, I begin by introducing an intriguing 
discursive phenomenon in/about Japan, namely that these contradictory discourses 
coexist in society. 
 Firstly, there is a narrative that Japan is far behind the West in terms of sexual 
politics and sexual minorities’ rights.  
These discourses emphasise the advanced aspects of Western societies and the 
backwardness of Japanese society. For example, Francis Conlan, translator from Japanese 
to English of a book by Japanese gay activists, writes in the Translator’s Note:  
 
The Confucianist mentality, which favours uniformity and authoritarianism, 
would appear to be a major cause of Japanese society’s outward hostility toward 
homosexuality. […] The basic Japanese mentality is driven by the perceived 
validity of rigid hierarchy, conformity and obedience to authority. These values 
are so deeply rooted that the always difficult job of bringing about social change 
is even more difficult in Japan than in the West. (Conlan 2001, p. xv)  
 
In this Translator’s Note, Conlan portrays Japan as a conservative and authoritarian 
society compared to the West. Similarly, Japanese news media introduce American and 
European society as being more LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender/sexual) 
-friendly compared to Japanese society. For example, a business magazine, Tokyo Keizai 
Magazine Online, in an article about LGBT movements at Oxford University, refers to 
the United Kingdom (UK) as the ‘leading country (senshinkoku)’ on LGBT human rights 
issues (Zixi 2012). In May 2013, the Japanese edition of The Huffington Post was 
launched, with a LGBT-related news story as one of its earliest articles (The Huffington 
Post 2013a). The article, entitled ‘Do LGBT take root in Japan? (LGBT wa nihon ni 
nezuku noka)’ reports Japanese social changes for sexual minorities who are newly called 
‘LGBT’ in Japanese. At this time, the United States of America (US) is introduced as ‘the 
leading country of LGBT (LGBT senshin-koku)’, while Japan is described as a country 
that has slowly started to change towards acceptance of LGBT people. In these discourses, 
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Western societies are simply represented as the leading and developed societies on LGBT 
issues and sexual politics, whereas Japan is mentioned as a backward country compared 
to those of the West. 
The second narrative is that Japan is different from the West, but Japan can learn 
from the West about sexual politics. 
In the first book of Gay Studies in Japan, Gei Sutadizu [Gay Studies] published in 
1997, the authors, Kazama Takashi, Kawaguchi Kazuya and Keith Vincent, started a 
controversy by pointing out the silence of homosexuals in history. They characterised 
homosexuals as the ‘silent people’ (Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent 1997, p. 19) in 
modern history. According to them, the silence of homosexuals consists not just of the 
lack of discourses by homosexuals. For instance, although they mention the existence of 
the gay pornographic magazine Barazoku in Japan in the 1970s, they do not count it as 
an example of a male homosexual voice that expresses homosexuals’ own interests and 
their future aims beyond sexual desire. Owing to the authors’ unique way of defining the 
silence of homosexuals, they trace the history of homosexuals’ voices in terms of Lesbian 
and Gay Studies. They define Lesbian and Gay Studies, that is, academic discourses by 
homosexuals, as their political voice, contrasted to the silence in the past. In their 
definition of Lesbian and Gay Studies, they characterise the academic discourses as 
parallel to the political movements of homosexuals, such as the Stonewall riots, German 
homosexual liberation movements in the late nineteenth century, and homophile 
movements in the United States in the 1950s. In their explanation of the history of Lesbian 
and Gay Studies, the homosexual political discourses only emerged in the West. Their 
genealogy of Lesbian and Gay Studies, focusing on the political background of 
homosexuals in its social context, is intended to provide a counter-discourse to Japanese 
academia. As Takemura Kazuko (2010), a feminist and queer theorist, notes, Japanese 
translations of academic works within Gender and Sexuality Studies were introduced as 
new intellectual trends in the United States, and were consumed in a process of 
depoliticisation:  
 
This depoliticisation is the second consequence produced incidentally by recent 
sexuality studies. A typical example is shown in the reception of ‘queer theory’. 
Basically, this appellation is highly political, appropriating the derogatory term 
‘queer’ in a performative way and transforming it into a positive concept for 
questioning the heteronormative system. For such critical performativity to be 
successfully implemented, the original offensive implication should remain 
cognisable to the receiver. But ‘queer’ was translated into Japanese in phonetic 
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symbols as ‘kuia’, which does not convey any scornful meaning but sounds, on 
the contrary, simply fashionable and cool. The Japanese translation deprives the 
appellation of the history of pain and sadness experienced by those who have been 
despised and denied, by being called ‘queer’. In addition, the overemphasis on the 
theoretical dimension of sexuality studies made such studies sound too puzzling 
and unintelligible to the people outside of academia and even to some feminist 
scholars who are not inclined to engage themselves in, as they call it, a ‘jargon-
loaded mystifying language’. (Takemura 2010, p. 19) 
 
In such a Japanese academic context, Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent emphasise the 
original political context of Lesbian and Gay Studies in the West.  
 At the same time, through contrasting the Western gay political and academic 
voice with the supposed Japanese political silence of homosexuals, they initially marked 
the national and cultural boundary between the West and Japan when arguing sexual 
politics. In their explanation, what erodes the boundary between Western and Japanese 
politics is globalisation. They insist that we should regard the political rise of 
homosexuality as a global phenomenon, and note: 
 
But the term ‘globalisation’ indicates the ‘Westernisation’ of the non-Western 
sphere in many cases. As many parts of daily life in Japan are Westernised, 
homosexuality and homosexuals’ situation are no exception. For example, the 
names ‘gei [gay]’ and ‘rezubian [lesbian]’ referring to homosexuals and their 
identities came from English. Now, for better or worse, we cannot completely 
deny the influences of Westernisation in our life. (Kazama, Kawaguchi and 
Vincent 1997, p. 46) 
 
In their narrative, the globalisation of sexual politics, or the Westernisation of Japan, can 
lead homosexuals in Japan to gain their political voice in order to fight against 
discrimination and homophobia in Japanese society. 
Their argument is distinctive in the historical context of sexual minorities in Japan. 
This is not only because they published the first book about Gay Studies in Japan, or 
employed Westernised identity politics in Japanese society (Asada et al. 1997; Suganuma 
2012), but also because they introduced new criteria for sexual politics in Japan. Firstly, 
they insisted that sexual minorities in Japan need new discourses, both academic and 
political, for their activism. Secondly, they create the narrative of the history of 
homosexuals based not on their sexual activities or desire, but on their political activism. 
In their argument about homosexuals in Japan, they prioritised political activism over 
sexual activities to narrate a history of homosexuals that renders the relationship between 
culture and sexual activities a secondary matter.  
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The Gay Studies that they tried to establish in Japanese society was not an 
academic approach to Japanese gay culture and sexual activity, but an activist project that 
applied the political approach of Cultural Studies to Japanese society from the viewpoint 
of gay people. Thus, their perspective of cultural difference focuses not on the culture 
itself but on the homophobia and activism within it, although they noticed the important 
differences between Japanese and Western social and historical contexts, as well as the 
problems of globalisation. They argued: 
 
In any case, homosexuality will be globalised more and more hereafter. 
However, there are many regions and countries where the situations of 
homosexuals are not changing. It is even dangerous to argue that the lifestyles 
of homosexuals in the world are going to gradually become similar and 
universal. In addition, it is certain that each region and country has cultural 
particularity and a way to be homosexual itself is influenced by it in local 
contexts. Therefore, in many cases, it needs to count the cultural particularity 
of the region to find a way to fight against homophobia. It may sound like a 
contradiction, but in the case of homosexuality, the phenomenon of 
‘globalisation’ would go hand in hand with the ‘localisation’. (Kazama, 
Kawaguchi and Vincent 1997, pp. 47-48) 
 
Therefore, their idea about cultural differences between Japan and the West is that, 
although Japan is different from the West, Japanese gay and lesbian scholars and activists 
can learn from the West to invent their own style of sexual politics against heterosexism 
in Japan. 
The third narrative is that Japan is already a queer nation so that it is an advanced 
place in terms of sexual culture, and discrimination and phobia against sexual minorities 
in Japan have come from the West. 
In the arguments about the history of sexuality in Japan, especially those focusing 
on male-male sex, the distinction between the premodern and modernised Japan, or the 
Edo (1603-1868) and Meiji periods (1868-1912), is often emphasised. For example, Mark 
McLelland, Katsuhiko Suganuma and James Walker (2007), in their introductory 
discussion of the historical background of Japan’s queer cultures, accentuated the 
historical fact that same-sex sexuality was widely accepted before Japan’s modernisation: 
 
During the Edo period (1603-1868), for instance, there was no necessary 
connection made between gender and sexual preference because men, samurai in 
particular, were able to engage in both same- and opposite-sex affairs. Same-sex 
relationships were governed by a code of ethics described as nanshoku (male 
eroticism) or shudo (the way of youths) in the context of which elite men were 
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able to pursue boys and young men who had not yet undergone their coming-of-
age ceremonies, as well as transgender males of all ages from the lower classes 
who worked as actors and prostitutes. (McLelland, Suganuma and Walker 2007, 
p. 6) 
 
Homoerotic culture in the Edo period is contrasted with the prohibition of homosexuality 
that emerged during Japan’s Westernisation, which occurred extensively from the Meiji 
Period onwards, and consisted of ‘borrowing’ knowledge and technology from the West:	
 
The elaboration of a realm of sexuality led to the designation of normal (seijo) and 
perverse (ijo) forms of sexuality and, accordingly, people. Indeed, from the end of 
the Meiji period, drawing upon theorists such as Sigmund Freud, discussions of 
‘perverse’ or ‘queer’ desire (hentai seiyoku) began to circulate in popular 
magazines that advocated the improvement of public morals in pursuit of 
‘civilisation and enlightenment’ – a popular slogan of the period. In particular, the 
previous discourses of nanshoku and the transgender practices associated with 
male prostitution were portrayed as feudal, incompatible with ‘civilised morality’, 
and something that ought to be eradicated. (ibid., p. 7) 
 
Such a historical narrative, which regards the Westernisation of Japan as bringing about 
the control of sexuality, i.e. compulsory heterosexism, while accentuating the freedom of 
varied sexual behaviours in premodern Japan, is often employed in the research of 
Sexuality Studies, especially those concerning early modern and post-war Japan. Donald 
Richie, a critic of Japanese cinema and culture, writes in the foreword to the book edited 
by McLelland, Suganuma and Walker: 
 
One of the results of this imitation was the incorporation of a Judeo-Christian bias 
that stigmatised homosexuality. There were no enduring laws promulgated against 
the practice in Japan as there had been almost everywhere else, but an imported 
prejudice became apparent, and still is. One of those quoted in this volume refers 
to ‘the disease of fellowship with the same sex’. This phrase would certainly never 
have occurred to an author in Japan prior to the Meiji Era. (ibid., p. xi) 
 
These narratives create utopian images of sexual freedom that are devoid of homophobia 
in premodern Japan in the pure world which, detached from Judeo-Christian sexual 
morals, accepted alternative forms of sexuality, at least for mature gay men. 
This view is utilised against the ‘Westernised’ gay activism in Japan which has 
blossomed since the 1990s. In Jack no danwashitsu (Jack’s conversation room), a blog 
started in 2006 to discuss the world’s homosexual cultures, blogger Jack explains why 
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gei-ribu, a derogatory slang term for Japanese gay liberation movements, has failed in 
Japan: 
 
I think that there are two main reasons that gay lib (gei-ribu) movements did 
not succeed in Japan. 
     The first reason is that they completely ignored the cultural differences 
between the West and Japan and tried to directly import the Western gay lib 
movements into Japan. As I have already pointed out many times in this blog, 
Christianity is the foundation of discrimination against gay people in the West. 
Christianity, the dominant religion in the West, prohibits homosexuality so 
that discrimination against homosexuality is strong… In Japan where it is 
different from the Western Christian culture, people tend to regard one’s 
personality apart from his/her sexual preference and follow an unwritten code 
that one should not interfere in others’ sexual lives as it belongs to their 
privacy. This is a big difference from the Western society in which people 
boldly interfere with others’ sexual behaviours for the reason that ‘God does 
not allow it’. And, in Japan, even if people know that you are a homo [sic], it 
would not happen that they deny your humanity as it can happen in the West… 
It is enough for us that general Japanese people think that ‘we cannot 
understand same-sex love but acknowledge that there are people who have 
such sexual preference, and will not interfere with their behaviours unless they 
make others in trouble’.  
     In fact, the Japanese are the rare people in the world who can regard 
homosexuality with a level gaze. [Stress in original] (Jack 2012)	
 
This narrative – that Japan is traditionally queer-friendly while homophobia has come 
from the West – can provoke criticism of LGBT social movements on the grounds that 
they are inspired by those in Western societies.   
Furthermore, a similar narrative is utilised against the introduction of same-sex 
marriage in Japan. Hasegawa Michiko, an advisor to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and a 
member of the management committee of NHK, the public broadcasting service of Japan, 
insists that Japanese culture is different from that of Western Christianity which has long 
banned and discriminated against homosexuality; thus, Japan does not need same-sex 
marriage, which has been introduced to protect the repressed homosexuals in the West 
(Hasegawa 2015) 2 . This discourse, which emphasises the cultural and historical 
differences between Japan and the West, is sometimes used to maintain the existing order 
in Japan, denying the introduction of new reforms. 
                                                
2 She also insists, in the interview, that same-sex marriage is against the 500-million-
year history of natural creation, as same-sex couples cannot make a baby naturally. 
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Each narrative also reflects its political attitude to sexual politics in Japan. The 
narrative, Japan is far behind the West in terms of sexual politics and sexual minorities’ 
rights, tends to argue for political and social reforms that introduce the social changes for 
sexual minorities that have already been institutionalised in Western societies. The 
narrative, Japan is different from the West; however Japan can learn from the West about 
sexual politics, insists that we need to analyse Japanese homophobia, which can be 
different from that in Western societies, and try to invent a new form of activism that is 
suitable for Japanese society. The narrative, Japan is already a queer nation so that it is 
an advanced place in terms of sexual culture, and discrimination and phobia against 
sexual minorities in Japan come from the West, can be critical of LGBT activism, which 
might be regarded as part of the ‘Western’ movement. 
 
2-2. Sexuality and Historical Narratives 
 
These discourses pose two difficult questions about sexual politics in Japan.  
Firstly, there is a question of how these conflicting discourses can be understood 
in the context of Japanese history. Furukawa Makoto (1994) presents a theoretical 
framework of discourses on male same-sex conduct between the Japanese federal state 
and the modernised state: from the nanshoku (male eroticism) code to the hentai-seiyoku 
(perverse sexual desire) code. According to him, male same-sex conduct was regarded as 
nanshoku, which was usually practised among the warrior class or with kabuki actors 
before the modernisation; therefore, the code of male same-sex conduct was tied to a 
particular class and gender in premodern Japan. However, after Japanese modernisation, 
ideas about male same-sex conduct have changed due to the influence of popular 
discourses in Western sexology, so that male same-sex conduct is now regarded as an 
internal problem of perverse sexual desire. Scholars of Japanese queer sexuality, Ishida 
Hitoshi, Mark McLelland, and Murakami Takanori (2005), summarised the shift in sexual 
codes as echoing Michel Foucault’s terminology, moving from ‘sodomies’ in premodern 
societies to ‘homosexuals’ in modern societies: ‘[t]his new code turned attention away 
from sexual acts (which it had been supposed might be engaged in by men in general) 
towards internal, ontological factors which prompted specific types of individuals to 
express “perverse desires”’ (Ishida, McLelland and Murakami 2005, p. 35).  
However, what is overlooked in this narrative of historical transition is the fact 
that nanshoku has actually failed to become a thing of the past, and cultural 
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representations of nanshoku have been remembered and regarded as part of Japanese 
‘tradition’ following the modernisation (Faure 1998, p. 219; Reichert 2006; Vincent 2012; 
Takeuchi 2007, pp. 114-115). Furthermore, Gregory M. Pflugfelder (2007), a historian of 
the Japanese history of sexuality, criticises the simplified narrative of the ‘Westernisation’ 
of Japanese sexuality on grounds that the rise in interest in the medical approach to 
sexuality in Japan shares the same period of time with the West: ‘The historical timing of 
this restructuring of knowledge is significant, for it was during the same period in the late 
nineteenth century that male-male sexuality, under the rubric of “homosexuality”, began 
to receive attention from medical and scientific authorities in the West’ (Pflugfelder 2007, 
p. 12). Therefore, Pflugfelder insists that the Japanese adaptation of sexual science cannot 
be described as a unidirectional movement coming from the West. Rather, he notes the 
complicated circulation of knowledge among the world’s cultures in the modern era: 
 
The medico-scientific model of sexuality that took root in Japan after the late 
nineteenth century constituted one form of Foucault’s scientia sexualis. The 
Orientalist temptation of narrating its development in terms of ‘East’ and ‘West’ – 
a romantic narrative in which the naïve charm of the former inevitably succumbs 
to the virile strength of the latter – must be resisted, however, because such 
geographical markers do not do justice to the global dimensions and local 
complexities of the knowledge system in question. Not only did the medico-
scientific model of understanding sexual behaviour achieve cultural prominence 
at virtually the same point in historical time in Japan, Europe, and North America, 
but the flow of knowledge across geographic borders was by no means 
unidirectional. Japanese sexologists should not be seen as handmaids to what is 
sometimes nostalgically imagined as the corruption of pure and innocent native 
traditions merely through their act of introducing Western sexual science into 
Japan, but rather as engaging in an ongoing and creative dialogue with their non-
Japanese colleagues, active participants in a global network of sexual knowledge 
in which they were not only tutees but mentors as well. (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 13) 
 
In his critique, Pflugfelder notes the historical fact of scientific knowledge shared across 
countries, which transcends the simplified narrative of differences between the East/Japan 
and the West3. 
Therefore, the complicated relationships connecting ideas of sexuality and of 
cultural differences disturb the straightforward narrative of the Japanese history of 
                                                
3 This passage does not mean that Japanese scientific knowledge had been developed 
by their own community without Western influences. As Sabine Frühstück notes, 
Japanese intellectuals and scientists at the beginning of modernisation became familiar 
with German and English for their studies, so it is certain that Western influences are 
essential for Japanese academic knowledge (Frühstück 2003, p. 204). 
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modernisation, from a federal state to the modernised state, through ‘importing’ Western 
knowledge and habits, even though the straightforward narrative is an attractive and 
compelling way to describe Japanese society’s dramatic changes, as brought on by 
Westernisation/modernisation. 
The second question is how these contradictory narratives have coexisted and 
what such coexistence means. The coexistence of various narratives on sexual politics 
and national identity can be understood as a struggle between two narratives of 
nationalism, which Homi K. Bhabha (2004) distinguished in his influential essay 
‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation’. Discussing the 
ambivalence of the ‘nation’ as a narrative strategy, Bhabha identifies two forms of the 
nation as narration: the pedagogic and performative. The mode of nationalist pedagogy 
signifies the people as ‘historical objects’, giving ‘the discourse an authority that is based 
on the pre-given or constituted historical origin in the past’ [stress in original] (p. 208). 
On the other hand, the performative narration stresses contemporaneity, representing the 
people as the ‘“subjects” of a process of signification that must erase any prior or 
originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle’ 
and, thus, as ‘that sign of the presence through which national life is redeemed and 
iterated as a reproductive process’ [stress in original] (pp. 208-209). Hence, in the context 
of discourses on sexual politics, it looks like the pedagogic narrative employs the 
continuous historicity of moving from the Japanese tradition of same-sex sexual conduct 
to the contemporary gay culture, to incorporate same-sex sexual cultures into Japanese 
national history, while the performative narration presents the sexual minorities as the 
new subject, to demand change in Japanese culture and institutions so as to include them 
in the nation. Bhabha points out that not only is the monophonic national history of 
homogeneous people interrupted from within the nation, because the movements of 
signification of the nation are split by two narrations, but also histories of minorities will 
be possible between two temporalities of national narrations whose significations 
propagate heterogeneous histories of the nation and people: 
 
Minority discourse sets the act of emergence in the antagonistic in-between of 
image and sign, the accumulative and the adjunct, presence and proxy. It 
contests genealogies of ‘origin’ that lead to claims for cultural supremacy and 
historical priority. Minority discourse acknowledges the status of national 
culture – and the people – as a contentious, performative space of the 
perplexity of the living in the midst of the pedagogical representations of the 
fullness of life… The discourse of the minority reveals the insurmountable 
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ambivalence that structures the equivocal movement of historical time. [Stress 
in original] (pp. 225-226) 
	
Bhabha attempts to theorise the complicated narrations used to represent minorities in the 
histories of the nation. 
Furthermore, there are efforts to analyse Japanese history of gender and sexuality 
minorities from the viewpoint of the in-between of past and present, or the Japanese 
‘traditional’ and the Western ‘new’ sexuality. In 2012, two books about Japanese queer 
sexuality and interculturality were published: Two-Timing Modernity: Homosocial 
Narrative in Modern Japanese Fiction and Contact moments: The politics of intercultural 
desire in Japanese male-queer culture.  
Keith Vincent, the author of Two-Timing Modernity, analysed the homosocial 
narrative in Japanese literature in pre-war Japan, when the nation entered modernity and 
the international community. Vincent insists that Japan’s modernisation, which is heavily 
influenced by Western culture, changed social attitudes towards male same-sex desire and 
practice and that, therefore, male sexuality represents characteristics of its modern social 
shift and national identity. 
 
In this patriarchal but not yet heteronormative world, moreover, relations 
between men in general could be mapped on an increasingly uneasy but still 
navigable topology in which ‘men-loving-men’ and ‘men-promoting-the-
interests-of-men’ coexisted and colluded in relative harmony. By the first 
years of the twentieth century, however, as exclusive and compulsory 
heterosexuality became associated with an enlightened modernity, love 
between men was increasingly branded as either ‘feudal’ or immature. The 
resulting rupture of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has famously theorised as 
the ‘male homosocial continuum’ thus constituted one of the most significant 
markers of Japan’s entrance into modernity. And yet just as Japanese 
modernity often seemed haunted by stubborn remnants of the premodern past, 
the nation’s newly heteronormative culture was unable and perhaps unwilling 
to expunge completely the recent memory of a male homosocial past now read 
as perverse. (Vincent 2012, p. 3) 
 
Focusing on homosocial narrative in early modern Japanese literature, Vincent read same-
sex male desire in early modern Japan as the national allegory of dynamic changes in 
Japan, with modernisation producing political and personal conflicts between the 
traditional and new Western culture, the provincial and the urban, individuals and the 
nation, adolescence and adulthood, feminine and masculine, abnormal and normal, and 
past and future. 
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 Suganuma Katsuhiko (2012) analysed queer cultures in post-war Japan by 
focusing on the interculturality between the West and Japan in his concept of ‘contact 
moment(s)’. He defines this concept as ‘a certain historical moment (or a series of those 
moments) that allows us to imagine the discursive conditions and effects enabled by 
cross-culturation’ (ibid., p. 18). He summarises Japanese history as generating the 
interculturality of sexuality: 
 
In the mid-nineteenth century Japan embarked on modernisation and 
industrialisation following Western models. As a result, modern sexual 
discourses were brought to Japan. However, the process of adapting those 
foreign discourses into the Japanese context proved to be far messier than a 
simple overwriting of local culture by the imposition of foreign knowledge. 
Conversely, the foreign concepts and discourses were often reshaped into a local 
context, so as to serve local needs. More often than not, this imported 
knowledge was utilised as a benchmark against which traditional as well as 
modern views of Japan’s identity were measured. Jim Reichert (2006), for 
example, compellingly argues in In the company of Men: Representations of 
Male-Male Sexuality in Meiji Literature that during Japan’s modernisation 
period (Meiji period), the imported Western concept of compulsory 
heterosexuality helped reinvigorate the literary representations of male-male 
eroticism called nanshoku, often discussed as a cultural shield against the 
Westernisation of Japanese traditions. In this sense, foreign knowledge did not 
always dominate the local construction of sexuality, but did quite the opposite; 
it consolidated the local identity. (ibid., p. 25) 
  
Noting the interculturality of sexuality and local Japanese identity through modernisation, 
Suganuma suggests that the ‘traditional’ male same-sex conduct, nanshoku, is not simply 
Japanese sexuality before Westernisation, but rather a partial result of Westernisation: 
borrowing Vincent’s words, it is the nostalgic homoerotic past, which has emerged 
through Japan’s modernisation. 
 These studies indicate the limits of Furukawa’s historical narrative of the 
transition in Japanese sexuality, echoing the Foucauldian narrative of a radical historical 
shift from the premodern to the modern, or from the indigenous to the Westernised Japan. 
But, at the same time, Vincent’s and Suganuma’s research, which focuses on the 
interculturality of Japanese sexuality, fails to answer certain questions, especially in terms 
of the sexual politics in Japan. Firstly, why and how have political dilemmas, such as the 
dualistic tension between Japanese ‘tradition’ and ‘new’ Western sexuality, been argued 
with problems of ‘perversity’, especially in same-sex relationships? Secondly, what is the 
social and political meaning of the coexistence of two conflicting narratives of sexual 
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politics in Japanese society – one praising Japanese tradition and the other introducing 
Western culture and politics? Lastly, if the narrative of straightforward ‘progress’ or 
radical shift to a new period of history, which is prominent in the narrative of modernity, 
is not applicable to the history of sexual politics in Japan, what kind of historicity has 
contributed to Japanese sexual politics? What is interesting to me in Furukawa’s very 
influential narrative, therefore, is not his analysis of the historical formation of discourses 
but, rather, the narrative itself; why is it so important to distinguish between the 
premodern and modern, or ‘traditional’ and ‘Westernised’, Japanese sexuality when 
discussing Japanese modernisation and sexuality, which supposedly emerged only within 
a few decades? 
What seems clear is that ideas of sexuality and politics in Japan are closely related 
to those surrounding cultural differences between Japan and ‘the West’. The relationship 
between sexuality and politics is reflected not only in accounts of Japanese national 
identity, but also in the imaginary position of ‘the West’, or Dipesh Chakrabarty’s ‘Europe’ 
(2000), which dominates the narrative of modernity and theoretical universality in 
subjects of history. To represent the imaginary position of ‘the West’ or ‘Europe’ in 
Sexuality Studies, I will analyse the theoretically influential works of Foucault and 
Sedgwick, and then discuss how sexuality has been merged with national and/or cultural 
identity through modernisation in pre-war Japan.  
 
3. Sexuality and Cultural Differences between East and West 
 
3-1. Sexuality and Western Modernity in Queer Theory 
 
Regarding cultural differences between East and West in discourses of sexuality, Michel 
Foucault is an interesting and important theorist, especially when we consider those 
narratives that romanticise the sexual cultures of the East before its Westernisation. In his 
ground-breaking book, The History of Sexuality Volume I, Foucault famously 
distinguished between the knowledge of sexuality in the East and that in the West: ars 
erotica and scientia sexualis. As I have already suggested above, ars erotica – Foucault’s 
characterisation of Eastern sexuality – is considered a contribution to the ‘Orientalist’ 
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understanding of sexuality outside the West (Boone 2014, p. 24)4. Joseph A. Boone 
relates: 
 
As thorny as some of these questions may be, what now seems clear to many 
theorists is the degree to which the distinction Foucault makes between an 
eastern ars erotica (based on acts) and a Western scientia sexualis (based on 
identities) is not only, as Traub states, ‘historically inaccurate’ in terms of 
Middle East history but also orientalising. Indeed, by distinguishing the sexual 
economies of East and West in these broad terms, Foucault is able ‘to establish 
[the] pre-modern/modern periodisation’ that supports his arguments about the 
West’s evolution of a disciplinary regime of modern sexual types, while the East 
remains locked in a timeless ars erotica. (ibid., p. xxx) 
 
In the Japanese historical context, Pflugfelder criticises Foucault’s dichotomy: 
‘Foucault’s simple dichotomy of ars erotica and scientia sexualis is clearly inadequate to 
describe the differences that exist among and within sexual knowledge systems in these 
diverse societies, and, in typically Eurocentric fashion, makes little allowance for 
historical change outside the West’ (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 7). As historians specialising in 
developments outside the West have clearly explained, Foucault’s formulation of ars 
erotica in contrast to scientia sexualis is not only questioned by historians of the Middle 
East and East Asia, but also has ideological functions.  
In The History of Sexuality Volume I, Foucault categorises numerous societies that 
exemplify ars erotica: China, Japan, India, Rome, and the Arabo-Moslem societies. 
According to Foucault, ars erotica, the erotic art, is defined as the realisation of the truth 
of sex through practices and pleasures, free from reliance on laws or rationality: 
 
In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and 
accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute 
law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, 
but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated 
in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the 
body and the soul. (Foucault 1990, p. 57) 
 
Illustrating ars erotica as the art of knowledge by/for pleasure, sexual cultures in the 
world of ars erotica are characterised as those which lack external authority over sexual 
activities, found in the laws that enforce prohibitions, morals, and medical knowledge: 
                                                
4 For Foucault’s ‘Orientalism’ and its influence on Sexuality Studies, see Leon Antonio 
Rocha’s detailed discussion (Rocha 2011).  
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thus, sexual cultures representing ars erotica are defined as those possessing the 
knowledge of the spheres of body and pleasure without absolute laws.  
On the other hand, Foucault characterises Western society as the only civilisation 
that has developed scientia sexualis. In The History of Sexuality Volume I, Foucault 
devoted himself to tracing the development of scientia sexualis, a form of knowledge 
‘strictly opposed to’ ars erotica (ibid., p. 58). Foucault defines scientia sexualis as 
presentation of the truth of sex, which Foucault considered a form of knowledge-power 
in modern society. Foucault finds the source of sexual science in the confession of 
Christian tradition, observing that ‘we have since become a singularly confessing society’ 
[stress is mine] (ibid., p. 59). Through the relentless confessions of Western society, sex 
has been transformed into the discourses that constitute sexual science and medical 
institutions.  
In Foucault’s analysis, sexuality produced through scientia sexualis is at the heart 
of power in Western modern society. According to Foucault, the development of sexuality 
in the West is one of the most important factors establishing the technology of power in 
the nineteenth century: 
 
This is the background that enables us to understand the importance assumed by 
sex as a political issue. It was at the pivot of the two axes along which developed 
the entire political technology of life. On the one hand it was tied to the discipline 
of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the 
adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the 
regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity. It 
fitted in both categories at once, giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, 
permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate 
medical or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with 
the body… Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of 
the species. (ibid., pp. 145-146)  
 
Foucault characterises the modern ‘Western’ way of sexuality as the one which is 
associated with knowledge and power, and is thus doomed to serve the interests of 
efficiency and proliferation in society.	
 Foucault’s simple dichotomy of ars erotica and scientia sexualis is, therefore, 
reflected not only in his Orientalist fantasy of sexual pleasures outside Western society, 
but also by his Westernisation of power and sexuality in modernity, which constructs the 
West as distinctive and different from other regions. But what is important in his argument 
is that, through placing ars erotica outside Western civilisation, Foucault was also able to 
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suggest a realm outside the power-knowledge of Western sexuality. At the end of the book, 
he insists that bodies and pleasures – the sphere of ars erotica – offer possibilities of 
resistance, through sexuality, to the power of Western society: 
 
It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim – through a tactical 
reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality – to counter the grips of power 
with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledge, in their multiplicity and their 
possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the 
deployment of sexuality ought not to be sexual desire, but bodies and pleasures. 
(ibid., p. 157) 
 
Foucault’s famous praise of bodies and pleasures as the sites of resistance has been made 
possible both by the Oriental otherness and the Westernisation of modern sexuality in his 
argument; thus, his argument of sexuality/power and resistance to modern power, which 
influences contemporary queer politics as well, is culturally and geographically marked 
in his discourse. As Boone (2014) and Pflugfelder (2007) criticised Foucault’s dichotomy 
for its Eurocentrism and inadequate allowance for historical change outside the West, 
Foucault’s arguments cannot be simply applied to Asian contexts. Furthermore, I want to 
focus on the way in which Foucault’s argument about the Western formation of sexuality 
and power – one of the most influential theoretical achievements in Sexuality Studies – 
forms part of the discursive mechanism of the Westernisation of sexuality-power in 
modernity, which spontaneously inscribes sexual politics onto geography.	
Another influential queer theorist, Eve K. Sedgwick, also presents a correlation 
between modern sexuality and Western cultural attributes in her distinctive book, 
Epistemology of the Closet. Following Foucault, Sedgwick expands his argument to 
encompass the cultural epistemology of modern Western society: 
 
Furthermore, in accord with Foucault’s demonstration, whose results I will 
take to be axiomatic, that modern Western culture has placed what it calls 
sexuality in a more and more distinctively privileged relation to our most 
prized constructs of individual identity, truth, and knowledge, it becomes truer 
and truer that the language of sexuality not only intersects with but transforms 
the other languages and relations by which we know. (Sedgwick 1991, p. 3) 
 
Arguing for the relationship between sexuality and politics, especially in modern Western 
culture, Sedgwick insists that the problems of homo/heterosexual definition are centred 
in ‘all modern Western identity and social organisation’ beyond the mere realm of 
homosexual identity and culture (ibid., p. 11). 
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In arguing that homo/heterosexual definition has been a presiding master term 
of the past century, one that has the same, primary importance for all modern 
Western identity and social organisation (and not merely for homosexual identity 
and culture) as do the more traditionally visible cruxes of gender, class, and race, 
I’ll argue that the now chronic modern crisis of homo/heterosexual definition 
has affected our culture through its ineffaceable marking particularly of the 
categories secrecy/disclosure, knowledge/ignorance, private/public, 
masculine/feminine, majority/minority, innocence/initiation, natural/artificial, 
new/old, discipline/terrorism, canonic/noncanonic, wholeness/decadence, 
urbane/provincial, domestic/foreign, health/illness, same/different, 
active/passive, in/out, cognition/paranoia, art/kitsch, utopia/apocalypse, 
sincerity/sentimentality, and voluntarity/addiction. (ibid., p. 11)	
	
Through reading the categories that Western culture and politics have heavily relied on, 
Sedgwick regards inquiry into sexuality, especially into the ambiguity of 
homo/heterosexual definition, as the prominent role of Western modern thought. 
Although Sedgwick does not mention Oriental sexuality as Foucault did, she also defines 
the cultural identity of Western modernity through sexuality, especially through the 
problems of homo/heterosexual definitions. 
 It is notable that these ‘ground-breaking’ works of Sexuality Studies define 
Western modernity and its cultural and political identity – constituting ‘Europe’ and 
differentiating it from the other cultures – through sexuality. These influential theories of 
sexuality contribute to representations of ‘the West’ as the unique and singular civilisation, 
synonymous with modernity. This is the discursive ideology of ‘Europe’ in the academic 
discourses, criticised by Dipesh Chakrabarty: ‘[J]ust as the phenomenon of Orientalism 
does not disappear simply because some of us have now attained a critical awareness of 
it, similarly a certain version of “Europe”, reified and celebrated in the phenomenal world 
of everyday relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern, continues to 
dominate the discourse of history’ (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 28). As sexuality defines human 
beings in modern society, sexuality now defines geographic cultures and the narrative of 
modernity as well.  
 
3-2. Interculturality: Sexuality and Japanese Modernity 
 
Contrasting to the theoretical functions of ‘Europe’ as the singular scene of the birth of 
the modern, the ‘outside’ of ‘Europe’ needs to explain its modernity through its 
relationship with ‘Europe’. Adopting Sedgwick’s homosocial theory, Keith Vincent 
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analyses Japanese modern literature to open up a new understanding of modern 
heteronormativity and homoerotic desire in pre-war Japan. As modernisation brought 
dramatic changes in public attitudes against male same-sex desire and love, which had 
once been admired, male same-sex affection became an ambivalent subject for male 
adults in modernised Japan. Vincent defines ‘homosocial narrative’ as the narrative that 
sustains a double tendency ‘to preserve male homoeroticism in the past as something 
precious and worthy of remembrance while also working to quarantine it there as 
something that had no further claim on the present’ [stress in original] (Vincent 2011, p. 
4). Thus, Vincent points out that ambiguity towards homoeroticism affects the attitude 
towards the categories of modern/pre-modern and West/Japan as well; that is, the sense 
of temporality, and national and/or cultural identity. Discussing homosocial narrative in 
modern pre-war Japanese literature, Vincent conceptualises a complex sense of 
temporality arising from Japan’s modernisation or ‘Westernisation’ as ‘two-timing’, a 
term which refers to tensions between two forms of temporality existing at once: the 
temporality moving towards a straight future and that moving towards a queer past; or 
the temporality moving towards a Westernised modern future and the one moving towards 
a Japanese traditional, homoerotic past. 
 Vincent insists that male homoerotic desire does not necessarily cause crises 
and tensions in the ‘two-timing’ narrative in Japan, as discussed by Sedgwick in her theory, 
which explains the mechanism of homophobia and homosexual panic in Western society 
through the ambiguity of homo/heterosexuality. Rather, Vincent suggests that homoerotic 
desire is a critical factor in preserving Japan’s cultural identity and mediating its fading 
past.  
 
By Japan’s ‘two-timing modernity’ I mean the way in which male-male sexuality 
was both relegated to and simultaneously preserved within the past, both on the 
level of national history and on the level of the individual. Thus, while it is true 
that by the early twentieth century in Japan the influence of European sexology 
and ‘enlightened’ modernisation had colluded to pathologise and condemn male-
male sexuality, it was also true that its full disqualification was prevented by the 
persistent and relatively recent memory of a cultural tradition of male-male love, 
celebrated in literature and in full collusion with the premodern patriarchy. 
(Vincent 2012, p. 24) 
 
In his discussion, Vincent remarks on the coexistence of a heteronormative narrative for 
the new Westernisation/modernisation and a homoerotic narrative for the dismissed past 
in Japanese modern literature. 
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 What is interesting in Vincent’s argument, which is inspired by Sedgwick’s 
homosocial theory, is his suggestion that modern Japanese sexual notions are not 
equivalent to Western ones, even though they are regarded as original; not only male 
homosexuality but also heterosexism had been altered through the Japanese adaptation of 
Western ideas of sexuality, fused in the modernisation with cultural tradition and memory. 
In the arguments of Foucault and Sedgwick, the emergence of power-sexuality is regarded 
as a peculiar feature of Western modernity. By contrast, in Vincent’s discourse, 
interculturality and twisted temporality through sexuality are regarded as characteristic 
aspects of Japanese modernisation.  
In Vincent’s theory, however, even though he tries to resist essentialism and 
American-Eurocentrism, the difference between Western and Japanese sexuality is still 
well defined, analogously to hetero/homosexuality: Western sexuality is symbolised as 
‘heteronormative’ and having a ‘straight future’, while Japanese traditional sexuality is 
symbolised as ‘homoerotic’ and ‘dragging past’. Thus, although he emphasises the 
interculturality of sexuality in early modern Japan, he presupposes a clear distinction 
between modern heteronormativity and pre-modern homoeroticism: as Western culture is 
clearly different from that of Japan, heteronormative modernity is different from the 
homoerotic feudal past. In this dualism, Vincent preserves the clear distinction between 
hetero/homosexuality. Rather than through psychological terms, the distinction between 
hetero/homosexuality is achieved and reiterated through cultural and temporal themes: 
through the differences between the West/Japan and future/past. In this sense, Vincent’s 
discourse is still akin to those of Foucault and Sedgwick. The theoretical narratives of 
Queer Studies are geographically marked and direct the gaze towards other cultures and 
politics, including those outside the West.    
In the next section, I will explore how representations of same-sex sexual relations 
and desire are even more complicated and contradictory in pre-war Japan than Vincent 
tried to theorise. Then, I will point out that such confusing representations of sexuality 
stimulate types of political perception: the sense of historicity, images of national identity, 
or the sense of cultural differences between the West and Japan. 
 
4. Historical Representations of Same-Sex Sexuality in Pre-war Japan 
 
4-1. ‘Homosexuality’ as a New Future 
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If we follow Sedgwick’s argument in Epistemology of the Closet, rather than that of 
Between Men, noting the crisis of homo/heterosexual definition in modern Western 
culture, Vincent’s argument will appear more complicated. In the ‘two-timing narrative’ 
argument, Vincent characterises the discussion of homo/heterosexual definition as 
moving between medical and cultural discourses. Introducing an article titled ‘The 
Historical View of Homosexuality’, published in the popular opinion magazine Chuo 
koron in 1935 by Yasuda Tokutaro, a psychiatrist and leftist cultural critic, Vincent notes 
that there was an ambivalent view on homosexuality, which adopts the Western medical 
principle of marginalising and pathologising male-male sexuality, while honouring 
Japan’s traditional cultural values of male-male love as a ‘grand history of homosexuality 
the likes of which one would be hard-pressed to find anywhere in the world’ (ibid., p. 32). 
Vincent described Yasuda’s argument, which utilises both the Japanese native 
terminology nanshoku and the sexological term doseiai (equivalent to homosexuality in 
English) for male same-sex sexual conduct, as a ‘good example of the way that native 
Japanese terms could be strategically combined with newer sexological ones as new 
sexual identities and histories were being negotiated’ (ibid., p. 32). When Yasuda 
mentions Japanese historical heroes, great warlords in the sixteenth century who each had 
a ‘favourite boy’, he differentiates their customs from medical categories of sexology. 
Vincent observes: 
 
He mentions, for example, that each of the great warlords who unified Japan in 
the sixteenth century – Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa 
Ieyasu – had a ‘favourite boy’. Did this mean that these ‘heroes’ were ‘sufferers 
of sexual perversion [hentai seiyoku no byonin]’ he asks, using the language of 
sexology? Not at all, he responds, in the language of premodern Japan: ‘They were 
lovers of boys [nanshoku-ka] as well as women [nyoshoku-ka], masters of the 
twain path [of love] [nido no tatsujin]’. (ibid., p. 32) 
  
When Yasuda distinguishes between nanshoku, Japanese traditional same-sex sexual 
conduct, and the sexual perversion of modern sexology, he notes not only the Japanese 
cultural and historical contexts but also the differences between two major explanations 
of homo/heterosexual identity: the universalising model and the minoritising model that 
Sedgwick developed in Epistemology of the Closet. Yasuda employs a universalising 
explanation, celebrating bisexual activities or ‘masters of the twain path of love’, for 
same-sex sexual conduct by historical warlords in Japan, while using the minoritising 
model of sexology to identify sexual perversity. In this discourse, same-sex sexual 
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conduct, which can represent Japanese national tradition, is explicitly differentiated from 
the model of perversion found in Western science. 
In discussions of homo/heterosexual definition, Vincent interprets the coexistence 
of the universalising model, representing the Japanese premodern past, and the 
minoritising model, representing new Western heteronormativity, as marking the 
emergence of two-timing homosocial narratives that reflect the ideas of temporality and 
national identity. 
	
In Japanese two-timing homosocial narratives, love between men is not so much 
repressed as it is contained within the past as an always early chapter in a tale of 
its own obsolescence through maturation and modernisation. In these narratives, 
moreover, the personal and national pasts tend to be superimposed upon each other 
such that the achievement of heterosexual ‘normality’ on the part of the 
protagonist doubles as a kind of modernising national allegory. In most cases, 
however, far from unsettling or threatening the normative future of the individual 
or the nation with a ‘return of the repressed’ or a revelatory ‘coming out’, the 
homosexual past could be made to function much as ‘tradition’ does in relation to 
modernity: as an inert and unthreatening heritage ready for preservation in the 
museum of progress. (Vincent 2012, pp. 34-35) 
 
In Vincent’s discussion emphasising sexuality, it is made clear that male homosexuality 
represents the past in the form of the heroic warlords of Japanese pre-modernity, while 
new heteronormativity represents the present in the form of Westernised modernity, 
although they coexisted at the beginning of Japanese modernisation. 
 However, the article ‘The Historical View of Homosexuality’, which Vincent 
refers to for his theory of the two-timing modernity of male same-sex love, was originally 
written in response to a scandal about a lesbian affair called ‘danso no reijin jiken (an 
affair of male-dressing lady)’: a new social phenomenon found in modern cities. In this 
case, a rich young woman, who wore male clothes and had short hair, eloped with a movie 
actress, using her parents’ money; then, after the police found the couple, they tried to 
commit suicide in a hotel room. Since Yasuda describes the ‘male-dressing lady’ as 
handsome and modern (Yasuda 1935, p. 146), he interprets the affair as a new social 
phenomenon of modern civilisation. Comparing the ‘male-dressing lady’ with the French 
writer George Sand, Yasuda writes ‘I’m impressed that Japan has become one of the first-
rate countries in the world in this field’ (ibid., p. 147). By contrast with Vincent’s 
argument, which emphasises male homosexuality as ‘premodern’ and ‘past’, Yasuda 
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treats female homosexuality and cross-dressing of both sexes as new, modern social 
phenomena representing a new civilisation. He writes: 
 
Japanese history had had two civilisations. The first one is a matriarchal society 
which is a female-centred civilisation, and the second one is a male-centred 
civilisation after it was overthrown. Now we are going to develop a new third 
civilisation. It is neither female-authoritarian nor male-authoritarian. It is 
obviously a new civilisation which should be built by cooperation between men 
and women. Today is a black transitional period to the third one and at the same 
time, it is a rapidly declining period of the old civilisation. I saw today’s female 
homosexuality as the phenomenon referring to this transition. Of course, it has 
positive and negative sides. The problem whether perverse women play a 
progressive role or a degenerating role depends on whether their homosexuality 
contributes to building the new civilisation or to the fall of civilisation. (ibid., p. 
152) 
 
In this passage, Yasuda regards female homosexuality, which is rarely found among 
Japanese historical figures, as representing the future of a gender-equal society which has 
not yet been achieved in history. Thus, in his view, same-sex love, or ‘sexual perversity’, 
is not necessarily the conduct of the past, or something that society must repress or 
overcome. It represents a certain social order: male same-sex love represents the old male-
authoritarian past, whereas female same-sex love, with its cross-dressing and gender 
fluidity, represents the new society of gender-equality that is to arise in the future. 
 As Vincent points out, same-sex love can indicate Japanese national and 
cultural identity, in contrast to Western modernity and its historical temporality. However, 
discourses on homo/heterosexuality in modern Japanese society are more complicated 
than Vincent’s argument. Firstly, the definition of homo/heterosexuality is unstable, if not 
confused, even within the same essay about homosexuality; occasionally, cultural and 
historical difference is utilised to justify same-sex conduct in history, whilst modern 
sexology’s idea of sexual perversion is maintained. In Sedgwick’s terms, minoritising and 
universalising views are equally applied according to cases. Secondly, homosexuality is 
differentiated between men and women. Male homosexuality can connect with the past 
whereas female homosexuality cannot, so that, when faced with social exclusion, male 
homosexuality negotiates with the society through Japanese history, but female 
homosexuality sometimes provides inspiration for utopian views5. Thus, when the same-
                                                
5 Akaeda (2011) regards female intimacy in early modern Japan, including erotic 
relations which could be labelled ‘homosexual’ today, as the practice of ‘romantic love’ 
which is considered the ideal relationship in modern society. Akaeda defines ‘romantic 
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sex relationship recalls the national past, it is understood through nationalisation; however, 
when a same-sex relationship that is rarely found in history is considered, it is seen in 
reference to the West and/or to a radical future, with Yasuda trying to identify the ‘male-
dressing lady’ with the French writer George Sand and symbolising her as the future.	
 
4-2. Samurai and their Nanshoku: a New Gender Norm and Old Sexual Activity 
 
Through achieving modernisation, the legacy of the samurai has come to be regarded as 
a model of masculinity for the Japanese, differentiating them from other Asians and the 
West. Morris Low (2003) points out that representations of masculinity and the nation 
have been regarded as important in the development of modernity in Japan for their 
construction of the Japanese national image. According to Low, representations of the 
Japanese masculine body – mainly expressed through images of the Emperor and 
Japanese soldiers – were influenced by the West, and differentiated from other Asian 
bodies at the beginning of modernisation. 
 
Notions of God-given whiteness and brightness linked the body of the Emperor 
to the lives and bodies of Japanese soldiers. In the late nineteenth century, the 
Japanese embarked on a programme of Westernisation that can be interpreted 
as the Caucasianisation of the Japanese and the appropriation of Western ideas 
of masculinity (Russell 1996)… Images of the Emperor in Western-style 
military uniform were also used to promote progress and national cohesion. The 
notion of proximity to the Emperor’s body, and the idea that Japanese soldiers 
were his sons, facilitated the disciplining of soldiers’ bodies and the regulation 
of their lives. (Low 2003, p. 82) 
 
With Westernisation, the Japanese were becoming more ‘white’. Woodblock 
prints depicting the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) show the Chinese in a 
cowardly light, with protruding cheekbones, mouths agape and effeminate 
pigtails. In contrast, the Japanese are portrayed more nobly, with European 
facial features, smart haircuts and military-style moustaches. (ibid., p. 83) 
 
                                                
love’ in the early modern Japanese context as a relationship or intimacy based only on 
affection towards the other without any enforcement (ibid., p. 33); thus, it includes 
mutual respect and female agency. Through reading intimacy among women as 
‘romantic love’, Akaeda reinterprets the intimacy among women in early modern Japan 
as the particular relationship that liberates women as modern individuals, free from 
domination, and insists that only women could achieve such relationships: ‘It seems that 
romantic love was possible only between women in modern society, and the form of 
intimacy has changed into another form’ (ibid., p. 215).  
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After Japan had grown into a modern and developed state that Western countries 
recognised, especially after the victory of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5), the Japanese 
warrior class, the samurai, were re-evaluated as symbols of the glorified past and as a new 
ideal of Japanese masculinity. Through reappropriation of the samurai image as the new 
Japanese masculinity, Japanese soldiers came to be routinely portrayed as ‘modern-day 
samurai’ (ibid., p. 84), and Bushido, the way of the samurai, was utilised as one of the 
ideologies for the construction of masculinity. 
 In the reinvention of the samurai as the new masculine model for Japanese 
soldiers, their sexuality, nanshoku, became a difficult aspect of the samurai to fit into 
modern gender norms. Here, I will compare two representations of samurai as the 
Japanese masculine model in around 1900. 
Jim Reichert focuses on the representations of nanshoku in the works of Koda 
Rohan, one of the greatest neoclassical writers, whose works try to re-evaluate the 
Japanese past and preserve Japan’s cultural heritage, as opposed to the rapid 
Westernisation promoted by reformists at the beginning of modernisation. According to 
Reichert, in the historical novel Hige otoko (The Bearded Man), published in 1896, Rohan 
succeeded in establishing the Japanese masculine model though a tale of medieval 
warriors. Reichert points out how the samurai’s homoeroticism functions in the story to 
mark both the past and modern patriotism: 
 
Building upon developments from the late 1880s, when a group of powerful 
ideologues mounted a campaign to discredit militant anti-government 
activists by promoting a new, more conciliatory construction of masculinity 
known as the seinen (young man), Rohan’s novel projected these modern 
seinen values back onto his portrait of a medieval warrior. Central to this 
undertaking was a complex set of negotiations with the legacy of samurai 
nanshoku. On the one hand, the text endeavoured to disengage its proto-
modern warrior hero from any overt association with his uncivilised practice. 
On the other hand, the text subtly exploited the aesthetic and erotic elements 
of male love to present the issues of samurai honour and devotion as timeless 
emotive responses that transcend the historical and political specificity of the 
late medieval epoch. In this manner, Hige otoko subtly re-presented the 
medieval warrior code of honour as a precedent for modern iterations of 
patriotic fervour directed toward the Meiji Imperial state. (Reichert 2006, p. 
230) 
 
While the representation of physical same-sex sexual activities signifies different lives in 
the past, an abstract translation of homoeroticism into emotional intimacy and a bond 
between men can be synchronised with patriotism, and especially with Japanese 
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militarism, which demands loyalty to the Emperor and a strong bond among soldiers. 
Reichert writes: 
 
Through its opportunistic treatment of nanshoku, which involves a 
simultaneous process of relentless invocation and silent disavowal, Hige 
otoko thus illustrates the kind of representational sleight of hand that allowed 
neoclassical texts to reformulate the past to support the ideological demands 
of the mid-Meiji present. (ibid., p. 161) 
 
After the Meiji period (1868-1912), however, nanshoku was still remembered as a habit 
of the past, but was rarely regarded as a model of masculinity for the general population. 
 
Even after the Meiji period, nanshoku continued to resonate powerfully with 
certain segments of the Japanese population as a symbol of the past and as an 
alternative model for interpreting male-male sexuality… But its pre-eminence 
in the popular imagination of the general population waned dramatically post 
Meiji. (ibid., p. 231) 
 
As Vincent notes in Two-timing Modernity, the nanshoku of the samurai-class marks the 
past in Japan, while the samurai have become the new model for Japanese militant 
masculinity. 
 In 1900, when Japan had dramatically enlarged its presence in international 
relations, Nitobe Inazo published Bushido: The Soul of Japan (A Way of Samurai) in the 
English language. Nitobe intended to explain Japanese moral codes to Western readers 
on the basis of his own experiences. As Nitobe was educated in a Christian-influenced 
school in Japan and became a Quaker while studying at Johns Hopkins University during 
the years 1884-7, Bushido was heavily influenced by his Christian ethical beliefs and his 
knowledge of Western manners, as if it were ‘a mildly exoticised version of the British 
public school ethos’ (Morris-Suzuki 1995, p. 765). In Morris Low’s description, ‘Despite 
being about traditional Japanese ethics and morality, the book is informed by his 
knowledge of Western ethics and literature’ (Low 2003, p. 84). Nitobe presents Bushido 
as an unwritten moral code deeply rooted in Japanese people’s consciousness, so that it 
is still alive following the Japanese Westernisation: ‘An unconscious and irresistible 
power, Bushido has been moving the nation and individual… Unformulated, Bushido 
was and still is the animating spirit, the motor force of our country’ (Nitobe 1905, p. 171). 
Even though the samurai were a privileged warrior class, a small part of the population 
in the federal period, Nitobe presents Bushido, the way of the samurai, as a moral 
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principle for all Japanese individuals and the nation. In his reinterpretation of Bushido, 
self-control, ‘a national trait of apparent stoicism’ (ibid., p. 103), is emphasised as one of 
the samurai’s virtues, along with loyalty, politeness and so on:  
 
It was considered unmanly for a samurai to betray his emotions on his face… 
The most natural affections were kept under control. A father could embrace 
his son only at the expense of his dignity; a husband would not kiss his wife, 
– no, not in the presence of other people, whatever he might do in private! 
(ibid., p. 104)	
 
Nitobe’s Bushido, which was translated into Japanese in 1908, was not only ‘an invented 
tradition’ (Benesch 2004) but had also become a new model of masculinity, especially for 
soldiers in the Japanese imperialism, which was set against Western imperialism (Karlin 
2002). 
 What is distinctive about the change in the samurai image through Japanese 
modernisation is the altered view of their sexuality and the emergence of a new Japanese 
masculine identity. At the beginning of modernisation, the samurai were an object of 
denial of the past through Westernisation. Their nanshoku was remembered as an aspect 
of their ‘uncivilised’ habits. Nonetheless, its eroticism can be attractive to some people 
and can offer an alternative Japanese masculine model, distinct from the Westernised one 
(Maekawa 2011, Ch. 1). When Japan achieved sufficient modernisation, however, the 
image of the samurai became not an alternative model but, rather, the masculine model 
for all men, and for the Japanese in general. With the new ‘invention’ of the samurai, their 
nanshoku was rarely mentioned among their characteristics and the samurai has come to 
be regarded as a polite, loyal and stoical man. Now, nanshoku can represent the past, but 
rarely the samurai’s respectful masculinity. Analysing discourses on state-regulated 
prostitution, Hayashi Yoko (2009) noted that stoicism had been regarded as a symbol of 
‘civilisation’ and masculinity, especially after the Russo-Japanese war, which made Japan 
a new presence in the world, and controlling sexual desire was described through the 
metaphor of fighting a war. For a country respected in the world, ‘“fidelity of men” is the 
symbol of “patriotism” in the new era’ (Hayashi 2009, p. 107). As in Nitobe’s example of 
self-control, the Japanese men who exemplify Bushido are characterised by stoicism and 
heteronormative behaviour, such as the proper attitude in front of their wives and sons, 
rather than by the homoerotic bond portrayed in Hige otoko. Thus, even though the 
samurai has a historical legacy of same-sex sexual conduct, the samurai’s homoeroticism 
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was buried in the past and ‘samurai’, as the new masculine model associated with 
nationalism in modernised Japan, was transformed into the male model that can fit with 
modern heteronormativity. 
 
4-3. Ero-guro-nansensu: Representations of Gender and Homosexuality in a Modernised 
City in the 1930s 
 
While the samurai had provided a new masculine model in modern Japan and their same-
sex sexuality, nanshoku, was turned into a sign of the past, a new representation of modern 
homosexuals appeared. Gregory Pflugfelder pointed out that, due to the influence of 
sexology in the early twentieth century, same-sex desire had become represented as 
‘perversion’. Recalling Foucauldian power’s repressive/productive dynamism, 
Pflugfelder argued that the emergence of ‘perversions’ opened up new kinds of 
representations of sexuality, not only in medico-science discourses, but also in popular 
culture:  
 
[T]he pleasure of ‘perversion’ revolved equally around such acts as knowing, 
speaking, and seeing. The sexologist, for example, derived pleasure from his 
(and very rarely her) ability to categorise the different varieties of sexual 
behaviour according to an authoritative conceptual scheme, thus demonstrating 
his superior knowledge. Likewise for the popular writer, the license that the 
sexological idiom gave to speak of ‘perversion’ in a public forum sanctioned 
new forms of narrative pleasure, as well as new commercial opportunities. 
(Pflugfelder 2007, p. 289) 
 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the new cultural phenomenon called ero-guro-nansensu, 
celebrating the pleasure of the moment,	arose between two disastrous events in Japan, 
the Great Kanto earthquake (1923) and the Second Sino-Japanese war (1937) (Kuroiwa 
2013). Pflugfelder explains: 
 
Each of the three elements implied a perversion, as it were, of conventional value. 
The celebration of the ‘erotic’ (ero) in its myriad forms constituted a rejection of 
the Meiji dictum that sexuality was unsuited for public display or representation 
unless it conformed to the narrow standards of ‘civilised morality’. The elevation 
of the ‘grotesque’ (guro) betrayed a similar disregard for prevailing aesthetic 
codes, with their focus on traditional canons of beauty and concealment of the 
seamier sides of existence. Finally, the valorisation of the ‘nonsense’ (nansensu) 
signalled a discontent with the constraining nature of received moral and 
epistemological certitudes. (ibid., p. 32) 
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As Pflugfelder characterises ero-guro-nansensu as a counter-cultural movement against 
the Meiji government’s regulation of people’s sexuality and morals, Miriam R. Silverberg 
(2006) also regards it as ‘an intense expression of cultural phenomena with profound 
political implications’ (p. 5). 
 Kuroiwa Yuichi (2013) discusses the representation of ‘sexual perverts’, 
especially of male homosexuals in ero-guro-nansensu, focusing on the ‘grotesque’. 
Kuroiwa argues that the artists of ero-guro-nansensu were fascinated by male 
homosexuals, seen as the ‘erotic’ and ‘grotesque’ in modern cities, and represented them 
as a ‘species’, similar to the new forms of discourse on sexuality found in medical science 
in the late nineteenth century, as noted by Foucault (Foucault 1976, p. 43). The 
representation of male homosexuals as a species is often characterised by the sexual space 
set aside for them, such as brothels and the night park for cruising, and their appearance 
is caricatured by their sexual gaze towards men, symbolising their sexual desire as 
differentiated from the ‘normal’. Analysing the description of homosexual men’s gaze in 
several novels, Kuroiwa notes that individualisation of homosexuals stimulates curiosity 
about homosexuals as unusual ‘grotesque’ beings but that, at the same time, the 
distinction between the ‘normal’ and the homosexual can be undermined by crossing 
gazes: the curious gaze towards homosexuals and the homosexuals’ sexual gaze towards 
the narrator as their sexual object. He suggests that the double movement of ero-guro-
nansensu, which individualises the abnormal and undermines the rigid distinction, has 
political potential in the representation of the ‘grotesque’ (ibid., p. 152). 
 Pflugfelder also points out that the male same-sex sexuality in ero-guro-
nansensu represents the ‘grotesque’ urban environment. Through analysing various 
novels published between the 1920s and the 1930s, Pflugfelder (2007) illustrates three 
distinctive features of discourses on male same-sex sexuality. Firstly, ‘same-sex love’ was 
linked with a ‘grotesque’ urban environment at a time when cities such as Tokyo and 
Osaka were rapidly growing in Japan and new subcultures of male-male eroticism were 
emerging in the large cities. Secondly, prostitutes were frequently portrayed as the central 
actors in this subculture, embodying an ‘inverted’ trope of male-male sexual behaviour. 
Male prostitutes for men are often represented as having an insertee role in sexual 
intercourse, with their feminine gender identity (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 322). Thirdly, same-
sex love is represented conceptually in a close relationship with criminality and mystery 
(ibid., pp. 310-315). Pflugfelder suggests that these representations of male same-sex 
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sexuality reflect the social changes stemming from Japanese modernisation, or 
Westernisation. Firstly, the male-male erotic subculture, especially that of male 
prostitutes for men, marks the change in social morality on sexuality due to 
Westernisation, as well as the social diversity that had been made possible by urbanisation. 
 
While the ‘new kagema’ and his world stood at the very heart of ‘civilised’ 
society, they contravened many of that society’s norms, and were constrained to 
resort to various strategies of self-concealment in order to survive in less than 
friendly surroundings. (ibid., p. 320) 
 
While homosexual cultures in urban areas signify mysterious secrecy akin to criminality, 
they also represent a by-product of Westernisation, ‘the “shadow” of a mature capitalist 
society’ (ibid., p. 320). Secondly, the medical discourses had affected popular discourses 
and provided new words for explaining same-sex desire, especially when taking the 
discursive form of individualisation and the gender inversion model. Pflugfelder notes 
the emergence of a new term for homosexual men in popular culture in the 1920s and 
1930s. 
 
By the 1920s and 1930s, however, the term okama had typically come to signify 
a distinct type of individual: a male who enjoyed ‘passive’ sexual intercourse 
with men, who exhibited feminine gender traits, and who often received money 
or some other form of remuneration for his sexual favours (as reflected in the 
cognate okamayasan, literally meaning ‘pot seller’). It was as if a particular 
orifice and its penetrative possibilities had come to define the individual’s entire 
being. The okama, in other words, was a popular counterpart of the ‘passive’ 
and ‘effeminate’ male dôseiaisha [the homosexuals], so that one 1927 source 
gives the word as a colloquial equivalent for the sexological term ‘urning’. (ibid., 
p. 323) 
 
In the 1920s and 1930s, male homosexuals were individualised and regarded as a by-
product of Westernisation in modern cities through the representations of ero-guro-
nansensu. 
 In these images of ero-guro-nansensu, male same-sex sexuality does not signify 
Japanese tradition or masculinity but, instead, Westernisation/modernity and male gender 
ambiguity, a ‘shadow of modernity’.  
 
5. History of Othering: National Identity, Temporality, Gender and Sexuality 
 
5-1. The National Ideal and Representations of Homosexuality 
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Keith Vincent (2012) applies Sedgwick’s reading to Japanese early modern literature to 
focus on its homosocial narrative, in order to figure out the rupture of heteronormativity 
constructed by Westernisation. In his argument, homoeroticism undermines the project of 
modernisation of the Western model as Japan becomes a heteronormative and mature 
nation. Homosocial narrative indicates the ‘failure’ of modernisation and its 
heteronormativity within the Japanese modern canon, recalling the homoerotic 
premodern past. However, as reviewed above, representations of same-sex sexuality in 
pre-war Japan are varied, even contradicting each other, rather than consistent, as seen in 
Vincent’s formulation of Japanese homoerotic premodern past versus Western 
heteronormative modern future. 
 Representations of same-sex sexuality had changed along with the change in 
the Japanese national ideal. In pre-war Japan, same-sex sexuality is represented as 
something negative for present-day society, something that Japan has to overcome. For 
example, when Japan started to enter modernisation, same-sex sexual conduct was linked 
to the federal past that the government was eager to reform. Then, after a few decades 
had passed, same-sex sexual cultures came to be regarded as a ‘shadow’ of Westernisation, 
at a time when Japan needed to seek its national identity and the samurai become a model 
of Japanese masculinity, especially for soldiers. Representations of same-sex sexuality 
had functioned as an ideology with which to indicate national ideals through its negation.  
What is notable is that various contradictory representations of same-sex sexuality 
had already emerged by the 1930s. In her ground-breaking book Epistemology of the 
Closet, Eve K. Sedgwick argued that contradictory definitions of homosexuality had 
contributed to the power of knowledge, or more exactly, to the power of ignorance. 
Following Michel Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge, Sedgwick regards ignorance 
as a part of knowledge and analyses how ignorance and secrecy work against 
homosexuals as a means of oppression in Western modernity. 
 
This possibility, however, was repressed with increasing energy, and hence 
increasing visibility, as the nineteenth-century culture of the individual 
proceeded to elaborate a version of knowledge/sexuality increasingly 
structured by its pointed cognitive refusal of sexuality between women, 
between men. The gradually reifying effect of this refusal meant that by the 
end of the nineteenth century, when it had become fully current – as obvious 
to Queen Victoria as to Freud – that knowledge meant sexual knowledge, and 
secrets sexual secrets, there had in fact developed one particular sexuality that 
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was distinctively constituted as secrecy: the perfect object for the by now 
insatiably exacerbated epistemological/sexual anxiety of the turn-of-the-
century subject. (Sedgwick 1990, p. 73) 
 
While secrecy about homosexuality inflames people’s anxiety and fear in regard to 
sexuality, it also undermines the political strength of gay people’s speech and experiences. 
Comparing Esther’s Jewish identity and political activity with those of gays, Sedgwick 
points out how a secret, or the refusal of sexuality, de-authorises the influence of gay 
people’s speech and identity in society. For example, although, in Esther, Esther’s self-
disclosure of Jewish identity is recognised without question and constitutes her as a 
political subject, Sedgwick notes that gay identity can be easily questioned or exposed by 
others without constituting it as a political subject in homophobic society. Then, 
reviewing various definitions of homosexuality, Sedgwick clarifies them into categories 
of minoritising/universalising models and gender/sexuality, and reveals how the modern 
definitions of homosexuality were built up as an incoherent dispensation, as if they had 
been constructed to form a double bind of gender oppression and heterosexist oppression. 
 In pre-war Japan’s case, definitions or representations of hetero/homosexuals 
are constructed not only with the binaries of minoritising/universalising models and 
gender/sexuality but also with the binaries of national identities – Japan/the West – and 
temporalities – the past/future, which have all been central political topics in modernity. 
Through more complicated definitions and representations of hetero/homosexuality than 
Sedgwick argued for in the context of modern Western cultures, discourses on 
homosexuality have contributed to Japanese national identity and political ideals, as well 
as to the construction of normative sexuality. In the following sections, I will argue how 
discourses of hetero/homosexuality have politically functioned in pre-war and post-war 
Japan. 
 
5-2. Definitions of Homo/Heterosexuality, National Identity and Temporality  
 
Following Sedgwick’s terms describing the definitions of hetero/homosexuality as 
minoritising vs universalising models, the Japanese discursive formation of sexuality is 
quite similar to the Western one discussed by Sedgwick: that is, as similarly constituting 
an incoherent dispensation. As I discussed above, the same-sex conduct, nanshoku, of the 
samurai is regarded as having been a custom in the past, not as an expression of individual 
sexual preferences; thus, it is categorised as a universalising model. On the other hand, 
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after modern compulsory heterosexism becomes rooted in Japanese society, the 
homosexual referred to by ero-guro-nansensu is often portrayed as an individualised 
figure, who is essentially different from others: therefore, representing a separatist and 
minoritising model. From the standpoint of gender, the nanshoku of the samurai is a 
symbol of their culture of gender segregation, while gender representations of 
homosexual men in ero-guro-nansensu, and the ‘male-dressing lady’ in Yasuda’s 
arguments, rely on an inversion model, depicting a transition towards the opposite gender. 
 
 Separatist: Integrative: 
Sexual 
Representation 
of Same-Sex 
Conducts: 
Homosexuality in ero-guro-
nansensu (‘Essentialist’, or 
Minoritising model) 
Nanshoku of samurai (Bisexual 
Potential, Constructionist or 
Universalising model) 
Gender 
Representation: 
Nanshoku of samurai 
(Gender segregation) 
Homosexuality in ero-guro-
nansensu, The ‘male-dressing lady’	
(Inversion model) 
Figure 1. Models of Gay/Straight Definition Based on Sedgwick’s Mapping, Focusing on 
Overlapping Sexuality and Gender 
 
 When these representations of homosexuality are re-categorised through 
binaries between Japan and the West, based on whether behaviour is normative or non-
normative, and between the past and the future, the incoherent dispensation of discourses 
becomes more complicated. The samurai’s nanshoku is regarded as Japanese traditional 
conduct (the past) while heteronormativity is regarded as the result of modernisation, a 
consequence of Westernisation (the present). On the other hand, in the gender-accented 
representations, the gender-inverted images of homosexuals are regarded as the product 
of modernisation and are even sometimes interpreted as a symptom of the coming-future 
(the future), whereas the masculine representation of the samurai who is sexually self-
controlled, therefore corresponding to modern heteronormativity, is regarded as a model 
of Japanese masculinity that has endured from the past up to the present.   
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 Normative: Non-Normative: 
Sexual 
Representations: 
Heteronormativity (the 
Western modernity) 
Nanshoku of samurai (the Japanese 
tradition) 
Gender 
Representations: 
Samurai masculinity (the 
Japanese tradition) 
Homosexuality in ero-guro-
nansensu, the ‘male-dressing lady’ 
(the Western modernity) 
Figure 2. Models of Gender and Sexuality Representations Based on Normative/Non-
Normative and Japan/the West in Pre-war Japan. 
 
In the mapping of Figure 1, definitions of hetero/homosexuality in pre-war Japan cross 
separatist and integrative models of sexual and gender definitions, as Sedgwick pointed 
out, in the context of modern discourses. Furthermore, what is noteworthy in 
representations of normative/non-normative figures, closely related to those of 
homo/heterosexuality, is that those representations also constitute asymmetrical 
dispositions of cultural identities; whilst Western heteronormativity consists of norms of 
sexual conduct contrasted with male homoeroticism of the samurai class in premodern 
Japan, a new representation of Japanese masculinity of the samurai, an invented tradition, 
is considered the ideal for Japanese men, whereas a gender inversion of homosexuals is 
regarded as ‘grotesque’ and a ‘shadow’ of Western modernisation. These incoherent 
representations of cultural identities based on gender and sexuality have generated a sense 
of national temporality as well. On the one hand, the male homoeroticism of the samurai, 
as Keith Vincent (2011) argues, marks the past as contrasted with the present, that is, the 
new age of Western modernity. On the other hand, gender representations of homosexuals 
that emphasise gender fluidity indicate a sense of the future, collapsing the contemporary 
norms and the coming, new, hitherto unseen society, described as ‘a new civilisation’ 
(Yasuda 1935, p. 157)6.  
 In Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick insists that the crisis of 
homo/heterosexual definition is the peculiar feature of Western modernity and the source 
of its homophobic social mechanism. According to her, incoherent discourses of 
                                                
6 A close relationship between futurity and ‘queerness’ is not only a characteristic 
discourse in Japan, although Lee Edelman (2004) asserts that futurity is a 
heteronormative ideology associated with reproduction. For example, Judith Butler’s 
argument about the political subversion by gender performativity for political 
transformation, in Gender Trouble (1990), can be interpreted as futurism through 
queerness and, notably, José Esteban Muñoz (2009) explores ideas of utopian queer 
futurism.  
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homo/heterosexual definition, the double bind of minoritising and universalising models, 
have contributed to the modern Western identity and social organisation and enabled 
homophobic violence against gay people in the course of fuelling anxiety over sexuality. 
In the case of Japan, the crisis of homo/heterosexual definition is forged not only through 
the confusing coexistence of minoritising and universalising models, but also through the 
contradictory questions of national identity as between Japan and Westernisation, and of 
historical perceptions as between the past and the future7. The result is the construction 
of the peculiar discursive formation in Japan, which is influential even now: discourses 
of gender and sexuality arouse political problems of national identity, especially between 
Japan and the West, and vice versa. Therefore, inevitably, discussions of nationalism in 
Japan must involve perspectives of gender and sexuality, which have often been ignored 
in previous studies, while studies of gender and sexuality in Japan also need perspectives 
of race, ethnicity and nationalism as essential elements.  
 
5-3. Contradictory Politics: Theorising Repression against Gender and Sexual Minorities 
and Sexual Politics in Japan  
 
The question of discourses of hetero/homosexual distinction, or of tolerant/intolerant 
attitudes towards homosexuality, in Japan has provided one of the critical arguments in 
                                                
7 The complex formations of temporality and contradictory relationships between the 
national and the West are not only the characteristics of Japanese sexual politics. 
Exploring the situation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Joanna Mizielińska and 
Robert Kulpa (2011) discuss that temporalities of sexual politics appear ‘queer’, the 
mixture of the past and the present all at once, compared to ‘straight’ Western time from 
the past to the future: ‘[T]hese “homophile-like” claims of acceptance and assimilation 
may be attempted by “jumping into the 1970s” and using some contestation strategies 
predominant at the time in America (and a handful of other countries). At the same time, 
other groups in CEE label themselves “queer” and draw directly on 1990s Queer Nation 
events such as “kiss-in” in public spaces. Therefore, the beginning of the 1990s for 
LGBT activists in CEE is truly a “queer time”: a time of mismatched models and 
realities, strategies and possibilities, understandings and uses, “all at once”. It is the time 
when “real” and “fake”, “the original” and “the copy” collapse into “the same”/“the 
one”; and yet, nothing is the same, nothing is straight any more’ (p. 16). In a different 
paper, Kulpa also points out lesbian and gay communities in Central and Eastern Europe 
embrace the national for one of the methods of their struggles, winning back the 
patriotism from homophobic and xenophobic nationalists (Kulpa 2011). Although there 
are different political, cultural and historical contexts of sexual politics between Japan 
and Central and Eastern Europe, sexual minorities’ activisms and discourses in both 
regions appear complicated and sometimes confusing when they need to negotiate with 
both Western centric views of ‘queer activism’ and domestic situations. 
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Japanese Sexuality Studies, as it characterises Japanese modernity, which has supposedly 
developed differently from that of Western society. As we have seen above, scholars in 
the field of Japanese Sexuality Studies have tried to establish a narrative of Japanese 
modernity that is strong enough to explain the discourses of sexuality, as well as those of 
Japanese/Western culture. Furukawa Makoto (1994) influentially provided the historical 
narrative that emphasises the discursive discontinuity between premodern and modern 
Japan. On the other hand, Keith Vincent (2012) and Suganuma Katsuhiko (2012) sought 
alternative narratives of history that stressed the interculturality of sexuality and the local 
identity of Japan through a modernisation that cannot be merely reduced to 
‘Westernisation’. No matter whether the narrative emphasises the discursive discontinuity 
or the interculturality of Japanese modernity, these scholars tried to establish a strong, 
complex narrative, which well explains Japanese historical and social transformations of 
gender and sexuality in modernity.  
However, as Sedgwick inspiringly shows, the impasse in homo/heterosexual 
definition lies neither in the problem of rationality nor in the lack of elegant theories of 
sexuality, but in the political apparatus that violently represses gay people, effectively 
depriving them of political agency. Sedgwick relates: 
 
I have no optimism at all about the availability of a standpoint of thought from 
which either question could be intelligibly, never mind efficaciously, 
adjudicated, given that the same yoking of contradictions has presided over all 
the thought on the subject, and all its violent and pregnant modern history, that 
has gone to form our own thought. Instead, the more promising project would 
seem to be a study of the incoherent dispensation itself, the indisseveration 
girdle of incongruities under whose discomfiting span, for most of a century, 
have unfolded both the most generative and most murderous plots of our culture. 
(Sedgwick 1990, p. 90)	
 
Focusing on the functions of power movements through the contradiction – the actual 
violent effects on gay people – rather than on the impasse of discursive confusion itself, 
Sedgwick has influentially changed the view of the discourses of homo/heterosexuality 
and opened up the possibility of queer critiques.  
 In pre-war Japan, discourses about the definition of homo/heterosexuality, the 
double binding of minoritising and universalising models, and of Japanese and Western 
cultural representations, did not necessarily produce the violent consequences against 
homosexuals that Sedgwick noted in the context of modern Western societies. Instead of 
contributing to the endless production of homosexual subjects and the violent denial of 
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them, it functioned to regulate Japanese normative identity through political implications, 
with male same-sex sexuality indicating the negativity of the past or the dark side of 
modernisation. In effect, the negation of sexual and gender deviance helps to mobilise 
Japanese self-identity by separating it either from the past or from excessive 
Westernisation, according to historical and social contexts, although sometimes it 
stimulates the imagination concerning the unknown future, as we have seen in Yasuda 
Tokutaro’s discussion. Certainly, in each historical context, this has resulted in the 
exclusion of same-sex sexuality in Japanese society. However, the method of exclusion 
is not to produce homosexual subjects within the society and culture and then violently 
deny them, but to construct the ‘outside’ of the society, such as the past, the future, or the 
‘West’, and project same-sex sexuality onto the outside, and then to erase same-sex 
sexuality within the normativity of Japanese society or within the present. 
What is an additional but more interesting consequence is that this kind of 
exclusion has ironically created discursive spaces for homosexuals through projection. 
This certainly functions as exclusion in Japanese society but, even so, appears as ‘tolerant’ 
or ‘queer’ compared to Western society, by seeming to preserve ‘homosexuality’ in the 
past or the future, and often mentioning it. It is notable that the Japanese history of sexual 
politics, featuring the struggle between repression of gender and sexual minorities and 
the politics opposing that repression, is ‘twisted’ compared to the history of gender and 
sexuality in the West. In North American or Western European countries, the history of 
sexual politics, like other politics of class, race, sexism, and colonialism, and so on, is 
often described as the story of a struggle against repression, as Dennis Altman (1971) 
narrated in the context of the emergence of social minorities’ movements in the 1960s. 
Even after Foucault’s influential critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ (Foucault 1990), 
the idea of repression-liberation, which constitutes a political arena for struggles, has been 
a powerful political driver. On the other hand, ‘repression’ of gender and sexual minorities 
in Japan is achieved through projection towards the outside of present-day Japan, treating 
the minority people as ‘foreign’ or anachronistic/futuristic objects rather than directly 
rejecting them within the culture and society: repression through denial rather than 
through violence.  
Such a method of exclusion and preservation of same-sex sexuality is hardly 
contextualised as a political struggle, because the same phenomenon produces conflicting 
political interpretations. For example, people like blogger Jack (2006), who criticised gei-
ribu (derogatory slang for Japanese gay activism), regard Japan as a tolerant culture, for 
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it has male same-sex sexual traditions and lacks Western-style gay activism and violent 
attacks against gay people. In this view, the absence of gay activism similar to that in 
Western societies shows that Japan is tolerant of gay people, while the situation of women, 
including lesbians, in the society is ignored. On the other hand, Kazama Takashi, 
Kawaguchi Kazuya and Keith Vincent (1997) insisted that Japanese heteronormativity 
functions through denying the political agency of gay people. While admitting that the 
Japanese media often covers gay culture out of curiosity, and society allows private same-
sex sexual affairs without moral condemnation, they also emphasised that this does not 
mean that homophobia is absent in the society, but rather that homophobia is tactically 
hidden to sustain the Japanese heteronormative power structure (Kazama, Kawaguchi and 
Vincent 1997, pp. 109-112). Thus, they argued that the Fuchu seinen no ie trial in 1997, 
the first legal case in Japan in which the court recognised discrimination against 
homosexuals in public spaces, was a ground-breaking case as it revealed the existence of 
homophobia and the need for judicial protection of the human rights of homosexuals in 
Japanese society (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2010, pp. 70-71). For them, the denial of 
homophobia within Japanese society is proof of homophobia in Japan.  
This is one reason why arguments about situation for Japanese sexual minorities 
often fail and go around in circles. One of the most complicated aspects of Japanese 
sexual politics is that the same social facts produce opposing political discourses, both 
denying each other and co-existing in Japanese society. Such discursive production makes 
it impossible to construct a linear narrative of the history of sexual minorities in Japan, 
thus undermining the grounds of political speech by sexual minorities on their own behalf. 
In Sedgwick’s account, the discursive apparatus that generates contradictory discourses 
associated with the binary of Japan/the West is a source of power for 
knowledge/ignorance, nullifying the political subject of sexual minorities in Japan: to be 
precise, I term it the source of power of knowledge/forgetfulness against social minorities 
in Japan. Tactically, the power of knowledge/forgetfulness against sexual minorities 
works well. It functions not only by utilising the homoerotic past to deny discrimination 
against sexual minorities in contemporary society, but also by utilising new discourses to 
deny or forget the political issues of the past. Thus, the questions of whether Japan is a 
gay friendly country or not, or whether Japanese homosexual culture is influenced by the 
West, or whether Japanese traditions are rather repressive, are pursued not only because 
they can incorporate Japanese cultural nationalism, Orientalism, or Eurocentrism, but also 
because they sustain the discursive production that is part of the Japanese modern sexual 
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scheme that artfully excludes gender and sexual deviances. The argument based on such 
questions can reproduce Japan’s contradictory sexual politics, but can never critically 
reveal the structure of political phenomena and their historical contexts. Instead of asking 
such questions directly, I focus, rather, on how people problematise their gender, sexuality, 
desire and lives in the present. To be precise, I shall focus on political dynamism and the 
failures caused by those questions associated with Japan/the West, in particular analysing 
what defines political struggles in each social context, then how such struggles are later 
forgotten or denied.  
I posit three viewpoints from which to analyse the history of sexual politics in 
relation to male homosexuality in post-war Japan. Firstly, I will focus on the relationship 
between sexual politics and national and cultural identity in post-war Japan, discussing 
how sexual politics have involved Japanese national or cultural identity, or been culturally 
and politically influenced by the ‘West’ in praising or criticising Japanese society. As we 
have already seen from various discourses on sexual and gender normativity in pre-war 
Japanese society, the discourses had changed through the variation of relationships 
between gender and sexuality on the one hand, and Japanese national and cultural identity 
in social contexts on the other. Thus, when analysing discourses, I will accent the shifts 
of relationships between sexual politics and the national identity/the West. Secondly, I 
will consider the sense of historicity and temporality that enables us to contextualise the 
society between the past and future. In discussing the historicity and temporality of 
Japanese sexual politics, I will emphasise its discontinuity through the shifts of sexual 
politics and the relationship between sexual politics and the national identity/the West, to 
reveal the power of knowledge/forgetfulness in Japanese society, rather than trying to 
construct a grand narrative based on the linear temporality of history. Thirdly, to analyse 
sexual politics in Japan, I will note social contexts: how one tries to include race, 
nationality, health and economic issues in its sexual politics, while the other ignores them. 
Through these viewpoints, this study does not focus on ‘achievements’ of sexual politics 
in post-war Japan, but on the discursive conditions of political struggles: how the political 
struggles of sexual minorities were able to emerge in particular social contexts and how 
the people understood social injustice and exclusions, and expressed them in each 
context; then, how the political struggles would be depoliticised and later forgotten. Thus, 
the narrative of this study accentuates the discontinuity and heterogeneity of sexual 
politics in post-war Japan in order to clarify their political possibilities and limits in each 
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social context, rather than trying to construct a ‘big theory’ that can cover all sexual 
phenomena in Japan.  
 
6. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
In the first two chapters, I shall explore political relationships between 
masculinity/femininity and individual or national pride/shame in the sexual politics of 
male same-sex sexuality. Through modernisation, the dualism between Japan and ‘the 
West’ has affected the idea of Japanese ideal masculinity and their national pride. After 
the loss of Second World War, which denied pre-war Japan’s normative masculinity, 
shame has become a ‘national emotion’, which is considered as a moral principle in Japan, 
influenced by Ruth Benedict’s characterisation of Japanese culture as a ‘shame culture’ 
in her famous book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946). In the beginning, I will 
argue how the relationship between homoerotic masculinity and national pride has been 
constructed in post-war Japan. Then, I will focus on the political functions of shame 
associated with femininity, which have contributed to homosexual counterculture against 
heteronormativity. 
In Chapter 1, I will investigate the works of Mishima Yukio (1925-1970), who 
is one of the representative writers in post-war Japan, especially famous for his gay-
themed, homoerotic works and far-right political activism, including his attempted coup 
d’état. In literary studies, Mishima’s early works, for example Confession of Mask and 
Forbidden Colours, are often discussed when he is described as a ‘gay’ writer in Japan. 
In this chapter, however, I will rather focus on his later works, such as Patriotism and A 
Defence of Culture, which are regarded as the representative works in which Mishima 
expresses his far-right political thought. Through analysing Mishima’s works, I will 
examine how homoerotic desire intersects with national politics and Japanese masculinity, 
which he tried to construct as the alternative Japanese traditional view against the post-
war Japanese masculinity that focussed on economic activities. In Chapter 1, I will 
contextualise him as one of the most distinctive artists in post-war Japan, in terms of the 
history of sexual politics, in relation to male homosexuals.  
 In Chapter 2, I will explore the political dynamics of gay shame in Japan. 
Japanese culture has been described as a ‘shame culture’, in contrast to the ‘guilt culture’ 
of the West, since Ruth Benedict’s very influential book, The Chrysanthemum and the 
Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, was published in 1944. In her book, which is 
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regarded as having successfully described the Japanese national character, ‘shame’ is 
identified as a moral principle representative of Japanese culture. In the field of queer 
studies, on the other hand, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has influentially refined the 
theoretical and political potential of shame, and presented a shame-accented definition of 
queerness. Considering the two sides of shame, which are discussed as the national moral 
principle in the context of Japan, and as an emotion of queer political potential, Togo Ken 
(1932-2012), a pioneer of Japanese gay activism, is an interesting figure. His political 
ideology was a revolutionary left one, and he started to challenge national elections in 
1971 as an openly homosexual candidate. In this chapter, I will examine the 
representations of his discourses and argue for Togo’s radical politics, focusing on his 
adaptation of shame. 
 Through analysing two political figures and their politicisation of 
homosexuality, I will discuss the function of nationalism, which politically includes male 
homosexuality within the nation, rather than excluding it through heteronormativity, 
which has often been discussed. In addition, I will show that heteronormativity has been 
politically challenged by Japanese national politics since the 1960s, and will explore 
sexual politics before the AIDS crisis, which is regarded as marking the beginning of gay 
activism (Shingae 2013).  
In Chapters 3 and 4, I will focus on the dramatic change in the sense of the national 
border and sexual politics after the AIDS crisis, and how the sexual politics of male 
homosexuals has been transformed into the private domain. 
In Chapter 3, specifically, I will discuss how the AIDS crisis in the 1980s affected 
Japanese society and the new gay politics. Then, after reviewing the English-language 
criticism of Westernised gay (gei) identity in Japan, I will analyse discourses of gay 
politics and gay studies that insist on gay identity in Japanese society. Through these 
investigations, I will discuss, firstly, how the AIDS crisis has changed the discourses of 
sexuality and the sense of national and cultural borders in Japan, noting the representation 
of ‘the West as the threat’, secondly, the discursive effects of Japanese studies and queer 
studies in the English language concerning Japanese gay identity and, thirdly, the political 
debate over coming out, arising from the institutionalisation of gay studies in Japan. 
In Chapter 4, I will discuss the discursive phenomena, focusing on the concept of 
Tohjisha in gay discourses. The term Tohjisha, which means ‘the people who are directly 
concerned’, has been used in social minority activism to press their demands and insist 
on their political visibility since the 1970s, probably constituting a type of activism 
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comparable to the identity politics of US society. Despite the frequent use of the term 
Tohjisha in Japanese gay discourses, as well as in other social minority studies and 
activism, neither Japanese Studies nor Gender and Sexuality Studies in English and 
Japanese have paid enough theoretical attention to this word or concept. Through 
examining the characteristics and problems of the political concept called Tohjisha, I will 
discuss how the approach of Tohjisha has prepared the Japanese homonormativity of the 
2000s, analogous to Lisa Duggan’s new homonormativity in the US context. 
In the last two chapters, I will analyse the Japanese situation under the 
globalisation of LGBT politics, along with international capitalism, especially after the 
Obama administration’s change of LGBT human rights policy.  
In Chapter 5, I will analyse the internationally influential queer criticism of 
homonationalism by Jasbir K. Puar and will try to point out her limits in the context of 
my discussion. Then, I shall analyse Japanese ‘LGBT’ political phenomena under the 
transnational influence of the Obama administration’s LGBT-friendly policy, notably 
expressed by Hillary Clinton in ‘Gay Rights Are Human Rights’, and neoliberal 
capitalism in contemporary Japan. In this chapter, I will note how the global LGBT 
politics driven by the US government, as well as several European ones, often represent 
‘LGBT rights’ as Western values, implying Western superiority over other regions. As a 
result, the campaign can create divisions among sexual minorities and isolate the ‘LGBT’ 
community from Japanese history and society.  
In Chapter 6, I will analyse discourses of LGBT rights in Japan in the 2010s under 
the influence of Western governments and international corporations’ campaigns, as 
discussed in the fifth chapter, especially focusing on the economic aspects and the 
political emergence of the topic of same-sex marriage. While LGBT rights have also 
advanced in the 2000s and 2010s in Japan, this is also a time when social and economic 
inequality has widened, and xenophobic and nationalistic movements have become 
dramatically influential in mainstream politics due to the notorious Japanese 20 year-long 
recession, deflation and neoliberal policy of the Koizumi and Abe administrations, 
whereas Japan had previously been regarded as one of most socially and economically 
equal societies. With such dramatic social changes turning Japan towards the ‘right’, 
retreating from issues of wartime responsibility, pacifism and human rights questions 
such as ‘comfort women’ or sex slaves for the Japanese military, I will investigate how 
global LGBT politics interacts with Japanese social and economic inequality and 
nationalism in the new neoliberal society. Through analysing international LGBT politics 
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in the context of Japanese society, which is due to hold the Tokyo Olympics and 
Paralympics in 2020, I will discuss a new emergence of the political relationship between 
sexuality and the national identity in the 2010s, following the new Japanese nationalism 
of the second Abe administration. 
 In these discussions, I will analyse the history of sexual politics in post-war 
Japan, focusing on how sexual politics, especially with regard to male homosexuality, has 
emerged and been negotiated with discourses on the cultural identity of Japan and the 
West, masculinity and femininity, past and future. 
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Chapter 1: Mishima Yukio as a Homosexual Political Precursor 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Considering the political and cultural interactions between national pride or shame and 
masculinity, between Japanese tradition and new Western cultures, and between 
homoeroticism and the national identity in post-war Japan, Mishima Yukio is a distinctive 
artist. Mishima is not only one of the most popular writers in post-war Japan, but is also 
considered as an artist who was the successor of traditional Japanese culture (de Bary, 
Gluck, and Tiedemann 2006). He wrote more than 50 novels and plays, including 
Japanese traditional plays such as Kabuki and No play. In addition, he often represented 
himself in public as a traditional Japanese man, or samurai. His gender performance, 
acting the samurai in post-war Japan, is well remembered among the Japanese, for his 
portrayal collaborated with various artists and his most famous picture was when he spoke 
in front of officers at Japan’s Self-Defense Force for his attempt at a coup d’état. Even 
though more than forty years have passed since his scandalous death, his novels and 
photographs, and academic books about him, have been published constantly in Japan.  
Mishima is also famous and still influential as an ideologue of far-right politics in 
Japan. He wrote several stories and political essays for nationalistic politics in Japan and 
passionately engaged in right-wing politics. His followers, who admire his far-right 
political beliefs, have organised events, called Yukokuki, which means the ‘anniversary of 
patriots’ death’, every year. He is certainly remembered as a national figure. Mishima 
‘sought to resurrect the diminished glory and noble beauty of Japan, adopted the pose of 
an intrepid samurai, and beseeched the nation for a return to emperor worship’ (Piven 
2004, p. 2). 
At the same time, however, he is considered as a gay writer both outside Japan 
and in the Japanese gay community (Vincent 2003). Mishima published several ‘gay’ 
themed novels in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as his own homoerotic portraits. Barazoku 
(1983), a Japanese gay magazine, featured the rumour that Mishima was the writer who 
anonymously published his novel in the underground gay magazine. This shows how 
Mishima has been an important artist among the homosexual community in Japan, even 
though the story is merely a rumour among Japanese gay people.  
Thus, Mishima has three faces: a popular and representative writer in post-war 
liberal Japan, a far-nationalist ideologue and a writer and artist of homoeroticism. He has 
  
46 
46 
often been criticised from the viewpoint of the ‘left’ perspective in Japan: the anti-
nationalism and heteronormative perspective. Once, however, we take the political 
position on anti-homophobia in Japanese society, Mishima becomes a controversial artist.  
Although some literary and cultural critiques focus on Mishima’s sexuality, it is 
rare, if not at all, to discuss Mishima in the context of gay politics in post-war Japan, for 
he is regarded as too ‘nationalistic’ to be a ‘gay pioneer’. This essay aims to explore 
discursive relationships between the Japanese national identity, politics, Japanese 
masculinity and homoeroticism through analysing Mishima’s works and the critiques of 
him.  
Firstly, I will summarise his major works and life. Secondly, I will review 
discourses about Mishima, focusing especially on relationships among Japanese culture, 
his sexuality and his death, and will then point out how these discourses contain 
homophobic presumptions and overlook the wider social and historical contexts of 
Mishima’s works. Thirdly, I will examine his far-right political discourses and how 
Mishima expressed his embodiment of nationalised gender and sexuality through his 
images in the context of the crisis of Japanese masculinity caused by the defeat in the 
Pacific War. Through these discussions, I will contextualise Mishima in the history of 
male homosexual politics in Japan and discuss not only how gender and sexuality are 
nationalised through Mishima’s performance and politics, but also the complicated 
relationships among nationalism or national pride, gender, sexuality and politics in post-
war Japan. 
 
2. Mishima Yukio: Life and Works 
 
2-1. Mishima and Homoerotic works 
 
In 1925, Mishima Yukio was born into an upper middle class family; his grandfather and 
father were government officers. His first successful novel, Confessions of a Mask (1949), 
is a semi-autobiographical account of a young homosexual who must hide behind a mask 
in order to fit into society. This novel expresses not only homosexual desire but also 
sadomasochistic fantasies of blood and death, and this scandalous work made Mishima a 
celebrity at the age of 24. Four years later, he published his third novel, Forbidden Colour 
(1953). ‘Colour’ can mean ‘erotic love’ in Japanese, especially erotic affairs outside of 
marriage or an official relationship. This novel is a story where an old ugly novelist 
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utilises a beautiful, young homosexual man for revenge against the women who have 
betrayed him. Mishima began to visit the homosexual bars and cafes in Tokyo in 1950 
and he vividly described the underground homosexual scenes in this novel as an important 
factor of the story (Nathan 1974, p. 105).  
 Mishima is famous not only for his gay-themed novels, but also for his self-
performance. He enjoyed self-exposure, often being described as pathologically 
‘narcissistic’ (Piven 2004), especially after he started bodybuilding. When he was young, 
he had a slim body and poor health. During World War II, Mishima received a draft notice 
for the Imperial Japanese Army. However, at the time of his medical check-up, he had a 
cold, spontaneously lying to the army doctor about having symptoms of tuberculosis, and 
he was thus declared unfit for service. This experience of betraying his country 
traumatised him his whole life and affected his ideas of beauty, death and eroticism. 
Fukushima Jiro (1998), a novelist who used to be in a relationship with him, wrote that 
Mishima had been ashamed of showing his body even during having sex. In the summer 
of 1952, he began his athletic life when he started swimming. In 1953 and 1954, he 
proceeded to boxing, taking lessons once a week. Then, he began lifting weights in 1955. 
As he gained an athletic body, he started to actively show his naked body, and even some 
researchers about him have regarded his passion for showing his body as ‘narcissistic 
exhibitionism’ (Piven 2004, p. 45). John Nathan, a biographer, quoted his diary of 5 
January 1959, showing how he cared about public judgement of his body: 
 
In the Shukan Yomiuri [a weekly magazine] that came out today there is a story 
about the rumours that I have begun kendo [Japanese art of fencing] and a 
photograph naked from the waist up. I don’t know where they got it, but it’s a 
picture taken three years ago, only a week after I’d begun bodybuilding. It is very 
annoying that people may think of me even now as such a weak and anaemic 
creature. If it is assumed this is the shape I am in now, I will be thought of as an 
empty boaster. I have a mind to sue for defamation, but in view of the auspicious 
time of year [i.e., New Year’s] I’ll forbear. (Nathan 1974, p. 125) 
 
In 1963, Mishima posed in the nude for a photographic study called Bara-Kei, 
‘Punishment by Roses’, by Hosoe Eikoh. In 1970, the year in which he sensationally 
committed suicide, Mishima also posed for the young photographer Shinoyama Kishin 
for the first of a series of photographs to be called ‘Death of a Man’. This series developed 
from Mishima’s inspiration, and Mishima designed the scenes. Nathan wrote about his 
attitude during creating this series: ‘In all the hours of talk about each scene while it was 
being planned and photographed, Shinoyama’s only impression was that Mishima was 
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intensely serious about the project, “the most demanding and the most cooperative” 
model he had ever had’ (Nathan 1974, p. 267). 
	
2-2. Mishima’s Political Commitment and Scandalous Death 
 
Although he was involved in many projects, Mishima is most famous in Japan as a far-
right ideologue. In the 1960s, he shifted to the politics of the right. He published the story 
titled Patriotism (Yukoku) (1961), which was inspired by the Army Rebellion of the 
February 26 incident in 1936, which is considered to have put Japan on the path of 
militarism, the ‘most dramatic internal disturbance in twentieth-century Japan’ (Shillony 
1973, p. ix). Young officers in the Imperial Army attempted to overthrow, with about 
1400 troops, a government that they considered traitorous, for a ‘Showa Restoration’. 
They managed to occupy a strategic square of Tokyo in just a few hours and to assassinate 
three of the six key figures on their list in their homes. The list targeted the Prime Minister, 
the Finance Minister, who was the ex-Prime Minister, the Inspector General of the 
Military, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and so on. The leaders of the rebellion asked 
the Head of the Army to talk to Emperor Hirohito, and demanded the establishment of a 
Showa Restoration. The Emperor himself was enraged and demanded that they be 
crushed for killing his loyal supporters, refusing even to consider ordering them to 
commit suicide due to their ‘terrible atrocities’. In the early morning of February 29, the 
orders were given for subjugation and all of them were arrested. Two of the young officers 
did commit ritual suicide; the others were executed8.	Mishima wrote the story in a highly 
sympathetic tone towards the soldiers and he also produced and co-directed a movie 
version of it in 1966, where he acted as a lieutenant of the rebellion. He devoted a long 
and detailed description to the seppuku of the lieutenant, a form of Japanese ritual suicide 
by disembowelment that had been practiced during the Edo-period (1603-1868) among 
the samurai class, but was symbolised as an honourable death in the name of the Emperor 
during militarism.  
 
                                                
8 For the details of the February 26 incident, read Shillony (1973), Kita (2003) and 
Tsutsui (2006). 
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Figure 3. The Asahi Shimbun (1970) reporting Mishima’s attempted coup d’état and 
seppuku at the commandant of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Courtesy of The Asahi 
Shimbun. 
 
In 1968, Mishima created a private militia, Tatenokai (the Shield Society), 
dedicated to traditional Japanese values and veneration of the Emperor. He thought that 
Japanese post-war democracy had lost the ‘Japanese soul’, which was, in his mind, 
Bushido, a way of samurai. One of his biggest problems was the Japan Self-Defense Force, 
which was created in 1954 under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. It prohibited an 
Act of War by the state and declared that ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the Nation’ and that ‘land, sea, and air force, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained’. Mishima thought, therefore, that the constitution 
must have been revised to permit the Japan Self-Defense Force to be a ‘national legitimate 
military’ that enabled Japan to fight again. Mishima insisted that being samurai meant 
preparing for fight and death: ‘The samurai’s profession is the business of death. No 
matter how peaceful the age in which he lives, death is the basis of all his action. The 
moment he fears and avoids death he is no longer a samurai’ (Mishima 1996, p. 26).	
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On 25 November 1970, Mishima and four members of the Tatenokai, in their 
uniforms, visited the commandant of the Tokyo headquarters of the Japan Self-Defense 
Force for an attempted coup d'état. With a prepared manifesto and a banner listing their 
demands, Mishima stepped onto the balcony to address the soldiers gathered below. His 
speech was intended to inspire a coup d'état restoring the powers of the Emperor. However, 
he succeeded only in irritating them, and was mocked and jeered. He finished his planned 
speech after a few minutes, returned to the commandant's office and committed seppuku 
with his long sword. 
 
3. Mishima’s Scandalous Death and Critiques of Him 
 
3-1. Mishima and Japanese Stereotypes 
 
Mishima’s acting of the modern samurai, the Japanese man who embodied the Japanese 
soul, and who Mishima claimed post-war Japan had lost, succeeded in making people 
believe that he was one of few Japanese men who truly represented Japanese tradition 
and culture in post-war Japan. However, his exhibitionism as the authentic Japanese man 
has been criticised as strengthening Japanese stereotypes in the West, and some Japanese 
intellectuals have openly expressed their embarrassment about Mishima’s embodiment of 
anachronistic Japanese stereotypes.  
In his book published just after the Showa period ended, Miyoshi Masao (1991) 
insisted that Japanese people had lost interest in Mishima as a writer and tried to 
historicise Mishima in the context of post-war Japan, resisting the portrayal of Mishima 
remembered as a legendary figure. Miyoshi interpreted Mishima’s aesthetics in the same 
light as the aesthetics of consumerism in post-war Japan, saying that ‘much of Mishima 
Yukio’s dazzling performance now looks merely flamboyant, or even kitschy’ (Miyoshi 
1991, p. 149). Miyoshi’s efforts to strip Mishima of his samurai mask and to bind him 
with the past reflected Japanese intellectuals’ trepidation for Western interpretations that 
‘misunderstand’ Mishima as being authentically Japanese.  
 Similarly, Ishiguro Kazuo, a Japanese-born British writer, and Oe Kenzaburo, 
the Japanese second Nobel Laureate in Literature, agreed in conversation that his death 
was a performance especially for Western audiences. 
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Ishiguro: I would be quite interested to hear what you feel about Mishima. I’m 
often asked about Mishima in England — all the time, by journalists. They expect 
me to be an authority on Mishima because of my Japanese background. Mishima 
is very well known in England, or generally in the West, largely because of the 
way he died. But also my suspicious is that the image of Mishima in the West 
confirms certain stereotypical images of Japanese people for the West. And this is 
partly why I think he is much easier for Western audiences. He fits certain 
characteristics. Of course, committing seppuku is one of the clichés. He was 
politically very extreme. The problem is the whole image of Mishima in the West 
hasn’t helped people there form an intelligent approach to Japanese culture and 
Japanese people. It has helped people perhaps to remain locked in certain 
prejudice and very superficial, stereotypical images of what Japanese people are 
like. Most people seem to regard Mishima as a typical response to this, because I 
know very little about Mishima, and very little about modern Japan. But that is 
certainly the impression that I get — in the West he is being used to confirm some 
rather negative stereotype. I wonder what you think about Mishima and the way 
he died, what that means for Japanese people, and what that means for 
distinguished author such as yourself. 
Oe: The observations you just made about the reception of Mishima in Europe 
are accurate. Mishima’s entire life, certainly including his death by suppuku, was 
a kind of performance designed to present the image of an archetypal Japanese. 
Moreover, the image was not the kind that arises spontaneously from a Japanese 
mentality. It was the superficial image of a Japanese as seen from a European 
point of view, a fantasy. Mishima acted out that image just as it was. (Shaffer & 
Wong 2008, pp.55-56) 
 
In this conversation, they openly expressed their discomfort and embarrassment for the 
fact that people outside of Japan, especially ones in the West, think of his performance as 
the authentic Japanese image. Ishiguro even accuses such stereotypes as a form of lack 
of intelligence toward Japanese culture.  
 Miyoshi (1991) compares Mishima to other writers in the Showa age, such as 
Tanizaki Junishiro and Oe, arguing that Mishima is a writer of a centralist position in 
Japan. According to Miyoshi, Tanizaki’s and Oe’s strategies were to place themselves in 
a ‘foreign’ place from the ‘centre’ of Japan, viewed as Tokyo, as Tanizaki wrote stories in 
the Kansai region and Oe created his fictional village in the mountains, to see Japan from 
distinctly off-centred perspectives. In contrast to them, Mishima was treated as just a 
fashionable man of his age in Japan, rather than the artist who represented the ‘authentic’ 
culture of Japan.  
The 1960s, Miyoshi (1991) insisted, had a different meaning for the United States 
and Japan. In the case of the United States, the 1960s were a time of dissent and conflict, 
questioning social hegemony, and the emergence of idealism. The movements of anti-war, 
civil rights, women’s liberation and student protest divided the nation; as a result, the 
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global hegemony of the United States was, for the first time, visibly shaken. On the 
contrary, however, the 1960s was a time when Japan succeeded in developing its economy 
and its social struggles focused on the question of whether, and how, Japan should be 
independent from the hegemony of the United States. The minority problems, the 
working conditions of the poor, and Japan’s war atrocities in Asia, and even in Okinawa, 
inside of Japan, were excluded from the focus of the struggle organised by the 
progressives, especially when they opposed the ratification of the revised Japan-US 
Mutual Security Agreement in 1960 (Miyoshi 1991, p.155). While Japanese progressive 
intellectuals withdrew into their bourgeois daily lives after Japan’s economic expansion, 
they were primarily concerned with Japan’s national independence from the United States, 
or the ‘national pride’ that had been lost by the defeat in The Pacific War, as if they were 
the only problems in Japanese society.  
While Mishima personally enjoyed consumerism, Miyoshi insists that Mishima’s 
political shift to a nationalist ideologue in the 1960s reflected changes in the Japanese 
society. Miyoshi recalls that Mishima was a snob, but was a popular writer in the age of 
consumerism, who liked to talk about Tiffany and Jaeger and was proud of his bizarre, 
self-designed ‘Western’ house, even though he is remembered as a samurai, who must be 
stoic. Thus, in his argument, Mishima’s ideas on nationalism and Japanese culture were 
superficial; his ideas on nationalism merely reflected the enthusiasm of a Japanese society 
that wasn’t facing the minority problems in the society and that adhered to regaining 
national pride. 	
 Even though Miyoshi was correct about Mishima as a writer with superficial 
ideas about Japanese culture and politics that merely reflected the Japanese society, 
Miyoshi still ignored the fact that Mishima’s sexuality had been marginalised in Japanese 
society as well as in US society. At the time when Mishima enjoyed his public life, gay 
activism was not even imaginable for people in Japanese society. Although Miyoshi tries 
to represent Mishima synchronising with the main history of Japan, Mishima’s sexuality 
produces excesses that cannot fit such an explanation. Mishima’s sexuality is sometimes 
marked as the enigma, the sign of his extremism especially when people are interested in 
his death. Indeed, Mishima’s sensational death and his sexuality — homosexuality and 
sadomasochism — were often considered as being intertwined.  
 
3-2. Mishima and Homosexuality 
 
  
53 
53 
Jerry S. Piven, a psychologist in the United States, insists that psychological analysis is 
helpful in understanding Mishima’s works and life because ‘his life and writing are a 
palimpsest of early trauma, severe conflict, narcissistic injury, the obsession with death, 
sadomasochism, vengeance, and the terror of disintegration’ (Piven 2004, p. 2). His 
analysis of Mishima’s personality with reference to psychoanalytic theory simply goes 
on to explain his ‘perversity’ with psychological terms, but actually repeats the misogyny 
and homophobia that he found in Mishima. In his logic, analysing his non-secret sexuality 
reveals his ‘secret’ fantasies and sexualities which are supposedly pathological: 
 
The elucidation of perverse sexualities thus entails tracing not only the obvious 
sadistic fantasies but also more elusive and unconscious rage and malice 
suffusing erotic desire. I believe that Mishima adopted and fantasised a number 
of perverse or neosexual strategies for coping with horrific terror and loss, 
including misogyny, the sexualisation of violence, sadomasochistic fantasies, 
even his homosexual interactions, which in his case (not necessarily in other 
cases) implicate real emotional problems — as he often knew. [Stress in 
original] (Piven 2004, p. 11) 
 
Piven insists that the problems of Mishima’s ego were caused by the failure of 
proper gender identification in his childhood because of his weak father and his 
emasculated, authoritarian grandmother. According to Piven, Mishima is a poor victim of 
the failure of his father’s Oedipal Complex. What is intriguing is that he explains 
Mishima’s personality through gender identifications: either hyper-identification with 
masculinity, internalisation of femininity, or both. Firstly, he analyses that Mishima 
identified with masculinity through the rejection of femininity, which, in his diagnosis, 
was especially symbolised by his grandmother:  
 
Note also that Mishima’s sadism and masochism also express the wish to punish 
the grandmother, not only act out her sadism. Mishima therefore becomes 
powerful and authoritarian, derogating weakness and impurity, and counteracting 
his own weakness through aggressive, exhibitionistic, and grandiose behaviour. 
Annie Reich (1960) writes of the person whose ‘uncontrollable feelings of 
helplessness, anxiety, and rage’ are narcissistic injures that lead to the 
compensatory ‘overvaluation of the phallus, in contrast to the concept of the 
female organs as being destroyed, bleeding, dirty, etc.’ (Piven 2004, p. 44) 
 
One page later, however, he insists that Mishima also identified with ‘perverse’ women 
too: 
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Mishima also developed an early inclination to transvestism in identification 
with narcissistic women. Mishima identified with the narcissistic exhibitionism 
of his grandmother, with the performer Tenkatsu, and with Cleopatra 
(Confessions, pp. 16-20). (Piven 2004, p. 45) 
 
Thus, in his discussion, the homosexuality and sadomasochism of Mishima was always 
already perverse and the result of the failure of proper gender identification, which was 
caused by destructive women, in this case, his grandmother. He constitutes the double 
bind of Mishima’s homosexuality that Eve Sedgwick criticised: the gender separatist 
model or the gender inversion model (Sedgwick 1990, p.88). According to Sedgwick, 
two contradictory tropes of gender have been utilised in explanations of same-sex desire 
in modern Western society. The gender inversion model functions as the preservation of 
an essential heterosexuality within desire itself, expressed in such words as: ‘a women’s 
soul trapped in a man’s body’ (Sedgwick 1990, p.87). The gender separatist model, on the 
other hand, explains same-sex desire through the expectation that it is the most natural 
thing to group people together, including the emotional bonding, based on their gender. 
In the case of Piven’s explanations of Mishima’s homosexuality, it was caused by 
misogyny, when Piven focuses on his masculinity, while he also asserts that it happened 
through Mishima’s femininity when his performance, such as his exhibitionism of his 
naked body, exceeded ‘proper’ masculinity.   
 Furthermore, he characterised Mishima’s homosexuality as fatal. ‘Mishima 
continually fantasised about murdering his weak and shameful self-image and 
commingled this sadistic impulse with fantasies of sexual merger with murdered loves. 
Finally, Mishima was the murderer, erotically eradicating his sexual vulnerability as both 
perpetrator and victim. His suicide was a repetition of this erotic sadistic fantasy’ (Piven 
2004, p. 19). Thus, Mishima’s sexuality and erotic performances were all about his 
scandalous death in Piven’s argument.  
 With Mishima’s scandalous death, homosexuality, ultra-nationalist politics, and 
his unashamed performance of Japanese samurai, it is easy to keep a distance from him 
through despising him or, in Vincent’s words, ‘Mishima became the writer that everyone 
loves to hate’ (Vincent 2003). On the one hand, as Piven’s critique on Mishima’s 
personality and Miyoshi’s suggestion of Mishima’s femininity that was fascinated by 
commodities in consumerism, discourses against Mishima’s performances tend to 
emphasise his homosexuality and gender dysphoria. On the other hand, as in the 
conversation between Ishiguro and Oe, Japanese intellectuals also express worries over 
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Mishima’s ‘misrepresentation’ of the Japanese for the West. But such embarrassments 
also share a concern about the Western interests of the Japanese and the desire for 
recognition of the ‘authentic’ Japanese by the West. These discourses about sexuality, 
masculinity and authentic Japaneseness well reflect Mishima’s strategy to construct his 
image as the authentic Japanese man, even though all of such discourses question his 
authenticity and masculinity.  
 If Miyoshi’s argument, which is that Mishima is a writer of a centralist position 
in post-war Japan, was correct, it is a critical question why there are so many discourses 
produced against Mishima’s masculinity and image as the authentic Japanese man. In 
other words, why do Mishima’s masculinity and sexuality disquiet so many men? In the 
following arguments, I will analyse his ultra-nationalist political arguments rather than 
his personality, focusing on the relationships between Japanese politics, masculinity and 
homoeroticism in his discourse. 
 
4. Homoeroticism and Mishima’s Political Thoughts 
 
When we read his political essays, Mishima certainly links eroticism to political terrorism 
for the reconstruction of Japan, especially in his famous political essays ‘The Defense of 
Culture (Bunka bouei ron)’ (2006a) and ‘The Manifesto of Anti-revolution (Han kakumei 
ron)’ (2006b), published in 1968 when left-leaning student activists were energetic and 
influential in society. In this section, his political thoughts will be analysed through his 
key elements: Japan’s historical uniqueness, the Emperor, and homoeroticism. 
 
4-1. The Emperor and Japanese Uniqueness 
 
According to Mishima, Japan is a unique country, which has had historical continuity and 
cultural wholeness since its beginning as a nation. The Japanese, he insisted, must protect 
such continuity and the cultural wholeness of Japan; therefore, his opponents, for example 
communists, are people who try to make divisions and schisms in Japan. 	
 
Japan is a rare country in the world which is an ethnically homogeneous and 
unilingual one and our nation, which shares the language, culture and tradition, 
has kept political unity since the dawn of time. Thus, our cultural continuity is 
entirely dependent on the inseparability of the people from the state. (Mishima 
2006a, p. 60) 
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Mishima denied the criticism that his politics was based on ‘nationalism’ because 
nationalism is, Mishima argued, a passion to create a state of one people and, therefore, 
it presupposes discontinuities between the peoples and the state. As the United States and 
South Africa have suffered conflicts between peoples due to racial issues, ‘nationalism’ 
tries to overcome divisions and to achieve a unity of the people in the state. Mishima 
believed that Japan had always been united as a nation in its history, so it was inaccurate 
for him to label his politics as ‘nationalism’. 
The left, however, has a contrary political purpose: they, Mishima insisted, try to 
find divisions and alienations in a society for a revolution that denies the Emperor. He 
claimed that the left utilises accusations of ‘nationalism’ for the political purpose of 
creating artificial conflicts between people in Japanese society. Mishima related: 
‘Problems of Koreans and ethnic minorities in Japan, the left insists, are deceptive. […] 
They already need to claim the problems of human alienation and alienation of ethnic 
minorities based on a fiction. Then, when they find alienation of one group, they will rush 
at it and only think to utilise it for a revolution’ (Mishima 2006b, pp. 20-21).  In spite of 
Mishima’s asseveration, his idea of Japanese ethnical homogeneity since the beginning 
of Japanese history is rather fictional, if not self-deceiving. Although Mishima 
emphasises Japanese history for his polemic against the revolutionary left, he ignores the 
historical fact that Japan, the Empire of Japan, used to be a multi-ethnic state including 
Koreans, Taiwanese, and so on, despite post-war Japan relinquishing its territory due to 
the defeat of World War Two in 19459. In addition, there is the Ainu, who are the 
indigenous people of northern Japan, ethnically distinguished from the majority of the 
Japanese, wajin or yamato (Siddle 1996). Thus, Mishima erased historical and social facts 
for his idea of historical continuity and ethnic homogeneity in Japan.  
His political idea, however, becomes visible in his deception. His political purpose 
is not rising ‘nationalism’ in Japan, which unites various ethnic and racial groups in 
society, but to make a coalition of a specific people, the Japanese. The coalition of the 
people in his sense means: ‘At least in Japan, Japan becomes aware of what Japan should 
be, then the purpose of the people will meet with the purpose of the state through the 
cultural concept. Culture is the only key for it [stress in original]’ (Mishima 2006a, p. 63). 
                                                
9 For the historical changes of discourses on who are ‘the Japanese’, see Oguma Eiji’s 
research (2002, 2014). 
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Thus, Mishima’s political purpose is to retrieve the figure of what Japan should be, that 
is oneness between the Japanese ethnic people and the state through the culture, not 
political institutions. His concept of culture includes eroticism and disorder. He argues 
that the concept of culture is in contraposition to the one of politics because politics 
supposedly exists for order whilst culture, such as poetry, exists for the diversity of human 
life and activity. This means, he notes, that his idea of cultural wholeness is neither 
totalitarianism nor fascism, which controls freedom of speech. Rather, his idea of cultural 
wholeness radically accepts freedom of speech because it must include anything 
indiscriminately in its space. Mishima believed that the Emperor embodies such cultural 
wholeness and historical continuity of Japan. This is Mishima’s idea of the Emperor 
System: ‘the Emperor System as a cultural concept’ (ibid., p. 66). 
There are two features of his idea of the Emperor System as a cultural concept. 
Firstly, Mishima radically rewrites the character of the Emperor since the Meiji 
Restoration, which reformed Japan as a modern state with the Emperor as the monarch to 
maintain the political and social order in Japan: Mishima called it ‘The Emperor as the 
political concept’: ‘The Emperor as the political concept had to sacrifice a great deal of 
the Emperor as the cultural concept which is comprehensive and allows more freedom’ 
(ibid., p. 75). Thus, his view of the Emperor is both highly abstract and far removed from 
the actual modern Emperor System in Japan. Secondly, there is a critical contradiction in 
his idea of the Emperor System as the cultural concept. Mishima insists that his political 
purpose is to make a coalition among the Japanese people under the Emperor System as 
the cultural concept, but the Emperor System as the cultural concept radically allows for 
diversity of human activities, and is even open to anarchism, in his view (ibid., p.74). 
Thus, his idea of the Emperor System as a cultural concept conflicts with its purpose. 
This contradiction does not collapse his political philosophy. Rather, it demands actions 
for making a coalition in the radical diversity of human activities, as if the co-existence 
of freedom of speech and the political demands of concord in democratic society 
encourages people’s political actions. This means that Mishima’s idea of the Emperor 
System as a cultural concept evokes struggles among the Japanese, rather than being a 
solution for the coalition, for instance, Mishima’s extreme	hostility against communists 
in Japan and his attempt at a coup d’état in the name of the Emperor. 	
In Mishima’s political thoughts, the Emperor represents not only Japanese cultural 
and historical uniqueness but also, supposedly, the political inclusiveness of the Japanese; 
therefore, in his discourse, the Emperor functions to define the ‘Japanese’ culturally, 
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historically and politically. Mishima’s Emperor System, as a cultural concept, functions 
as a fictional origin of the Japanese and marks the boundary between the ‘Japanese’ and 
the ‘other’ whilst endlessly producing exclusions of ethnic minorities from the political 
domain. In short, in his discourse, the Emperor is a fiction that defines the ‘Japanese’ and 
their politics.	
 
4-2. Politics, Eroticism and the Emperor  
 
Mishima was fascinated by political battles under the name of the Emperor and had 
created himself as a political subject through such battles. He claimed that his position is 
the minority of the strong, the last guardian of Japanese culture, history and tradition, 
opposing the weak majority of the revolutionary thoughts in post-war Japan. When he 
opposes communism in ‘The Manifesto of Anti-revolution’ (2006b), due to their hostility 
against the Emperor System and Hirohito himself, Mishima insists that their conflict must 
be a life-or-death battle, which can only happen once. He regarded such conflicts as the 
place for the samurai subject in the political battle in post-war Japan. In the book For 
Young Samurai (wakaki samurai no tameni), published one year before his death, he 
regards the male subject and his body as essential factors in the politics: ‘When a man 
finds the meaning of life in peace, he should help what women do rather than what men 
do. If a crisis is a conceptual role given to men, men’s life and men’s body must always 
be tense like the bow which is drawn toward a crisis’ (Mishima 1996, p. 29). Mishima 
ties together the Japanese male body, politics and culture aesthetically through a crisis.  
 Consequently, his politics evoke homoeroticism among men through the image of 
physical battles by well-trained, beautiful men. In addition, his concept of culture-
eroticism is destructive in its nature, as Mishima was strongly influenced by Georges 
Bataille (Hirano 1991). Thus, his political battle is supposed to be both homoerotic and 
destructive. He constructs eroticism around the Emperor, who he tries to protect, and 
regards the Emperor as the legitimacy of destruction. He claims that the eroticism that is 
evoked by the Emperor System as the cultural concept is destructive, referring to Miyabi, 
the traditional Japanese aesthetic ideal of the Royal court.	
 
The Emperor System as the cultural concept implements two requirements of the 
cultural wholeness: the temporal continuity is linked to the imperial rite and the 
spatial continuity sometimes accepts even a political disorder exactly as the 
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deepest eroticism closes to the ancient theocracy on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, it closes to anarchism.	
Miyabi, which is both the flower of Royal culture and the admiration of it 
among people, has become even the form of terrorism in a time of emergency. 
That is, the Emperor System as the cultural concept is not only for the state power 
and the order but also for the disorder. (Mishima 2006a, pp. 74-75)	
	 	 	
Through his conceptualisation of the Emperor as the erotic legitimacy for destruction in 
a time of crisis, he treats the Emperor as both the authority and the purpose of his politics. 
If the Emperor defines the politics, and its purpose is destined for the Emperor, 
Mishima’s figure of the Emperor and its political nature will be tautological. In his 
response to the critique of ‘The Defense of Culture’ by Hashikawa Bunso, Mishima 
admits his logical weakness. On one hand, Mishima warns of the possibility that the 
communists might utilise the Emperor for justification of the communist government in 
Japan. He considers it as the end of the continuity of the Emperor System as a cultural 
concept, because the Emperor System falls into the political symbol for a certain 
government. On the other hand, however, Mishima also insists that the Emperor should 
directly lead the Japanese military because the Emperor must represent all kinds of 
honours in Japan for its cultural wholeness (Mishima 2006a, p. 79). Hashikawa points 
this out as the contradiction in Mishima’s politics. Firstly, Hayakawa recalls the historical 
fact that the modern Japanese Emperor System has been regarded as being political. 
Mishima’s idea of the Emperor System as a cultural concept, Hayakawa reveals, was 
already violated by the modern Japanese reformation, especially by the Constitution of 
the Empire of Japan promulgated in 1889, because it established the Emperor as the head 
of the government. Secondly, Hashikawa indicates that Mishima himself changed his own 
idea of the Emperor System as the cultural concept into the Emperor System as the 
political concept in his statement, as Mishima also demanded that the Emperor should 
lead the military directly, which is considered as opposite to the cultural concept.   
In his reply to Hayakawa, Mishima admitted that the criticism was accurate, 
especially in his logical weakness. However, his recognition of logical weakness in his 
political philosophy did not mean that he had to recant or refine his argument. He writes: 
‘To begin from the conclusion, I was certainly beaten by your two questions but it is true 
that I did not feel any responsibility of them because the two points you asked were logical 
contradictions not of me but of the Emperor himself who is responsible for them’ 
(Mishima 2006a, p.80).  
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 Mishima does not need to commit to the actual politics based on reason, nor to 
change his ideas based on the historical facts or logicality, because his political discourse 
is tautological: the Emperor defines politics and its purpose is the Emperor. While the 
Emperor engages his logical contradictions, he can attack the actual political issues, such 
as the left movements and the Japanese post-war, pacifist Constitution, in the name of 
Emperor. Mishima’s aesthetic politics justifies hostility against the order in post-war 
Japanese democratic society by the using the name of the Emperor, which is symbolised 
as the ‘erotic’ and the ‘desired’.  
Homoeroticism functions at four levels in his political discourse. Firstly, 
homoeroticism toward the Emperor constitutes the foundation of his politics, which is 
destructive and combative in Japanese society. Secondly, the homoeroticism of his 
politics defines the domain of politics, where only Japanese men participate. Thirdly, his 
combative politics demands that Japanese men build up their bodies against other men. 
Finally, the homoeroticism in his politics, or his passionate love of the Emperor, isolates 
his politics from reality and logicality, as if we do not need an explanation for loving 
someone. Watanabe Eriko (1997) characterises his works as the paradise of death without 
women; he was obsessed with masculinity, death, male bodies and the Emperor.	
As Mishima turned homoeroticism into a political ethos, the essential passion for 
men in politics, he regarded the Japanese male body as being political. Next, I will analyse 
how Mishima represents the male body as political through his own body and 
performance. 
 
5. Mishima’s Body, Masculinity and Performance	
 
5-1. Changes in Japanese Masculinity through the Loss of World War II 
 
Before discussing Mishima’s particular masculinity, it needs to be contextualised in 
Japanese cultural and social history at that time. Modern Japanese masculinity has been 
constructed between the traditional Japanese model of the samurai and the Westernised 
model represented by whiteness, as Morris Low (2003) points out. In the beginning, 
Japanese masculine ideals also embraced a Western-inspired modernity, as did Japanese 
society in other fields, with representations of Japanese male bodies becoming 
increasingly ‘white’. Low discusses how the Emperor had played an important role in the 
promotion of the Westernisation of new masculine ideals at the beginning of Japanese 
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modernisation. While Japanese male bodies were homogenised and westernised through 
the disciplines in modern institutions, such as schools, the military, etc., bushido, the 
traditional ethical code of the samurai, was appreciated for its glorification of the past 
and of the culture for the construction of a Japanese identity differentiated from the West. 
Although Japanese male bodies were represented to resemble white people in the West, 
bushido, or the image of the samurai, was utilised as an ideology with which to define 
Japanese nationhood and to keep Japanese men loyal to the Emperor (Mason 2011). At 
the same time, however, as men were integrated into the nation as ‘sons of the Emperor’, 
women were expected to remain in the maternal sphere, reproducing the Emperor’s sons. 
Thus, the ideology of the Emperor System strongly influenced gender roles and private 
lives in modern Japan10. 
 At the time when Mishima came of age, there was a crisis of masculinity in 
Japan due to its defeat in World War II. The US-led occupation changed Japanese society 
in many respects and emasculated the Japanese masculinity constructed by the Emperor 
System and by militarism. The photograph of the first meeting between Emperor Hirohito 
and General Douglas MacArthur at the US Embassy revealed not only Japan’s loss, but 
also the dramatic changes in its old order. Hirohito, who had been a divine being in Japan, 
stood in a strained position, wearing a morning coat, next to General MacArthur, who 
simply wore an open-necked shirt and no decorations. Young and small, Hirohito looks 
like a child compared to MacArthur in the picture. Low describes the picture as a wedding 
photograph, with Japan cast as the bride: ‘The meeting represented a marriage between 
the two countries, with Japan as the bride’ (Low 2003, p.93). Three months later, Hirohito, 
at the request of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, issued the Humanity 
Declaration, which repudiated the concept of the Emperor as a living god. This picture 
represents the collapse of the Japanese masculine model, as embodied in the Emperor, 
and the feminisation of Japanese men by the defeat. 
 
                                                
10 For the construction of gender roles and family systems at the beginning of the 
modernisation of Japan, especially through the modern Emperor System, see Hayakawa 
(1998).  
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Figure 4. The Photograph of General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito at the US 
Embassy on 27 September 1945, by the United States Army (1946).  
	
 Japan’s transition to demilitarisation was represented as a gendered and 
racialised process. The US-led occupation especially affected women. The Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers reformed family law so as to promote women’s rights 
and encouraged female nationals to participate in the parliamentary process. Lisa 
Yoneyama (1999) points out that the prominent feminine presence in formal politics 
contributed to the emasculation of the nation’s image. While the new status of Japanese 
women symbolised a new national image of Japan as a democratic and demilitarised 
nation, Japanese women could also signpost the feminisation of Japanese men. Yoneyama 
writes: 
 
The racialised stories of Japanese women flirting with foreign soldiers or suffering 
metaphorical or actual rape, which suggested the inability of Japanese men to 
protect the chastity of ‘their women’, underwrote images of Japanese men 
emasculated by the absolute power of the United States. Sexualised and gendered 
relations operated persuasively in popular memories of the period and helped 
figure the nation’s (that is, the masculine subjects’) inferior status in the post-war 
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global order - more precisely, its political and economic subordination to the 
United States. (Yoneyama 1999, p.190) 
 
After the emasculation of Japanese men as national warriors, the Japanese reconstructed 
their national masculinity in the economic field, even though this was also often racially 
caricatured, for example in the stereotypes of middle-aged, grey-suited, characterless men 
or groups of rich men who embodied grotesque sexuality in nightclubs (Dasgupta 2003). 
 
5-3. Defeated Heroes as the Japanese Masculinity by Mishima 
 
Mishima’s masculinity embracing political battles was intended to counteract the 
emasculation by the US-led occupation, as well as the new found glory of Japan in the 
field of economics, replacing that of militarism. As discussed above, he developed his 
own political theory, together with the masculine political subject based on the combative 
character of Japanese men, on behalf of the Emperor, while excluding women. His image 
of politics rejects the emasculated figure of post-war Japan that constitutes a denial of the 
old masculinity and its past.  
Mishima’s novel, Voices of the Heroic Dead (eirei no koe) (2005), expressed the 
sorrows of the dead soldiers of the February 26 incident, and of the kamikaze pilots 
(Tokkotai) who confessed their love for Emperor Hirohito, but criticised him, along with 
post-war Japanese society, through a spiritualist medium. The dead soldiers’ voices 
accuse Hirohito of his denial of divinity: ‘But, your Majesty, you should have been a god 
only twice in history of Showa. You should have been a god, how to say, as a duty of 
human being. […] But you missed both opportunities. You became a human at the most 
important time when you ought to have been a god. The first was when our senior spirits 
stood up for you [the February 26 incident]. The second was when Japan lost’ (Mishima 
2005, pp. 66-67). Mishima criticises the Emperor through the voices of dead soldiers who 
were ‘betrayed’ by his Humanity Declaration, which ‘nullified’ both the meaning of their 
sacrifice and the foundation of Japanese masculinity. At the same time, Mishima 
disdained the contemporary Japanese society, which was peaceful and economically 
flourishing, as symbolised by the success of the Olympics in Tokyo in 1964 (Mishima 
2006a, p. 56). 	
 After the crisis in Japanese male masculinity following the defeat, it was not 
possible to simply replicate the militant masculinity centred on the Emperor. Instead, 
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Mishima romanticises the defeated men and constructs a new version of masculinity 
based on collapsed ‘heroes’, for instance, passionately identifying with the officers of the 
February 26 incident, the kamikaze pilots and his ideal samurai. As Michele M. Mason 
observes, bushido was argued as being the source of Japanese success in the economic 
and military fields in the book published in 1900 by Nitobe Inazo, who first introduced 
bushido, as the Japanese traditional ethical code, to the English language (Mason 2011). 
In Mishima’s interpretation, bushido remains ‘Japanese soul’, but becomes all about death. 
In the book devoted to his thoughts on bushido, he writes: 
 
When Jocho says, ‘I found that the Way of the Samurai is death’, he is expressing 
his Utopianism, his principle of freedom and happiness. That is why we are able 
to read Hagakure today as the tale of an ideal country. I am almost certain that if 
such an ideal land were ever to materialise, its inhabitants would be far happier 
and freer than we are today. (Mishima 1977, p. 8) 
 
The occupation of the samurai is death. No matter how peaceful the age, death is 
the samurai’s supreme motivation, and if a samurai should fear or shun death, in 
that instant he would cease to be a samurai. (ibid., p. 27) 
 
Romanticising defeat, sacrifice and death, he presents blood and intestines as symbols of 
the national and erotic, which were essential to his political thoughts. 
 
5-4. Mishima’s Performance in the Film and the Nationalised Male Body  
 
Mishima directed the movie Patriotism in 1966 and acted as the main character, a young 
officer who fails in the coup d’état in the incident of February 26 and kills himself for the 
nation. In the film’s scene of seppuku Mishima acted passionately, devoting five minutes 
of the 28-minute movie to the scene of the officer’s painful death. After his shocking 
death by actual seppuku, the film was believed lost because his wife had ordered that all 
of his films should be burnt. However, the original film was found at his house after his 
wife’s death in 2005, and the DVD was released in 2006. From the planning stage, this 
movie was probably produced for release outside Japan, because its style is stereotypical 
of Japan and is, thus, easily comprehended by Western audiences. It is a movie set in the 
Japanese traditional theatrical style, without any speaking, with all of its story lines 
presented by subtitles. In the English version the letters are written in Japanese calligraphy, 
exactly as in the Japanese version, and the music of Wilhelm Richard Wagner plays in the 
background. The movie starts with a scene in which the lieutenant tells his beautiful wife 
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about his decision to commit suicide by seppuku. He and his wife make love for the last 
time in front of a wall scroll, on which is written ‘loyalty’, and then comes the scene of 
their suicide: sacrificing themselves for the Emperor and for the nation (Izumo 2010)11. 
The famous scene of seppuku in this film might be the best evidence for the 
interpretation that his performances were expressions of his ‘perverted’ sexuality and 
extreme sadomasochism. Piven writes:  
 
Mishima created his body as a work of art. His literary images are poetic, vivid, 
and luxuriant, his physical images aesthetically striking. From helpless 
imprisonment in disease and shame to literary and physical elegance is an 
astounding triumph. Yet Mishima’s need for visual exhibition, his drive to 
transform himself from that diseased world into a resplendent, pure one, is the 
psychological issue here. (Piven 2004, p. 24) 
 
However, what Piven misses is that Mishima tried to present himself not only as one of 
the beautiful men, but also as a model of the ‘authentic’ Japanese man after the crisis in 
Japanese masculinity. 	
In the movie, Mishima presented his body as a highly symbolic object. It is 
repeatedly shown either naked or uniformed; firstly, the lieutenant appears wearing his 
uniform, then he becomes fully naked for the sex scene. He wears his uniform again as 
part of the ritual suicide, with the help of his wife; then he becomes half-naked, opening 
his jacket for disembowelment. Finally, his wife puts his uniform back onto his dead body. 
His body is nationalised through repeatedly changing between naked and uniformed.	
In the scene where he commits seppuku in front of his wife, his body is objectified 
by his sword and his wife’s gaze. During his ritual death, the viewer cannot see his facial 
expression because of the shadow of his hat, and the camera mainly focuses on his belly, 
though it sometimes gives a closes-up of his mouth to indicate pain. When he stabs the 
base of his left leg to begin the seppuku and blood emerges from the wound, the camera 
focuses on the wife’s face with its expression of shock at seeing his blood. After the 
stabbing and slitting of his belly, with its massive outpouring of blood, the camera 
switches to his face in pain, to her face, to his blood, to her face, then to his face. When 
the camera returns from the pained expression on his face to his belly, his intestines have 
come out. By these repeated shots, his blood, symbolising loyalty to the Emperor, is 
                                                
11 Izumo Maro (2010) points out that the movie is based on the triangle made up of 
three elements, the Absolute, a military man and a wife.  
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sanctified through the gaze of his wife, the only spectator, who recognises his painful 
death. Even though she commits suicide after his death, this symbolises her love for him, 
not for the nation. She puts on makeup after his death, then commits suicide by slitting 
her neck with a knife. Her dead body nestles against his in the last scene.  
In this film, the image of his blood is differentiated from that of hers. While the 
film’s image of dark bright blood from his belly is realistic, the image of her blood is 
inversed, black and white reversed, so it appears as a white liquid splattered on the black 
wall. The images of blood in this film are gendered and differentiated through the 
classifications of love; one is love for a nation and the other is love for a person. This 
gendered expression of blood is inspired by the formation of gender roles in pre-war 
Japan: the male role is that of a warrior for the Emperor, and the female role is that of a 
mother for men.  
 
6. Mishima and Homoeroticism 
 
6-1. Male Bodies and Homoeroticism 
 
Mishima’s highly symbolic use of a naked male body and blood amalgamates the 
celebration of masculinity for the nation with homoeroticism. In his exhibit on the theme 
of ‘Death of a Man’, photographed by Kishin Shinoyama in 1968, he posed naked, 
imitating Guido Reni’s painting of St. Sebastian, his bleeding body pierced by arrows. 
This image can be interpreted as a work that celebrates the death and sacrifice of men for 
the Absolute, as did his performance in Patriotism, his ideal masculinity. However, the 
image of his body as the hurt and sacrificed man for the sublime is literally translated into 
homoeroticism through his own ‘confession’ of homosexual desire. In his first novel, 
Confession of a Mask, he wrote about a homoerotic fantasy centred on the aforementioned 
picture by Guido Reni.  
 
A remarkably handsome youth was bound naked to the trunk of the tree. […] The 
youth’s body – it might even be likened to that of Antinous, beloved of Hadrian, 
whose beauty has been so often immortalised in sculpture – shows none of the 
traces of missionary hardship or decrepitude that are to be found in depictions of 
other saints; instead, there is only the springtime of youth, only light and beauty 
and pleasure. His white matchless nudity gleams against a background of dusk. 
[…] The arrows have eaten into the tense, fragrant, youthful flesh and are about 
to consume his body from within with flames of supreme agony and ecstasy. […] 
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That day, the instant I looked upon the picture, my entire being trembled with 
some pagan joy. […] The monstrous part of me that was on the point of bursting 
awaited my use of it with unprecedented ardour, upbraiding me for my ignorance, 
painting indignantly. (Mishima 1960, pp. 38-40) 
 
The narrator is aroused by the naked young man’s white body and experiences his first 
ejaculation. Describing St. Sebastian in the painting as ‘a remarkably handsome youth’ 
displaying ‘white matchless nudity’, Mishima certainly regards the beauty of St. 
Sebastian in the young white body, which has long been a norm of male beauty in Europe. 
Hence, while his intention in ‘Death of a Man’ could be to celebrate the death for its ideal 
Japanese masculinity as the one of the samurai and the defeated military young Japanese 
men, he also eroticises himself through identification with Guido Reni’s St. Sebastian, 
the white youthful man whom he once erotically glorified.  
George L. Mosse argues that the young, white, masculine beauty that evokes 
homoerotic desire was the national male ideal in modern Europe: ‘There is some irony 
that Winckelmann, the homosexual, made Greek art fit for the middle classes and supplied 
the model for the national stereotype’ (Mosse 1985, p. 14). Similarly, when Mishima 
exposed his naked body in front of cameras, he tried to present the stereotypical Japanese 
masculinity. When he posed holding a Japanese sword and wearing fundoshi, old-styled 
Japanese male underwear, for the photograph entitled Japanese Bodybuilders by Tamotsu 
Yagashira, he commented:  
 
Now is the time we have lost all old attires, what is the only thing representative 
for the external norms of Japanese? It is the strong, masculine body, isn’t it? We 
do not have ideas nor thoughts anymore which can be a substitutive for such a 
body. Thus, this polite and refreshing powerful body can first be one of cultural 
values for Japanese, can’t it? (Mishima 1966, p.11) 
 
As the Japanese lost their old cultural legacy for masculinity, Mishima tried to create the 
Japanese male bodies themselves as Japanese monuments. For Mishima, male bodies, 
made strong and beautiful by bodybuilding, with old Japanese symbols, such as the 
Japanese sword and fundoshi, are a part of the new Japanese culture. However, Mishima 
himself noticed that the exhibition of naked bodies was not originally a feature of 
Japanese culture. In an essay entitled ‘On Bodies’ (1996), Mishima discusses the 
differences between the Western and Japanese perspectives on bodies. He observes that 
Japanese culture did not share ancient Greek culture’s interests in physical male beauty. 
Rather, the Japanese regarded male bodies as something to be covered up, and spirituality 
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as the proper object of people’s concern, especially in higher cultures such as the Miyabi. 
He remarks that the Japanese perspective on bodies had changed only recently, as the 
result of American influence, and argued that Japan should adopt a middle way between 
the Western perspective and the traditional Japanese one; that is, that Japanese men should 
have a perfect body as well as a perfect spirit. Then he concludes the essay by pointing 
out why the Japanese people still despise physical beauty: ‘The biggest reason why people 
easily misapprehend bodies is that physical beauty cannot distance itself from sensual 
beauty and this fact is not only a part of human being but also a part of the beauty which 
humans perceive’ (Mishima 1996, p. 44). He well understood that the eroticism evoked 
by naked bodies was not rooted in Japanese tradition and caused excess and 
misapprehension. 
 As the excess of eroticism plays an essential role in Mishima’s political idea, 
which supposes chaotic situations and battles among men, his performances of 
masculinity display some excess and confusion as well. The homoeroticism in his 
imitation of St. Sebastian creates an ambivalence as to whether it is either an expression 
of his ideal of Japanese masculinity, the death for the Absolute, or an expression of his 
desire to identify with a young white man by whom he had once been erotically fascinated, 
or both. Mishima’s political aesthetics and his gender performance, which supposedly 
embodied his political aesthetics, are controversial subjects for gay critiques as he 
intertwined the homoerotic desire and the ‘fascist’ politics expressed in his works and 
activisms. The obvious connection between homoeroticism and his ultra-nationalist 
politics provides his opponents with a reason to attack his sexuality. In the book 
Homosexuality and the Emperor System in Mishima Yukio (Mishima Yukio ni okeru 
nansyoku to Tenno-sei) (1971), published the year after Mishima died, Yamazaki Masao 
argued that Mishima’s radical nationalist politics was caused by his sexuality, which 
failed to develop in the ‘proper’ way: into heterosexuality. In Yamazaki’s argument, all 
Mishima’s ‘ill’ behaviours, such as his sadomasochism, authoritarianism, uniform fetish, 
love for Nazism and narcissistic identification with the officers of the February 26 
incidents, are explained by his homosexuality. Following Susan Sontag, who pointed out 
the eroticisation of fascism in Mishima’s works (Sontag 1980), Tanaka Jun (2008) also 
regards Mishima as the representative figure to explain the relationship between Japanese 
homosocial ties and fascist desires. 
 
6-2. Queer Critique and Mishima 
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As Mishima’s homosexuality, as probably one of the best known homoerotic artists in 
post-war Japan, is often connected to far-right politics and his fascination with fascism, 
Gay Studies in Japan in its early stages had to analyse the connection between nationalist 
politics and homosexuality. Keith Vincent (1997) criticised Yamazaki’s homophobic 
connection between homosexuality and nationalist politics in the first book on Gay 
Studies in Japan. Then, Vincent (2003) tried to offer an alternative reading of the 
relationship between Mishima’s fascist politics, homosexuality and his ideal of being 
heterosexual in Japanese society. Vincent twisted the discourse of the	 relationship 
between homosexuality and Mishima’s fascism, stressing the homophobic society in 
which he lived.  
The queer critics, which well recognise homophobia in Japanese society, try to 
interpret his works and performances as more than merely anachronistic works that 
express the close relationship between homoerotic desire and fascism. Izumo Maro, a 
film critic and lesbian activist, relates: ‘The existence form of Mishima Yukio holds the 
things deep inside which cannot be explained only by fascist aesthetics and disseminates 
an intense self-image: but ultimately, it disappears into the ambiguity of mysticism’ 
(Izumo 2010, p. 104). Izumo notes that it was the late 1970s when the critique of the 
alienation caused by sexuality and questions towards heterosexism emerged in the 
Japanese fourth estate. Before that, Izumo points out, representations of sexual minorities 
in underground culture, such as drag queens and lesbians, were a part of ‘freak show’, 
which existed outside of heteronormativity. Against such a social background, Izumo 
interprets, Mishima had spent his later life for daringly exhibiting his ‘man’s body’ as a 
spectacle. Izumo calls Mishima’s performance of Japanese masculinity ‘emotional right-
wing kitsch’ (ibid., p. 105). Izumo writes: 
 
Looking back at the 1960s from the present of 2010, Mishima’s kitsch 
representation, which utilises a ‘male body’ determinately subjected to the norm 
belonging to the supreme man in politics and power, seems a challenge against 
the demands of explanation posed by heterosexism. Thus, I think, for queer 
gazes, the existence form of Mishima Yukio is deeply tied to the rhetoric of a 
blatantly openly secret like being in the glass closet. (ibid., p. 105) 
 
In her interpretation, Mishima’s ‘aestheticisation’ of fascism is not the result of his 
homosexuality but rather the reappropriation of history and politics for expressing his 
sexuality in a homophobic society. Izumo focuses on the gay symbols in Patriotism in 
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her close reading of the movie in which Mishima performs the role of a lieutenant in a 
heterosexual marriage. She tries to read Mishima’s performance as a self-expression of 
sexuality by a gay man in the closet in a homophobic society, rather than his yearning for 
fascism.  
However, Izumo’s conclusion is pessimistic about Mishima’s efforts to express 
his desire and sexuality within social norms. She relates: 
 
The alienation of sexuality is one of the important keys to read Mishima’s works. 
But, Mishima well acknowledged the structure of repression. That is the 
structure that even if an alien raises a question, the question is recognised as the 
only problem of the aliens, then excluded. Repressors never listen to aliens’ 
crying. Mishima must have known such a nightmare. 
It is the 1990s, twenty years later since Mishima’s suicide, that studies 
which question heteronormativity – the dualistic repressive structure which sets 
homosexuality against heterosexuality – are introduced and discussed in 
Japanese fourth estate, but what Mishima attempted was the strategy to hide 
himself in his legend made by himself while accepting such the dualistic 
repressive structure. (ibid., p. 128) 
 
Izumo regards his attempt to be doomed from the beginning because his body 
performance represents emptiness and his existence form signifies ‘nothing’. Izumo 
suggests that his fascination with death and his attempt to be political, which was also 
hopelessly doomed, came from his emptiness, hiding his sexuality within the 
heteronormative norms as if it were ‘a phantom in the ruins’ (ibid., p. 128).  
 Although his attempt seems hopeless, do his discourses and performances 
really only signify his desperate expressions of his desire? It is notable that critics which 
emphasise the relationship between his sexuality and fascist politics contextualise him in 
history, while queer critics tend to liberate his expressions of sexuality through 
individualising them, focusing on his closeted sexuality. How can we contextualise his 
expressions of sexuality in the Japanese history of male homosexuality?   
 
7. Mishima’s New Discourse of Same-Sex Desire: Historicising Mishima Yukio in 
the History of Homosexuality in Japan 
  
In reading Mishima’s works, a question has been repeatedly posed as to whether 
Mishima’s novels, especially his representative work, Confessions of a Mask, published 
  
71 
71 
in 1949, can be called the first ‘gay’ literature in Japan and whether it expresses gayness 
in the sense of Westernised sexual identity or not.  
Saeki Junko (1997) insists that we cannot identify the same-sex desire of ‘I’ in 
Confession of a Mask as ‘homosexuality’ in the modern Western sense, because she finds 
traditional forms of same-sex sexual relations such as existed in premodern Japan in his 
narrative, including his attraction to men of a different age group from his own. 
Furthermore, she also argues that ‘I’ is influenced by ‘Western prejudices’ about male 
love, as ‘I’ considers his same-sex desires sinful and shameful, compared to traditionally 
tolerant Japanese attitudes towards same-sex sexual conduct in premodern Japan. She 
therefore concludes that the character ‘I’ in Confession of a Mask represents the mixed 
characteristics of indigenous and exogenous elements of male love in modernised Japan.  
Keith Vincent (2011) insists that ‘homosexuality’ in Confession of a Mask is not 
understood as an identity but, rather, echoes what he calls ‘homosocial narrative’, which 
is the early modern Japanese narrative of same-sex desire that regards same-sex sexuality 
as ‘a developmental stage belonging to adolescence that would eventually and inevitably 
give way to heterosexuality in adulthood’ (ibid., p.178). This is the opposite to the critic 
Atogami Shiro, who insists that Confession of a Mask is the ‘dawn of modernity in 
homosexual literature’ expressing same-sex desire as one’s sexual orientation (ibid., 
p.175), Vincent notes the movements of desire in a narrative rather than a fixed identity 
based on sexual desire, while admitting the possibility that Confession of a Mask can be 
retroactively interpreted as a ‘homosexual novel’. Thus, Vincent’s conclusion is close to 
Saeki’s. It expresses not both traditional homosexual narratives and new identity-oriented 
same-sex desire, but neither of them. ‘In my reading’, Vincent writes, ‘Mishima’s novel 
is neither a piece of “homosexual literature” nor a homosocial narrative, but text that 
hovers uncomfortably in between’ (ibid., p.182). 
It is an intriguing fact that the critiques which focus on sexual minorities in 
modern Japan are divided over whether Mishima’s novel belongs to traditional Japanese 
sexuality or indicates the dawn of Westernised sexual identity, or whether it belongs to 
both of them or neither of them. However, the coexistence of opposing discourses rather 
suggests that the question that they both rely on is not a proper one in analysing Mishima’s 
works, as both of them only produce their interpretations but fail to contextualise the 
works, even though they have tried to. Nevertheless, what is notable in the coexistence 
of opposing discourses is the fact that Saeki (1997) and Vincent (2011) insist on the 
opposing conclusions but stand on common ground that Mishima’s work includes 
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something different about same-sex sexuality in Japan, alienating itself from the past and 
from contemporary Japan. 
Here, instead of asking the question – the question non-Western cultures are 
almost always forced to answer – of whether Mishima belongs to traditional Japanese 
sexuality or to the dawn of Westernised sexual identity, I will focus on contextualising 
Mishima’s discourses in the history of same-sex sexuality in Japan and on clarifying the 
features of Mishima that still have an influence on ideas of same-sex sexuality in Japan. 
Although Mishima became a popular writer by producing works about homosexuality, in 
later years he did not write ‘homosexual’ novels anymore. However, his later works still 
retained elements of homoeroticism, as we have already seen, and those have often been 
linked to his far-right politics. What is notable in Mishima is not his homoerotic 
expression itself, but his change of style of homoerotic expression. Thus, what is the 
difference between his early style and later style of homoeroticism? 
Contextualising Mishima’s works, Sabine Früstück (2002) and Gregory M. 
Pflugfelder (2007) have already shown that Western medical discourses on sexuality were 
translated into Japanese in the early stages of Japan’s modernisation. As early as 1890, 
the conduct of ‘homosexuality’ was beginning to be formulated through translations of 
Western medical concepts, and people’s sexuality was considered a subject that society 
had to deal with in Japan. As ‘homosexuality’ was already standardised as ‘same-sex love 
(doseiai)’ by the 1920s, and homosexuals and ‘pervert’ characters were often represented 
in popular culture after the 1920s, it is reasonable to suppose that Mishima, who was 
familiar with Western classical culture, was well acquainted with homosexuality in the 
modern Western sense when he wrote Confession of a Mask. Interestingly, it is written in 
the style of a confession of desire, which Michel Foucault characterises as the Western 
way of discursive productions on sexuality, by contrast with the supposedly Eastern 
approach to knowledge of sexuality, Ars Erotica (Foucault 1990, pp.53-73). Thus, it is 
rather anachronistic and misleading to focus on the question of whether he expresses the 
sexual identity familiar to homosexuals, or gay identity in contemporary society, or 
whether he expresses ‘traditional’ Japanese sexuality. 
His second homosexuality themed novel published in 1951, Forbidden Colours, 
also echoes pre-war expressions of homosexuality: ero-guro-nansensu. Pflugfelder 
characterises the discourses about homosexuality in ero-guro-nansensu as demonstrating 
three elements: firstly, ‘same-sex love’ was linked with a vaguely ‘grotesque’ urban 
environment at the time when cities such as Tokyo and Osaka were rapidly growing in 
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Japan and new subcultures of male-male eroticism were emerging in the large cities; 
secondly, prostitutes were frequently portrayed as central actors in this subculture, 
embodying an ‘inverted’ trope of male-male sexual behaviour; thirdly, same-sex love is 
represented conceptually as having a close relationship with criminality (Pflugfelder 2007, 
pp. 310-311). Even though it is a heavy work of literature, rather than popular novels as 
ero-guro-nansensu were, Forbidden Colours, which portrays the underground culture of 
homosexuals in Tokyo in the early 1950s, clearly takes over the characteristics of the 
genre of ero-guro-nansensu. In addition, this novel holds the ‘Western’ idea of sexual 
identity, as one of main characters is a beautiful young homosexual man, who is self-
conscious that he is incapable of loving women. Thus, even though it would be reasonable 
to regard Confession of a Mask as the distinctive work in regard to expression of same-
sex desire, Forbidden Colours, which is less discussed as ‘homosexual’ literature, clearly 
shows the influence of ‘Western’ sexual discourse and pre-war cultural expression of 
homosexuality. 
As Mishima turned from being a ‘homosexual’ writer to being a far-right activist, 
the expression and meaning of same-sex desire in his work also changed. In his early 
works, same-sex desire is expressed as being disturbing for the men who hold it; it is a 
shameful desire, or a desire isolating men from society. In his later works, however, 
homoerotic desire is not shameful but rather an essential desire to participate in national 
politics. As Mishima’s homoerotic desire functions as an expression of loyalty to the 
Emperor and identification with war heroes who also were loyal to the Emperor, 
homoeroticism, or a desire for strong male bonds, represents national politics, masculinity 
and a nation-state itself. In his discourse, homoeroticism builds a mutually 
complementary relationship with Japanese national politics. Now, homoerotic desire is 
something essential in a nation-state.  
The emergence of the discourse that directly connects homoeroticism with a 
nation-state, is notable in the history of male same-sex sexuality because, as discussed in 
the introduction, same-sex behaviours used to be regarded as something negative, 
temporarily indicating the past or the future. In Mishima’s discourse, on the other hand, 
homoerotic desire has become something central in Japanese politics, relating the present, 
or the living tradition. Through Mishima’s efforts to establish the new Japanese 
masculinity and ideal image of the nation in post-war Japan, i.e. after Japan’s defeat in 
the Second World War, Mishima succeeded in involving homoeroticism, or something 
very close to homosexuality, in national politics, and in explicitly recontextualising it 
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from Japanese tradition to contemporary Japan. It is a politically distinctive moment for 
homosexual politics in Japan, as same-sex desire is now regarded as something not 
outside contemporary Japanese society, but central to Japanese society and politics. Even 
though his discourse belongs to the far-right, and is based on the exclusion of women and 
ethnic minorities from the political domain, Mishima Yukio is the first influential figure 
in Japanese culture and politics who has positioned male same-sex desire in the public 
domain, not as something private or that must be kept secret, but something essential in 
Japan as a nation-state. He redefined it as a political desire that allows Japanese men to 
access the Emperor. 
 
8. Conclusion	
 
Many critics of Mishima tend to treat his sexuality as the source of his far-right politics 
and extremism. Such critics suggest that Mishima is an exceptional figure in post-war 
Japan. Nonetheless, Mishima’s concerns, such as the Emperor, national pride, Japanese 
masculinity, and the problems of homosexuality are still critical, or becoming more so, in 
contemporary Japan, despite the growing economy - now declining -	 offering an 
alternative model of Japanese masculinity, the so called ‘salaryman’, a hard working 
Japanese man. When we read Mishima’s political arguments and performances within the 
wider context of post-war Japan, including the crisis of masculinity, social conditions in 
Japan, and contemporary nationalist movements, Mishima emerges as a controversial 
artist for the Japanese people, rather than just a ‘mad’ artist who killed himself by seppuku.  
In one sense, Mishima can be seen as an ideologue of far-right politics who offered 
a new model of nationalised masculinity that suited his ideal Japan. As we examined 
Mishima’s male gender performances, which are considered as ‘traditional’ and 
‘Japanese’, they seemed to be rather artificial performances, expressed through 
homoerotic fantasy and the appropriation of white masculine bodily ideals. His national 
fantasy, including homoeroticism, urged him towards a radical right movement, which 
tried to reconstruct a Japanese political domain based on the Emperor, a symbol of 
Japanese nationalism.  
At the same time, however, his nationalist discourses have made room for male 
same-sex desire in Japanese ‘traditional’ cultures and national politics. In this sense, he is 
the first celebrity to invent the discourse clearly involving male same-sex desire in 
contemporary national politics in modern Japan. He shaped a new form of discourse on 
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male same-sex desire, differentiated from the medical discourses or the ero-guro-
nansensu discourses, both of which marginalised homosexuals, found in popular culture 
in pre-war Japan. Interestingly, his political discourses, which constructed close 
relationships between the Emperor and homoeroticism, would be reappropriated by a far-
left sexual dissident activist in the 1970s, after Mishima’s death, but against the Emperor. 
Togo Ken, a pioneer of gay activism in Japan, challenged the Emperor’s political holiness 
by grotesquely homoeroticising him. Although Mishima reformulated same-sex desire as 
something denoting loyalty and national unity, Togo insisted that Japanese society 
regarded same-sex desire as inferior, but he also utilised it against morals, norms and the 
Emperor by expressing his same-sex desire and identity openly. Togo’s political purpose 
is the opposite of Mishima’s but the latter’s discourse of same-sex desire, which admits 
it into the national political domain, enabled Togo to promote his desire as a political 
issue in Japanese society. In this sense, Mishima, we can say, is among the distinctive 
people who have broken new political ground for male sexuality in post-war Japan.	
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Chapter 2: Queer Shame and Togo Ken’s politics 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I explored representations of homoeroticism and national fantasy 
in the work of Mishima Yukio. Mishima is one of the first and most notorious artists who 
contributed to a representation that built up a close relationship between homoeroticism 
and nationalism in the modern Japanese context. Due to him, as Keith Vincent points out, 
homosexuality has been considered part of reactionary right-wing politics, akin to fascism, 
rather than liberal-leaning politics in Japan, unlike its position in the Euro-American 
context (Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, pp. 81-82). In this cultural context of 
homosexuality in Japan, Togo Ken (1932-2012) is an interesting figure. His political 
ideology was a revolutionary left one and he started to challenge national elections in 
1971 as an openly homosexual candidate. He is now considered to be a pioneer of gay 
activism (McLelland 2005, 2012; Oikawa 2001). In this chapter, I will analyse 
representations of his politics and his own discourses, and argue that there is a gap 
between the way in which Queer Studies and activism understand his politics and the way 
in which he politicised his sexuality. In doing so, I will investigate not only the 
representation of Japan in Queer Studies and Japanese Studies in the English language, 
but also the relationships between gender, sexuality and national politics in Togo’s 
thoughts.  
 Firstly, I will discuss how Togo has been debated as a pioneer of gay activism 
or as a prototype of the queer figure in Japan since the 2000s, following the introduction 
of Queer Studies to Japanese society.  
Secondly, I will analyse Togo’s politics, focusing on his adaptation of shame. But, 
before analysing Togo’s discourses, I will critically review discourses within Japanese 
Studies concerning shame in Japanese culture, and then argue for the originality of Togo’s 
political usage of shame, with reference to arguments of shame in Queer Theory.  
Thirdly, considering the limitation of Togo’s politics, I will examine Togo’s ideas 
on gender and politics.  
Finally, I will pursue the relationships between gender, sexuality and the national 
imaginary in Togo’s politics compared with those of Mishima Yukio, and then try to 
contextualise Togo’s politics in the history of sexual politics in Japan. 
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2. Togo Ken as the Legendary Okama 
 
2-1. The Pioneer of Gay Activism 
 
From mid-April 2012, a rumour started to spread across Twitter that Togo Ken had died 
of cancer. A few days later, the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s national newspapers, 
reported his death, describing him as ‘a celebrity among gays’, who fought discrimination 
against homosexuals (The Asahi Shimbu 2012b). Two months later, a gay group organised 
a memorial party for Togo Ken, presenting a panel discussion, his songs, the drama he 
produced, and screening the movie he directed, as if to summarise his cultural and 
political contributions. Because people regarded Togo as a pioneer of gay culture and 
activism in Japan, when his death in his home became known, which was not until a few 
weeks afterwards (Oikawa 2012), he was remembered as ‘the legendary gay activist’ 
(Oikawa 2001).  
Evaluation of Togo’s activism had grown in the 2000s, during which time gay or 
‘queer’ activists were established in Japanese society. In 2001, Oikawa Kenji, a writer 
and activist, featured Togo in his article for a series in the liberal weekly journal Syukan 
Kinyobi, focusing on unique non-conformists in Japan or people devoted to the types of 
activism ignored by society. His article, entitled ‘Togo Ken, the legendary okama: 
Burning with sexual desire and revolt (Densetsu no okama: aiyoku to hangyaku ni 
moetagiru)’, presents Togo as a dissident activist and self-styled ‘okama’, a slang term 
for buttocks or homosexual men, especially stereotypical effeminate men, carrying an 
implication of anal sex. He presents Togo’s profile as follows: 
 
He was born at Kakogawa city, Hyogo, in 1932: The representative of a political 
party, Zatsumin-no-kai and Zatsumin-tou12: The managing editor of The Gay (Za 
Gei). He is known as the legendary okama, working for various expressive 
activities including election campaigns, editing of gay magazines and theatrical 
performances. He is a father of one boy and two girls. He has many arrest records. 
His motto is, ‘At the very least, I want to sleep without being ashamed of myself’ 
(Oikawa 2001, p. 34).  
 
                                                
12 The word Zatsumin means “a motley assembly of people” in Japanese. Togo explains 
that the Zatsumin Party promotes solidarity among the people who are at the bottom of 
society (Togo 1979, p.155).	
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Stressing Togo’s arrest record, Oikawa aims to portray Togo not only as a pioneering gay 
activist but also as a radical anarchist.  
Oikawa introduces the episode that best demonstrates Togo’s radical political 
attitude. In 1984, the Party of Zatsumin, organized by Togo, placed a political 
advertisement in the magazine Shin zasshi X, containing an illustration of Emperor 
Hirohito penetrated by General Douglas MacArthur. In response to this provocative 
advertisement, right-wingers, outraged by this ‘disrespect’, made phone threats and 
protested at the magazine’s office and Togo’s house for days. Kimura Mitsuhiro, a 
member of Issuikai, an organisation promoting Mishima Yukio’s nationalist politics, 
demanded a public debate with Togo because Issuikai was also under fire from other 
nationalist groups as another magazine had reported that its members, including the 
representative member, had attended Togo’s publication party just a month before the 
controversial advertisement came out. However, Togo did not even reply to his request. 
According to Kimura, he accidentally encountered Togo on the street when riding a 
bicycle in Tokyo. Although Kimura called out to him ‘Hi, Togo’, Togo just answered, 
‘No, I’m not’ and tried to run away. Due to Togo’s dishonesty and cowardice, he insists, 
Kimura frenziedly hit Togo with his bicycle and beat him. Togo filed a report of the 
damage to the police and Kimura was arrested two months later. 
Oikawa tells this story as an example of Togo’s political style, especially his 
dislike of the Emperor System, since violent attacks from right-wingers were quite 
predictable in Japanese society if one published a ‘disrespectful’ illustration. According 
to Oikawa, Togo’s strong hostility to the Emperor System stems from his childhood under 
the patriarchal influence of Japanese militarism. He quotes Togo’s words: 
 
‘Back then the head of the nation was the divine Emperor, the head of the family 
was the father, and after his death, my first-born brother became the head. The 
authority of the household head was clearly related to the patriarchal authority 
embedded in the Emperor System’.  
He goes on,  
‘Although after the war, the Emperor declared that he was human, he 
continued to be the Emperor. He completely avoided accepting responsibility 
for the suffering of the victims of the war. The declaration of humanity was just 
a strategy to deflect attention away from his ultimate responsibility for the war 
and its consequences’. (Oikawa 2007, p.265) 
  
In his election campaigns, Oikawa emphasises Togo’s provocative comments about the 
Emperor, such as; ‘If the Emperor’s “chin” (a first-person pronounce used only by the 
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Emperor) is a symbol of Japan, I prefer the symbol of a man, his chinchin (a slang term 
for penis)’ (Oikawa 2007, pp. 265-266).  
 Oikawa also refers to the troubles Togo had faced during his sensational 
election campaigns. In 1983 Togo stood for the Upper House election on behalf of the 
party he organised, the Zatsumin Party, and made an election video in association with 
his colleagues, one of whom was visually impaired and the other of whom was physically 
disabled. In this video, Togo spoke of discrimination against disabled people, 
commenting, ‘[When he tried to sell tickets to his play] people told us “who’s gonna buy 
a ticket for a play by mekanchi and chimba [discriminatory words referring to people who 
are visually impaired and have a lame leg]?” and our tickets did not sell well. There is no 
such thing as happiness in the world, as long as such discriminations exist’ (Oikawa 2001, 
p. 36). NHK, the public broadcasting organisation in Japan, censored the words mekanchi 
and chimba without Togo’s permission, as the network considered these words highly 
inappropriate and unsuitable for broadcast on the public airwaves. Togo and the Zatsumin 
Party sued NHK for violating the principle of freedom of speech and the Public Office 
Election Law, which allowed candidates to express their unedited political views. Even 
though the Supreme Court of Japan ruled against Togo in this case, afterwards NHK 
changed its broadcasting policy on public elections and stopped editing its broadcasts. 
 Reviewing Togo’s life, whilst Oikawa describes Togo’s political actions as anti-
establishment, Oikawa also characterises Togo’s ideas on sexuality as ‘humanism’, a 
creed based on the fundamental principle of human equality. He quotes Togo’s words: ‘It 
is difficult to understand that all people are equal, unless we think of them having sex. 
Even the Emperor has a dick—and he uses it. We are not so different from each other’ 
(Oikawa 2007, p. 266). Oikawa asked Togo why he continued to use the word okama, 
which sounds discriminatory and offends some gay people, as it emphasises anal sex 
when identifying gays. He relates Togo’s answer: 
 
‘I love the word okama very much… I feel free to love this word because of the 
fact that I have been discriminated against through its use’. His face was still red, 
but his eyes showed sobriety, as if he weren’t drunk at all. 
‘There is no need to justify love between men by adjusting the wording. 
What’s wrong with men loving each other, and women loving each other? What 
is shameful is to live your life lying to yourself, and not being able to love another 
person’. 
Togo dares to embrace the word okama, a term that symbolises contempt for 
homosexuals. 
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‘I believe that okama originally comes from the Sanskrit word kãma, which 
means love. Therefore, the origin of okama is love’. (Oikawa 2007, p. 268) 
 
In his report, Oikawa describes Togo, ‘the legendary okama’, not merely as the first 
person to stand for public office in Japan as an openly gay man, but as a highly political 
figure who insisted on radical equality between people through sexuality and, in his own 
life, had confronted social norms, including the Emperor System, censorship, Japan’s 
obscenity laws and the norms of sexuality13.  
 
2-2. Togo is a queer model of Japan 
 
Mark McLelland (2005, 2012), an Australian historian of sexual minorities in Japan, also 
pays considerable attention to Togo Ken in his study of Japanese sexual minority politics 
in the 1970s. He summarises the context of sexual minority movements in Japan since 
the 1960s, explaining that, compared to the United States, gay activism was limited in 
Japanese society until the mid-1980s. Since homophobia in Japan was less pronounced 
and there were no laws against homosexual conduct and cross-dressing, McLelland 
argues, the police surveillance and harassment of sexual minorities that had proved a 
unifying factor in the US were absent in Japan. In addition, there was no powerful moral 
authority, such as the church. Thus, it was more difficult for varied sexual minority groups 
to imagine that they shared a common predicament and agenda within society (McLelland 
2005, p. 160). Even though there were countercultural movements in Japan, such as ethnic 
minority movements and feminist movements, McLelland concludes that these 
movements failed to reach out to sexual minorities during that period14. He focuses on 
                                                
13 All these problems, which Togo had challenged, still remain in contemporary Japan 
in the 2010s. For example, Megumi Igarashi, a feminist artist, who creates art works 
shaped as her own vagina was arrested twice in 2014 for breaching obscenity laws. 
14 Following Vera Mackie’s studies, McLelland regards lesbians as marginalised in both 
‘mainstream’ feminist groups and male homosexual social groups. He writes: 	
	
Indeed, the few lesbians who were out about their sexual orientation ‘felt 
marginalised from “mainstream” feminist groups and activities’ (Mackie 2003: 
160). Although social groups of homosexual men were by this time well 
established, as were extensive homo [sic] print media, male homosexuals had 
little interest in establishing coalitions with lesbian women – not that such 
overtures would necessarily have been welcomed, since, as Mackie reports, 
lesbian groups considered homosexual men to be as sexist as their straight 
counterparts (1980:108). (McLelland 2005, p.160) 	
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Togo as a radical exception, despite Togo’s having failed to galvanise a broad range of 
interest groups: ‘there was at least one activist who understood that a broad range of 
sexual nonconformists- both hetero- and homosexual - were similarly disadvantaged by 
Japanese social practices’ (2005, p.162). 
  In McLelland’s view, Togo was a unique activist, not only because he 
questioned the Japanese family system as one that disadvantaged both heterosexuals and 
homosexuals, but also because he had practised a confrontational style of activism similar 
to, but 20 years in advance of, queer activism in the West. McLelland remarks that Togo’s 
promotion of the term okama and confrontational projection of the effeminate stereotype 
of gay men were ‘queer’ and that he was ahead of his time, in an era when even US 
activism, characterised by its militancy, rejected the effeminate gender stereotype.  
 
[T]hrough embracing queerness in such a confrontational manner while also 
engaging in social critique, Togo was to develop in the early 1970s a mode of 
activism that was very close to contemporary queer positions. (McLelland 2005, 
p. 163) 
 
In many ways, then, Togo’s perverse politics can be seen as an uncanny precursor 
to the ‘queer’ activism that developed in Anglophone societies in the late 1980s. 
(ibid., p. 167) 
 
Furthermore, McLelland argues that Togo’s cross-dressing performance is also a queer 
act, expressive less of homosexual desire than of a wish to challenge the rigid gender 
norms that constrained all men. Arguing for the queer aspects of Togo’s activism, 
McLelland stresses Togo’s femininity and his transgender performances.  
 Unlike Oikawa, who reviewed Togo’s life and activities in terms of his left 
radicalism and confrontational attitude, McLelland tries to explain his politics in terms of 
                                                
	
The narrative of marginalised and isolated lesbians, however, is too simplified and 
trivialises lesbian activism. As Sugita Ikuko (2011) shows, there were lesbian members, 
who were influenced by the ideals of lesbian feminism, who participated in the 
women’s liberation movement and published their newspaper for educational purposes; 
namely, to eradicate internalised homophobia among lesbians. Sugita points out that 
their newspaper, like others that followed, clearly shows the influence of lesbian 
feminism in its claims, such as that the roots of lesbian oppression could be traced to the 
existence of patriarchy, and that one must value one’s own womanhood (Sugita 2011, 
p.165). Their problematisation of patriarchy and their efforts to accept their own 
sexuality were rather similar to Togo’s, except for their differences of style and activist 
targets. For further studies of lesbian activism in Japan, see Sugita (2008) and Iino 
(2008). 
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his ideas about gender and sexuality. He views Togo’s opposition to the Emperor System 
as exemplifying not only his battle with right-wingers, but also his queer attitudes to 
gender norms. Togo insisted that, just as Japanese people could accept the Emperor’s 
dramatic shift from divine being to human being, ‘they surely should be able to come to 
terms with the different forms of love that exist between human beings or with, indeed, 
the relatively minor shift in a person’s identity occasioned by a change of sex from man 
to woman’ (ibid., p. 164). McLelland also refers to the fact that Togo’s Zatsumin-no-kai 
was not an exclusively homosexual organisation, but was open to a wide range of people, 
including sex workers. He describes Togo’s politics as operating in terms of gender and 
sexuality rather than in the traditional leftist political style. 
 In McLelland’s narrative, however, Togo’s progressive politics increasingly fell 
out of sync with the wider homosexual community, as the understanding of ‘gay identity’ 
in Japanese society became more masculine under the influence of US gay culture. At the 
same time, while gay identity in Japan had been masculinised by the influence of Western 
gay culture, Togo also suddenly came into vogue under the influence of the new ‘queer’ 
approach to sexuality at the beginning of the 21st century. McLelland writes: 
 
Togo, although he was the most visible homosexual activist of the 1970s, was not 
the figure who had the most impact on developing notions of gay identity in Japan. 
Despite his tenacity, Togo’s queer approach to activism never caught on; he 
appeared an anachronism to a new generation of gay activists who felt they had 
more in common with the masculine-identified gay movement of the United States 
and Europe. (McLelland 2005, p.167) 
 
Thus, McLelland casts ‘Western’ activism as the opposite of Japanese gay activism: on 
the one hand, it caused the Japanese gay identity to become more masculine and gay 
people to turn away from Togo’s activities but, on the other hand, it offered a new 
perspective from which to understand his radicalism. Briefly, he suggests, Japanese gay 
people did not understand Togo’s progressive politics of the 1970s, which was similar to 
queer politics in Anglophone societies from the late 1980s, because they had been 
influenced by the masculine-identity based politics of the United States and Europe before 
queer politics emerged. 
 Arguing for the Japanese queer figure who was ahead of his time, McLelland 
presents an intriguing narrative. Firstly, he considers Japanese culture and sexuality based 
on ‘Western’ ideas, such as ‘gay identity’, ‘transgender’, and ‘queer’. Even though 
McLelland tries to present a Japanese ‘unique’ or ‘progressive’ sexual culture and politics, 
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such cultural activities are expressed either through presupposed images of ‘queer’ or 
‘gay’, or through differences from them. Secondly, presupposing the model of the history 
of Anglophone sexual politics to pass from homophile movements to gay activism, then 
to queer politics, he constructs a complicated temporal narrative of the Japanese history 
of sexual minorities. When he introduces Togo’s politics as ‘queer’, he describes Togo as 
‘an uncanny precursor’ (ibid., p.167), comparing his style in the 1970s with Euro-
American queer politics in the late 1980s. Characterising Togo as the ‘progressive’ 
activist, McLelland suggests that the Japanese gei (gay) identity, which, he insists, is more 
masculine and influenced by the Western gay identity, is anachronistic, with the result 
that Japanese gay people dismissed Togo’s queer activism. Therefore, when McLelland 
calls Togo ‘queer’ in the 1970s, his narrative creates a complex temporality in Japan: 
Japan was ahead of its time compared to the West in regard to queer politics in the 1970s, 
but gay politics wrongly imitated the masculine Westernised gay politics, and sacrificed 
Japanese cultural ‘progressiveness’ from the 1990s. 
 McLelland presents this narrative to criticise earlier gay and lesbian accounts 
within Japanese Studies. He insists that supporters of sexual minorities in Japan stressed 
repression in Japanese society so as to represent Japanese sexual minorities as ‘the hapless 
victims of a repressive regime’ (ibid., p. 6). For example, McLelland cites comments from 
the translators of first-person narratives by sexual minorities in Japan. Francis Conlan 
(2001), a translator of Coming Out in Japan, an autobiographical book by a Japanese gay 
couple, characterised Japanese society as mired in tradition: ‘The Confucianist mentality, 
which favours uniformity and authoritarianism, would appear to be a major cause of 
Japanese society’s outward hostility toward homosexuality. […] The basic Japanese 
mentality is driven by the perceived validity of rigid hierarchy, conformity and obedience 
to authority. These values are so deeply rooted that the always difficult job of bringing 
about social change is even more difficult in Japan than in the West’ (Conlan 2001, p. xv). 
His essentialist approach to Japanese society, which reduces problems in Japanese society 
to the ‘Japanese mentality’, constructs not only the image of the ‘Japanese’ but also that 
of the privileged (Western) subject, who knows about the ‘Japanese’ and their problems, 
within the ‘advanced’ society of the West, which has been moving towards acceptance of 
homosexuals. McLelland ironically observes that Japan was less homophobic than the 
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West during its feudal period, by contrast with Conlan’s suggestion that ‘the Confucianist 
mentality’15 produced homophobia in Japan: 
 
Explaining Japanese people’s supposed negative attitude toward homosexuality in 
terms of their ‘feudal’ mentality is particularly ironic given that male-male sexual 
relations were not only common throughout Japan’s feudal period (1600-1867) 
but were, in fact, highly valued in certain circumstances. (McLelland 2005, p. 5)16 
 
McLelland criticises the representation of gays and lesbians in Japan as victimised and 
the paternalistic inclination of researchers to ‘give voice to lesbian- and gay-identified 
Japanese whose existence has largely been passed over in silence by “Japanese Studies” 
as it is taught in western academic institutions’ (ibid., p. 7). He remarks that these 
narratives relied on metaphors of the journey, from oppression to freedom, from darkness 
to light. 
 Instead of the narrative of the ‘journey’, McLelland pays close attention to non-
heterosexual subcultures in Japan, in order to avoid representing the West as the liberated 
society that must be the standard for sexual minorities outside it. He stresses the 
methodological importance of prioritising Japanese over English terminology in order to 
reflect Japanese nuance and categories. In this sense, he is certainly sincere in his aim of 
understanding and representing Japanese sexual minority cultures in the English language. 
However, he is still influenced by ideas of sexuality contained in the English language 
and by its history of cultural representations. For example, when he calls Togo ‘queer’, 
accenting his transgenderism and femininity, while analysing Japanese gay people’s 
reactions to Togo’s activities caused by their identification with the masculine gay male 
and the influence of Western gay culture, he interestingly reappropriates Orientalist 
stereotypes of the masculine West and the feminine Orient. By his logic, the femininity 
                                                
15 Interestingly, in the book that Conlan translated, the authors explain that homophobia 
in Japan is rooted not in ‘the Confucianist mentality’ in Japanese society, which favours 
uniformity and authoritarianism, as Conlan explains in the Translator’s notes, but in the 
influence of Christianity. They write: ‘Since the Meiji period the status of 
homosexuality has plummeted. This co-incided with the rapidly growing influence of 
Christianity, a phenomenon which is directly related to Japan’s modernisation. After the 
Second World War, the place of homosexuality in Japanese society dropped to the point 
where its existence could only be verified through a genre of soft pornographic 
magazines’ (Ito and Yanase 2001, p.85). 
16 For homosexual cultures in pre-modern Japan, see Leupp (1997).  
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of the gay male body represents radical queerness in Japan, whilst Japanese masculine 
gay identity is reductively ascribed to the influence of Western culture. 
 Keith Vincent (2010) points out the problematic aspects of McLelland’s writing 
as it stresses queer culture in Japan. On the one hand, Vincent agrees with McLelland that 
some researchers criticised by the latter have taken a condescending and neo-imperialist 
approach toward Japan. On the other hand, Vincent criticises McLelland for placing too 
much emphasis on ‘queer’ culture in Japan:  
 
Perhaps in reaction to those who have overemphasised the prevalence of 
homophobia in Japan, McLelland almost completely avoids any discussion of the 
suffering experienced by Japanese ‘queers’ at the hands of mainstream society. 
The result is that one comes away from the book with the impression that Japan 
is a very queer place indeed, a place where virtually anything goes. And this, of 
course, is just the other side of the Orientalist coin from Conlan’s and 
Summerhawk’s excessively gloomy vision of a Japan groaning under a restrictive 
‘confucianist’ morality. (Vincent 2010, pp. 178-179) 
 
Vincent notes that McLelland’s narrative avoids serious discussion of the discrimination 
and violence faced by Japanese sexual minorities, as well as misrepresenting Japanese 
society. 
 Similarly, Diana Khor (2010) criticises the English-language studies of same-sex 
sexuality in Japan that claim that Japan is quite different from ‘the West’, suggesting a 
high level of tolerance of homosexuality in Japan. Khor disputes such claims of tolerance, 
which are based on the existence of various types of perverse (hentai) press in the post-
war period and the absence of laws prohibiting homosexuality or of strong political or 
religious coalitions condemning it. Although there was some influence from sexology 
and a tendency to pathologise homosexuality, she argues, some scholars, including 
McLelland and his associates, emphasise queer culture in Japan. She writes: 
 
Indeed, citing Fushimi (2002), a Japanese gay activist, who translated hentai as 
‘queer’, the same researchers claim that the hentai press was the first Queer 
Studies in Japan, way ahead of its Western counterparts but showing many 
parallels with the current Queer Studies ‘in which a wide range of individuals 
whose sexual and gender identities are not sanctioned by the mainstream culture, 
come together in a variety of forums to consider the dynamics at play in the 
construction of some desires as normal and others as perverse’ (Ishida, McLelland 
& Murakami, 2005, p. 40). (Khor 2010, p. 46) 
 
  
86 
86 
As a result, these representations of ‘abnormal’ desire and practice in Japan veil the power 
of normalisation among the people and of gender asymmetry in Japanese society. She 
notes that the argument for tolerance of sexual transgressions in Japan was based 
primarily on observations of male homosexuality, and remarks that ‘considering female 
same-sex relationships in Japan, one could find ample evidence of a history of intolerance 
or dismissal’ (Khor 2010, p.48). 
 Thus, there are two kinds of criticism of English-language representations of 
Japanese society in regard to sexual minorities. One is criticism of how Japan is 
represented, erasing the culture of sexual minorities and their politics, and stressing its 
repression of them, as well as the backward aspects of Japanese society in regard to sexual 
politics from the viewpoint of the West. The other criticises the representation of Japan 
that exaggerates its difference from the West, stressing ‘queer’ aspects of Japanese culture, 
such as the perverse (hentai) press and transgender culture, but ignoring violence and 
problems in society. The arguments about Japanese sexual politics in the English language 
are often also formed in the dichotomy of Japan and the West, which contribute to each 
other’s cultural identities, rather than discussing Japanese politics and cultural 
phenomena in historical and social contexts. 
 Considering McLelland’s description of Togo, we can see that he certainly casts 
a spotlight on Togo as an example of Japanese progressive queer politics, in contrast to 
the representation of Japan as a ‘Confucianist’ conservative country, which ‘favours 
uniformity and authoritarianism’, and from which queer activism is absent. He 
emphasises the ‘queer’ aspects of Togo’s activities as being more or less similar to queer 
activism in the US since the late 1980s because Togo is a highly political person in 
Japanese society. McLelland’s focus on Togo contradicts Khor’s criticism that his 
argument ignores political conflicts in Japan. However, McLelland did not explain in 
what sense Togo could be ‘queer’ in that society, beyond pointing out the similarity 
between Togo’s activism and queer activism in the United States.  
This criticism can also be applied to Oikawa’s portrait of Togo. Oikawa describes 
Togo as a radical left activist only by virtue of Togo’s resemblance to the traditional 
radical left, which is also against ‘authority’ in such forms as the Emperor and law and 
order. Their interests in Togo are mainly focused on his achievements and performances, 
rather than on the ideas of social equality, gender and sexuality that motivate his social 
activities. 
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 To avoid simplifying Japan as either a ‘Confucianist’ conservative country or an 
‘anything can happen’ queer country, I will closely analyse Togo’s thinking on society, 
discrimination, gender and sexuality. There is some common ground between the ideas 
of those who stress Japanese conservatism and the image of Togo as representing ‘queer’ 
or ‘radical’ Japan. Just as Conlan (2001) uses the term ‘the Confucianist mentality’ (p. iv), 
the scholars who regard Japanese society as conservative often refer to the Japanese 
mentality as the root of such conservatism, especially in terms of emotions such as shame 
and fear. On the other hand, Togo himself often mentioned, in his book, in speech and on 
his personal website, his motto: ‘At the very least, I want to sleep without being ashamed 
of myself’ (Togo 1979; ‘Togo Ken wo shibobu’ 2012).  
 In the next section, I will explore how Japanese studies have regarded ‘shame’, or 
‘haji’ in Japanese, as the essential emotion in society or, should I say, the ‘national 
emotion’, and then I will analyse how Togo utilised this emotion for his politics, which 
are closely related to gender and sexuality. 
 
3. Shame and Japanese Culture  
 
3-1. A Shame Culture in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword and Cultural Wholeness 
 
Before analysing Togo’s discourses on shame, gender and sexuality, I will present an 
overview of discourses surrounding haji, or ‘shame’ in Japanese Studies, as haji has long 
been treated in these studies as the essential emotion in Japanese society. As early as the 
1940s, American cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict, in The Chrysanthemum and the 
Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (1946), famously described Japanese culture as a 
‘shame culture’, in contrast to the US ‘guilt culture’. Her research into Japanese culture 
was initiated by a US government commission in 1944. Even though Benedict was not 
an expert on Japanese culture, as she had never been to Japan, could not speak Japanese, 
and conducted her research by interviewing Japanese migrants to the US and investigating 
Japanese documents, her book has become one of the most influential works on 
contemporary Japanese culture and society, both in the United States and in Japan. As 
Ozawa Kazunori (1995) points out, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was widely read 
in Japan and has contributed to the close-knit network of interests concerned with 
Japanese culture following the Pacific War. 
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 Benedict defines ‘shame cultures’ as those that ‘rely on external sanctions for 
good behaviour’, whilst ‘guilt cultures’ rely ‘on an internalised conviction of sin’ 
(Benedict 1946, p. 223). She notes the differences in moral principles between shame 
cultures and guilt cultures. In shame cultures, people behave in accordance with the 
judgement of the public regarding their deeds, while people in guilt cultures behave in 
accordance with their conscience or for avoidance of sin. Such a clear distinction between 
cultures presupposes that each culture has a coherent and consistent character. In her 
theoretical book, Patterns of Culture, originally published in 1934, she insists that cultural 
behaviours need to be understood from the viewpoint of a culture as a whole. ‘A culture, 
like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action. Within each 
culture there come into being characteristic purposes not necessarily shared by other types 
of society’ (Benedict 1989, p.46). Thus, when she compares two different cultures, she 
focuses on the incommensurable differences between them. 
 
They [cultures] differ from one another not only because one trait is present here 
and absent there, and because another trait is found in two regions in two different 
forms. They differ still more because they are oriented as wholes in different 
directions. They are travelling along different roads in pursuit of different ends, 
and these ends and these means in one society cannot be judged in terms of those 
of another society, because essentially they are incommensurable. (ibid., p.223) 
 
As she clearly argued, her idea of cultural patterns, or a culture as a whole, is based on 
cultural relativism17.  
 When Benedict (1946) compared Japanese culture to that of the US, she 
emphasised the differences in moral principles between the two cultures, now well-known 
as, respectively, a ‘shame culture’ and a ‘guilt culture’.  
 
In anthropological studies of different cultures the distinction between those 
which rely heavily on shame and those that rely heavily on guilt is an important 
one. A society that inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men 
developing a conscience is a guilt culture by definition, but a man in such a society 
may, as in the United States, suffer in addition from shame when he accuses 
himself of gaucheries which are in no way sins. […] In a culture where shame is 
a major sanction, people are chagrined about acts which we expect people to feel 
guilty about. This chagrin can be very intense and it cannot be relieved, as guilt 
can be, by confession and atonement. (Benedict 1946, pp. 222-223) 
                                                
17 For detailed analysis of Benedict’s theoretical view of culture and The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, see Lie (2001). 
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Stressing the fact that people in the United States, which she categorised as the guilt 
culture, can also suffer from shame, she defines the characteristics of a shame culture as 
the lack of a sense of guilt and of absolute standards of morality, interestingly similar to 
Foucault’s characteristics of ars erotica. 
 Although The Chrysanthemum and the Sword is now regarded as a classic on 
Japanese culture, Japanese scholars criticised Benedict’s view of Japanese culture as a 
coherent whole just after the Japanese translation of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword 
was published. The Journal of Folkloristics, in 1950, featured a special issue titled ‘The 
Problems Raised by The Chrysanthemum and the Sword’. Yanagida Kunio (1950), a 
founder of Japanese native folkloristics or minzokugaku, criticised her work as 
overlooking the Japanese people’s sense of sin, which was developed by the Buddhist 
tradition. After expressing his interest in Benedict’s work from the viewpoint of a native 
folklorist, he ironically writes: ‘One can rarely find even among the Christian nations a 
people such as the Japanese who have so often and for so long used the word tsumi’, 
which means sin or guilt in Japanese (Yanagida 1950, p. 290). Giving examples of how 
commonly the word tsumi is used in Japanese idiomatic expressions, Yanagida notes that 
the influence of Buddhism, especially the ideas of guilt, sin and life, has been strong 
among Japanese people, even though their understanding of Buddhism was not 
theoretical.  
 Referring sarcastically to Benedict’s gender, Yanagida argues that the idea of sin 
was gendered, since Buddhism had encouraged the Japanese people to believe that 
women were sinful beings. According to the Buddhist idea of a circle of reincarnation, 
Yanagida writes, people came into the world as women as a consequence of sin in 
previous lives; hence, the ideal, for women in particular, was to live without sin in this 
life.  
 In addition, he extends the idea of ‘shame’ in Japanese culture. As Yanagida 
explains, shame primarily meant ‘being laughed at’, and it was only allowable to laugh 
overtly at an enemy (1950, p. 291). Thus, he points out that the moral force of shame, 
stressed by Benedict, was distinctive only for the Warrior class and not for the majority 
of Japanese people. By such counterexamples, Yanagida questions Benedict’s 
understanding of Japanese culture as a whole and as a shame culture. 
 Despite such criticism of Benedict’s idea of ‘the Japanese culture’ immediately 
following the book’s publication in Japan, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword has been 
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enthusiastically accepted as the work that successfully described the Japanese national 
character (Mead 1959, p. 248; Modell 1983, pp. 286-290). After the Japanese identity 
crisis caused by defeat in the war, studies of ‘Japaneseness’, Nihonjinron, which attempt 
to pinpoint the essential nature or uniqueness of Japanese people, culture and society, 
became popular in post-war Japan, and The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was regarded 
as the source of this interest (Kent 1999).  
 John Lie (2001) discusses the similarities between analyses of Japanese culture in 
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword and discourses of Nihonjinron. Firstly, they both lack 
a comparative perspective and exaggerate Japanese distinctiveness. He notes that these 
discourses also treat the West as a homogeneous unit: ‘In creating a polar contrast 
between Japan and the West, they reify and homogenise the West and ignore altogether 
non-European societies. The West appears as an antipode of Japan’ (Lie 2001, p. 255). 
Secondly, both works are ahistorical and presuppose static essences of Japan and the 
Japanese people. ‘Although the rapidity and urgency of Meiji state-making heightened 
the importance of top-down control and vertical hierarchy, egalitarian and horizontal 
sentiments and relations persisted in the twentieth century’ (Lie 2001, p. 255). Lie (2001) 
argues that the popularity of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword in post-war Japan 
contributed to the idea that the West and Japan are distinct and that, therefore, Japan is 
unique18. 
 Harumi Befu (1987, 2001), regarding Nihonjinron as a kind of mass consumer 
good rather than as an academic discourse, insists that it has functioned as a national 
ideology in Japanese society. Because symbols of national identity, such as the Emperor, 
the flag, the anthem and national shrines, were for some people contentious reminders of 
the wartime regime, Befu (2001) asserts that Nihonjinron ‘has entered the arena of post-
war nationalism as a way of defining Japan’s new identity, unblemished by past symbols’ 
(p. 101). Jack Eisenberg (2007) suggests that Nihonjinron has played a prominent role in 
Japanese politics, contributing to Japanese nationalist politics, especially its xenophobic 
anti-multiculturalism. As Nihonjinron presupposes Japanese racial or ethnic features as 
                                                
18 For critical analysis of Nihonjinron, see Aoki (1990) and Sugimoto and Mouer 
(1995). Oguma (2002) also genealogically investigates discourses of Japanese self-
image in pre-war Japan and asserts that discourses of the homogeneous Japanese have 
become dominant in Japanese society after the defeat in the war, which caused Japan to 
relinquish its colony.  
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the basis of Japanese homogeneity, it has been used to ignore racial and ethnic minorities 
in Japan in favour of preserving the ‘core of Japaneseness’. He writes:  
 
In light of this preoccupation with Japanese identity, which continues to play out 
on several platforms of life, including graphic art, pop culture, and literature, 
politicians can exploit these assumptions about core identity in attacking 
foreigners. Nihonjinron is not a new concept. It has been built into the social fabric 
of Japanese society for centuries, but now seems to manifest itself in the political 
rhetoric of anti-immigration. (Eisenberg 2007, p. 94) 
 
The idea of Japanese culture as a whole, which The Chrysanthemum and the Sword and 
Nihonjinron have promoted, has been regarded not only as an Orientalist view that unduly 
simplified Japanese culture, but also as a nationalist one that masks the diversity of 
Japanese society.  
 Altogether, the discourses of Japanese culture as a shame culture in the thinking 
of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword and Nihonjinron have decidedly disputable aspects. 
Firstly, as Sugiyama and Mouer and Befu point out, these discourses, considered as 
academic achievements, have serious methodological flaws (Sugiyama and Mouer 1986: 
Befu 1987, 2001). They mostly tend to ignore the perspective of history, the diversity of 
Japanese culture, class issues, and ethnic, gender and sexual minorities in Japanese 
society. Secondly, their methodological presumption of a culture as a whole can be useful 
in representing the Japanese culture for a general reader, but at the same time, such 
simplification can function as an ideology that contributes to cultural nationalism and, 
even worse, to xenophobia in the Japanese political arena (Eisenberg 2007; Lie 2001). 
Thirdly, labelling Japanese culture a ‘shame culture’ in such a way only emphasises moral 
norms of ‘shame’ in Japanese society, resulting in neglect of political and cultural 
struggles by social minorities. Although Benedict defines shame as the moral discipline 
contrasting with guilt in the West, it results in contributing to the national ideology in 
post-war Japan, differentiating it from the West, as well as marginalising social minorities. 
 
3-2. Shame and Order 
 
As might be expected, Benedict’s categorisation of Japan as the one of ‘shame cultures’ 
is applied to the analysis of Japan as being a society with a low crime rate. Komiya Nobuo 
(1999), a former research officer in the Ministry of Justice of Japan, utilises Japanese 
moral principles such as shame, loyalty and giri (duty), which Benedict analysed in 
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explaining the low crime rate in Japan. According to him, the Japanese legal system is an 
imitation of the Western legal system, accepting the form of the legal system but with the 
Japanese government leaving Japanese traditional morality and custom intact: that is, he 
insists, ‘Japanese legal system is Western in guise but Japanese in spirit’ (Komiya 1999, 
p.372). He regards that Japanese social order has been maintained through group-based 
informal rules in local contexts: the moral principles, such as loyalty and shame, of each 
small group. 
 
Differences in the quantity and quality of such rules provide a significant basis 
for an understanding of the lower crime rate in Japan vis-à-vis the West. To put 
it simply, the difference in the strength of informal social control over 
individuals in Japan as compared with the West offers the key to an 
understanding of Japan’s relatively low crime rate. (ibid., p. 380) 
  
Thus, according to Komiya’s analysis, Japanese social order and its low crime rate is 
achieved not by the national legal system but by a local informal control over individuals. 
 Although his analysis of the mechanism of negative emotions in Japanese society 
is different from Benedict’s, Komiya considers that the Japanese sense of shame has 
social effects in maintaining order. Opposing Benedict’s view of the Japanese sense of 
shame, Komiya relates: 
 
This [Benedict’s discussion] seems to be based on the assumption that Japanese 
lay emphasis on the judgement of others, whereas Westerners place emphasis 
on inner standards of conduct. However, the Japanese sense of shame is not a 
superficial concern for others, but a function of the inner mind. In other minds, 
the Japanese sense of shame arises as a result of going against the ‘belief’ that 
one should confirm to rules. Therefore, what is important is the difference in the 
characteristics of Japanese and Western rules. Japanese rules are personalistic 
and particularistic, whereas Western rules are universalistic. (ibid., p.386) 
 
In Komiya’s view of Japanese social order, shame among the Japanese functions to 
produce self-consciousness and obsession with rules shared with others in the community. 
Thus, shame in Japanese society has inner and social functions: producing self-
consciousness and a sense of the community that one belongs to. As shame sticks to the 
sense of community, someone else’s ‘shameful’ conduct can also mean shame for the 
community to which the person belongs. Therefore, shame works not only as a self-
discipline but also in maintaining order in the community. Komiya notes the differences 
in sanctions against offenders against social rules between Japan and the West: ‘What is 
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interesting here is that, as a means of differentiation of offenders, Japan adopts the 
deprivation of membership because of its emphasis on groups, whereas the West uses 
official stigmatisation because of its emphasis on individuals’ (ibid., p. 387).  
 As Komiya applies the functions of shame to his explanation of Japan’s low crime 
rate and the order of local communities, shame has been regarded as emotion functioning 
conservatively in Japanese society for Japanese self-consciousness, self-discipline and 
the order of communities. As Benedict says, for some scholars, shame is ‘the root of 
virtue. A man who is sensitive to it will carry out all the rules of good behaviour’ in Japan 
(Benedict 1946, p. 224). 
 Considering sexual politics in post-war Japan, I will try to explore the cultural and 
political movements of social minorities that arise through shame rather than looking at 
the functions of the moral principle in Japanese society. In the following section, I will 
discuss the politics of Togo, focusing on the political functions of emotions, and 
especially of ‘shame’, as reflected in the on-going discussions in queer theory concerning 
emotions and their affects. Through analysis of shame and Togo’s politics, I will discuss 
how the emotion of shame does not only work as moral enforcement in Japanese society, 
as Benedict and her followers insist, but can also be utilised as the voice of a minority, 
even producing ‘counter discourses’, in the Foucauldian sense, in sexual politics 
(Foucault 1980).  
 
4. Shame and Queer Politics 
 
When exploring a new horizon of cultural politics, many interdisciplinary studies have 
taken note of the cultural, social and psychological meaning of painful emotions, for 
example, shame, debasement, humiliation, disgust and so on (Nathanson 1995; Honneth 
1995, 2007). In the field of Queer Studies, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) has 
influentially refined the theoretical and political potentials of shame in the context of post-
structuralism. Along with interpreting Silvan Tomkins, Sedgwick suggests that Affect 
Theory might offer an alternative understanding of sexuality, which has often been 
discussed in terms of psychoanalysis. According to Sedgwick, Tomkins thought that 
Freudian theory was flawed in its use of sexuality to represent drives in general (ibid., p. 
18). For Tomkins, the difference between the drive system and the affect system lies in 
degrees of freedom: while the drives are relatively narrowly constrained in their aims and 
time scales, affects have greater freedom in both respects. In relations to aims, drives are 
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more constrained than affects, in that, for example; ‘breathing will not satisfy my hunger, 
nor will sleeping satisfy my need to excrete waste’ (ibid., p. 18). Affects, however, can 
have any object: ‘Affects can be, and are, attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, 
relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things, including 
other affects. Thus, one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame or surprised by joy’ 
(ibid., p. 19). Similarly, drives are time-constrained: ‘I need to breathe within the next 
minute, drink something today, and eat within the next few weeks to sustain life’ (ibid., 
p.18). Affects, on the other hand, have greater freedom than drives in respect to time as 
well: ‘anger can evaporate in seconds but can also motivate a decades-long career of 
revenge’ (ibid., p. 19). In contrast to the teleological nature of the drives, Sedgwick argues, 
affects can be autotelic, so that Affect Theory can be useful in resisting the teleological 
presumptions of the discipline of psychology, including heterosexist teleologies long left 
unquestioned by psychology. Following Tomkins’s critique of Freudian theory, to the 
effect that it overlooked functions of the affect system in sexuality, Sedgwick 
reconsidered sexuality and the human psyche with reference to the freedom of the affect 
system. 
 In her notable article, ‘Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry 
James’s The Art of the Novel’, Sedgwick (2003) explores the intriguing relationships 
between shame and queerness, or queer performativity. Firstly, Sedgwick notes that 
shame is a form of communication: ‘Blazons of shame, the “fallen face” with eyes down 
and head averted – and, to a lesser extent, the blush – are semaphores of trouble and at 
the same time of a desire to reconstitute the interpersonal bridge’ (ibid., p. 36). Secondly, 
shame forms identity: ‘The conventional way of distinguishing shame from guilt is that 
shame attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is, whereas guilt attaches to what 
one does’ since ‘in the developmental process, shame is now often considered the affect 
that most defines the space wherein a sense of self will develop’ (ibid., p. 37). However, 
Sedgwick emphasises the peculiar feature of shame that it is at once both contagious and 
individuating. For example, even though it seemingly has nothing to do with me, seeing 
someone else’s embarrassment or stigma can overwhelm me with the sensation of shame 
as if I were a shame-prone person. Speaking of the identity-making function of shame, 
Sedgwick insists that shame makes the double movement: ‘toward painful individuation, 
toward uncontrollable relationality’ (ibid., p. 37). Thirdly, shame interacts with sociability. 
Sedgwick interestingly expands these interactions into a sort of theatricality by quoting 
Michael Franz Basch:  
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‘The shame-humiliation reaction in infancy of hanging the head and averting the 
eyes does not mean the child is conscious of rejection, but indicates that effective 
contact with another person has been broken…. Therefore, shame-humiliation 
throughout life can be thought of as an inability to effectively arouse the other 
person’s positive reactions to one’s communications. The exquisite painfulness of 
that reaction in later life harks back to the earliest period when such a condition is 
not simply uncomfortable but threatens life itself’ (pp. 765-766). So that whenever 
the actor, or the performance artist, or I could add, the activist in an identity 
politics, proffers the spectacle of her or his ‘infantile’ narcissism to a spectating 
eye, the stage is set (so to speak) for either a newly dramatised flooding of the 
subject by the shame of refused return, or the successful pulsation of the mirroring 
regard through a narcissistic circuit rendered elliptical (which is to say: necessarily 
distorted) by the hyperbole of its original cast. (ibid., pp. 37-38) 
 
Then, Sedgwick concludes, shame is a ‘theatrical performance’ (ibid., p. 38). 
 Through her refinement of the theoretical features of shame, and the peculiar 
constructions/distractions of identity and dynamic movements between self and others 
made by shame, Sedgwick also redefines ‘queer’ as not necessarily simply meaning 
‘homosexuality’ or a kind of ‘gayness’ in Euro-American cultural contexts: 
 
If the structuration of shame differs strongly between cultures, between periods, 
and between different forms of politics, however, it differs also simply from one 
person to another within a given culture and time. Some of the infants, children, 
and adults in whom shame remains the most available mediator of identity are the 
ones called (a related word) shy. (‘Remember the fifties?’ Lily Tomlin used to ask. 
‘No one was gay in the fifties; they were just shy’.) Queer, I’d suggest, might 
usefully be thought of as referring in the first place to this group or an overlapping 
group of infants and children, those whose sense of identity is for some reason 
tuned most durably to the note of shame. […] [T]he shame-delineated place of 
identity doesn’t determine the consistency or meaning of that identity, and race, 
gender, sexuality, appearance, and abledness are only a few of the defining social 
constructions that will crystallise there, developing from this originary affect their 
particular structures of expression, creativity, pleasure, and struggle. I’d venture 
that queerness in this sense has, at this historical moment, some definitionally very 
significant overlap, through a vibrantly elastic and temporally convoluted one, 
with the complex of attributes today condensed as adult or adolescent ‘gayness’. 
(ibid., p. 63) 
 
Her careful reading of personal shame and her shame-accented definition of queerness 
suggests the rich potential of shame for exploring ‘queer’ politics in Japan, avoiding both 
the Euro-American-centric narrative of queerness and the orientalist or nationalistic 
narrative of Japanese culture, which reduces all cultural phenomena into the crystallised 
Japaneseness.  
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 Even though Sedgwick confesses her suspicions of Foucauldian power theory – 
she herself was undoubtedly influenced by it in her earlier works – in that ‘its very 
elegance seems also to make its promise unfulfillable’ (ibid., p. 9) while devoting herself 
to evolving her Affect Theory, some queer theorists, particularly Kathryn Bond Stockton 
(2006) and Sally R. Munt (2007), have applied discussions of shame to political struggles.  
 Stockton (2006) focuses on the functions of shame and debasement for exploring 
cultural and historical entanglements between ‘black’ and ‘queer’ in the US:  
 
Shame itself proves exceptionally composite, as I am going to show. There is no 
purely black form of debasement --- nor a queer one. Only blended forms of shame. 
A circuitry of switchpoints keeps associations sparking between ‘black’ and 
‘queer’ and the signs attached to them: between cloth and skin, between sexual 
dirtiness and the filth of neighbourhoods, between tabooed attractions and acts of 
racial punishment, between miscegenation and sexual sameness, and between the 
autoimmunities of memory and those of the body. (Stockton 2006, p. 23) 
 
Although her efforts to link ‘black’ and ‘queer’ through shame ironically imply the 
‘whiteness’ of ‘queer’ in the premises of her discussion, her work still indicates the 
theoretical fruitfulness of shame as social dynamism intervening between race and 
sexuality, or between stigmatised bodies and desire. 
 Munt (2007) explains how shame can create counter discourses, recalling 
Foucault’s famous example, in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, of the occurrence of 
reverse discourses, whereby the pathologised homosexuals, who supposedly were 
shameful people in society, have started to claim their identity and rights by using the 
themes of psychology that had previously pathologised them (Munt 2007, pp. 3-4).
  
 Applying these theoretical features of shame to the politics of Togo Ken, I will 
analyse how haji or shame functions in his discourses and performances and in the 
audience’s reactions to him. Thus, I will focus on his ideas about gender, sexuality and 
Japanese society, rather than on a wider analysis of Japanese society and history and on 
contextualising him within them as Oikawa and McLelland did. How did he define 
himself when he performed his famous political acts and what was his political 
legitimation for actions that nobody before him had ever undertaken? 
 
5. Togo’s Sexual Politics and Shame 
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5-1. Togo’s Autobiographical Narrative and Shameful Life 
 
When we investigate Togo’s thoughts and the meaning of his performances, the first thing 
we notice is that he always talked about his own life. Indeed, it is remarkable that Togo’s 
publications and his personal website contain detailed profiles and autobiographical 
accounts of his relationships with his parents (especially with his mother), his school life, 
his first sexual experiences and life as an owner of a gay bar. As he narrates, Togo was 
born into a high-profile Japanese family in 1932. His grandfather was a member of the 
House of Representatives of Japan and his father was a prefectural assembly member. He 
repeatedly tells the autobiographical story of how an upper-class man, who graduated 
from an elite university with good grades and used to work in a major bank, became just 
an owner of a gay bar. His autobiography is impressive for readers, especially those who 
are interested in him, so much so that both Oikawa (2001) and McLelland (2005) have 
mentioned Togo’s life in their articles. 
 Although his life story seemingly gives a clue to his character, it is uncertain as 
to whether or not the story is altogether true. For example, in the profile on his personal 
website, he relates that the British newspaper The Daily Mirror, in June 1971, introduced 
his public activities as an openly gay activist with a photo in its leading article describing 
Togo as ‘a twenty-first century Angel from the East’ (‘Togo wo shibobu’ 2012). But, in 
fact, The Daily Mirror farcically discussed him on the page dedicated to ‘weird news’, 
illustrating its report with a photo of him and half-naked men: ‘MORE Gaiety: Ken Togo, 
39, is running for office in Japan’s Upper House elections as a sort of one-man 
homosexual party. His bodyguards are members of his party or persuasion, whichever 
way you look at it’ (The Daily Mirror 1971, p. 4). Of course, there is no word in this 
report about ‘a twenty-first century Angel from the East’. Hence, his autobiographical 
story, which he sometimes narrates in overly camp language, cannot simply be read as a 
memoir based on fact. Rather, it might be part of his performance.  
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Figure 5. The Daily Mirror’s article about Togo’s electoral campaign (The Daily Mirror 
1971). Courtesy of The Daily Mirror. 
 
 Interestingly, since he insists that he has learnt ‘the truth’ of human life and 
society through living as a homosexual, his autobiographical narrative is performative, 
indicating what ‘the truth’ of human life and society is and how he learnt it. In his 
discourses, living as a homosexual, or an okama, is an essential factor in capturing ‘the 
truth’ of the world. He writes:	
 
So far, I have lived, so to speak, in an underground society. As I have come down 
to the lowest place in society and found the truth, I will keep crying out from the 
other side of the world. […] I have nothing to be ashamed of in being called a 
‘homo’ and ‘okama’. In fact, I have lived such a life. Rather, now I’m turning 50 
years old, I think that I have gained a glimpse into ‘the truth of humans’ through 
an unashamedly homo life. (Togo 1979, p. 9) 
 
Togo’s narrative has the structure of a classic literary genre, the Bildungsroman or 
coming-of-age story, in which an innocent, naïve boy becomes an adult who understands 
the world well though the difficulties he has faced. What is intriguing in Togo’s story is 
that the goal of the story is reversed, as he moves from an economically and politically 
privileged young boy to a homosexual or okama living in an underground society. Thus, 
a query arising from Togo’s discourses is what he meant by ‘the truth’, and how he could 
learn ‘the truth’ through life as a homosexual or okama. 
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 In the book Zatsumin no ronri (the logic of a motley assembly of people), he 
repeatedly relates where and with whom he happened to have homosexual sex. His affairs 
with men are far from romantic; rather, they are grotesque, shameful, disgusting, and 
sometimes violent. For example, he calls a middle-aged guy with whom he had sex in his 
undergraduate days a ‘drowned rat’, as the man was a perspirer, and describes sex with 
him in detail. Elsewhere, he relates how he forced an employee in his gay bar, who 
smelled bad as a result of syphilis, to go to a clinic. 
The most disturbing episode that he recounts is of the violence or, in his own 
words, the ‘okama lynch’, which he personally witnessed in the underground world. What 
happened was that a group of ex-staff members of Togo’s establishment beat up the most 
beautiful and popular transgender woman in his bar, putting a lighted cigarette in her nose 
and cutting her hair and clothes, as she had been the cause of them having to leave Togo’s 
bar and had spread reports of their bad behaviour. In his writing, this incident and its 
violence are closely related to homosexuality, gender divergence and ‘undergroundness’. 
When his ex-employees visited him to meet their target, he says he did not wonder at all 
since, ‘in a normal society’, he explains, ‘it is not common that one comes to the bar 
which she ungratefully left and asks the owner to see an ex-colleague, but she won’t 
follow such normal rules’ (ibid., p. 84). While Togo emphasises their femininity when 
explaining their rudeness, he describes their violence as masculine: ‘Even though people 
call them an okama, gay, or sister, they are still men. They punished Miki by baring their 
nature under the covering masks’ (ibid., p. 85). Then, Togo describes how they changed 
after the attack: ‘After the lynch, they acted feminine as usual, as if they were completely 
different people from the ones who had just finished a tough fight and they left with a 
typically feminine way of walking among homos’ (ibid., p. 86). Along with episodes of 
his economic problems as an owner of a gay bar, Togo describes the underground world 
of okama, with its dramas of homosexuals, transgenders, prostitutes, hostesses, and 
yakuza (Japanese mafia), as the chaotic place of abnormal sex, violence, money and 
illegality: the shameful place.  
  
5-2. Towards a Politics of Shame 
 
Togo reflects on a young boy with whom he had a relationship, asserting that this young 
boy was a key person in Togo’s political development. According to Togo, when they met 
he was seventeen or eighteen years old and a high school student, but during his time as 
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an undergraduate he became a leader of the student movements of the 1960s. Through his 
relationship with the student activist, Togo was influenced by the Marxist ideas of the 
student movements: 
 
The student movements in the late 1960s had a wonderful word, self-criticism, 
and as this word indicates, they tried to radically deny class-consciousness and 
cast a new light on human equality. I understood that their purpose was closely 
related to me who lived as a social outcast and suffered from that burden. 
Listening to their discussions, I felt that they talked about me. 
‘Yes, we should not deprecate ourselves as okama. Isn’t it lying that we live 
hiding the fact that a man loves a man? There is no true peace nor equality until 
all lies are gone from the world’. 
So, self-criticism of okama is that one declares in public, in broad daylight, ‘I 
am an okama’. It was a tough thing to do. But just thinking that I had made the 
declaration, I enjoyed a feeling of refreshment from removing the weak people’s, 
loser’s shame, which belongs to a social outcast, from myself. (Togo 1979, pp. 
109-110) 
 
From his encounter with the left student movements, Togo came to regard his own shame 
as a result of repression in society and started to turn away from shaming himself and 
towards social activism. 
 Togo’s political ideas are influenced by, so to speak, the ‘leftist ideology’ of the 
student movements in Japan, inspired by Marxism, as Togo himself admits. However, his 
analysis of social repression and strategies for combating it differ from the traditional 
Marxist account. Leftist ideology under the Marxist influence of the 1960s defines 
politics as the struggle between classes, explaining social injustice as the result of 
repression of one class by the other19. By contrast, Togo does not posit a tense relationship 
between the homosexuals, or okama, and people who are not, since class relations cause 
economic and social exploitation but the relationships between homosexuals and non-
homosexuals do not necessarily lead to such exploitation. Rather, in Togo’s view, there is 
no distinct difference between homosexuals and people who are not because homosexual 
desire is not something belonging to some people from birth, but something all people 
                                                
19 Sunada (1969) points out that the ideology of student movements in the 1960s is 
primarily based on Marxism, aiming at overthrowing the existing capitalist system, and 
the differences in the interpretations of Marxism distinguished among the groups; 
‘Marxism is the only ideology among the student groups’ (p. 491). Although, for the 
Japanese Communists, the main enemy that embodied capitalism was the United States, 
which had strongly influenced Japanese politics and the economy since the end of the 
Second World War, the class struggle of the working class was also regarded as the 
essential for a revolution.  
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have: ‘From my experience, all men have homosexual desire. Therefore, there is no one 
who completely fails to relate to a homo. People only live their life ignoring their 
homosexual desire in themselves’ (ibid. p. 111). To support this claim, Togo 
autobiographically describes numerous sexual encounters with married men and men in 
high positions.  
 Instead of the class struggle of the left-wing theory20 , he uses the spatial 
distinctions in Japanese society to explain social injustice. His way of distinguishing 
social spaces is not based on the approach of modern politics, which distinguishes 
between the public and the private, as discussed in early Lesbian and Gay Studies in the 
English language (Schneider 1986; Sedgwick 1990; Griffin 1992; Plummer 1995; 
Halperin 1995). He identifies social spaces on the basis of shame, distinguishing between 
‘a place of sunlight’, or the place of common-sense (in his words, hi-no-ataru-basyo), 
and ‘a place of shade’, or the shameful place (hikage-no-basyo). He asserts that okama 
are alienated because they belong to the shameful place, so their liberation will shift their 
whereabouts from the shameful place to the place of common-sense. Togo writes, ‘I insist 
that I convey my thought to okama and we should liberate okama from a place of shade 
to a place of sunlight’ (Togo 1979, p. 111).  
Even though the difference in sexual desire between homosexuals and people who 
are not is subtle, the spatial distinction functions separately. Some people can come and 
go between both spaces, whereas people who are marked by shame must exist and stay 
in the shameful place. Togo says, for example, that professors or executive-level 
employees are able to enjoy homosexual affairs secretly in the shameful place while living 
with honour in society, but cross-dressers or owners of gay bars must stay in the shameful 
place for life (Togo 1979, pp.152, 156; Oikawa and Togo 2002, p. 150). Thus, Togo 
redefines social class based on emotions, honour and shame, to include sexuality in 
politics, and categorises discriminated-against people as those who live only in the 
shameful place. He calls them ‘Zatsumin’, meaning ‘a motley assembly of people’, and 
has tried to act as their political representative. 
By contrast, for Togo, the Emperor is the symbol of the space of honour in Japan, 
so that he has to struggle with it. This is why Togo continued to press the issue of the 
Emperor, even though the subject was considered politically taboo in Japan. For instance, 
                                                
20 For analysing ‘the left-wing theory’, the discourses and ideology of Japanese student 
movements in the 1960s, see Oguma (2009).  
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he challenged the Emperor’s holiness by distorting the symbol of his national power into 
an obscene image in his electoral campaign. In an election broadcast on a national public 
network in 1977, Togo said, after coming out as an okama and an owner of a gay bar: ‘I 
will abolish the Emperor System by the Constitution. If the Emperor is the national 
symbol, then a symbol of men is more important to me. I don’t need the Emperor System’ 
(Togo 1979, p. 149). 
According to Togo, the okama represents the paradox that all human beings are 
sexual, while the space of common sense is supposedly asexual, excluding the sexual 
subject. He argues: 
 
It is said that okama is against common sense. What is common sense? Common 
sense is exactly what restricts people. From my experience, all men have 
homosexual desire. Therefore, there is no one who completely fails to relate to a 
homo. People only live their lives ignoring the homosexual desire in themselves. 
I'm not insisting that all humans should be homos. From my own experience, I 
say that it's better not to be a homo as long as the society stays as it is, for society, 
through common sense, alienates a homo. And those who are on the side of 
common sense are alienating themselves by alienating homos. (Togo 1979, pp. 
111-112)  
 
Consequently, his political strategy would be to subvert the spatial distinction. There are 
two methods for his particular politics to adopt. In the first method, a social outcast or 
okama comes out from the shameful place into the place of common-sense and makes 
people accept his existence there. This method is exemplified by Togo’s notorious 
campaigns for public office as an okama, from the 1970s to the 1990s, despite having no 
chance of being elected. The second method consists of pulling people in honourable 
positions down to the same level as the social outcasts. This is why the word ‘equality’ in 
Togo’s politics tends to function not by elevating the lower people to respectable positions 
in society but, rather, by making the higher people fall into the shameful positions. In a 
poem published in a public newsletter for the Upper House election in 1977, he declared, 
 
We are marked, discriminated against as an okama, whore, mistress, hostess, 
sadist, masochist, and lez.  
 
A song to you.  
If people call you abnormal, treat you like a pervert,  
I would say, politicians in corruption, those who shamelessly lie in public, are 
rather perverts… 
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Now, let’s pull down your zipper,  
Erect your gun and fire 
Toward capitalists associated with the Emperor. […] 
 
Now, rub your symbol with sweat and semen, 
Erect your gun and fuck asses, 
Of hereditary conservatives associated with bankers. (Togo 1979, pp. 143-144) 
 
When Togo uses sexual rhetoric against capitalists and politicians, and constructs political 
relationships between social outcasts or sexual deviants and the governing class through 
sexual metaphors, it can be seen that his political strategy is not to expand people’s ideas 
on normality and put outsiders into it. Rather, he radically tries to expand the sexual 
domain in society, as expressed by his comments on human equality: ‘I think that talking 
about sex is the best way to evoke people’s understanding of human equality. Anyone has 
a “bulge” and “hole”. No matter who you are and what your occupation is, this fact is 
true; we are all the same’ (ibid., p. 8). 
 Intriguingly, Togo’s autobiographical story and political purpose are 
synchronised: his life story represents his own political possibilities, whereby people can 
give up their own privileges and realise a ‘true’ idea of human equality through sex, as he 
did. This is what he calls the ‘truth’ of humans when trying to legitimate his politics. 
Therefore, even when telling his autobiographical story in public, Togo actually is 
intensely engaged, for the story is part of his politics: in his politics, his life itself is 
performative. 
  
5-3. Shame and Politics 
 
Indeed, Togo’s eccentric assertions and appearances in public have provoked not only the 
general public, but the homosexual audience as well. Hasegawa Hiroshi, a gay AIDS 
activist, said of Togo: ‘To be honest, at that time, every time when I saw Mr. Togo Ken 
on TV, I felt that I did not want to be something like that, not want to be lumped together 
with him even though I liked a man’ (Fushimi et al. 2002, p. 53). His comment is 
significant in understanding Togo’s politics, since his political message was that the 
disgusting people in the shameful place, like Togo himself, and the people who believed 
they were normal, like the majority, were the same human beings and were equal. Thus, 
performing as a shameful, disgusting man was an important part of his politics. Togo’s 
political style is like a theatrical performance; he appears in outrageous costumes and 
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expresses provocative opinions to attract public attention, then denies the difference 
between himself and his audiences, trying to pull them down to his own position, which 
is supposedly that of a shameful person. 
While Hasegawa felt that he did not want to be lumped together with Togo, some 
people actually felt a ‘closeness’ with Togo that, at the same time, they had to deny. Sara 
Ahmed (2004) and Sally R. Munt (2007) argue that disgust and shame are ‘sticky’ affects. 
For Ahmed, ‘sticky’ emotions, such as disgust and shame, are shaped by relationships, 
developed through a history, between objects, subjects and objects, or subject and signs 
(Ahmed 2004, pp. 84-92). Ahmed describes the ‘stickiness’ of affects: 
 
As a result, to get stuck to something sticky is also to become sticky. In the event 
of being cut off from a sticky object, an object (including the skin surface) may 
remain sticky and may ‘pick up’ other objects. Stickiness then is about what 
objects do to other objects – it involves a transference of affect – but it is a relation 
of ‘doing’ in which there is not a distinction between passive and active, even 
though the stickiness of one object might come before the stickiness of the other, 
such that the other seems to cling to it. (Ahmed 2004, p. 91) 
 
Because Togo had intentionally projected the shameful stereotypes of the okama, he 
himself became the sticky, shameful object, not only for straight audiences, but also for 
homosexuals who tried to establish a respectable image of themselves in order to build 
gay pride. After Oikawa (2001) published his article about Togo, a polemic was directed 
against the discriminatory connotations of the word okama in the gay community. 
Sukotan kikaku, a gay organisation, criticised a weekly journal for using this word in an 
article’s title and in its advertisement (Fushimi et al. 2002)21. A year later, Oikawa and 
Togo co-authored a book entitled ‘Joshiki wo koete (Beyond common sense)’ about 
Togo’s life and ideas. In this book, Oikawa also devoted pages to the critical responses to 
Togo’s activism from gay communities, especially gay people who worked for political 
reformation in Japan. According to Oikawa, Miyahara Junpei, a representative of Forum-
Aquarius, which aims to promote the political visibility of gay people in Japan, explains 
that in organising the Forum-Aquarius, he was motivated by antagonism towards Togo’s 
political style. Oikawa quotes Miyahara’s comment on Togo in the Forum-Aquarius 
newsletter:  
 
                                                
21 For more activities of Sukotan kikaku, see Ito and Yanase (2001).  
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The biggest harm done by his [Togo’s] activity is that it has impregnated Japanese 
society with the wrong idea that ‘an openly gay man can never be publicly elected’. 
It is possible that there will be a gay politician if our strategy works well. But for 
him to emerge, there must have been an openly gay politician in Japan long before, 
mustn’t there? (Oikawa and Togo 2002, p.217) 
 
Just as Miyahara clearly shows his hostility towards Togo, many gay activists, especially 
those of the generation slightly older than Oikawa’s, describe their ‘traumatic’ 
experiences of seeing him – a homosexual man who projected the effeminate gay 
stereotype on TV– in their childhood (Oikawa and Togo 2002, pp. 212-220). Oikawa 
relates having been told by a gay activist that his article on Togo opened a Pandora’s Box, 
raising an unmentionable subject for gay activists and leading to a bitter argument as to 
whether the publisher could use a discriminatory word like okama against gays. Ironically, 
shame and the sign ‘okama’ were tightly bound together through Togo’s performances in 
the political domain in Japan, and for some gay activists, gay shame is still something 
they need to fight in order to attain political visibility and respect. 
For this reason, his politics can be considered as a failure, and even harmful, for 
gays in Japan. Yet, considered as a political strategy, his approach, which tries to build 
equality on the basis of disgust and shame, is radical and can be of interest within queer 
politics.  
Martha C. Nussbaum (2010) discusses how the politics of disgust and of humanity 
are engaged in a complicated struggle with each other in sexual politics in the United 
States. In the first type of politics, disgust is utilised to debase some groups of people, 
such as those with disabilities, homosexuals, and gender, racial and religious minorities. 
By contrast, the politics of humanity offers all persons equal respect in relation to human 
dignity and natural rights, as protected by the Constitution. Nussbaum notes two features 
of disgust: projection and attachment. Firstly, disgust can be extended from object to 
object: 
 
Disgust is then extended from object to object in ways that could hardly bear 
rational scrutiny. This sort of extended disgust is what I call projective disgust. 
Rozin calls the principles of disgust-projection ‘laws of sympathetic magic’. One 
such magical idea is that if object A is disgusting and B looks like A, B is also 
disgusting. (Nussbaum 2010, p. 15) 
 
Thus, objects of disgust and the effects of disgust can be extended through analogical 
similarity. Secondly, disgust is attached to human animality: 
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The so-called primary objects of disgust are reminders of human animality and 
mortality: feces, other bodily fluids, corpses, and animals or insects who have 
related properties (slimy, smelly, oozy). Rozin concludes that it is the filth and 
stench of humanity itself that underlies all of disgust’s more parochial instances. 
(Nussbaum 2010, p. 14) 
 
Even though Nussbaum tries to secure equal respect for all people based on the rational 
ability of humans and on the Constitution - the so-called politics of humanity - the politics 
of disgust can undermine it by recalling human animality, which is a natural attribute of 
human beings. Thus, the politics of disgust is not something the politics of humanity can 
overcome but, rather, it is the conditions of the politics of humanity, or the starting point 
of the politics of humanity, which negates disgust by rationality. In addition, disgust can 
be rationally utilised in the field of Law, as Nussbaum observes when criticising Sodomy 
laws (Nussbaum 2010, pp. 27-28). Therefore, her politics of humanity is not as clear as 
the politics of disgust. Nonetheless, her distinction between the politics of disgust and the 
politics of humanity is useful in understanding the mechanism of the exclusion or 
inclusion of people considered ‘sexual’, and often caricatured by images of faeces, human 
fluids and disease. 
 What Togo meant by his spatial distinction, that is, between the space of 
common-sense and the shameful space, is akin to Nussbaum’s meaning in distinguishing 
between the politics of humanity and the politics of disgust. For example, when Togo 
describes the shameful place, he often symbolically mentions the semen of homosexual 
affairs and the blood flowing from the violence that takes place there. However, 
Nussbaum’s discussion in the context of legal philosophy can be seen as a denial of 
sexuality in itself, since the politics of humanity, which relies on rationality and the 
Constitution for equal respect to be accorded all people, tries to overcome the politics of 
disgust, which is rooted in natural human attributes such as affects and the body. Her 
politics always needs to rationalise human sexuality in order to gain respect. In contrast, 
Togo insists that all people are equal because all people are sexual, so that our ideas on 
equality and the existing rules of sexuality should be changed. Thus, in his thought 
process, equality must be grounded in human animality. ‘Unity of outsiders should hold 
to the slogan “equality for all”, especially equality in sex. I believe that equality in love 
can be the starting point of new forms of humans, for all humans equally have sex and 
sex is fundamental to a human being’ (Togo 1979, pp. 157-158). His radical ideas on 
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sexuality and equality can be disturbing even now, for he asserts that not only homosexual 
acts, but also incestuous affairs and paedophilic acts, should be liberated in society. 
 I do not discuss here whether his political purpose is realistic, or whether we 
should follow him nowadays. Rather, I will focus on the role of shame in his politics and 
identity. In Japanese studies, or nihonjin-ron, shame has been considered to function 
‘conservatively’ in Japanese society; shame works to sustain morals or is the key emotion 
of the homogeneous Japanese culture. In Togo’s politics, however, shame functions 
distinctively: constructing a minority identity, explaining social injustice, and facilitating 
political performances. Togo’s radical political performances, or exhibitionism, are the 
reverse side of the shame he has suffered as a homosexual in Japanese society. He used 
shame for his theatrical-political performance, trying to attract the attention of the general 
public through his eccentric appearance and opinions; then he denied the difference 
between himself and the general public for claiming human equality. Contradictory 
affects operate simultaneously in his theatrical politics: his performance indicates his 
exquisite shame and pride as a social outsider or okama. In addition, it conveys his denial 
of occupying a shameful place in society, and his assertion that all humans are equal in 
regard to sex. This contradiction in his politics allows him to insist on contradictory 
political messages; on the one hand, he tried to gain respect for people, like himself, who 
live in the shameful place, but, on the other hand, he claims equality for all, which would 
mean abandoning the political importance of the people in the shameful place, and even 
Togo’s own importance. Shame and his ambivalent relationship with it have produced his 
contradiction, but shame has also certainly opened up the possibilities of radical ‘queer’ 
politics in Japan. 
   
5-4. Gender-bending Politics, or the Paradox of Togo’s Politics 
 
As Sally R. Munt points out that shame is discursively linked to femininity in the context 
of Western culture (Munt 2007, p. 2, 97), Togo’s shame is marked by femininity in his 
descriptions of homosexuals, sexual identity and political representations. Reading 
carefully Togo’s description of the shameful place, in his discourse shame is distinctively 
gendered. When Togo emphasises the marginalised position of okama, he refers to the 
okama’s feminised figure and conduct (Togo 1979, pp. 81-89). Reflecting his childhood 
and his sexual identity as a homosexual, Togo expresses his strong love for his mother 
and considers that his homosexuality came from her influence (ibid., pp. 15-23). In his 
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political address, Togo appealed to the people who he considered himself to represent: 
‘We are marked, discriminated against as an okama, whore, mistress, hostess, sadist, 
masochist, and lez’ (ibid., p. 143). Since he mentions a ‘whore, mistress, hostess, and lez’, 
who are all females, the people in the shameful place are largely female or feminised 
people. Thus, the female image is important in understanding his shame, as Mark 
McLelland noted when considering Togo’s feminised transgendering performance as an 
element of his ‘queer’ politics (McLelland 2005, pp. 166-167). Since shame is regarded 
to be a close relation to femininity, his political performance, which represents the 
marginalised ‘shameful’ people, exaggerates his femininity as an okama. 
However, when he turns from the shameful person to the political one in public, 
he returns to the image of a masculine being, or at least distances himself from the female 
subject. 
 
Some struggle to climb up from the bottom while others impose undesirable things 
on the bottom. I have talked about women as vulnerable. But dominators in the 
Emperor System cleverly try to utilise the ambition of people in vulnerable 
positions. Women are especially susceptible to control through their love for home 
and children. (Togo and Oikawa 2002, p. 150)  
 
In this comment, he describes women not only as victims of the hegemonic society within 
the Emperor System, but also as people who are easily controlled and affected by the 
system to reproduce injustice.  
In Togo’s thoughts, therefore, femininity represents two types of inferiority: a 
source of shame in society and a lack of political ability to oppose it. As Togo asserts, 
women are repressed since femininity is often marked as sexual and is marginalised in 
the hegemony of Japanese society. Nevertheless, Togo thinks that women are too weak 
and naïve to fight this hegemony. This ambiguity towards femininity leads Togo to a 
contradictory position. He tries to represent the powerless people in the role of an okama, 
a feminised man, but, in his political role, he cannot be fully a woman because, by his 
logic, women are too naïve to be political. 
Hence, he must be a male subject with regard to politics but must adhere to 
femininity as a repressed subject. In this sense, what McLelland evaluates as queer 
politics in Togo’s transgenderism, was not positive at all, since misogyny is intricately 
involved in it. Firstly, there is the misogyny that looks down upon femininity, and 
excludes it from society, as being sexual. This femininity is what Togo identified with, 
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attacking Japanese hegemonic society for its view of the repressed subject. However, 
there is also Togo’s own misogyny, causing him to reject femininity as a political man. 
This femininity makes a person an inferior subject in the political arena, suggesting illogic, 
stupidity, emotionalism and powerlessness. Even though Togo’s political performances 
seem interestingly ‘queer’ from our viewpoint, since he used gender-bending 
performances to criticise society, such performances are motivated by his ambivalent 
attachment to, and avoidance of, femininity.  
His shame certainly motivates his radical politics but, at the same time, it can lead 
him to turn his back on his own radicalism, which denies social inequality from the 
standpoint of the shameful place. Although shame and femininity are closely related, 
Togo cannot completely embrace femininity as a political man. It is not the reservations 
about Togo among gay activists in Japan, but his own reservations about femininity, that 
limit his radical politics by undermining his political purpose. 
When McLelland rereads the history of sexual minorities in Japan as ‘queer’, 
based on its similarity with queer theory from the Anglophone society, which offers new 
perspectives on gender and sexuality, the problem is not simply that McLelland 
reappropriates Orientalist sexual fantasy, including the stereotype of the masculine West 
and the feminine Orient. Firstly, he dismisses the problem of misogyny, as associated with 
sexuality, in Japanese society, which deeply affected Togo’s political thoughts. Secondly, 
he reinforces Togo’s misogyny through failing to mention it when evaluating Togo’s 
transgendering politics. In light of these problems, it can sometimes be misleading or 
oversimplified to apply the concept of ‘queer’ to the cultural phenomena of other cultures 
just because of the similarity between what they look like and what the word ‘queer’ 
represents. 
 
6. Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken: Historicising Togo’s Politics and the Nation 
 
At first glance, Mishima Yukio has nothing in common with Togo Ken, except that they 
were both homosexuals. On the one hand, Mishima was a notable Japanese novelist and 
radical nationalist who openly adored the Emperor, while Togo, on the other hand, was 
an owner of a gay bar and radical leftist who passionately attacked the Emperor, which 
was politically taboo in Japanese society. I argued in the previous chapter that Mishima 
tried to represent the Emperor as the homoerotically desirable ideal, and then expressed 
his homoerotic desire as tragically heroic. When he endeavours to re-masculinise his 
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desire and himself, he converts his homoeroticism to legitimate political passion through 
the image of the Emperor. Togo, who appears to be an activist at the other end of the 
political spectrum from Mishima, also comes compulsively close to the Emperor. 
 Togo aggressively criticised the Emperor System and the Emperor’s holiness 
as symbols of the hegemonic Japanese society. He considered that the hegemony of 
Japanese society is reproduced through the class hierarchy and people’s desire for upward 
mobility: ‘Some struggle to climb up from the bottom while others impose undesirable 
things on the bottom. […] But dominators in the Emperor System cleverly try to utilise 
the ambition of people in vulnerable positions’ (Oikawa and Togo 2002, p. 150). 
Accordingly, his politics is defined in terms of that which exactly opposes the Emperor 
System, reversing the hegemony of the Emperor and trying to degrade honourable men, 
such as politicians and the Emperor. Togo describes himself as the opposite face of the 
Emperor. 
 
With the Emperor on top of the pyramid, Japanese people confirm their existence 
through discriminating against each other. At the bottom of the pyramid are okama, 
the most discriminated against, and on the top, there is the Emperor. (Oikawa and 
Togo 2002, p. 158) 
 
With this logic, as the opposite face of the Emperor, Togo tried to convert the Emperor’s 
holiness, honour and political symbolic power to shameful objects such as himself, 
leading to an actual violent attack on him by a right-winger. At the same time, however, 
his politics eroticised the Emperor in that his insults were always conducted through 
sexual messages. By placing an okama in the position exactly opposite to the Emperor, 
Togo narcissistically identified with the obscene version of the Emperor as an okama, 
although in a different way from Mishima’s fantasy, which homoeroticised the 
relationship between himself and the Emperor. Despite differences of political ideology, 
this common aspect of Mishima and Togo indicates how useful the political symbol of 
the Emperor was for marginalised men when they tried to politicise themselves and to 
reconstruct their masculinity within the Japanese national imaginary. 
 It is interesting to compare Togo with Mishima. Mishima transformed the 
representation of homoeroticism from underground desire and something taboo to the 
patriotic homoeroticism of Japanese iconic figures, such as samurai, and the tragic but 
heroic soldiers of the Pacific War who had died for the Emperor. In this type of 
representation, Mishima has nationalised homoeroticism and situated his desire as a 
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legitimate one in the Japanese political arena. Togo, for his part, stayed in the homosexual 
underground world, whereas Mishima had lost interest in it, at least in his public works. 
Togo politicised the spatiality of homosexuals, by contrast with the legitimate space, 
including that represented by the Emperor. Togo’s politics were made possible by a 
history of underground homosexuals in Japan, well known as ero-guro-nansensu 
(Kuroiwa 2013, Plungfelder 1999, pp. 290-335), as well as by Mishima’s nationalist 
homoeroticism, which was associated with the Emperor, and by leftist movements and 
new democracy in post-war Japan. When we interpret Togo’s politics with reference to 
Mishima, we also observe a shift in the politics of homosexual desire in relation to 
Japanese national imaginary. In comparison to Mishima, Togo did not treat 
homoeroticism as a politically legitimate desire but, rather, as a form of anti-
establishment activism against the Emperor System. However, as Togo easily asserted his 
political position in terms of the Emperor System without the efforts of Mishima, it is 
evident that there were already contexts that allowed homosexuality to exist in a Japanese 
political-social context. Thus, in Togo’s discourse, we can see a nationalised 
homosexuality in Japan, which can intervene in national politics, not as an ‘imported’ 
identity or position from the West. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Togo Ken is an interesting figure, not only as a pioneer of radical gay politics in Japan, 
but also as a person who delivers new political discourses of gender and sexuality in 
Japanese society. In the context of relationships among gender, sexuality and national 
norms in Japan, he is worthy of attention. Firstly, he has become a model of radical gay 
activism or ‘queer’ figures at a time when gay activism and queer studies have gained 
influence in Euro-American societies and people have tried to locate the same kinds of 
politics outside Euro-American contexts. As an openly homosexual person, who 
campaigned in national elections before Harvey Milk did in San Francisco and fought 
some cases in the Supreme Court in Japan, he stands as a representative figure of 
progressive left gay/queer politics in Japan. In such representations, Togo has often been 
discussed in the essentialist binaries of Right and Left, West and East, progress and 
backwardness, liberal society and repressive society, and queer and normative.  
Secondly, when we focus on Togo’s discourses rather than on his public acts or 
performances, it is understandable that shame can have politically subversive functions 
  
112 
112 
in Japanese sexual politics. In Japanese studies, or nihonjin-ron, shame is a characteristic 
emotion of Japanese society and culture, perhaps one of the national symbols of Japan. 
Yet, Togo has adapted shame and utilised it against the hegemonic Japanese society, 
which Japanese studies or nihonjin-ron treat as a ‘homogeneous society’. His political 
theme of shame can be called ‘queer’ in Sedgwick’s sense (Sedgwick 2003, p. 63), and 
as Mark McLelland actually calls it. However, it is often overlooked that Togo’s ‘queer’ 
politics is still motivated by his misogyny. Femininity induces a sense of shame in him, 
so that he conveyed his sense of being discriminated against through his feminine 
performance, while at the same time expressing the wish to distance himself from women. 
Togo’s ambivalent relationship with shame leads him to express his politics by a sort of 
transgenderism, as a feminised male homosexual, although this political image is 
considered ‘queer’ without acknowledgement of its creator’s misogyny.  
Finally, when we compare Togo with Mishima, Togo is a symbolic figure whose 
discourses indicate a new relationship between homosexuality and a Japanese national 
imaginary. On the one hand, Togo challenges the Emperor System but, on the other hand, 
he still has a desire that he sexually identifies with the Emperor through his shame. If we 
regard Mishima as the first person who tried to utilise homoeroticism in nationalist 
politics in Japan and to reconstruct a new Japanese masculinity, Togo is the person who 
situates okama as an emblem of the repressed people in Japanese national politics. In this 
sense, we can interpret his okama as repressing nationalised sexual minorities in Japanese 
society. 
 However, as McLelland points out, Togo’s politics did not have a strong 
influence on the gay community in Japan (McLelland 2005, p. 166). McLelland argues 
that Togo fell out of sync with the Japanese homosexual community because, due to 
Western influence, ‘gay identity’ had come to be understood as masculine, with the result 
that his feminine representation of okama was not appreciated by homosexual people. 
However, I think that this explanation is too simplistic. Firstly, as Togo uses his 
autobiographical story as an allegory of his political purpose, his politics is characterised 
by his personal life. This factor makes it difficult to share his politics with the wider 
population. Secondly, McLelland overlooks the impact in Japan of the globalisation of 
sexual politics, featuring the emergence of the global HIV epidemic and the 
institutionalisation of gender and sexuality studies. These events have changed the 
problems and discourses of homosexuals in Japan as well. In the next chapter, I shall 
  
113 
113 
show how these events recontextualised Japanese sexual politics, especially in regard to 
male homosexuality. 
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Chapter 3. Questions of Gay Identity and Coming Out after the AIDS 
Crisis in Japan	
	
1.Introduction 
 
While ‘pioneers’ of cultural representations of homosexuality, such as Mishima Yukio 
and Togo Ken, have been regarded as ‘indigenous’ models of Japanese homosexuality, 
gay activism that insists on gay identity has been considered an ‘imported’ model of 
gayness from the West, mainly from the United States, in Queer Studies in the English 
language (Altman 1997; Lunsing 1997, 2005; McLelland 2000). These views are based 
on the social and discursive shifts among Japanese sexual minorities taking place between 
the 1970s and 1990s. Additionally, they suggest that there are ‘indigenous’ Japanese 
homosexuals and ‘Westernised’ gay people in Japan. The questions that arise here are: 
what are the differences between so-called ‘indigenous’ Japanese sexualities and not, and 
what do the differences mark politically? 	
 In this chapter, I will explore how the AIDS crisis affected Japanese society and 
the new gay male politics in the 1980s. Then, after reviewing the criticism of Japanese 
gay male identity in the English language, I will analyse discourses of gay male (‘gei’) 
politics and Gay Studies that assert gay identity in Japanese society. Through these 
investigations, I will discuss, firstly, how the AIDS crisis has changed the discourses of 
sexuality and the sense of national and cultural borders in Japan; secondly, the discursive 
effects of Japanese Studies and Queer Studies in the English language concerning 
Japanese gay identity; and, thirdly, the political debate over coming out, arising from the 
institutionalisation of Gay Studies in Japan.	
	
2. The AIDS Panic and Identities of Sexual Minorities 
 
2-1. The Virus, Homosexuality and the Border 
 
For perspectives on national borders and sexuality in Japan, the AIDS epidemic is 
regarded as one of the most significant events in the history of Japanese sexual minorities. 
As Susan Sontag (1991) argues in the US context, the symbolic power of AIDS, or the 
metaphors attached to AIDS, were distinctive. AIDS had become identified with evil; 
therefore, to contract AIDS was regarded as scandalous, and the shame of AIDS carried 
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an imputation of guilt (Sontag 1991, pp. 101, 110). Sontag points out a dual metaphoric 
genealogy of AIDS: one metaphor is that of ‘invasion’, whereby AIDS is described in the 
same way as cancer; the other is ‘pollution’, which focuses on the transmission of the 
disease. Nonetheless, according to Sontag, what is particularly significant in the 
description of AIDS is the military metaphors used:	
 
With cancer, the metaphor scants the issue of causality (still a murky topic in 
cancer research) and picks up at the point at which rogue cells inside the body 
mutate, eventually moving out from an original site or organ to overrun other 
organs or systems – a domestic subversion. In the description of AIDS the enemy 
is what causes the disease, an infectious agent that comes from the outside. […] 
This is the language of political paranoia, with its characteristic distrust of a 
pluralistic world. (ibid., p. 103) 
 
As Sontag notes, metaphors of AIDS are associated with ideas of ‘invasion from the 
outside’, evoking the fear of insecure borders and a pluralistic, postmodern world.  
In Japan, AIDS was represented in terms of foreignness, the danger coming from 
foreign countries or foreigners.  
The ‘first discovery’ of a person with AIDS in Japan reflected the strong 
stereotype of AIDS already present in society, relating it both to homosexuality and to 
foreign countries, especially the United States. The Ministry of Health and Welfare 
introduced AIDS surveillance in 1984, with the AIDS Surveillance Committee 
announcing the identification of Japan’s first AIDS case in 1985. This patient was a gay 
male Japanese artist living in the US, who was diagnosed as HIV-positive during a return 
visit to Japan.  
However, some researchers were sceptical about this identification (Hirokawa 
2003). The first outbreak in the AIDS epidemic in Japan was among haemophiliacs 
infected by contaminated blood products, imported mainly from the United States. 
Although groups of haemophiliac patients had already pointed out the risk of HIV/AIDS 
from contaminated blood products from the US, demanding in 1983 that the government 
approve the use of heated blood products, the government continued to allow the use of 
unheated blood products until 1985. As a result of this official medical policy, 
approximately 40 percent, or 1800, of the haemophiliac patients treated with these blood 
products were infected by 1985. As noted in a report from the Japan Centre for 
International Exchange, ‘the history of the epidemic in Japan differs greatly from that in 
the North American and European countries where HIV/AIDS was originally identified 
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in the public mind with sexual transmission’ (2004, p. 19). The infections among 
haemophiliac patients, caused by the government’s inaction, had a big impact on Japanese 
society. This is why researchers speculate that there were quite a few HIV-positive people 
in Japan before the announcement of the first AIDS case by the AIDS Surveillance 
Committee in 1985. 
Kazama Takashi (1997) observes that, according to the national newspaper The 
Asahi Shimbun, haemophiliac patients were infected by HIV through imported 
contaminated blood products two days before the AIDS Surveillance Committee’s 
announcement of the first Japanese person with AIDS (p. 407). Keith Vincent and 
Kazama argue that the Japanese government utilised homophobia among Japanese people 
to smother their failed AIDS policy (Vincent 1996; Kazama 1997). As a result, Kazama 
says, ‘homosexuality’ came to mean ‘something’ in Japanese society (Kazama 1997, p. 
407)22. Iino Yuriko also comments that the government’s announcement reflected the 
Japanese stereotype of AIDS as a foreign disease, arising in far countries: the first person 
with AIDS was a ‘homosexual artist living in the US’, who was easily conceived of as a 
special person unrelated to the generality of Japanese people (Iino 2008, pp. 145-147). At 
this time, AIDS was understood as a disease only of special groups, such as drug users, 
haemophiliacs, male homosexuals and foreign sex workers. 
The ‘biggest AIDS panic’ (Iino 2008, p. 148) was the ‘Kobe incident’, in which 
the first Japanese heterosexual woman, an alleged sex worker, was diagnosed with AIDS 
in 1987. Shiokawa Yuichi, the chairperson of the AIDS Surveillance Committee, declared 
1987 to be ‘AIDS Year One’ in Japan and commented:  
 
The emergence of AIDS through heterosexual sexual intercourse means that we 
must develop renewed AIDS strategies in our country. This is because the disease 
is not limited to a small number of homosexuals but now shows a dangerous sign 
of spreading to people who are leading ordinary lives. We take this year ‘AIDS 
Year One’ seriously. (Cited from Kazama and Kawaguchi 2003, pp. 182-183) 
 
The discovery of an AIDS patient infected by heterosexual sexual intercourse was 
perceived as shocking news since it meant there was a possibility of ‘ordinary’ Japanese 
people contacting the disease.  
                                                
22 Shingae Akitomo (2013) analyses how the AIDS Surveillance Committee targeted 
male homosexuals from the beginning and created the case of the ‘first discovery’ of a 
person with AIDS. 
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 To allay the panic in society caused by the Kobe incident, the Japanese 
government introduced an AIDS Prevention Bill, which became law in 1987 and took 
effect in 1988. This law includes the following provision:  
 
1. When doctors believe that persons with HIV are not following their 
instructions and are deemed likely to spread the disease, the physicians 
are obligated to report the patients’ names, addresses, and other 
information to the prefectural governor. 
2. When the governor deems that individuals justifiably suspected to be 
HIV carriers may spread the disease to an unlimited number of other 
people, or when s/he otherwise decides it necessary, s/he may require 
those persons to undergo physical examinations. If diagnosed to have 
contracted HIV, the governor may issue further prevention-oriented 
directives. 
3. Foreigners with HIV or PWAs who are suspected as likely to spread the 
disease may not enter Japan. (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2003, p. 184) 
 
This Bill, intended to prevent the spread of HIV among ‘ordinary’ Japanese citizens, was 
seen as encouraging discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS, so that groups of 
haemophiliac patients, male homosexuals and feminists organised movements to oppose 
the bill. Kazama and Kawaguchi note that ‘this bill essentially treats all people suspected 
of possible HIV infection – essentially, homosexuals and foreigners – as potential 
assailants and legitimates the strengthening of state surveillance and control over these 
people’ (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2003, p. 184). 
 Sandra Buckley (1997) analyses the way in which AIDS was represented in 
relation to foreigners in Japanese society. She shows that AIDS was implicitly portrayed, 
in statistics, educational material, posters and newspaper articles, as a disease emanating 
from foreign countries or foreigners. Buckley points out that some Japanese government 
HIV/AIDS statistics provided a second figure, representing the number of foreigners 
separately from the figure for Japanese nationals, because this figure, the Japanese 
government explained, reflected the large number of illegal immigrants working in sex 
industries. She writes that, according to reports from sex workers, blood tests were much 
more actively encouraged among foreign workers than among Japanese nationals: ‘Such 
extensive publicity might represent an official attempt to reassure the public that the 
government is acting to “protect” against any further incursion by the “foreign disease”’ 
(Buckley 1997, p. 267). 
 John Whittier Treat (1999), a gay scholar of Japanese literature in the US, 
describes the ‘hysteria’ over AIDS in Japanese society in the 1980s. The AIDS panic that 
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he faced in Japan forced him to reflect on race issues, both his own and those seen in 
Japan: ‘Any mention of “blood” panics a society nervous about its health or ethnicity, and 
Japan is more nervous than most. Racial purity is important to Japan, but it seems 
impossible to preserve these days’ (Treat 1999, p. 10). He relates having seen a large 
poster warning of the danger of AIDS near his residence in Tokyo:  
 
Its notices are normally restricted to letting residents know what days the garbage 
is collected. But in the spring of 1987 a large poster covers almost the entire board. 
It shows the four main Japanese islands outlined in black. The spot where Tokyo 
should be projects out, as if a spotlight, and forms the map of another country: my 
own, a most ungainly shape. But within the crudely drawn contours of the United 
States loom the large, solid black roman letters AIDS. And the simple caption for 
me and my neighbours? Eizu kara mamoro, or ‘Let’s Protect Ourselves from 
AIDS’. (Treat 1999, p. 154) 
 
Treat describes the AIDS panic in Japan through metaphors of race.  
 
In Japan, [AIDS] is a white man’s disease; in America, if it isn’t mine it belongs 
to a black man. (Treat 1999, p. 10) 
 
Encountering his own ‘foreignness’ in Japan though AIDS, no longer symbolising 
privilege but rather racial otherness subject to the gaze of fear and biopolitical 
surveillance, like that experienced by a black man in the US, he deliberates, in his book, 
on his own race, sexuality and Orientalism23.  
 The AIDS epidemic was a significant event, obliging people in Japanese 
society to face the fluid borders of the nation, the body, and sexuality, and the fear and 
shame they evoked. At the same time, it unveiled contradictions and injustices in society, 
including ableism, xenophobia, racism, sexism and homophobia. These contradictions in 
Japanese society were often featured in AIDS art in Japan. For instance, S/N (1994), 
which is considered Dumb Type’s most outstanding work, was created in such 
circumstances (Saito 2011; Fujita 2003). Dumb Type was an art group founded in 1984 
as a collaboration of various artists, including musicians, architects, visual artists, 
choreographers and computer programmers. For its characteristically multimedia 
approach and political messages, its work, especially S/N (1994), was among the most 
notable AIDS and queer performances of the 1990s in Japan. Asada Akira (2000), a 
                                                
23 For a close analysis of his narcissistic circuit of reflection on his race, sexuality and 
Orientalism in front of his mirror, ‘Japan’, see Suganuma (2012, Chapter 4).  
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Japanese philosopher and critic, describes Furuhashi Teiji (1960-1995), a leading member 
of Dumb Type, as the most profound artist of the fin-de-siècle in Japan. Furuhashi, who 
learnt drag performance in the US, found that he was HIV-positive in New York in 1987, 
and disclosed his disease to close friends by letter in 1992 when he began medical 
treatment24. After he came out as a person with HIV, his works acquired political leanings 
(Fujita 2003). His last creation, S/N, contributed to AIDS phenomena in Japanese society 
and conveyed many direct political messages, unlike his earlier abstract works25. At the 
start of S/N, three performers, wearing various labels, appear onstage and wittily talk 
about their labels: Furuhashi’s stating ‘Japanese’, ‘male’, ‘HIV+’ and ‘homosexual’; 
another saying ‘male’, ‘black’, ‘American’, and ‘homosexual’; and the third saying 
‘male’, ‘deaf’, ‘Japanese’, and ‘homosexual’. Peter, a black American performer, 
explains: ‘There still are so many unlucky people in the world who have never had the 
chance to see real, living, breathing homosexuals in front of them before. The first gays 
or lesbians that people meet should not be their own children. So, hello’. After introducing 
himself as ‘male’, ‘black’, ‘American’, and ‘homosexual’, he asks the audience ‘And how 
are you’? Then, in a scene with the light turned down, dancers move intensely against a 
wall, onto which the images of parts of naked bodies are projected, while a woman at the 
wall screams with a megaphone: ‘I dream my gender will disappear. I dream my 
nationality will disappear. I dream my blood will disappear. I dream my rights will 
disappear. I dream my worth will disappear. I dream my common sense will disappear. I 
dream my race will disappear. I dream my property will disappear. I dream my style will 
disappear. I dream my fear will disappear. I dream my duty will disappear. I dream my 
authority will disappear. I dream my power will disappear’. As the impressionistic 
opening of S/N successfully expresses, AIDS contributed to the acute sense of differences 
in Japanese society, and at the same time expanded the political scope of activism both 
based on, and militating against, differences in the 1990s. 	
 
2-2. A Male Homosexual Identity and AIDS Activism 
 
                                                
24 For an analysis of his letter and dominant media discourses of AIDS in Japanese 
society, see Takeda (2009).  
25 For a close analysis of Dumb Type’s series of works, see Neave (2001); Hood and 
Gendrich (2003).  
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While representations of AIDS are bound up with foreignness in Japanese society, the 
AIDS crisis contributed to the consummation of homosexual identity, both as a target of 
AIDS policy and as a new form of subjectivity in Japanese politics. On the one hand, 
homosexuals were distinctively categorised as a ‘risk group’ by the Japanese government 
just after the identification of the first person with AIDS in 1985. But on the other hand, 
according to Kawaguchi Kazuya and Kazama Takashi, a gay community comparable to 
those in European and North America was formed through the fight against AIDS 
(Kawaguchi and Kazama 2010, Chapter 1).  
 Kawaguchi and Kazama discuss how an identity of the homosexual was 
targeted by the Japanese AIDS policy. For example, they refer to the classification of 
infection routes by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan: 
	
In this scheme ‘male homosexuality’ stands out in comparison with the other 
categories since without ‘contact’ appended – as is done in the case of 
heterosexual contacts – it refers to an identity called ‘male homosexuality’ based 
on sexual orientation while the other four items suggest some kind of ‘behaviour’ 
(Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997: 124-127). (Kawaguchi and Kazama 
2003, p. 181) 
 
Since male homosexual identity itself is constructed as a risk factor, the AIDS 
phenomenon serves to stigmatise male homosexuality in Japan. The authors call the 
stigmatisation of male homosexuality through AIDS the ‘gaying of AIDS’ (Kawaguchi 
and Kazama 2003, p. 185; Kazama 1997). 
 In such discursive construction of the male homosexual identity as a risk factor, 
with the emphasis on anal sex and prolific sexual activity, representations of male 
homosexuals were associated with the image of death (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent 
1997, pp. 124-149; Kazama 1997, 2003). Noting that research into HIV contact among 
MSM (Men who have Sex with Men) Groups characterised the passive penetrated role of 
homosexual men in anal sex as ‘a destructive form of sex, leading to death by AIDS’ 
(Kawaguchi and Kazama 2003, p. 190), they argue that the ‘passive’ homosexual role 
was considered fatal because men playing the ‘female role’ threatened gender roles in 
heteronormative society. Thus, in their argument, through the AIDS phenomenon, a 
homosexual identity essentially different from others was constructed and portrayed as 
destructive not only to their own lives but also to the heteronormative gender order in 
society. 
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 Hence, in the argument of Kawaguchi and Kazama on AIDS and male 
homosexuality in the late 1980s and 1990s, the problematisation of homosexuality in 
Japanese society departed from that of Togo Ken in the 1970s, as I argued in Chapter 2. 
Firstly, a male homosexual identity was constituted as a risk factor by Japanese 
governmental AIDS policy and by AIDS research, with homosexuals being treated 
differently from various groups of heterosexuals. Since, as Kawaguchi and Kazama note, 
such a categorisation of homosexuals always focuses on their (risky) sexual activities, a 
homosexual identity refers not to psychological identity or identification with specific 
cultures but, rather, to their sexual orientation and high probability of infection with 
HIV/AIDS. Within this perspective, they had to face the individualisation of male 
homosexuality through the AIDS panic in Japan. By contrast, Togo insisted that all men 
have homosexual desire, so his argument did not posit distinct differences between 
homosexual and heterosexual men at the level of desire. In his politics, the social space 
where people belong and the sense of shame function so as to differentiate okama, or 
feminised homosexual men, from ‘normal’ people.  
Secondly, between Togo’s discourse of okama on the one hand and analysis of the 
AIDS panic on the other, a significant shift occurs in the discourse surrounding the gender 
deviance of male homosexuals. In Togo’s thoughts, femininity and the sexualisation of 
homosexual men are crucial factors in their shame and debasement, but such shame and 
debasement still dwelt in the Japanese hierarchy, signifying the opposite pole of the 
Emperor’s honour. Reflecting his political ideas, Togo’s political style had become akin 
to class struggles, although he rather focused on sexuality and emotions than on economic 
injustice. Therefore, Togo thought that he, as an object of discrimination, could represent 
other ‘weak’ people politically, including sexualised women, such as prostitutes and 
lesbians, as the communists could do for the working class. However, male homosexuals 
as represented during the AIDS panic are isolated by their ‘particular’ sexual behaviour: 
anal sex. According to Kawaguchi and Kazama, anal sex, especially in its passive form, 
was regarded as a sign of gender subversion, while this gender subversion, in turn, 
represented homosexuals’ fatal threat to their own lives. Although foreign female sex 
workers were stigmatised by AIDS, they were seen as threatening ‘ordinary’ people in 
society, but not marked as engaging in ‘strenuous sexual activity’ like male homosexuals 
(Kazama 1997, p. 413). Thus, a male homosexual identity is visualised and isolated as an 
AIDS risk category, with homosexuals essentially differentiated from other groups in 
Japanese society through the AIDS panic.  
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 Kawaguchi and Kazama regard the isolation of homosexuals in Japanese 
society as an aspect of repression. They consider that even the absence of laws banning 
homosexual conduct, and of religious pronouncements against homosexuality, is one of 
the difficulties that homosexuals have faced in Japan. 
 
There are no laws in Japan similar to those prohibiting sodomy in the West, nor 
are there clear religious bans on homosexuality. However, this does not mean that 
Japanese society tolerates homosexuality without any discrimination. Rather, the 
problem lies in the fact that there is no clear or obvious homosexual ‘object’ of 
prohibition. If, as Foucault (1987) has said, ‘prohibition’ or the ‘prohibition of 
desire’ generates its objects and if bans invite resistance, then Japanese society 
offers no locus for homosexuals’ resistance. Under these circumstances, 
individual homosexuals have been isolated and placed in contexts where it is 
difficult for them to organise or form groups. (Kawaguchi and Kazama 2003, p. 
190) 
 
However, as Kazama (1997) observed, the homophobia and isolation imposed on 
homosexuals by the AIDS panic have also constructed a new political subjectivity of 
homosexuals. In the year following the discovery of the first person with AIDS, OCCUR, 
Ugoku Gei to Rezubian no Kai (Organisation for Moving Gays and Lesbians) was 
founded by gay youth, who were still teenagers. OCCUR has been considered the most 
successful of all Japanese gay organisations (McLelland 2005, p. 177). Its early purposes 
were to build movements on social issues and provide support for gay youth. These 
purposes reflected a reaction against the older generations of homosexuals, the group’s 
activist rationale being expressed as follows: ‘We are going to practice a new mode of 
life and movements for avoiding the failures and pains of our predecessors who could not 
live as a gei (gay)’ (Kazama 1997, p. 412). The word gei (gay) supposedly points to a 
new, positive identity, differentiated from okama or homo, the popular Japanese words 
referring to male homosexuals at that time. For instance, Kawaguchi writes: 
 
At the beginning of the 1980s the requisite elements for being able to identify as 
‘gay’ were comparatively few; of course today the number of people who identify 
themselves as ‘gay’ is large but I think that 20 years ago, as you’d expect, it seems 
that almost no-one did so. Rather, most people around me claimed to be ‘okama’ 
or ‘homo’; and if you asked older people about the word ‘gay’ [they said] it 
connoted ‘gay boys’ or ‘those people who dress as women and work in the bar 
world’, it seemed difficult to take on gay as an identity. (Kawaguchi 2003, p. 
146)26   
                                                
26 I followed Mark McLelland’s translation in this citation (McLelland 2005, p. 175).  
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Thus, with reference to Foucault’s famous interview suggesting that being gay is a new 
paradigm of a way of life (Foucault 2000), Kawaguchi insists that being ‘gay’ is a political 
project by male homosexuals in Japan (Kawaguchi 1997).  
OCCUR members regarded the emergence of a gay identity and the activism 
based on it as constituting the first gay activism in Japan. Kazama writes: ‘The political 
discourses of homosexuals have rarely existed in Japan before AIDS’ (Kazama 1997, p. 
412). Similarly, McLelland cites OCCUR’s statement: ‘The Japanese lesbian and gay 
movement did not begin in any real sense until the late 1980s, more than fifteen years 
after Stonewall’ (McLelland 2005, p. 180). These comments can be interpreted as 
showing ignorance or dismissal of earlier activists, including Togo Ken and the lesbian 
groups of the 1970s and 1980s, as Mark McLelland suggests (McLelland 2005, p. 180). 
Thus, his historical investigation is apt to focus on sexual politics before the emergence 
of AIDS politics, insisting how rich the sexual politics in Japan used to be before the 
emergence of ‘American’ influenced gay activism. At the same time, however, the view 
of the emergence of gay identity and the activism based on it as the first gay activism in 
Japan indicates the discontinuity of political consciousness and contexts of 
homosexuality in Japan before and after the AIDS epidemic. For example, Togo tried to 
represent the people in the underground world politically, as it is supposedly the space in 
which homosexuals live, consisting of bars and the sex industry, but activists in OCCUR 
saw the emergence of male homosexuals from the confines of the sexual world27 as an 
important political project. The presumptions and meaning of ‘politics’ shift dramatically 
between the discourses of Togo and OCCUR. 
As the impact of AIDS in Japanese society redefines the necessity and meaning 
of gay politics, the AIDS epidemic has affected the historical perspective on Japanese 
sexual politics too. For example, McLelland’s view on Japanese gay activism is well 
reflected by the discursive changes caused by AIDS in Japan. While he evaluates sexual 
politics, especially of Togo, before the AIDS epidemic as ‘indigenous’ (McLelland 2005, 
p. 180), or the one rooted in Japanese society and history, he analyses gay politics that 
                                                
27 As Kazama writes, ‘Another purpose [of OCCUR] was a support for isolated gay 
youth. It arose from their own experiences of suffering disadvantage in gay 
neighbourhoods in terms of age, social status and economic power’ (Kazama 1997, p. 
412). They were not downgrading the homosexual night cultures, but rather criticising 
the hegemony in the night culture and seeing it as part of homophobia in Japanese 
culture. 
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accents gay identity after the AIDS epidemic as the one influenced by American activism 
(ibid., pp. 174-180). It is not hard to see the influences of AIDS in Japanese society; on 
the one hand, AIDS individualised and isolated gay male people as a different category 
from the others, consolidating gay identity marked by the fear of AIDS; on the other hand, 
in Japan, AIDS is tied to foreignness, especially in US society. Through the metaphors 
attached to AIDS, the representations of gay men after the AIDS panic have become 
individualised and signifying something ‘outside of Japan’, in many cases, ‘America’. 
 
2-3. AIDS and Lesbian Politics 
 
The AIDS panic affected lesbian political identity as well. In the atmosphere of hysteria, 
the bill setting out the AIDS Prevention Law was widely opposed by gay groups who 
criticised its homophobia and discriminatory policies, by feminist groups who criticised 
its discrimination against women and foreigners, and by groups of haemophiliacs who 
were already suffering discrimination in clinics, schools and workplaces. Even though 
lesbian activists were not as publically prominent in AIDS activism as other groups in 
Japan, Iino Yuriko (2008) focuses on lesbian people committed to opposing the AIDS 
Prevention bill. 
Iino (2008) analyses the newsletters of Regumi Studio, the first lesbian 
organisation in Japan, the character of their discussions of the bill, and their manner of 
interpreting the AIDS crisis as a problem for lesbians, even though lesbians were regarded 
as the group least at risk of AIDS infection. Iino points out three ‘stories’ through which 
the AIDS crisis was interpreted as a lesbian problem. In the first one, the AIDS Prevention 
Bill was seen as targeting male homosexuals and female sex workers, who thus faced 
AIDS both as women and as homosexuals. The second account offered a narrative of 
HIV/AIDS as a problem of sexuality, in this sense criticising the government’s policy on 
AIDS as negating independent female sexuality. In this story, HIV/AIDS is essentially a 
problem for them as women. The third story understands AIDS as a problem of life and 
sexuality, and regards the Japanese government’s action as normalising people’s lives 
only within heteronormative, monogamous relations. In this discourse, Iino argues, life 
and sexuality are viewed as something actively and autonomously created by each person, 
each form of which, although not necessarily successful, must be respected as part of the 
process of self-creation, however ‘imperfect’ it may seem (Iino 2008, pp. 168-170). This 
story, Iino notes, is not distinct from the others but is rather the fundamental one on which 
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the other stories implicitly rely. Iino’s study shows how lesbian people have adopted the 
social issues connected with AIDS and others’ lives as their own problem, related to their 
identity and lives, despite not seeming so on the surface.  
While AIDS strengthened the sense of boundaries among Japanese people, it also 
forced gay and lesbian people to rethink their identity, politics, and lives. In the following 
sections, I shall investigate how new notions of gay and lesbian identity have generated 
new activism and political theory concerning sexual minorities in Japan.    
3. Facing Discrimination and New Styles of Activism 
 
3-1. Fuchu seinen no ie Trial 
 
In 1991, OCCUR sued the Tokyo metropolitan government over the decision to refuse 
the group the use of public facilities for its residential seminars. This event is known as 
the Fuchu seinen no ie Trial and is considered the first trial to promote ‘gay rights’ in 
Japan, ensuring the recognition of sexual orientation and identity as an aspect of human 
rights (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2010, Chapter 2; Fujitani 2008; Lunsing 2005).	
This trial was brought about by harassment of OCCUR members at Fuchu seinen 
no ie, a public facility of the Tokyo metropolitan government. Kazama, a member of 
OCCUR, describes what happened when they used the public facility in Fuchu, a city in 
Tokyo (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, Chapter 3). In February 1990, OCCUR 
held a study camp at Fuchu seinen no ie. In the public facility, there was an interactive 
meeting among leaders of groups sharing the facility, with a Christian group, a university 
choral society, and a primary school football association, along with OCCUR, 
participating in it. After the interactive meeting, members of OCCUR started to suffer 
various types of harassment by members of the other groups. For example, when OCCUR 
members used the public bath, some people from other groups came along to take a look; 
they knocked on the door of the meeting room when OCCUR members were using it for 
studying; other residents called out ‘They are homos’ when members of OCCUR passed 
by in the corridor; at breakfast, people shouted ‘homo’ and ‘okama’, and then laughed.	
Kazama wrote that the members of OCCUR had to learn that those reactions 
against them constituted harassment and that they should get angry about them: 
	
At the beginning, two members, who were high school students at that time, were 
looked at in the public bathroom. They didn't tell it to other members. Not a few 
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of us have grown up habitually with the words ‘homo’ and ‘okama’ since 
childhood. As being bullied and ridiculed was a part of everyday affairs for us, we 
have come to regard this kind of behaviour as not something to talk to somebody 
or get angry about. After they were called “homo” by the members of the Christian 
group again when they were passing that night, then, for the first time, they 
reported that they were ridiculed as ‘homo’. (…) 
We talked about how to deal with these harassments till midnight. At this time, 
each member expressed a range of opinions. Although some members were 
furious, associating this incident with their own past of being bullied with the 
word ‘okama’, these were in a small minority. Some said that a series of 
harassments was caused by their ‘ignorance’ and negative information about 
homosexuality so that we could not accuse only them of their behaviour. Some 
members were even shocked to realise that there was a choice of ‘being angry’ 
about harassments because these were already a part of their life. (Kazama, 
Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, 173-174) 
 
As Kazama describes members’ reactions at that time, their activism, aimed at 
overcoming their hesitation over resisting harassment in public, focused on questioning 
the knowledge of homosexuality in Japan, as well as trying to construct a ‘gei (gay)’ 
identity, which would allow homosexuals to get angry about the injustice towards them 
in Japanese society. Members of OCCUR decided to talk to the other groups that had 
harassed them. However, at the meeting, a leader of the Christian group started to quote 
the Bible’s prohibition against same-sex intercourse, and declared that homosexuals were 
morally wrong. Even though they tried to oppose this statement, the staff of the public 
facility intervened in the argument and indirectly supported the Christian group.  
One month later, OCCUR demanded a meeting with a director of the public 
facility, who had not been there when the incidents of harassment had taken place, and 
asked for the directors’ view on discrimination against homosexuals taking place in the 
public facility, as well as their plans for preventing such discrimination in future. The 
director’s answer was the opposite of what they had expected. The director read a 
statement to the members of OCCUR, saying, firstly, that what had happened in the 
facility was not discrimination against homosexuals but a kind of prank; secondly, that as 
the facility was an educational institution for healthy young people, and as OCCUR was 
a group of homosexuals who could create trouble with other groups, OCCUR was refused 
any further use of the facility. The director explained, citing an encyclopaedia, that it was 
inappropriate for homosexuals to occupy the facility, since the definition of 
‘homosexuality’ made reference to sexual conduct, which was prohibited in the facility. 
He asked the members of OCCUR whether they had practised in real life what the 
  
127 
127 
encyclopaedia described. At the trial it would later be asked whether or not the director’s 
statement, based on lack of knowledge about homosexuality, was slander. 
After suing the Tokyo metropolitan government, OCCUR held a press briefing to 
present their view and to distribute leaflets explaining their activities, including activity 
against stereotypical images of homosexuals in the mass media. However, national 
networks reporting the trial called them ‘homo’ or ‘okama’, the words that had offended 
them in the public facility; for example, some news media called OCCUR ‘Organisation 
for Moving Homos and Lesbians’ or ‘Organisation for Moving Gays and Lezzies’, not 
‘Organisation for Moving Gays and Lesbians’, while another reported that okama were 
suing the Tokyo metropolitan government for their rights (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and 
Vincent 1997, 207-211).  
In the 1990s, some members of OCCUR, including Kazama, Kawaguchi, and 
Vincent, who published the book Gay Studies, started to theorise the way in which 
heterosexism and homophobia function in Japanese society, as revealed by the Fuchu 
seinen no ie episode. Thus, while pursuing the trial, they targeted their activities at various 
sectors of society. Firstly, they urged publishers of dictionaries and encyclopaedias to 
remove the definition of ‘homosexuality’ as ‘one of abnormal sexuality’, which had been 
used in the decision to ban OCCUR’s use of the facility and in the defence of that decision 
in the trial. Secondly, they appealed to the mass media to abandon discriminatory words 
and stereotypes of sexual minorities. Thirdly, they tried to inculcate positive knowledge 
about homosexuality through the introduction of Gay Studies in Japanese academia.  
Both the Tokyo District Court and the Tokyo Court of Appeal ruled for OCCUR, 
agreeing that refusing the group the use of public facilities infringed the rights of 
homosexuals. In particular, the ruling of the Tokyo Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
the government should protect the rights of minorities, including homosexuals, and that 
lack of knowledge or ignorance of the issue did not excuse people from the duty to respect 
human rights28 . After the ruling of the Tokyo Court of Appeal in 1997, the Tokyo 
metropolitan government withdrew a further appeal to the Supreme Court and the 
decision of the Tokyo Court of Appeal became final. 
 
3-2. Westernised Activism? 
	
                                                
28 For close analysis of the judges’ verdict, see Fujitani (2008). 
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The activism of OCCUR is regarded as an example of the Westernised gay and lesbian 
movements in Japan, especially among scholars outside Japan (Altman 2001, p. 97). 
According to Altman, ‘Westernisation’ or ‘globalisation’ of sexuality primarily means the 
emergence of ‘gay/lesbian’ identity: 
 
Globalisation has helped create an international gay/lesbian identity, which is by no 
means confined to the western world: there are many signs of what we think of as 
‘modern’ homosexuality in countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica, Poland, and 
Taiwan. (Altman 2001, p.86) 
	
Following Altman’s view, many scholars who are interested in the ‘Westernisation’ of 
sexuality in Japan focus on the role of gay identity in OCCUR’s activism and among 
Japanese people (McLelland 2000).  
McLelland (2005) criticises OCCUR’s identity politics based on the identity of 
cisgendered people as, according to McLelland, it alienated other queer communities, 
especially transgender people. Since, for McLelland, ‘queer’ in Japan apparently refers 
to gender deviance or transgender people, especially in the sex industry, he criticises ‘gay 
identity’ outside of night culture, which embodies the normative male gender, in response 
to an OCCUR member’s comment that he was a man: 
 
OCCUR’s tactic of presenting lesbians and gay men as ‘normal’ in their 
interactions with official bodies, such as the law courts and government agencies, 
has resulted in alienating broad sections of the queer community. OCCUR 
member Niimi Hiroshi’s testament that he was ‘completely male (kanzenna 
otoko)’, in a 1991 interview with the women’s magazine Josei sebun (Lunsing 
1999:312), while understandable given the transgender connotations that gei had 
long held, did little to recommend that organisation to Japan’s large transgender 
community, let alone to senior figures like Togo Ken who continue to identify 
with the indigenous category of okama and embody queer desire in a much more 
confronting manner than the salaryman persona adopted by more recent gay 
activists. (McLelland 2005, p. 180) 
 
Although McLelland knows that there was a masculine model of homosexuality in 
Japan, such as that presented by Mishima Yukio, and that a transgender man can describe 
himself as ‘completely male’ as well, he regards the gay identity adopted by OCCUR as 
a ‘foreign identity category’ and a mode of ‘homonormativity’: 
 
Organisations that, like ILGA Japan and OCCUR, have taken a prescriptive, 
‘hard-line’ approach to gay and lesbian identity can be seen as promoting a mode 
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of ‘homonormativity’ (Duggan 2003) that is at odds with Japan’s well-established 
queer community, within which transgender identity and performance has a long 
history. (McLelland 2005, p. 180) 
 
In Duggan’s definition of new homonormativity, the term refers to the new neoliberal 
sexual politics in the US, which ‘does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions 
and institution, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a 
demobilised gay constituency and a privatised, depoliticised gay culture anchored in 
domesticity and consumption’ (Duggan 2005, p. 50). Since OCCUR has questioned 
dominant Japanese heteronormative assumptions and institutions in a political manner, it 
is inaccurate to call OCCUR’s activism ‘homonormativity’ in Duggan’s sense. However, 
McLelland still labels their image as one of homonormativity, accenting their masculine 
gay identity, far from the transgender manner that he suggests the ‘Japanese queer’ must 
demonstrate. It is notable that, when he criticises the masculine identity of gay politics in 
the 1980s, he emphasises transgender cultures in the Japanese ‘queer’ community; 
Japanese ‘indigenous’ queerness is represented by gender fluidity. On the other hand, 
when McLelland criticises Eurocentric views in Anglophone academic discourses, which 
regard Japanese ‘queers’ as being backward in comparison to those in Anglophone society, 
he mentions Japan’s tradition of samurai same-sex conduct, which is masculine and male-
centric as well (McLelland 2005, p. 5). Here, the distinctions of West/Japan, 
masculine/feminine or gender separatist/integrative not only define the critical discourses 
(against Japanese masculine gay politics in the 1980s or Eurocentrism in Anglophone 
academic discourses), but also constitute a double bind against Japanese sexual minority 
politics. Even though they formed their politics in context of Japanese society, against the 
heteronormativity of Japanese society, their politics is judged on whether it’s influenced 
by the West or not, or whether it looks ‘Japanese queer’ enough or not. 
Wim Lunsing (2005) also argues that OCCUR’s strategy in the courts has been 
strongly influenced by mainstream American gay movements. 
 
The definition of homosexuality the court now uses is borrowed from U.S. 
mainstream gay movements, referring to it as a sexual orientation (seiteki shiko) 
inherent to particular individuals, which signifies a departure from existing 
Japanese constructions. The goal of this definition, as in the United States, is to 
stress that gay men (Occur hardly discusses lesbians, even though their English 
name is Organization for Lesbian and Gay Movement) identify themselves on 
intrinsic qualities rather than external actions. (Lunsing 2005, p. 144) 
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Thus, he negatively evaluates OCCUR’s legal achievement of ‘a legal definition of male 
homosexuality’ (Lunsing 2005, p. 144) created for the first time in Japan, compared to an 
earlier law, which existed for a brief period in Japan and similarly mentions homosexuals, 
namely the Sodomy law (Keikan-zai). Lunsing suggests that the activism of OCCUR 
marks the emergence of a homosexual identity in Japanese society, along with the 
discursive shift in society towards regarding ‘homosexuality not so much as something 
personified in particular individuals, but rather as an activity in which people may or may 
not engage’ (Lunsing 2005, p. 144). 
 Lunsing’s narrative, which detects the birth of the homosexual identity and a 
new stage in the Westernisation of Japan, not surprisingly, echoes Foucault’s famous, and 
very popular, assertion of the birth of homosexuals in the middle of the nineteenth 
century: 
 
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of 
forbidden acts. (…) The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a 
past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, 
and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious 
physiology. (Foucault 1978, p. 43)  	
 
If we consider Foucault’s schematic model of the history of sexuality in Western Europe 
to be applicable to Japanese society in the 1990s, as Lunsing implicitly does, we would 
be neglecting historical facts about the course of sexuality in Japan. It is not simply that, 
as Kazama (1997) argues, the construction of a homosexual identity fundamentally 
different from that of heterosexuals began with the reaction against AIDS in Japanese 
society in the 1980s. Historians observe that the idea of homosexuality, which is exactly 
what Foucault considers the birth of homosexuals (Foucault 1978, p. 43), was introduced 
and translated in Japan in the 1890s and had its influence on society (Pflugfelder 1999, p. 
175; Frushtuck 2003, pp. 69-70). Apart from the fact that, according to historical research, 
the date of the ‘birth of homosexuality’ in the Foucauldian sense in Japan was not so 
different from that in Western Europe, the narrative in Foucault’s impressionistic scheme, 
progressing from ‘sodomy as an act’ to ‘homosexuality as an identity’, was often used in 
describing OCCUR’s activism, which emphasises the group’s gay identity. 
 What is notable here is that even though Foucault does not argue that the ‘birth 
of homosexuals’ refers to ‘the birth of gay activism based on their identity’, but rather 
that it referred to the emergence of énoncé, or new knowledge and thematisation of 
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sexuality in The History of Sexuality, Foucault’s narrative is still utilised to criticise 
OCCUR’s activism in insisting upon their gay identity in Japanese society. Thus, the 
question here is not whether OCCUR’s activism signals the birth of homosexuality in the 
Foucauldian sense. Rather, the question I want to pose is: what can Foucault’s narrative, 
which discusses European society in the nineteenth century, mean when scholars of 
sexuality use it to describe Japanese society in the 1990s?	
Firstly, the application to contemporary Japanese society of a narrative analysing 
nineteenth-century European society creates the impression that Japanese society is over 
a hundred years behind in modernisation, or alternately that it is a unique society that has 
eluded the influence of ‘Western’ modernisation. This amounts to a kind of fetishising of 
Japanese ‘native’ culture, differentiated from that of the ‘West’.  
Secondly, as Lunsing uses the words ‘borrowed from U.S. mainstream gay 
movements’ (Lunsing 2005, p. 144) in regard to OCCUR’s gay identity, the US or the 
West emerges as the model of sexual identity, to the neglect both the agency of Japanese 
people who embrace identity politics, and the effects of ‘translations’ of gay identity 
stemming from the United States or the West. Although cultural translations always 
depend on cultural contexts, and can thus produce new meanings, the interculturality of 
gay identity is easily overlooked. Doing so amounts to Western superiority and an attempt 
to secure it. 
Thirdly, the valuation of ‘acts’ over ‘identity’ without considering political 
contexts in other cultures effectively extinguishes the subjectivity of same-sex activities 
in those cultures, while sustaining their (sexual) identity as persons from the West. In 
Foucault’s argument, identification or subjection through sexuality characterises the 
modern power of the West; however, avoiding identification does not always result in 
liberation from such power, because, according to Foucault, modern power functions 
though medical institutions and knowledge, education, the military and the family as well. 
Even so, since the Foucauldian idea of power analyses the network of power from a 
holistic viewpoint, we cannot simply address ‘lack of sexual identity’ without considering 
how power works in society. However, the ‘lack of sexual identity’ in Japanese society is 
often discussed positively, with reliance on Foucault’s passage unaccompanied by 
detailed research into the structure of Japanese society, corresponding to Foucault’s 
investigation in the European context. Diana Khor (2010) points out that such discourses 
construct ‘Western sexual identity’ rather than referring to the ‘lack of Japanese sexual 
identity’. 
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An alternative way to think about these assertions of unstable identities and 
meanings is to consider instead ‘the West’, as arguments of instability and 
queerness are made with reference to a coherent ‘Western sexual identity’. In other 
words, rather than disputing that identity is fragmented and unstable in Japan, I’d 
contend that in these studies the coherence and stability of identity in the West are 
exaggerated and ahistorical. (Khor 2010, p.51) 
 
Through trying to prohibit the construction of sexual identity, reducing same-sex culture 
in Japan into mere ‘acts’, while sustaining a stable Western sexual identity, Japan will 
become the place where people from the West can enjoy same-sex conduct consisting 
merely of ‘acts’, without worrying about politics. In other words, Japan will be where 
‘the (male) (homo)sexual paradise’ (Khor 2010, p. 53) exists. Thus, although discourses 
that evaluate the lack of sexual identity and criticise identity politics in Japan as imitating 
the West seem to be following Foucault, they rarely deal with questions of power or social 
hegemony as Foucault did. Rather, these discourses offer a touristic gaze towards other 
cultures; they appreciate and consume differences as if they were exactly what they expect, 
and if not, they can openly express their disappointment.  
  Finally, the dualisms of Japan and the West, pre-modern and modern, 
indigenous and foreign identity, oversimplify the discourses and political phenomena of 
sexual politics in Japan. Discussions of whether gay identity is indigenous or not, or 
whether Japanese gay politics in the 1990s is borrowed from the American politics or not, 
aim to trace the origins of identity and sexual politics. If, however, results and effects are 
also important for understanding politics, these discussions are not only inadequate but 
misleading. 
 Interestingly, feminism in Japan has suffered from the same discursive 
concentration on the dualism of East and West. Ueno Chizuko (1994) points out how 
Orientalism undermines female discourses in Japan: 
 
Feminism in Japan has been under cultural pressure to argue at a distance from 
Western thought to prove that it is not an imported idea from the West. However, 
since the East is already female from the viewpoint of the West, the male 
discourses in Japan, insisting that they were female since antiquity, try to destroy 
the female discourses of feminism. For example, men strongly insist that women 
don't have to be stronger because they have already been strong enough through 
the ages, and that Japan was, at the beginning, the country which professed the 
ancestral goddess, Amaterasu-Omikami. The discourse of ‘the mother Emperor’ 
is a version of this idea. (Ueno 1994, p. 188) 
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Orientalism emphasises the feminised male figure ironically but, quite predictably, 
obstructs politically feminist discourses as well.	
 This narrative not only fails to consider Japanese social factors regarding the 
cultures and activism of social minorities, but also constructs fixed oppositional models 
of ‘Japanese’ and ‘Western’ culture. Such a narrative itself, however, indicates a new stage 
of globalisation of the identities and activities of sexual minorities: now, it is not only 
medical or scientific discourses, but also discourses of Cultural Studies or Queer Studies 
that, in effect, can set norms of sexuality, although their political agenda is externally 
‘anti-normalisation’. Therefore, in the following sections, I will analyse discourses of gay 
politics in Japan in the 1990s, how they considered homophobia in Japanese society, and 
their strategy against it, focusing on their political contexts and effects on the community 
and society rather than discussing their gay identity as either Japanese or ‘foreign’.  
	
4. Theorisation of Homophobia and Gay Identity in Japan 
	
4-1.	Project of Theorising Homophobia and Politics of Anti-homophobia in Gei Studies 
 
In 1997, Kawagushi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi, and Keith Vincent published the first 
academic volume of Gay Studies in Japan, entitled Gei Studies (Gay Studies). Their aim 
was to analyse homophobia and the logic of exclusion of homosexuals in Japanese society, 
as revealed by the Fuchu seinen no ie trial, and to establish an academic discipline 
countering homophobia in Japan. Their work mainly analyses the discourses of the Tokyo 
metropolitan government as utilised in the trial, with critical reference to the 
achievements of Gay Studies in the United States since the 1980s. Thus, their work is not 
simply an academic discourse ‘imported’ from the West. Rather, this book, at least for 
their purposes, was an ambitious work aimed at analysing homophobia in Japan and 
criticising the structure of Japanese society: it was an attempt to establish Gay Studies 
consistent with their view of activism in Japan.	
	 In the Fuchu seinen no ie trial, the Tokyo metropolitan government insisted that 
their decision to deny the use of the public facility for an educational purpose by 
homosexual groups was legitimate, since sexual affairs might be taking place if 
homosexuals were staying in the same room. According to the Tokyo metropolitan 
government, it was equivalent to the situation of male and female students occupying the 
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same room, which is prohibited by the rules of a public facility used for educational 
purposes. In other words, for the Tokyo metropolitan government, homosexuals can be 
excluded from the public facility since they subvert the proper boundary between the 
public, which must be asexual space, and the private, which can entail sexual involvement. 	
	 Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent argue that the separation in Japanese society 
between the public and private realms amounts to the structural oppression of 
homosexuals (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997; Kazama 2002). According to 
them, the separation between the public and private realms constitutes a privilege of 
heterosexuals: their sexual affairs are protected as private while, in the public space, their 
relationships are respected through the system of marriage. In the case of homosexuality, 
however, the identity of homosexuals is regarded as sexual, which must be a private 
matter, so that homosexuals in Japan are not offered an opportunity to talk about problems 
related to their sexuality, including their relationships, in the public space. Vincent points 
out that the definition of the private itself is different for heterosexuals and homosexuals. 
The private, for a heterosexual, means the privilege of choosing not to talk about her/his 
sexual life; for homosexuals, by contrast, the private functions so as to deny them 
opportunities to talk about their relationships and identity in society (Kazama, Kawaguchi, 
and Vincent 1997, pp. 93-94). They insist that homosexuals are forced into the ‘private’ 
realm, which functions as the closet within society, and cannot exist as social and political 
beings as long as they accept the unequal definitions of the private and public as applied 
to heterosexuals and homosexuals. 
 In addition, Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent criticise the gay community for 
not trying to develop an overtly political gay identity in Japanese society. According to 
them, ‘gay identity’ does not always mean something associated with exclusion, as 
criticism of identity politics suggests. They distinguish between an identity and a 
category: while defining ‘category’ as functioning to fix meanings, they defend ‘identity’ 
as a political project that can change in specific social contexts. Vincent writes, ‘identities 
gain their meaning in contexts of specific struggles’ (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 
1997, p. 68) and ‘the meaning of being gay can change in the process of making theory 
as a gay’ (ibid., p. 63). Therefore, they define ‘gay identity’ as a political agency that 
emerges through networks of social context, cultural theory of society and political 
struggles. It is important that, according to the definition in this book, ‘gay identity’ is not 
something one can borrow from other cultures, as McLelland (2005) and Lunsing (2005) 
suggest.	
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 Thus, in asking why a political identity had not emerged in Japan despite the 
many critical theories, including Gay and Lesbian Studies as well as Queer Theory, that 
have been translated in Japanese society in the 1990s, they examine the Japanese situation 
that obstructs the constitution of gay identity as an element of heterosexism, a political 
ideology in Japan. Firstly, they criticise the Japanese academic system, which accepts 
foreign theories through de-politicisation: even though all theory subsists in political 
backgrounds and social contexts, the Japanese academic system functions by removing 
political aspects and lived experience from theories once they are accepted. 
 
In Japan, as if a museum safely displays them as a part of an exhibition, theories 
are commercialised and consumed so that people can continue to live the same as 
before. To keep theories inside the walls of the museum means to insulate the 
theories from life and politics. Even though the theories are insulated from politics 
as a part of an ‘exhibition’, such activity does not become objective and apolitical. 
Rather, it is a quite political action. (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent 1997, p. 
70) 
 
One of the queer theorists who was accepted through de-politicisation, they argue, was 
Michel Foucault. They insist that Foucault’s scepticism about the liberation of the subject, 
which he called the repressive hypothesis (Foucault 1977), is utilised to undermine the 
political discourses of minorities and functions so as to drown out the voices of 
homosexuals in Japan. Although the theories were originally born to resist the hegemony, 
they work for the hegemony when they are translated and accepted by Japanese society. 
Secondly, they suggest that the strong national identity of people as ‘Japanese’ 
interferes with possession of a gay identity, that is, the identity of a social and political 
minority (Kawaguchi, Tasaki and Vincent 1995, pp. 26-27; Kazama, Kawaguchi, and 
Vincent 1997, pp. 155-161). They analyse the essay on Derek Jarman by Fushimi Noriaki, 
the first popular and openly gay writer, arguing how the issue of Japanese gay identity 
turns into the issue of Japanese identity as contrasted with ‘foreigners’ and ‘foreign 
cultures’, which are often regarded as presenting ‘authentic’ gayness and gay culture. As 
the strong and fundamental identity is a national one for Japanese people, as ‘Japanese’, 
it is difficult to develop a minority identity that challenges the hegemony in Japanese 
society, while at the same time, they note, political discourses of minority groups can also 
turn into xenophobic ones. 
Their strategy, both for opposing the heteronormative separation between the 
public and private realms and for constituting gay identity, is ‘coming out’. In a society 
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that is ‘tolerant’ towards homosexuality and has not criminalised homosexual conduct, 
homosexual men can enjoy these benefits as long as they stay in the closet. However, the 
authors argue, once a homosexual man comes out of the closet, the gay agent starts to 
emerge as a political and social one, since the difference between heterosexuality and 
homosexuality is made clear to society. They define ‘coming out’ as the ritualised moment 
for gay identity and as a political tool against heteronormative society: ‘Coming out is 
essentially to redefine the distinction between the public and the private, and through the 
process of such redefinition, the gay agent will emerge’ (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and 
Vincent 1997, p. 95). Thus, within their Gay Theory, coming out is an essential weapon 
of resistance to heteronormative society, exposing the unfair system of segregation of the 
public and private realms that excludes gay men, and allowing the constitution of a gay 
identity in the form of the political agent that demands social reformation.  
	
4-2. Coming Out or Not, That is the Question 
 
Following this theorisation of coming out both as political resistance and as constituting 
the gay political agent, coming out became an important subject for Gay Studies in Japan. 
Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s argument was not the first to discuss coming out in 
Japan. For example, Fushimi Noriaki published Private gay life in 1991 as an openly gay 
man and Kakefuda Hiroko, as an openly lesbian woman, wrote ‘“Rezubian” de aru to iu 
koto (To be “lesbian”)’ in 1992. In articles and books by activists – especially in the early 
1990s – coming out has been regarded as something positive for gays and lesbians, 
constructing new relationships with others and society, as well as with themselves (Ito 
1993; Oishi 1995; Sunagawa and Ryoji 2007). However, their insistence on the 
importance of gay identity and coming out with reference to academic achievements in 
the US was very influential, especially among young scholars who were also interested 
in Gay Studies and had read Queer Theory, which, as they interpreted it, was against 
identity politics. Those who were influenced by Queer Theory were sceptical about the 
political functions of coming out as asserted by Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent. 
 Kaneda Tomoyuki (2003) points out that, on the basis of interviews with gay 
men, they can be visibly a sexual minority to their friends even though they have not 
‘come out’ in speech. Kaneda writes, ‘In some cases, one does not have to come out to 
express their sexuality and if one can sustain their social relations, coming out does not 
necessarily become the central problem in their social life’ (Kaneda 2003, p. 71). 
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According to him, in actual Japanese gay life, coming out is not utilised for a political 
purpose but reserved for intimate human relationships, so that the choice of whether or 
not to describe one’s sexuality to friends is determined by each relationship. What 
Kaneda demonstrates in his argument is that coming out does not necessarily redefine 
the public space but rather functions in private life as a practice within friendship. 
 Ino Shinichi (2005) criticises the strategy of coming out as ‘identity politics’. 
The problems with identity politics are: it imposes homogeneity within the identity while 
emphasising differences outside it (Ino 2005, p. 43); the identity politics of coming out 
is relevant to the ‘repression/liberation’ type of politics (ibid., p. 61); and it is impossible, 
for Ino, to see varied ways of coming out (ibid., p. 62). Ino regards Kawaguchi, Kazama 
and Vincent’s politics as problematic, since their gay identity can become a norm among 
gays. 
 Their argument about coming out is problematic for lesbians too. Kawaguchi, 
Kazama and Vincent analyse the distinction between the public and private realms in 
Japan as relevant to the distinctions between men and women, and between 
heterosexuality and homosexuality. In their analysis of Japanese society, gay men can be 
political through coming out because their gender and sexuality expose the unequal 
distinction between the public and private realms and its arbitrariness: on the one hand, 
their male gender is regarded as public in principle but, on the other hand, their sexuality 
must remain in the private realm. Therefore they can demand a change in this distinction 
through their public gender role, as men who have the right to be in public. Yet, in the 
case of lesbians, as both their gender and their sexuality are traditionally regarded as 
private, their coming out does not reveal the contradictions in society. Kakefuda had 
already insisted, in 1992, that it was more difficult for lesbians to come out than it was 
for gay males. 
 
In fact, a woman is threatened with losing a lot if she comes out saying ‘I am a 
lesbian’. It is probably a far greater risk than for male homosexuals, because she 
is first a ‘woman’, and additionally she is a ‘lesbian’. Lesbians are discriminated 
against as ‘women’ in this society at first and then they are discriminated against 
as ‘homosexuals’. And such discriminations physically deprive lesbians of the 
power to come out. Even if there were no direct discrimination against lesbians, 
discrimination against ‘women’ is enough to make it difficult for lesbians to live 
as lesbians. 
In the past one or two years, male homosexuals have come out one after 
another as a result of gay rights activism and started to fight in the court for their 
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rights. However, the circumstances of lesbians are not changing so much. 
(Kakefuda 1992, p. 201) 
 
Their argument is clearly built on the privileges of male gender in Japanese society. 
 Horie Yuri (2008) also explores the difficulty for lesbians of coming out of the 
closet in Japanese society. Following Kakefuda, she argues that, for lesbians, coming out 
can create dissociation between their identity and social prejudices about lesbians, who 
have been portrayed in a pornographic light for heterosexual men. According to Kakefuda 
and Horie, lesbians coming out can be exploited as pornography for male heterosexuals, 
creating an obstacle to speaking as lesbians in society.	
 As seen from the above, the political effect of coming out has been frequently 
discussed in Gender and Sexuality Studies in Japan, initially as an academic discipline, 
until the mid-2000s. At the same time, however, gradually coming out is regarded as an 
apolitical act in the private realm outside academia. For example, there are comments 
about coming out in a queer magazine published in 2005: 
 
Frankly speaking, nobody is following if I now call for coming out, and I feel 
slightly turned off about myself when talking about coming out. (Fushimi 2005, 
p. 129) 
 
Talking about coming out, it is not about a social issue but only about an individual 
issue. It ends just as: ‘Coming out? Why don’t you do so if you want’? (Fushimi 
2005, p. 129) 
 
Citing these comments, Moriyama Noritaka (2012), a sociologist in Gay Studies, 
observes: 
 
In the arguments about coming out in the 1990s as well, individuals who did not 
want to were not forced to come out. Now, however, coming out is regarded as a 
totally personal choice. The political background of coming out has stepped back 
in relation to personal choice, and the political reality among people has been 
completely withdrawn. The change in meaning of coming out from the 1990s to 
the present can be summarised as dismantling the meaning of coming out as a 
political project. (Moriyama 2012, pp. 136-137) 
 
Therefore, when we survey the discourses of coming out in Japan between the 1990s and 
the 2000s, we see an interesting phenomenon emerging in Japanese gay politics: while 
people in academia actively discuss the political impact of coming out in society, 
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discourses regarding coming out as personal issue rather than a political project have 
gradually become influential and more mainstream.  
	
5. Conclusion  
 
The AIDS crisis in Japan redefines Japan as a heteronormative society in contrast to 
foreign society and represents homosexuality as something differentiated from ‘normal’ 
Japanese life, as well as something closely connected with foreignness. At the same time, 
however, the AIDS crisis and Japanese society’s reaction to it contributed to the 
development of homosexual identity as political agency. Thus, in regard to gay politics 
in Japan in the 1990s, as suggested by English-language queer studies focusing on Japan, 
the question of whether homosexual identity is indigenous, or whether it is imported from 
US mainstream gay activism, is an oversimplification. Rather, in terms of the effects of 
discourses, such a narrative retroactively recreates the ‘traditional sexuality’ of Japanese 
culture while constructing a fixed sexual identity in the West.  
  With regard to the relationship between gay identity and politics in Japanese 
society, the theorisation of Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi and Keith Vincent is 
innovative since their work is not only the first example of gay studies to analyse 
homophobia and heteronormative social structures in Japan, but also analyses the reasons 
why gay identity finds it difficult to be accepted in Japan, and points the way to resisting 
heterosexism. Their advocacy of gay identity and discussion of the political effects of 
coming out opened the door to academic debate within gender and sexual studies at the 
beginning of the academic institutionalisation of these fields in Japan. At the same time, 
the de-politicisation of coming out was taking place in Japan outside of academia. This 
discursive phenomenon indicates two facts: firstly, the same kinds of discourses of 
coming out have circulated both inside and outside academia but, secondly, the political 
meanings attached to the discourses can differ between the two realms.	
In the next chapter, therefore, I will investigate why the same kinds of discourses 
about coming out can be perceived as ‘political’ in academic disciplines while being 
regarded as an apolitical, private issue outside of it, my focus being on political arguments 
both in academic discourses and in gay discourses outside academia. 
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Chapter 4: Politics of Tohjisha and Homonormativity in Japan	
	
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I pointed out the phenomenon of similar discourses about coming 
out being considered ‘political’ in academic discussions, especially in the field of Gay 
Studies, while being regarded as ‘a totally personal choice’ and ‘the political reality 
among people has been completely withdrawn’ (Moriyama 2012, pp.136-137) in the ‘gay 
community’ outside academia. Observing discourses of the sexual politics of gay men in 
Japan in the late 1990s and 2000s, four characteristics can be found. Firstly, the fact that 
the same discourses have circulated in the academic world, among gay activists and in 
the community, does not mean that the discourses can function politically in the same 
way. Secondly, the heated arguments about gay politics taking place in Gay Studies have 
focused on the same topic from a political standpoint, for example, over gay people’s 
perceptions of coming out or identity. It is noteworthy that these ‘political’ disputes in 
Gay Studies arose at a time when the Japanese political environment was leaning towards 
conservatism over gender and sexuality issues, especially in the 2000s (Nozaki 2005; 
Wakakuwa and Fujimura-Fanselow 2011). Thus, there was political logic in the Japanese 
Gay Studies approach, in that discussion of gay people’s coming out, identity or 
community could be ‘political’ by contrast with discussion of the heteronormative, or 
conservative-leaning, Japanese society at that time. Thirdly, the ‘political’ discourses in 
academia have fallen into the ‘personal’ sphere and have been perceived as related to 
private matters in the gay community outside academia, even in the conservative-leaning 
society. Lastly, these discourses of gay men in Japan have revolved around questions of 
national identity, such as whether or not the ‘gay identity’ is rooted in ‘Western’ culture, 
and whether the activism style of OCCUR is similar to that of American gay politics. 
  In this chapter, I will discuss these discursive phenomena, focusing on the 
concept of Tohjisha in gay discourses. Despite frequent use of the term Tohjisha in 
Japanese gay discourses, as well as in other social minority studies and activism, neither 
Japanese Studies nor Gender and Sexuality Studies in English or Japanese have paid 
enough theoretical attention to this word/concept, with the remarkable exception of Mark 
McLelland’s study (McLelland 2009). The term Tohjisha, which means ‘the people who 
are directly concerned’, has been used in social minority activism to press their demands 
and insist on their political visibility since the 1970s, probably constituting a type of 
  
141 
141 
activism comparable to the identity politics of US society. However, the term has acquired 
theoretical connotations, especially since academia adopted it for discussions and 
institutionalised minority studies, known as Tohjisha studies29. Thus, I shall theoretically 
analyse discourses of both gay activism and academia in Japan. 
 Although the term Tohjisha has been employed within broader academic and 
political fields in Japan, including Disability Studies, Ethnicity Studies, Women’s Studies, 
Lesbian Studies and Gender Identity Disorder Studies, I will mainly focus on gay men-
related discourses here, since the discourses in gay activism and academia fittingly 
represent the characteristics and problems of the political concept called Tohjisha. 	
 
2. Tohjisha and Academic Disciplines 
 
2-1. The Political Meaning of Tohjisha  
 
As McLelland (2009) points out, the word Tohjisha is frequently used both in sexual 
minority activism and academic discourses. According to a Japanese dictionary, Daijirin, 
the word Tohjisha means ‘the people who are directly concerned’. The word was, as 
McLelland notes, originally used in the field of Law, meaning ‘the people who are directly 
involved in the legal matter’, as differentiated from third parties. In the 1970s, this word 
was employed in various minority social movements, including women’s and disability 
rights movements, by those whose opinions and wishes had not been respected even in 
connection with issues directly affecting their bodies, lives and dignity (Nakanishi and 
Ueno 2003; Bethel’s house 2005). Thus, the term Tohjisha in minority activism and 
studies refers to ‘the person who is directly concerned’, with the implication that he or 
she must be respected since the topic is that person’s issue. 	
Nakanishi Shoji and Ueno Chizuko (2003) redefine Tohjisha in terms of academic 
knowledge and politics, including Women’s Studies, Lesbian and Gay Studies, and 
Disability Studies. Nakanishi and Ueno regard the institutionalisation of Women’s 
Studies as a good example of Tohjisha studies (Nakanishi and Ueno 2003, pp.15-17). As 
                                                
29 As the word Tohjisha can refer to an actual person as well as to a theoretical concept, 
it has become a very complicated or, rather, confusing term even for a Japanese native 
speaker. In this chapter, I will distinguish between the term in its objective sense, 
referring only to the actual people, called tohjisha, and its usage as a subject or 
theoretical concept, called Tohjisha.	
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Women’s Studies change the woman from an object of knowledge to the subject of 
research, Tohjisha reconfigures a traditional system of knowledge: Tohjisha (women), not 
male specialists, know best about tohjisha (women). The idea that the topics related to 
tohjisha-people should be researched by Tohjisha challenges traditional academia, which 
is both specialist-centric and objectivist, and which tries to exclude any subjective views. 
Nakanishi and Ueno regard the objectivism of traditional academia as harmful when 
considering social minorities and discrimination, since traditional specialists have 
contributed to the existing order of society in the name of neutrality and objectivity. 
Tohjisha studies, the academic discourses and theories reflecting tohjisha’s experiences 
and voices, challenges the hegemonic institutions of traditional education and aims at 
social reformation. Nakanishi and Ueno call the new politics based on Tohjisha ‘the 
sovereignty of Tohjisha (Tohjisha syuken)’, a term referring to the right of self-
determination of minorities, as if the State otherwise had rights of sovereignty that could 
not be violated by others (Nakanishi and Ueno 2003, p. 3).  
In this chapter, I term the discourses that emerged along with the idea of Tohjisha 
as ‘Tohjisha discourses’. Then I will examine how these discourses affected both 
academic Gay Studies disciplines and gay activism in Japan between the 1990s and the 
2000s.	
	
2-2. The role of Tohjisha and the Institutionalisation of Gay Studies in Japan 
 
Along with disability and women’s movements, gay activism also adopts the term 
Tohjisha in describing its concerns and life. For instance, when establishing Gay Studies 
in Japan for the first time, Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi and Keith Vincent 
defined ‘Gay Studies’ in their book as: ‘the knowledge conducted by the gay people as 
Tohjisha, for the gay people to think about themselves and to contribute to improving 
their life, and furthermore, the useful knowledge fighting against homophobia through 
analysing social consciousness and structure where people value only love between a man 
and woman as the supreme one and discriminate against the homosexuals’ (Kawagushi, 
Kazama and Vincent 1997, pp. 2-3). Since they defined Gay Studies as ‘the knowledge 
conducted by gay people as Tohjisha’, the idea of Tohjisha was an essential factor in the 
establishment of the new discipline.	
 Their definition of Gay Studies clarifies their idea of the power relationships in 
society that they try to confront. In Togo Ken’s politics, discussed in Chapter 2, the 
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dualism between the shame of okama and the honour of the Emperor was considered the 
source of social hegemony; thus, he dramatised his provocative activism through the 
tension between okama and the Emperor. In Kawagushi, Kazama and Vincent’s argument, 
on the other hand, the power relationships in Japanese society were discussed in terms of 
the production process of knowledge: they ask, when discussing the social structure that 
reproduces the weak position of homosexuals, who possesses the specific knowledge and 
who can speak in society? In the round-table talk published by the magazine Gendai shiso 
(Contemporary Philosophy), Kawaguchi Kazuya talks about the relationship between the 
production process of knowledge and politics: 
 
Thus far, scholars have asked what is homosexuality; but it is one of our purposes 
that we will break free from such a question and challenge the scholars’ or public’s 
curiosity and interests about homosexuality itself, then pose a new question why 
they need to know about homosexuality, and even further, we overcome such 
questions. The question here is who will gain what by knowing homosexuality, or 
who will understand what from their research about homosexuality. We, as 
homosexuals, have always been forced to explain our existence itself while being 
exposed to people’s ignorance as well as knowledge. Or, there is a history of others 
explaining homosexuality because we cannot explain it by ourselves.  
 As there is such a history, for homosexuals, the essential first step is to resist 
the power of knowledge and truth. I think that statements or researches about 
homosexuality itself, whatever the content is, are not transparent and innocent but 
always related to politics. We have to acknowledge this relation between politics 
and knowledge. (Asada et al. 1997, pp. 18-19)	
 
This comment expresses well the differences in the understanding of what they must 
recognise for their politics between Togo Ken and the young 1990s activists who tried to 
establish Gay Studies in Japan. The young gay activists who are interested in Gay Studies 
now focus for their politics on the production process of knowledge in society, rather than 
on Togo’s challenge to the social distinction between the shame and honour spaces. 
 This political shift explains their way of challenging the social distinction 
between the public and private realms in Japanese society, which seems also a spatial 
problematisation of politics similar to Togo’s. However, Kawaguchi, Kazama and 
Vincent’s problematisation of the social distinction between the public and private realms 
was related to the question of who can rightfully speak in public, since the identity of 
homosexual men and problems related to their sexuality were regarded as ‘private’, with 
their political claims thus considered inappropriate topics for public discussion, while 
heterosexual men derived unproblematic advantages from the social distinction between 
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the public and private realms (Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent 1997; Kazama 1999). 
Thus, their political problem was essentially the question of the political right of speech: 
how gay men can rightfully speak in public, and how society’s view can be changed to 
establish homosexual men themselves as the politically appropriate people to speak out 
about their problems in society. The question ‘Who can rightfully say what?’ was 
considered essential for them, and their way of discussing the social distinction between 
the public and private realms indicates their political concern with the relationship 
between power and knowledge.	
 The term Tohjisha, meaning ‘the people who are directly concerned’, was 
utilised in addressing the question of power and knowledge in Sexuality Studies in the 
1990s, especially when people discussed who should study and speak about sexual 
minorities. With Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent having defined Gay Studies as ‘the 
knowledge conducted by gay people as Tohjisha, for gay people to think about themselves’ 
(Kawagushi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, p. 2), Tohjisha was discussed in order to specify 
the subject of knowledge in questions of who can rightfully deliver particular discourses 
and who might gain (dis)advantage from them. Furthermore, such a discursive 
community based on Tohjisha might exclude people considered not-Tohjisha, or hi-
Tohjisha in Japanese, as persons without the right to speak or gain advantage from the 
discourses of sexual minorities. In other words, Tohjisha is discussed as constituting 
ownership of particular discourses. 
 
2-3. Polemics and Authorisation of Tohjisha 
 
The dispute surrounding Tohjisha, incorporating questions of who can rightfully deliver 
particular discourses and who would gain (dis)advantage from them, defines many 
polemics and much activism in Japan since the mid-1990s. For example, Oikawa Kenji’s 
report on Togo Ken (Oikawa 2001) gave rise to this argument when he used the word 
okama – a discriminatory word towards gay people – in the title, whereupon Ito Satoru, 
a prominent gay activist, complained to the magazine's editors that the use of that word 
in the title was ‘discriminatory’30. The polemic, ‘Is “okama” discriminatory?’ (Fushimi 
et al. 2002), was not about Togo’s activism but about the question of who is Tohjisha: 
who can use the word okama or who would suffer from the use of the word, etc. The same 
                                                
30 For the detailed background of this argument, see McLelland (2009). 
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kind of discussion took place in regard to the name of the Pride parade in Tokyo. The 
event in question, the Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Parade, was held between 1994 and 2006, 
although sometimes it was cancelled and organisers were changed. The name Tokyo 
Lesbian and Gay Parade had been criticised for representing only gays and lesbians, not 
transgender people and bisexuals, even though they also participated in it. Some activists 
proposed changing its name to represent various identities, but the name Tokyo Lesbian 
and Gay Parade was utilised until 2006 because, as one organiser explained, most of the 
volunteers were gay men31. In this discussion, the term Tohjisha, ‘the people who are 
directly concerned’, indicates two different subjects: on the one hand, Tohjisha refers to 
participants in the parade, on the other hand, it refers to the promoters and volunteers who 
organise the parade.  
 Within the academic world, Tohjisha is often utilised for criticising others’ 
opinions. Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s Gei Studies (Gay Studies) was often 
discussed in relation to their insistence on gay identity and coming out, as we saw in 
Chapter 3. Interestingly, the scholars who criticised them relied on Tohjisha, which 
Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent tried to place at the centre of the new academic 
discipline, Gay Studies. The academic discipline based on Tohjisha enabled these critics 
to argue against Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s political insistence on gay identity by 
relying on differences between their argument and interviews with or writings of Japanese 
gay people who are considered Tohjisha (Ino 2005; Kaneda 2003; Moriyama 2008, 2009). 
Therefore, references to what Tohjisha ‘says’ have become strong academic weapons in 
this discursive community. For instance, Ino Shinichi (2005) severely criticises 
Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s argument, which posits a close relationship between 
gay identity and coming out. In Ino’s argument, he depends on interviews with gay people 
who are not comfortable with the category of ‘gei (gay)’. His argument, however, only 
succeeded in drawing a subtle distinction between his and Kawaguchi, Kazama and 
Vincent’s arguments, in that his politics searches for a comfortable category for 
homosexuals who feel uncomfortable with the name of ‘gei (gay)’, while Kawaguchi, 
Kazama and Vincent try to establish a new political subject bearing the name ‘gei (gay)’. 
The political argument takes place among gay scholars: on the one hand, Kawaguchi, 
Kazama and Vincent’s politics raises the homosexual subject as Tohjisha against 
                                                
31 For detailed points of discussion of the name Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Parade, see the 
blog FemTumYum (2005). 
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heterosexuals who intellectually exploit homosexuals and, on the other hand, Ino supports 
other homosexuals as Tohjisha against the gay political theory of Kawaguchi, Kazama 
and Vincent. Such arguments do not merely mean that criticism of Kawaguchi, Kazama 
and Vincent’s gay theory accepts and repeats their definition of Gay Studies – the Gay 
Studies by the gays, for the gays – even though they are against Kawaguchi, Kazama and 
Vincent’s theory itself; rather, such discourses indicate that reference to Tohjisha has 
become the best way of downgrading the authenticity of other discourses in Gay Studies 
in Japan. In Japanese Gay Studies, Tohjisha has been authorised both as the source of its 
political foundation and as a measure of the veridicality of academic arguments, and has 
been proactively utilised.	
Such authorisation and utilisation of Tohjisha is not limited to the academic world. 
Fushimi Noriaki, an openly gay popular writer, mentioned the ‘real people’ to restrict the 
authority of academia at the symposium of the Japan Association for Queer Studies: 
 
The people who came to the symposium on such a typhoon day are very geeky 
[mania], or very strange people. And when the strange people come to gather, the 
association would be strange as well. In such circumstances, it can easily depart 
from reality. So, it is important to make it comfortable for the people here as well 
but, I think, it is very important to imagine the people who are not here. As I have 
a prejudice about academic disciplines, I’m not sure if I would participate in this 
association. (Kawagushi et al. 2008, p. 54) 
 
Thus, Tohjisha has been utilised both for establishing the authority of knowledge and for 
dismantling it. One who can be successfully identified with tohjisha can speak politically 
with authority as representing ‘repressed sexual minorities’, while differentiating oneself 
from others who are not Tohjisha. But in such a discursive community, it is not certain at 
what point a person will be regarded as Tohjisha and at what point someone else will 
challenge his or her status as such, since the term Tohjisha, which means ‘the people who 
are directly concerned’, is too abstract to determine the context, especially as a political 
or academic term, unlike the legal term which is always used with reference to a particular 
legal case. McLelland points out the difficulties of making political statements based on 
Tohjisha: 
 
Indeed, the move toward championing the right of the tohjisha, which establishes 
the individual as the final arbiter of truth about the self, is difficult to reconcile with 
a prescriptive, identity-based politics. Since each individual is unique and different, 
it is problematic when organisations seek to speak on behalf of widespread identity 
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categories such as ‘homosexuals’, because not all people will feel comfortable with 
the chosen terminology or sense that their needs or individual differences are being 
respected. (McLelland 2005, p. 183)	
 
As no one can say who truly is Tohjisha in the given context, the Tohjisha discourse 
constructs an agonistic situation within which one can be Tohjisha or gain a right of access 
to tohjisha. Alternately, people can speak in advance as not-Tohjisha, in order to avoid 
the polemics, by using the category ‘arai (ally)’. 
 Therefore, the Tohjisha discourse in the gay community has two functions: it 
restricts the people who can rightfully speak as Tohjisha on the one hand, but at the same 
time, since the content of Tohjisha (the people who are directly concerned) is very 
ambiguous, it also raises new arguments among the people who consider themselves 
Tohjisha.	
 It is doubtful that the Tohjisha discourse can solve the ‘exploitative’ relationship 
between power and knowledge, as Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent supposed at the 
beginning of Gay Studies. Firstly, as the idea of Tohjisha has now come to frame the 
academic disciplines of Gender and Sexuality Studies in Japan, the importance of 
Tohjisha has become a reason for utilising the ‘same tohjisha’ for their research by 
scholars who consider themselves Tohjisha on the basis of interviews, citations and 
political engagements. In such academic disciplines, the Tohjisha discourse might be 
critical of existing academic authority but, at the same time, constitute a new authority 
itself. For example, sociologist Moriyama Naotaka writes about the gay community: 
 
For now, let’s discuss the way to consider a gay community by researchers. The 
most naïve but general approach is based on the presumption that because a 
researcher is Tohjisha – i.e. a gay male – it means that his research correctly 
comprehends the gay community. In fact, most Tohjisha studies are certainly 
given ‘authenticity’ based on this presumption. (Moriyama 2009, pp. 11-12) 
 
As Moriyama points out, Tohjisha already constitutes one of the presumptions in Japanese 
academic work and produces new discourses. 
 Secondly, the academic and political ‘authenticity’ of Tohjisha defers 
exploration of new ways of discussing topics related to sexual minorities. After his remark 
on ‘the most naïve but general approach’ of Tohjisha in Gay Studies, Moriyama continues: 
 
However, I do not think that we should jump to an alternative approach from 
Tohjisha studies. If we try to manage research based on ‘objectivity’ which is 
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independent from positionality, the only possible research would be conducted in 
reliance on the definition of gay community which researchers determined in 
advance. For example, this definition might be: ‘in this article, the term gay 
community indicates the gay town in Shinjuku 2chome in Tokyo’. But, if we 
observe this definition carefully, the presumption that the definition is suitable for 
studies about gay community is as certain as the one about Tohjisha studies. 
(Moriyama 2009, pp. 11-12) 
 
Moriyama’s argument is not just one of postmodern cynicism, which admits the 
impossibility of perfect neutrality and objectivism in academic discussions. Rather, it 
indicates how deeply the idea of Tohjisha has been rooted in Gay Studies in Japan, 
especially in Sociology, which is the most popular discipline encompassing Gender and 
Sexuality Studies. Tohjisha authorises the verisimilitude of academic discourses and 
implies the possibility that there might be other tohjisha whom researchers have never 
discussed, thus evoking the desire to keep searching for tohjisha as academic interests. 
Such a discursive system discourages new ways of discussing sexual politics in Japan 
while justifying utilisation of the people of tohjisha for academic interests. 
 In the next sections, I will examine how the idea of Tohjisha affects 
relationships between activism and academia. 
	
3. Tohjisha and Queer Theory  
 
3-1. Differences and Similarities between Tohjisha Studies and Feminist Standpoint 
Theory 
 
At first glance, Tohjisha Studies is very similar to Feminist Standpoint Theory as the latter 
was also intended to connect academic research with feminist politics. For overcoming 
the ‘neutrality’ and power of science, standpoint theory was proposed as an alternative 
academic method and epistemology for feminist research and politics about relationships 
between the production of knowledge and power in the 1970s and 1980s. As Tohjisha 
Studies bring people in society, whom academic society had treated only as objects of 
research, to the position to academically and politically speak for themselves, Feminist 
Standpoint Theory defines feminism as a mode of analysis for their own politics of 
women and the ‘standpoint’ as a key concept to analyse society and politics. Nancy 
Hartsock writes: ‘At bottom feminism is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching 
life and politics, rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression of women’ 
  
149 
149 
(Hartsock 1981, p.35). Defining feminist Standpoint Theory as a new epistemological 
and political project, Hartsock adopts Marxism. Emphasising that women’s social 
situation is different from that of men in dominant positions, Hartsock insists that 
‘women’s lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male 
supremacy, a vantage point which can ground a powerful critique of the phallocratic 
institutions and ideology which constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy’ [stress is 
mine] (Hartsock 1983, p.284). While, as with Tohjisha Studies in Japan, Hartsock accents 
that standpoint theory is interested in the sense of being engaged, she also regards that it 
can provide a better scientific method than masculine-dominant science. Thus, the 
question here is: in what sense is Feminist Standpoint Theory a better epistemological 
tool for analysing society and what are the differences between standpoint theory and 
Tohjisha Studies?  
 Hartsock interprets Marxism by focusing on two points: biased knowledge and 
engagement of the people. She summarises Marxist epistemological and political claims 
as: firstly, that class positions in Marxist theory not only consist of social structures but 
also set limits on the understanding of social relationships and reality and, therefore, the 
social views of the ruling class will be incomplete, partial and biased; secondly, the vision 
of the ruling class constructs the society and reality in which all classes are forced to 
participate so that the view is not simply false but is the ideology reproducing the social 
hegemony; and thirdly, while the vision of the ruling class is partial and reproducing the 
social cognitions, the adoption of a standpoint and the understanding of the oppressed 
expose the truth, the real relations among human beings and society (Hartsock 1983, p. 
285). As Hartsock’s interpretation of Marxism shows in defining standpoint theory, as a 
scientific method it is premised on not only the partial understanding of the standpoint of 
the subject but also on the need for truth and complete understanding of society through 
its recognition of partiality. Thus, Sandra Harding (1993) clearly notes against the 
criticism of standpoint theory that it is not relativism or ethnocentrism but, for the 
standpoint epistemologist, ‘the problem with the conventional conception of objectivity 
is not that it is too rigorous or too “objectifying”, as some have argued, but that it is not 
rigorous or objectifying enough; it is too weak to accomplish even the goals for which it 
has been designed, let alone the more difficult projects called for by feminisms and other 
new social movements’ [stress in original] (p.51).  
 On the other hand, Tohjisha Studies also recognises the partial understanding 
of society as well as the power relationships created by knowledge. However, when 
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Tohjisha Studies have tried to reformulate the relationship between the subject of 
knowledge and social relationships, it was rare to discuss the problems of epistemology 
for strong objectivity or complete views of society differentiated from the ones of existing 
science, as Feminist Standpoint Theory does. Instead of discussing epistemological and 
methodological arguments, Tohjisha Studies have been keen to produce new academic 
discourses that have simply relied on the veridicality of tohjisha, the people in 
marginalised positions in society. Thus, as already analysed in Moriyama’s argument 
above (Moriyama 2009), Tohjisha Studies have tended to produce new political 
discussions rather than developing an epistemology and a scientific methodology beyond 
their own partiality and social positions. Thus, comparing Tohjisha Studies with Feminist 
Standpoint Theory, it is notable that Tohjisha Studies do not share the need for strong 
objectivity and ‘hope’ of universalism through the partiality that Feminist Standpoint 
Theory was inherited from Marxism. 
 In next sections, I will argue how Queer Theory from the United States, 
especially in the works of Judith Butler, was (mis)interpreted through Tohjisha, which 
focuses on subject, social positions and politics rather than on epistemological problems, 
and why such interpretations were circulated as ‘politics’.	
 
3-2. Interpretation of Judith Butler through Tohjisha 
 
The 1990s was also the time when Lesbian/Gay Studies and Queer Theory in the English 
language were actively translated into Japanese, and applied to the analysis of Japanese 
society, while activists and scholars discussed the role of Tohjisha. At the theoretical level, 
however, the notion of Tohjisha can have a tense relationship with Queer Theory, since 
queer theorists have been critical of notions that presuppose fixed categories and divisions 
between majority and minority individuals in society. For example, Judith Butler writes: 
 
As expansive as the term ‘queer’ is meant to be, it is used in ways that enforce a 
set of overlapping divisions: in some contexts, the term appeals to a young 
generation who want to resist the more institutionalised and reformist politics 
sometimes signified by ‘lesbian and gay’; in some contexts, sometimes the same, 
it has marked a predominantly white movement that has not fully addressed the 
ways in which ‘queer’ plays – or fails to play – within non-white communities; 
and whereas in some instances it has mobilised a lesbian activism, in others the 
term represents a false unity of women and men. Indeed, it may be that critique of 
the term will initiate a resurgence of both feminist and anti-racist mobilisation 
within lesbian and gay politics or open up new possibilities for coalitional 
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alliances that do not presume that these constituencies are radically distinct from 
one another. (Butler 1993, pp. 228-229) 
 
On the other hand, Tohjisha discourses authorise Tohjisha, who are supposed to be 
differentiated from non-Tohjisha or hi-Tohjisha in Japanese. 
 In Gei Studies (Gay Studies), Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent were well aware 
of the theoretical tension between Queer Theory and the notion of Tohjisha. They insisted 
that it could be politically harmful to assimilate the ‘deconstructionist’ Queer Theory in 
Japan, where a gay political subject had not yet emerged, since ‘deconstructionist’ Queer 
Theory can disturb the establishment of political representations of Tohjisha: 
	
Recently, the research of western Lesbian/Gay Studies which mainly discusses the 
‘deconstruction’ of the subject [shutai] is often introduced in Japan. So-called 
postmodern research is rapidly translated, one study after another. Of course, it is 
not bad that those are translated and people can read them in Japanese. But there is 
a situation in which the only discourses of deconstruction of the subject [shutai] are 
becoming general outside their academic context, especially that of the early 
important academic achievements. If people understand them in an extreme way 
without any contexts, they might insist that it is ‘nonsense’ or ‘harmful’ to have 
agency [shutai]32. Through such a process, it can happen that homosexual Tohjisha 
are erased rather than enabled to exist [in society]. (Kawaguchi, Kazama and 
Vincent 1997, p. 49)	
 
They were concerned that translations of deconstructionist theory without its political 
context could dismantle political discourses of sexual minorities who have just begun to 
be visualised in Japanese society. 
 Ino Shinichi (1997, 2005), who regards Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s 
politics as identity politics, seeks to theoretically combine Queer Theory with Tohjisha 
politics. In his theoretical exploration, along with a reading of Judith Butler, he focuses 
on the possibilities of negotiation between category and self-definition, which cannot be 
understood when identified with the existing category of ‘gei (gay)’. Ino proposes to 
utilise categories of sexuality as a political tool, in the way in which people (Tohjisha) 
                                                
32 The words of the original passage might be better translated as ‘it is “nonsense” or 
“harmful” to have the subject’. In Japanese, the term shutai can indicate ‘the subject’, 
‘agency’, ‘individuality’, and ‘independence of will’. Thus, ‘to deconstruct the subject’ 
(shutai no datsukouchiku) can mean ‘to deconstruct the subject/agency/individuality/ 
independence of will’ in Japanese. This is why they interpreted deconstructionist theory 
as undermining the political agency of homosexuals that had just emerged in Japanese 
society.	
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reappropriated the word queer for themselves in the US, while suspending the integration 
of political identity with the name ‘gei (gay)’. He distinguishes between an identity and 
a category, arguing that the notion of identity refers to an ontological state of being that 
cannot be verified or rebutted, but which, at the same time, functions as a norm. In 
contrast, a category is a social space constructed for a subject by discourses, so that there 
is always a gap between a category comprised of discourses and the subject. This is why 
the subject, Ino argues, can negotiate with categories through the gap between the 
category and the subject. Ino interprets Butler’s reading of the failure of the subject’s 
identification with the Law or the Symbolic, the linguistic dimension that is the 
determining order of the subject, in Lacanian psychoanalysis as the operability of 
categories by the subject. Ino argues that ‘the subject is given the locus of discourses by 
an interpellation through a category’ but, because Butler insists that an identification of 
the subject with the Law will always fail, ‘we can develop the idea of agency which is 
able to talk about the self through manipulating the gap between categories and the self 
even though one cannot be completely free from the categories’ (Ino 2005, p. 46).  
 On the surface, Ino’s argument is similar to Butler’s idea of identity and agency. 
Butler writes: 
 
Indeed, to understand identity as a practice, and as a signifying practice, is to 
understand culturally intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound 
discourse that inserts itself in the pervasive and mundane signifying acts of 
linguistic life. Abstractly considered, language refers to an open system of signs 
by which intelligibility is insistently created and contested. As historically specific 
organisations of language, discourses present themselves in the plural, coexisting 
within temporal frames, and instituting unpredictable and inadvertent 
convergences from which specific modalities of discursive possibilities are 
engendered. 
As a process, signification harbours within itself what the epistemological 
discourse refers to as ‘agency’. (Butler 2008, p. 198) 
 
Although Butler also advocates the possibilities of the pervasive signifying act through 
identification within a linguistic process, Ino’s argument is particularly distinctive in its 
notion of the self which negotiates and operates with categories. With the notion of the 
self that is able to negotiate with a category, Ino transforms Butler’s notion of agency into 
the prelinguistic subject, which Butler herself criticises in Lacanian theory as ‘slave 
morality’, since it romanticises and idealises the ‘failure’ before the Law (Butler 2008, 
pp. 74-77). Although Butler regards the inevitable failure before the Law as an ideological 
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narrative of Lacanian theory since ‘the dialectic between a juridical imperative that cannot 
be fulfilled and an inevitable failure “before the law” recalls the tortured relationship 
between the God of the Old Testament and those humiliated servants who offer their 
obedience without reward’ (Butler 2008, p. 76), Ino considers it as the political possibility 
of talking about the self through manipulating categories. 
 In his ‘politics of categories’, Ino presupposes the authentic self, which cannot 
be represented by language but still adheres to the utopian view of the perfect language 
that could fully express such a self. For example, Ino writes about the possibilities of 
Queer Theory: 
 
We can rewrite significations of categories through negotiations with them while 
exploring narratives beyond the prescriptions of categories which bind us. We 
should learn such possibilities from Queer Theory. (Ino 2005, p. 70)  
  
Thus, what he calls politics means exploring the possibilities of talking about the self as 
such, avoiding the simplified story of the self. This is why he regards Kawaguchi, Kazama 
and Vincent’s politics of coming out as problematic, since the representation of identity 
through coming out can cause simplification of the self and confusion with others of the 
same name, the so-called ‘gei (gay)’. In this regard, Ino’s theoretical interest is closer to 
that of Charles Taylor (1989, 1991), who considers morality based on authenticity, or the 
ideal of self-fulfilment (Taylor 1991, p. 16), rather than that of Judith Butler, who pursues 
the political possibilities of subversion. 
 As Ino pursues the proper language for expressing the individual ego, the 
Tohjisha discourses, which challenge the politics of Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent, 
contribute to the politics of self-liberation through linguistic acts. Because the term 
Tohjisha has been developed through questions about the authority of institutional 
knowledge, Tohjisha can cause one to become sceptical about all discourses by others, 
leaving only the discourse of self-reference. Ironically, it is exactly the politics of coming-
out, which seeks the fully expressed-self, that Ino tries to criticise. 
 On the theoretical level, therefore, Tohjisha discourses have contributed to two 
kinds of politics. One is what Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent tried to establish as Gay 
Studies in Japan: we may call it the representative gay male politics. The other one is 
what Ino expressed in his criticism of Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent: that is, the gay 
male politics of self-liberation. 
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3-3. A Constitution of the Political ‘Reality’ through Tohjisha 
	
As Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent or Ino disputatiously adopt their positions on Queer 
Theory in Japanese social contexts, discussion of the relationship between Tohjisha and 
Queer Theory could be one of the most important achievements of Japanese Gay Studies. 
In particular, these political and academic arguments could contribute to the problems of 
translation of Cultural Theories into politically, socially, historically and culturally 
different contexts, whichever Japanese gay theorists might choose for Japanese society. 
They might either temporarily suspend applying Queer Theory to Japanese society, as 
Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent insist, or they might pursue the interpretation of Queer 
Theory through Tohjisha, as Ino did. This argument essentially comprehends questions 
of how cultural and political contexts could affect understanding of the Cultural Theories 
of a different society, as well as of what translations, beyond cultural differences, might 
generate as they depart from the original contexts – a perspective analogous to how new 
questions related to gender and sexuality have opened up new horizons for the 
interpretation of classic texts in Feminist and Queer Theory. 
 However, such intellectual tensions can be transformed into relatively clear-cut 
problems such as the antinomy between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, or between ‘theory’ and 
‘reality’. For Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent, the assimilation of ‘deconstructionist’ 
Queer Theory in Japanese society was the actual problem of Japanese heteronormative 
ideology, which utilises the discourses of foreign cultural theories against political voices 
of sexual minorities in order to maintain the homophobic society of Japan. However, in 
the dialogue between Noguchi Katsuzo, a philosopher, and Sunagawa Hideki, an 
anthropologist and gay activist who was the representative member of Tokyo Lesbian & 
Gay Pride between 2000 and 200733, the problem is regarded as that of the gap between 
the ‘theory’ of the United States and the ‘reality’ of Japan. In a discussion among Fushimi 
Noriaki, Noguchi Katsuzo and Sunagawa Hideki, Noguchi said: 
 
The new generation rapidly started to enjoy being gay without problems in the 
way previous generations cannot even imagine although they might deny 
themselves as gay when they were junior high school or high school students. This 
change can be expressed as the shift from ‘man lover’ to ‘gei/gay’ but this is not 
the shift from ‘gei/gay’ to ‘queer’ nor going to be ‘queer’. This is obvious if you 
are in gay scenes for a while and you have to make an issue based on this shift 
                                                
33 In 2007, Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Pride changed its name to ‘Tokyo Pride Parade’.	
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when you discuss gay identity. So, the current form of criticism by Queer Theory 
is, in my words, metaphysical thought. I think that the way of applying the notion 
of queer in Japan today reflects the ignorance, or low sensitivity to today’s 
historical-social situations of gay people. (Fushimi, Noguchi and Sunagawa 2001, 
p. 247) 
 
In this remark, Noguchi presupposes two ideas: the superiority of the ‘reality’ over the 
theory and the adversarial relationship between the theory and the ‘reality’. Furthermore, 
they both are based on the tautological notion that the people who refer to Queer Theory 
are ignorant of the ‘reality’, because you cannot critically think in the way in which Queer 
Theory does if you know the situation of gay people properly. With those presumptions, 
theoretical collisions between the political approach of Tohjisha and the queer approach 
no longer posed a philosophical and political problem for him, since he can replace 
theoretical and political problems with the supposed ignorance of Japanese Queer 
theorists, even though it is caused by the differences in their political and intellectual 
backgrounds, rather than by the differences between theory and practice. 	
	 More importantly, the basic question hidden by such a transformation in the 
approach towards the relationship between Queer Theory and Tohjisha is: what is meant 
by the ‘reality’ of sexual politics in Japan? Even if there were collisions between the 
respective approaches of Queer Theory and Tohjisha studies, we need to ask whether the 
‘reality’ should always mean the specific activities of gay men in big cities, or whether 
Tohjisha could properly represent the ‘reality’ of sexual politics. Since Tohjisha is 
regarded as the authentic subject that researchers must approach, the ‘reality’, which 
researchers should consider, becomes the self-evident concept. 	
  
4. Tohjisha Turns into Homonormativity	
 
4-1. ‘Gender-Free’ and Fushimi’s The Issue of Desire 
 
When reviewing discourses of gay men in Japan, focusing on Tohjisha from now on, it 
can be inferred that some of those discourses indirectly resulted in disturbing criticism of 
the exclusive Japanese social system. It is worth noting that the rise of Gay Studies, which 
claims to present the new knowledge of gay men for gay men, shares its era with the 
rising nationalist backlash against feminism and the gender-equality it promoted in 
Japanese society in the 2000s. In the field of Queer Studies in the English language, for 
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instance, McLelland and his associates published academic articles and books about 
tolerance towards homosexuality in Japanese society, underground and pop cultures and 
the queerness of Japan (McLelland, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005; Ishida, McLelland and 
Murakami, 2005; McLelland, Suganuma and Welker 2007).  
However, it was at that same time that conservative politicians and activists started 
to attack gender-equality policy and sex education in schools in Japan. An anti-feminist 
movement of Japanese conservatives, the so-called Bakkurasshu (the backlash), rose 
rapidly in the early 2000s just after the implementation of the Danjo kyodo sankaku 
shakai kihonho (Basic Law for a Gender-Equality Society) in 1999, and the issue of 
‘Comfort Women’ during the Second World War became the subject of heated public 
debates. The backlash movement was characterised by two features: the anti-gender-
equality discourses, often utilising grassroots rhetoric, and popular neoconservative 
politicians, including Abe Shinzo who became the Prime Minister between 2006 and 
2007, and again from 2012, openly supported the movement (Wakakuwa and Fujimura-
Fanselow 2011; Kato 2011; Yamaguchi, Sato and Ogiue 2012). Wakakuwa and Fujimura-
Fanselow (2011) note that the backlash movement affected sex education, the 
government’s gender-equality policy and Japanese diplomatic policy on the issue of 
‘Comfort Women’. The backlash movement especially attacked the term ‘gender-free’, 
which started to be used by Japanese feminists in the 1990s, to indicate freedom from 
socially gendered roles and arrangements. However, the backlash movement interprets 
this term as ‘denying all physical differences between male and female’ and accused it of 
‘denying masculinity and femininity altogether’ (Wakakuwa and Fujimura-Fanselow 
2011, p. 343). Unsurprisingly, the backlash movement utilised homophobia to exaggerate 
the alleged harm done by the term ‘gender-free’ and sex education. For example, the 
conservative opinion journal featured an article entitled ‘Background of the Ideal – Free 
Sex, Homosexuality and Extreme Sex Education’ in 2003 (Wakakuwa and Fujimura-
Fanselow 2011, p. 340)34. 
However, Fushimi Noriaki (2007), a pioneer of openly gay popular writing in 
Japan since the early 1990s, expressed his sympathy with conservative criticism of the 
term ‘gender-free’. In Yokubou mondai (The Issue of Desire) (2007), Fushimi insists that 
discourses of sexual minorities in Japan have failed to recognise the importance of desire 
                                                
34 For more about homophobic arguments in the backlash movement in Japan, see 
Kazama (2007) and Maree (2007). 	
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and pleasure as issues of sexuality and, instead, have been dominated by discussions 
within the framework of social justice and anti-discrimination. Thus, departing from 
social justice arguments, the issues of sexuality need to be repositioned within the wider 
framework of problems of desire, since, he argues, discourses of minorities are not 
necessarily always right simply because they are minorities. McLelland (2009) introduces 
Fushimi’s argument as a successfully inclusive argument about sexual minorities in Japan 
by virtue of its deployment of the discourses of Tohjisha: 
 
Fushimi, although deploying the discourse of the tohjisha to some extent, has 
skilfully avoided the politics of recrimination, instead arguing for a more inclusive 
debate about sexual minority status. His latest book, which might be titled in 
English as Problems of desire: It’s not about people working to just end 
discrimination [sic], sidesteps the essentialising tendencies inherent in the 
tohjisha debate as conducted by groups such as Sukotan, by focusing not so much 
on discriminated identities as on stigmatised desires – a more universalising 
perspective. As the book’s subtitle suggests, working to end discrimination against 
a few new officially recognised ‘sexual identities’ such as gay men, lesbians and 
transsexuals does little to offset the negative repercussions of what Fushimi terms 
the ‘hetero system’ overall. (McLelland 2009, p. 18) 
 
In his book, Fushimi considers examples of discourses focusing only on issues of 
social justice and anti-discrimination, such as those of gay activism in the 1980s and 
1990s, and of feminism, especially discourses on the ‘gender-free’ concept. He argues 
that while it is right for feminists to deny masculinity and femininity altogether in the 
sense of abolishing all kinds of discrimination caused by gender roles, not only is it 
impossible to deny all gender roles in society, but it is also harmful for sexual minorities 
who derive fantasy and pleasure from existing gender roles (Fushimi 2007, Chapter 2). 	
His opinion is that he accepts the caricaturised criticism of the ‘gender-free’ idea 
in conservative discourses while trying to promote gay male acceptance by society. In the 
1990s, one of the topics that Japanese feminists such as Ueno Chizuko and Osawa Mari, 
who are regarded as influential feminist theorists of ‘gender-free’ activism (Yamaguchi, 
Sato and Ogiue 2012), focused on was the Japanese labour system based on the gender 
division of labour (seibetsu-yakuwari-bungyo) (Ueno 1990; Osawa 1993), and the term 
‘gender-free’ was originally utilised for consciousness-raising about this problem in 
society. In these arguments and activism, the social and economic problems of women, 
such as income inequality, labour conditions, female education and the ideology of the 
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full-time housewife and mother, are mainly targeted by the term ‘gender-free’35 . In 
Fushimi’s discourse, however, the term ‘gender-free’ is interpreted as the ‘feminist 
ideology’, which denies all gender roles, abolishing existing femininity and masculinity 
completely, as stereotyped by backlash activism. As a result, the term gender in his 
discourse becomes highly abstract, rarely recalling the cultural, social, political and 
economic inequality of women in Japanese society, as if gender issues are ‘postmodern’ 
problems of signs that only refer to attributes of desire, fantasy and pleasure. Similarly, 
Moriyama Noritaka (2012), a sociologist of Gay Studies, argues that gay male 
Top/Bottom roles are analogous to sexual differences, although he does not criticise 
Japanese feminism as Fushimi does. Both of them symbolically treat gender or sexual 
differences in terms of the sexual activities of gay males, without considering the social 
injustice of gender inequality or the violence that gender minorities actually face in 
Japanese society. 
In regard to the practical potential of Fushimi’s politics of desire, he is not eager 
to apply his argument to wider social issues. When he discusses the problems of 
discrimination in Japanese society, he mentions such discriminatory issues as the 
Burakumin (the discriminated-against hamlet people) and Zainichi Korean (the ethnic 
Korean residents of Japan), which are considered results of the Japanese national system 
and the Emperor System36, as well as problems of male homosexuals in Japan. But he 
rarely pursues such issues.  
He insists that, instead of social criticism and activism based on the idea of justice 
and anti-discrimination for social minorities, we need social movements that enhance the 
social possibility of actualising people’s desire. In his argument, however, desire, the 
possibility of which we should promote in society, is always that of homosexual men. If 
he applies his idea of movements for the actualisation of people’s desire to all social issues, 
he should respect people’s desire to achieve justice in society just as much as homosexual 
desire. Yet, he always gives priority to homosexual desire, which is not so controversial 
in society. For example, he understands the difficulty and pain for people who only have 
                                                
35 For example, the booklet entitled GENDER FREE, published by Tokyo Women’s 
Fund in 1995, which was attacked by backlash activism and criticised by some 
feminists due to its inappropriate introduction of terms from feminist studies, mainly 
focused on the gender roles that can contribute to the sexual division of labour. For 
criticism of this booklet by feminist scholars, see Yamaguchi (2006).  
36 For relationships between the Emperor System and discrimination against the 
Burakumin and Zainichi Korean, see Uesugi (2008), Park (2003) and Chapman (2008).	
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desire for minors, but he concludes that such desire cannot be actualised in society 
without any consideration37. On the other hand, he talks about the gay community after 
discussing the possibility that an identity and community could function repressively and 
result in the exclusion of some people:  
 
In regard to gay people, it is necessary to examine if the inevitable norms of the 
establishment of gay community function repressively to some people as well as 
challenging stereotypes of gay people. 
  But we cannot deny their identity and community only for the reason that 
boundaries of categories can function violently against the people who are in 
between, or that the norms of community can repress some people in that 
community. It is because the desire of people who think they should dissolve the 
identity and community is not necessarily always prior to the desire of people who 
want to take delight in Eros there. (Fushimi 2007, pp. 148-149)	
	
While, on the surface, Fushimi’s argument in The Issue of Desire tries to involve a broader 
range of people and topics than ‘old fashioned’ activism based on justice for social 
minorities, as McLelland (2009) evaluates, his discussion results in support only for gay 
men who can enjoy their sexual life without any problems from the community, and never 
extends to other social problems, because the Tohjisha of desire is always arbitrarily 
determined in his argument. Thus, his argument amounts to the exclusive promotion of 
male homosexual pleasure, without the complicated discrimination-related issues, such 
as sexism, nationalism, classism, and racism in Japanese society, as if the selected group’s 
pursuit of their own desire would eliminate social injustice.	
 The Tohjisha discourses, which politically authorise themselves in the political 
arena as Tohjisha, can provoke the question ‘Who are the Tohjisha?’ and can establish 
agonistic debates between people; however, when Tohjisha is bound up with a specific 
group and automatically refers to them, for example the Japanese, middle-class, mature, 
gay male in Tokyo, the term Tohjisha can function conservatively to secure the group 
identity.	
                                                
37 See his introduction to the book (Fushimi 2007). In Japanese society, paedophilic 
desire is not stigmatised in the same way as in Anglophone societies, as long as a person 
does not actually threaten children, and it is characteristic that queer activists, especially 
of an older generation, often express sympathy with the pain of paedophiles compared 
to that of homosexuals in the era when society openly discriminated against them, as Ito 
(2006) writes. As the relations of hetero/homosexuality and paedophilic desire in 
Japanese culture and society are very complicated and beyond the scope of this paper, I 
will not discuss them further here. 	
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4-2. Tohjisha within National Identity and Homonormativity 
	
Fushimi’s argument in The Issue of Desire is characterised by the de-politicisation of gay 
identity in the social context, while maintaining the community of pleasure secure from 
criticism. Shimizu Akiko (2007)38  notes that his politics is distinct in its neoliberal 
inclination. She points out similarities between Lisa Duggan’s analysis of the new 
homonormativity of neoliberalism in US society and Fushimi’s discourse (Duggan 2003). 
Fushimi redefines ‘justice’ as a personal matter, not a social or economic one. Shimizu 
relates how: 
 
[T]his ‘justice’ is based and ‘justified’ merely on the grounds of the ‘pain’ of the 
discriminated, and therefore can only be ‘a feeling of one person, a personal 
justice’ (Fushimi 2007, p. 58). According to Fushimi, the ‘pain’ of a discriminated 
person is an issue of desire just as much as the pleasure or convenience of another 
person is, and therefore should be justified through a negotiation with other forms 
of desire. He thus redefines discrimination not as a public and social issue of 
injustice regarding a structural and institutional inequality, but as a matter of 
personal feelings. (Shimizu 2007) 
 
Duggan also describes how the rhetoric of US neoliberal gay activists labelled progressive 
left politics campaigning against social and economic injustice as being obsessed with 
victimhood (Duggan 2007, p. 55). With the redefinition of ‘justice’ characterising it as a 
personal objection against individuals’ own pain or victimhood, Shimizu argues, both 
Fushimi’s and the US neoliberal gay politics effectively depoliticise sexual politics by 
shifting it from the public to the private realm, and redefining it as an issue of personal 
endeavour, rather than of structural or institutional discrimination. 
 While observing that Fushimi and US neoliberals redefine and promote the 
politics of sexuality as belonging to the private sphere isolated from the social system that 
reproduces social inequality, Shimizu emphasises that their politics are still marked by 
nationalism. Analysing discourses of the Independent Gay Forum (IGF), which Duggan 
regards as an example of the politics of the new homonormativity (Duggan 2003, p. 50), 
she argues that their promotion of gay rights, focusing on gay access to marriage and the 
                                                
38 You can see part of this paper in the blog: tummygirl (2007). Here, I quote her from 
this blog.	
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military, conforms to US nationalism following 9/11 (ibid., p. 60). Duggan cites IGF’s 
principle, as found on their site: 
 
We share a belief in the fundamental virtue of the American system and its 
traditions of individual liberty, personal moral autonomy and responsibility, and 
equality before the law. We believe those traditions depend on the institutions of 
a market economy, free discussion, and limited government. (ibid., p. 60) 
 
Thus, in their discourses, the form of gay activism that focuses on personal issues of gay 
rights, rather than pursuing social justice against structural inequality, is considered part 
of ‘American’ traditional culture. Jasbir K. Puar later conceptualises such discourses and 
activism as ‘homonationalism’ (Puar 2007, p. 2). 
 Correspondingly, Shimizu remarks that Fushimi’s argument, too, in its implicit 
effort to assimilate into the existing public institutions of Japan, can be easily connected 
to a fundamental affirmation of the national.	
 
Answering his own question whether ‘this society is worth maintaining’, Fushimi 
says he would like to think so, and continues: ‘Surely one can endlessly keep 
pointing out what is wrong about this country, Japan . . . but my experience and 
my gut reaction tell me that this society can get so close to my ideal’ (Fushimi 
2007, p. 63). Following this casual rhetorical replacement of the social and the 
national is the affirmation of ‘Japan’ as that which should be maintained as it is: 
‘Overall, not everything about this country is getting worse’ (ibid., p.64); 
‘Enabling the desires of the others as much as possible, while trying to 
accommodate them so they will not contradict the formation and sustenance of 
this country… I would like to share this country with others as the forum for such 
endeavours’ (ibid., p. 64). Considering how many backlash discourses also 
promote ‘patriotism’, we could argue that Fushimi is trying in this book to secure 
gay existence by upholding the kind of gay politics that not only reformulate the 
sphere of the public and the political according to neoliberal principles but are 
also accommodated to national orders, thereby contravening the kind of gay 
politics that have endeavoured both to secure and expand the right to sexual 
privacy against the powers of the state and to open the question of sexuality to the 
sphere of public interference to the existing institutions. (Shimizu 2007) 
 
However, Shimizu accentuates Fushimi’s turn between his argument in Issues of Desire 
in 2007 and his interview in 2000 with a leading Japanese sociologist, Miyadai Shinji, 
about activism in Japanese society, and maintains: 	
 
One may consider Fushimi’s attempt in The Issue of Desire to survive under the 
backlash by discarding ‘un-Japanese’ identity politics and by endorsing the 
national as an incontestable precondition, as following this observation. The 
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crucial difference is, however, that while in this interview Fushimi still talks of 
possible social reorganisation through ‘non-typical forms of activisms’, seven 
years later in The Issue of Desire the search for possible public forms of 
intervention and reorganisation has been replaced with neoliberal and nationalistic 
gay ‘politics’, if they can be still termed as such, that are reduced to the personal 
effort to ‘make friends’ without radically questioning the existing social structures. 
(Shimizu 2007) 
 
Her remark about Fushimi’s nationally-accented gay desire in the guise of ‘politics’, or, 
as she suggests, the Japanese homonormativity, is important since it indicates how easily 
the personalisation of gay ‘politics’ in Japan can go hand in hand with the national and 
can reinforce the sense of unity of the Japanese, which the conservatives are eager to 
secure during the era of globalisation or the ‘crisis’ of Japanese society39. 
 Correspondingly, in his study of the gay community in Japan, Moriyama (2012) 
brings the sense of the national into the sphere of Japanese gay people and naturalises it 
without any qualifications. He focuses on gay men’s ties (tsunagari) through gay 
magazines, bars, cruising space and the Internet in his sociological research. However, 
his description of these cultures is highly abstract, with many references to discussions of 
social theory, such as those of Niklas Luhmann and Judith Butler. With his theoretical 
tendency, he rarely specifies his actual field of study of the gay community except as 
being ‘of Japan’, nor does he pay attention to the political background of the term ‘gay 
community’. Instead of analysing culture, human practices, economic and social 
dynamism among gay people, or political contexts in a certain area, he tries to explain the 
Japanese gay community40  as the ‘ties with privileged others’, for example, ‘love’, 
‘partnership’ and ‘fuck buddies (sekkusu furendo)’ (Moriyama 2012, p. 57), and abstractly 
universalises it. 	
	 Furthermore, he uses interviews with gay people to explain his prepared 
frameworks. Arguing from the features of gay slang, Moriyama insists that the term 
kocchi (here/this side) has played a significant role in constructing gay/bisexual men as 
‘we’ in Japan (Moriyama 2012, pp. 200-203). In his book, he does not usually give 
                                                
39 For example, the Japanese government internationally promoted the Kizuna project 
(the bound project) to display Japan's revival efforts in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. Such a term as kizuna (bound) has been utilised in Japan, accenting 
national solidarity, as described by Samuels (2013): ‘Social solidarity is hardly a new 
tile in the mosaic of Japanese national identity, but social solidarity is always tested in a 
crisis, and if it passes, it is always reinforced. 3.11 was no different’ (p. 108).  
40 The English title of his book is Sociology of the Japanese ‘Gay Community’. 
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detailed information about interviewees, such as their race/ethnicity, nationality, age, 
occupation, locality, health condition, education, the location of interviews, how often 
they go to gay scenes, or whether or not they are openly gay/bi men, other than the simple 
fact that they are gay or bisexual men, in the interest of ‘reducing a risk of specifying the 
individual’ (ibid., p. 182). The only exception occurs when, in his discussion of the way 
the linguistic practice of using the term kocchi (here/this side) contributes to the sense of 
‘we’, he emphasises the nationalities of the interviewees: 
 
The third reason for choosing the term kocchi is in regard to a question of ‘we’. 
Mr. H (South Korean) says:  
 
Mr. H: Today, listening to people’s talks, I felt so far that understanding of the 
word can change depending on their culture and individuals. For example, in the 
case of myself, especially in South Korea, the word [which is equivalent to the 
term kocchi] is just utilised as slang, I don't have any sense of fellowship. It is 
only the word for concealing myself from ordinary people. So, in kocchi [Japan], 
when I talk and hear, I get an impression of the sense of fellowship or something 
similar. This is what I felt. 
 
Here, it is expressed with surprise that the term kocchi utilised by gay/bisexual 
men in Japan has an implication of ‘sense of fellowship’. Japanese interviewees 
as well express the implication of the term kocchi with words such as ‘sense of 
fellowship’, ‘friendship’, and ‘fellows’. (Moriyama 2012, p. 185) 
 
In his citation, although Mr. H, a South Korean man, said that he felt a ‘sense of fellowship’ 
due to listening to the others’ talks during the interviews at that time, Moriyama interprets 
his words as expressing cultural differences, especially regarding the characteristics of 
the Japanese gay culture, without explaining what kinds of conversation took place in 
this interview prior to Mr. H’s comment. Then, following the comment, Moriyama 
introduces Japanese men’s comments about the implications for them of using the term 
kocchi (here/this side), but he does not make it clear when and where these comments 
were made; whether it was before Mr. H’s comment, which is the impression given, or in 
another of Moriyama’s interviews. In this unclear description, Mr. H’s personal reflection 
and feeling of ‘cultural differences’ at that time, accompanied by the observation that 
‘understanding of the word can change depending on their culture and individuals’ 
[emphasis mine], is essentialised and crystallised as the fact of cultural differences, and 
the sense of fellowship among Japanese gay/bisexual men is framed by the gaze of a 
foreigner, Mr. H. Here, the ‘we’ that emerges through the linguistic practice of the use of 
the term kocchi (here/this side) among gay/bisexual men is not only organised by sexual 
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orientation and their culture, as Moriyama argues, but is also subtly marked by the 
national commonality of the Japanese, as differentiated from the cultural other, South 
Koreans. Furthermore, what is observable in his writing is that Moriyama only mentions 
Mr. H this one time in his discussion, to stress the sense of fellowship of the Japanese, as 
if Mr. H only needs to be there to represent the ‘Japaneseness’ of the sense of fellowship 
among gay/bisexual men through his national difference.	
 
4-3. Politics of Disregarding and Japanese Ethnocentrism of Homosexuality  
 
Iino Yuriko (2006) argues that the ethnocentrism of Japanese sexual minorities can limit 
the possibilities of sexual politics in Japanese society. Referring in her argument to an 
episode that took place in the second Asian Lesbian Network, Iino Yuriko stresses the 
differences and power relationships amongst lesbians in Japan, especially focusing on 
differences between Japanese lesbians and Zainichi Korean. Zainichi literally means 
‘residents in Japan’, but is commonly used to refer to Korean residents, who, due to the 
Japanese colonial past, are the largest group of foreign residents in Japan. Iino follows 
arguments in the monthly newsletter of Regumi Studio, the first lesbian organisation in 
Japan, following an ‘incident’ during the second Asian Lesbian Network conference held 
in Tokyo in 1992. The incident, which sparked criticism in the lesbian community, took 
place during the opening ceremony of the conference. Iino quotes the description of the 
incident, as recalled by one of the presenters of the meeting: 
 
When a participating nation reported on the conditions of each country, a group 
of emcees introduced the participants by their country, saying, ‘Asians who come 
from (name of the country), please stand’. However, when they introduced the 
participants from Japan, they said, ‘Japanese lesbians who live in Japan, please 
stand’. There were many lesbians in the hall who were resident of Japan but were 
of foreign nationality, and they lost the opportunity to stand. (Iino 2006, pp. 77-
78) 
 
In response to the presenters’ insensitivity towards the foreigners and ethnic minorities in 
Japan, Park MiJwaJa, a Zainich Korean lesbian, wrote a criticism of the organisers in the 
newsletter of Regumi Studio, remarking on the ethnocentrism of the Japanese: 
 
The Asian conference, organised by the Japanese, who are not conscious of being 
Asian, was very successful from the perspective of the Japanese but was an utter 
failure from the viewpoint of Zainichi Koreans. It is widely acknowledged that 
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the Japanese lack the consciousness of being Asian. In addition to this, the 
consciousness that only Japanese live in Japan surfaced at this conference. This 
Japanese consider foreigners to be English-speaking people or whites. They do 
not regard Zainichi foreigners who speak fluent Japanese as foreigner. (…) 
By virtue of nature, Japanese are born and live in Japan naturally, have the right 
to vote, are guaranteed their human rights, are not discriminated against, and are 
alive. It is not surprising that they could not understand the meaning of gathering 
together only with Asians. (Iino 2006, p. 70) 
 
In this ‘politics of disregarding’ (p. 69), as Iino (2006) calls it, the Japanese ignore other 
Asian ethnic minorities in Japanese society, as a result of the power relationships between 
the Japanese and other Asians, together with the colonial legacy of contempt for the latter. 
Iino relates: 
 
As noted earlier, the Japanese and other Asians are differentially located in a 
power relationship. This difference in positionality exists not only between the 
countries but also between the Japanese and these other Asians living in Japan as 
well. However, many Japanese tend to disregard this fact, whether intentionally 
or unintentionally. The statement of ‘Japanese lesbians who live in Japan, please 
stand’ might have been an unintentional mistake on the part of the emcee. 
However, in the relationship between the Japanese and Zainichi Koreans, it is 
always the latter’s existence, culture, and history that have been forgotten. (Iino 
2006, p. 79) 
 
 Considering Fushimi’s and Moriyama’s ethnocentric characterisation of gay 
desire, identity and community in the light of Iino’s criticism, their arguments are also 
part of the politics of disregarding by the Japanese towards foreigners and ethnic 
minorities in Japan. They both not only fail to respect differences and power relationships 
among gay people in Japan and to recognise foreign and ethnic minority gay people as 
necessary members of the ‘gay community’ in Japan, but also construct the gay identity 
and community in terms of Japanese national/ethnic identity and through the exploitative 
use of the ‘foreign gaze’. However, it is not enough to point out the implications of 
Japanese national identity in their discourses. The question here is: what is the political 
significance of this approach, compared to that of their precursors who pursued the sexual 
politics of male homosexuals in Japan? 
 In the discourses of Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 
2, the national symbols, such as soldiers of World War Two, samurai and the Emperor, 
have been utilised to create a bridge between national politics and the marginalised desire 
that is supposed to reside in underground society. In their political arguments, homoerotic 
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desire functioned to reconstitute the domain of politics and was central in political 
struggles, whether right or left leaning. Just after the AIDS panic in Japan, for example, 
Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi and Keith Vincent insisted that gay identity was 
political, radically questioning normative distinctions between the public and private 
realms in Japanese society under the influence of both American Gay Studies and 
stereotypes of Japanese society, according to which gay identity was a ‘foreign’ concept. 
In their discussion, ‘Japan’, including Japanese national identity, is regarded as a national 
ideology, depoliticising social minorities, while they opt to overemphasise the political 
aspects of US gay politics (Kawagushi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, pp. 159-161). Thus, 
their usage of Tohjisha was intended to counter the discourses that connect gay identity 
with foreignness, while securing Japan as the heteronormative nation after the AIDS 
panic in the country.	
	 A decade later, discussions of gay men’s desire, identity and community only refer 
to the human relationships of gay people and the sexual activities among the Japanese, 
differentiated from cultural and ethnic others and isolated from political struggles. 
Originally, Tohjisha discourse emerged to question the power relations of institutionalised 
knowledge in social minority activism and academic research; ironically, however, it 
prepared the ground for the depoliticised or assimilated figure within the heteronormative 
society of ‘Japanese gay men’, equivalent to Duggan’s new homonormativity in the US 
context.	
  
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed the discursive phenomena of gay politics in Japan, 
focusing on the Tohjisha discourse. At the beginning of the discussion, I pointed out the 
four characteristics of gay male discourses in Japan between the late 1990s and the 2000s. 
In regard to the Tohjisha discourse, I analysed these phenomena as follows. Firstly, it is 
distinctive that the idea of Tohjisha has strongly influenced the discourses of both 
academia and activism in Japan. In this respect, the concept of Tohjisha has played a 
significant role in bridging the gap between academic discussions and activism in gay 
politics. However, Tohjisha is not always referred to with the same political implications 
and in the same contexts by various academics and activists, so that it generates many 
kinds of political style, depending on what the word Tohjisha means when a commentator 
uses it. Thus, the Tohjisha discourses do not function politically in the same way. 
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Secondly, because the term Tohjisha is so abstract and confusing as a concept, with multi-
layered political significance, it prompts heated arguments about gay politics in Gay 
Studies and constitutes a peculiar discursive arena among the people. At the same time, 
such arguments have also defined Japanese gay politics. Through the academic arguments, 
the Tohjisha discourse produced two kinds of gay politics in Japan: the representative gay 
male politics and the gay male politics of self-liberation. Thirdly, however, when Tohjisha 
comes to refer simply to ‘Japanese-middle-class-gay-men-in-a-big-city’, the term is 
easily associated with the representation of specific gay activities in the private realm, 
without radically questioning the Japanese politics and social norms that marginalise 
several social groups, including women, foreigners and ethnic minorities. Lastly, 
representing normative Japanese men as the ‘gay people in Japan’, the term Tohjisha in 
the gay culture can rather reiterate or even enforce the national norms of Japan while 
suspending political approaches to the nation and its heteronormativity. We can call such 
gay ‘activism’ the Japanese homonormativity.	
	 With the turn of Japanese gay politics towards private issues through the 
Tohjisha discourse, topics related to the national, that is, the Japanese, are discussed not 
as political issues but as private or individual matters, forming part of the identity or gay 
culture, or constituting a ‘unique’ element of communication among the people. This does 
not simply amount to the depoliticisation of Japanese gay politics since, as Iino (2006) 
argues, the ethnocentrism of Japanese sexual minorities is rooted in the Japanese colonial 
past and often results in the exclusion of foreigners and ethnic minorities in the 
community. Now, the tension existing between homosexual desire and national politics 
has vanished, while the ethnocentric and its cultural identity, along with the exclusions 
caused by it, are preserved in gay politics.	
On the other hand, it is also true that such redefinition of gay issues in Japan has 
emerged in the midst of the globalisation of LGBT politics as a human rights matter. 
Today, the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender/sexual) issues are regarded 
as human rights issues that the government should protect, especially in western 
democratic societies, as the former United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton proudly declared at the anniversary of the passage of the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights in Geneva in 2011. In the next chapter, I will discuss how the 
globalisation of LGBT issues emerging from Western countries has affected sexual 
politics in Japan. 
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Chapter 5: Representations of International Politics and LGBT Politics 
in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
 
While the concept of Tohjisha has been utilised for ethnocentric gay discourses and the 
depoliticisation of same-sex desire and gay identity in Japan, the topic of ‘globalisation’ 
has become a subject of heated debate. The influence of the globalisation of sexuality has 
also been extensively discussed since the 1990s in the English language (Altman 1996a, 
1996b, 1996c, 2001; Harley 2001; Binnie 2004). In the discussions of the globalisation 
of sexuality, gay identity outside the West is said to be influenced by gay cultures from 
the West, especially those of the United States. 
 In addition, especially since the 2000s, LGBT issues have become international 
human rights issues. In June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed a 
resolution on human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity for 
the first time in its history (International Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Commission 
2011). Countries in the European Union and North America have become more serious 
with regard to LGBT issues as international human rights issues and diplomatic issues.  
In this chapter, I will examine how the representations and narrative of global 
LGBT human rights can affect Japan. In the beginning, I will examine the internationally 
influential queer criticism of ‘homonationalism’ by Jasbir K. Puar (2007) in 
contextualising Japanese phenomena in international political movements of LGBT 
human rights. Although her concept is intended to criticise the idea of Western superiority, 
I will show that homonationalist critics still remain and reproduce the power relationships 
of the Western superiority to the others. Secondly, I will analyse a narrative of the speech 
‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ delivered by former US Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton in recognition of International Human Rights Day. Through examination 
of the speech, I will point out characteristics of the language of the Obama 
Administration’s international LGBT human rights policy, constructing the relationship 
between American democracy and LGBT human rights. Lastly, I will analyse the political 
influence by the Obama Administration’s LGBT-friendly policy promoted in Japan as the 
Obama Administration’s international human rights issues.  
	
2. Western Supremacy and Representations of LGBT Rights  
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2-1. International Changes in LGBT Politics 
 
Considering the contemporary political shifts on international issues, the changes in 
LGBT-related human rights issues are significant. In June 2011, the United Nations 
Human Rights Council passed a resolution on human rights violations based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity for the first time in its history (International Gay & 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission 2011). In October 2011, David Cameron, the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, declared that the UK government stands for LGBT 
human rights and warned that the UK government would cut aid to African countries that 
persecute homosexuals unless they suspended the relevant laws (The BBC 2011a). Then, 
on 6 December 2011, Hillary Rodham Clinton, the Secretary of State of the United States, 
delivered a speech called ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ in recognition of International 
Human Rights Day in Geneva. Her speech, which was delivered just 8 years after the US 
Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, struck down as unconstitutional the sodomy laws 
in the United States of America, symbolically represents the US government’s rapidly 
changing attitude towards LGBT issues. Among contemporary democratic societies, 
LGBT rights are becoming regarded as human rights, which governments and people 
should protect and respect. 
 However, it is not so easy to appreciate such international changes on LGBT 
issues as positive in all aspects. For instance, in response to Cameron’s warning about 
LGBT issues in African countries, it was not only politicians in the targeted countries 
such as Uganda, but also social justice activists in Africa generally, who criticised 
Cameron’s aid policy. They released a statement that cutting the aid would affect the lives 
of LGBT people in Africa as well as others, creating the real risk of a backlash against 
LGBT people (The BBC 2011b; African Men for Sexual Health and Rights 2011)41. In the 
context of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, international Israeli promotion of itself as 
                                                
41 Anna Agathangelou (2013) points out the relationship between racial politics, 
especially of ‘African blackness’, and neoliberal, global queer politics, saying: ‘In 
saving the queer from the “African” and the slave, the leadership of imperialism 
engages in a reconstruction of the new neoliberal entrepreneurial self that requires more 
than biopolitics: the US and certain European states turn against the populations that 
rupture their attempts to reconstruct a necro-economic-political order whose 
foundations depend on sustaining a material and metaphorical matrix and mobilising 
militias to eliminate “white but not quite” queer corporealities’ (p. 471). 
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a gay-friendly country was criticised as ‘pinkwashing’ and it was seen as propaganda 
designed to represent Israel as ‘relevant and modern’, while labelling the Palestinians as 
‘homophobic fanatics’ and expunging the existence of Palestinian gay-rights 
organizations (Schulman 2011)42.  
Considering such transnational politics in relation to LGBT human rights issues, 
Jasbir Puar’s argument about ‘homonationalism’ has been very influential, both in 
academia and in activist circles, since the publication of her book Terrorist Assemblages 
in 2007. Before considering US-Japan relationships on LGBT issues, I will analyse her 
argument and point out its limits, especially in the light of transnational LGBT politics 
beyond American society.	
	
2-2. Homonationalism and the Critique of LGBT politics in the age of the War on Terror  
 
In Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, published in 2007, Jasbir 
Puar poses an interesting argument about the complicated relationships among various 
forms of bio-politics comprised within the ‘War on Terror’ after 9/11: neoliberalism, 
racism and queer politics in the United States. Puar insists that mainstream gay politics, 
or queer politics in the US, has been assimilated into nationalism, as well as xenophobia 
and racism. She conceptualises and criticises as ‘homonationalism’ the new form of gay 
politics assimilated with US nationalism. She defines ‘homonationalism’ as follows: 
 
At work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism – the emergence of 
national homosexuality, what I term ‘homonationalism’ – that corresponds with 
the coming out of the exceptionalism of American empire. Further, this brand of 
homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, 
queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that 
reinforce these sexual subjects. (Puar 2007, p. 2) 
	
In the case of what I term ‘US sexual exceptionalism’, a narrative claiming the 
successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an 
exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional 
form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. [Stress in 
original] (ibid., p. 2) 
 
                                                
42 Jasbir Puar points out that the ‘pinkwashing’ of Israel functions to silence Israeli 
radical queers as well. Puar relates: ‘Israeli democracy, through its promotion of LGBT 
rights, offers golden handcuffs – a beautiful gift that comes with control – to Israeli 
queers’ (Puar 2012). 	
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In her definition of homonationalism, she characterises the term in relation to her notion 
of US sexual exceptionalism, which sustains the American empire. She also defines ‘US 
sexual exceptionalism’: 
 
One mapping of the folding of homosexuals into the reproductive valorisation of 
living – technologies – includes the contemporary emergence of ‘sexually 
exceptional’ US citizens, both heterosexual and otherwise, a formation I term ‘US 
sexual exceptionalism’. (ibid., p. 3) 
 
Even though her term ‘homonationalism’ has now been adopted in broader areas of social 
critique, such as the social exclusion of Muslims in the UK, Netherlands and Germany, 
and pinkwashing in Israel (El-Tayeb, 2012; Puar, 2010, 2011; Schulman, 2011, 2012), 
Puar argues, in Terrorist Assemblages, that homonationalism in the context of US sexual 
exceptionalism is a narrative presenting the United States as the heteronormative nation-
state, while pointing to its exceptional tolerance of homosexual difference as a sign of its 
national and cultural supremacy. Thus, although the term US sexual exceptionalism is not 
mentioned as often as homonationalism, Puar regards the concept of US sexual 
exceptionalism as essential to analyse the role of homonationalism during the War on 
Terror in the Bush Jr era following 9/11. 
 Her notion of US sexual exceptionalism refers not only to the cultural 
production of the United States as an exceptional nation-state but also to the production 
of sexual others: 
 
Further, a more pernicious inhabitation of homosexual sexual exceptionalism 
occurs through stagings of US nationalism via a praxis of sexual othering, one that 
exceptionalises the identities of US homosexualities vis-à-vis Orientalist 
constructions of ‘Muslim sexuality’. (ibid., p. 4) 
 
In her argument on US sexual exceptionalism, Puar notes not only a new form of 
homosexual subject, which is complicit with heteronormative nationalist discourses, but 
also a process of sexual othering through Orientalist constructions of Muslim sexuality. 
By examining reactions to the homophobic violence committed by US guards at Abu 
Ghraib, Puar explains how discourses about Abu Ghraib have produced ideas of 
homosexuality as taboo and of sexual repression in Muslim culture, while representing 
US society as occupying a superior position of knowledge regarding Muslim sexuality, 
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as well as being a liberated society in which homosexuals are able to enjoy their freedom. 
She writes: 
 
Given the unbridled homophobia (among other phobias) demonstrated by the US 
guards, it is indeed ironic, yet predictable, that the United States nonetheless 
emerges as sexually exceptional: less homophobic and more tolerant of 
homosexuality (and less tainted by misogyny and fundamentalism) than the 
repressed, modest, nudity-shy Middle East. (ibid., p. 94) 
 
Thus, US sexual exceptionalism functions through the construction of sexual others to 
secure US supremacy and cultural boundaries, besides inscribing homosexuality, in 
certain forms, as a nationally and morally acceptable subject in US society. 
Even the queer subject, she argues, is a part of US sexual exceptionalism. 
According to Puar, the queer agential subject has been fathomed as outside the norms of 
religion or, indeed, as an agency against them. While a ‘queer’ is characterised as a secular, 
resisting and transgressive subject with a white, Western or Westernised body, Arabs and 
Muslims are regarded as homophobic, fundamentalist and improper sexual subjects.  
 
Visually, the body reclaims the faggotry, the effeminacy, the failed masculinity, 
always already installed in the naming of the terrorist, staging further defiance in 
the face of such easily rendered accusations of being a terrorist. The (white) 
secular norms by which queerness abides contributes greatly to (racist) Islamo- 
and homophobic representations of terrorists… Queer secularity is constitutive of 
and constituted by the queer autonomous liberal subject against and through the 
reification of the very pathological irrational sexualities that are endemic to 
discourses of terrorist culpability. (ibid., p. 14) 
 
In the argument on queerness, Puar stresses how a certain body is supposed to be a proper 
‘queer’ subject, while bodies of Arabs and Muslims are regarded as perversely sexualised 
ones outside the cultural representations of ‘queer’.  
She also questions multiculturalism as a cultural movement that includes other 
cultures and ethnicities within US society, and also applies her discussion of racial 
formations to a context of multiculturalism in contemporary liberal policy. Puar, 
following Rey Chow (2002), argues that the ‘ascendancy of whiteness’, to which modern 
biopolitics has contributed, incorporates multicultural bodies complicit with this 
ascendancy in contemporary liberal society. She notes, however, that such incorporation 
is limited by class, gender and, especially, sexuality. Even though liberal diversity 
includes the ethnic minorities, this inclusion redefines the realm of exclusion because a 
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person whom a liberal society welcomes is ‘usually straight, and usually has access to 
material and cultural capital (both as a consumer and as an owner), and is in fact often 
male’ (Puar 2007, p. 25). Puar argues that heteronormativity is the most pivotal of 
attributes, which, in many cases, distinguishes tolerable ethnics from intolerable ethnics, 
as ‘certain Orientalist queernesses (failed heteronormativity, as signalled by polygamy, 
pathological homosociality) are a priori ascribed to terrorist bodies’ (ibid., p. 25).  
 Puar radicalises a cultural logic of differentiating US society from others in her 
account of US sexual exceptionalism and homonationalism. Her analysis of cultural 
movements, which seem to open up the society to gender, sexual, ethnic and racial 
minorities, always reduces them to the narrative of US sexual exceptionalism as well as 
racial hegemony in the US society, even interpreting them as core elements in sustaining 
US hegemony. Furthermore, Puar emphasises differences created by the dichotomy 
between US sexual politics and its sexual others, so-called ‘Muslim sexuality’, by 
rendering them as metonymical relationships between biopolitics and necropolitics, such 
as those between US citizens and terrorists, or Israel and Palestine. In her book, she 
attempts to examine ‘the process of disaggregating exceptional queer subjects from queer 
racialised populations in contemporary US politics rather than proffer an overarching 
paradigm of biopolitical sexuality that resolves these dilemmas’ (ibid., p. 35). Her 
narrative itself not only exemplifies the dichotomy but also performatively creates and 
emphasises an abyss between the West and ‘Oriental others’, who are a cultural construct 
of the West. 
 
2-3. The Limits of Narrative of Dichotomy in Transnational Politics  
 
It is undeniable that Puar’s discussion of homonationalism has been innovative and 
influential, in both academia and activism, in its analysis of the contemporary sexual 
politics of Western societies. It offers a new viewpoint from which to argue about Euro-
American centric discourses of gender and sexuality. The dualistic narrative of the West 
vis-à-vis Oriental others is also distinctive among criticisms inspired by her argument. 
Maya Mikdashi, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University's Department of Anthropology, 
correlates Clinton’s ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ speech with a pinkwashing 
movement promoted by the Israeli Government on the website Jadaliyya of the Arab 
Studies Institution, which provides both local news and critical analysis of the Arab world. 
She notes how a discourse of human rights itself regulates people’s lives through 
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identities of ‘LGBTQ’ and repeats a colonial distinction between people who deserve 
protection along with political rights, and people who ‘enjoy’ full civil rights as human 
beings but not political rights. She says: 
 
Today, the promise of ‘gay rights’ for Palestinian goes something like this: The 
United States will protect your right to not be detained because as a gay, but will 
not protect you from being detained because you are Palestinian… 
Pinkwashing only makes sense as a political strategy within a discourse of 
Islamophobia and Arabophobia, and it is part of a large project to anchor all 
politics within the axis of identity, and identitarian (and identifiable) groups. Thus 
critics of pinkwashing who assume an international queer camaraderie repeat a 
central tenet of homonationalism: homosexual should be in solidarity with and 
empathise with each other because they are homosexual [stress in original]. 
(Mikdashi 2011)  
 
Her analysis, focusing on the radical difference between the ‘West’ and ‘others/Islam’, is 
representative of an interpretation of homonationalism following Jasbir Puar. Despite this 
critique, however, Secretary Clinton actually spoke against Islamophobia in this speech, 
as well as confirming her position against homophobia: ‘Combating Islamophobia or anti-
Semitism is a task for people of all faiths. And the same is true with this struggle for 
[LGBT] equality’ (Clinton 2011). It is noteworthy that the dichotomy asserted by the 
homonationalism critique may cause one to overlook one of the characteristics of 
Clinton’s ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ speech, which tries to avoid a confrontational 
relationship between the West and Islam.	
 The narrative of radical dichotomy between the West and Oriental others helps 
to represent the critique of homonationalism itself as political. However, because the 
Oriental others are considered as a cultural construction of Western sexual politics, the 
politics of the criticism of homonationalism tends to dwell in a self-critique of the ‘West’, 
so as to avoid both homonationalism and the construct of sexual others. Ironically, Puar’s 
expansion of the critique of homonationalism reaches so far as to find ‘homonationalism’ 
in anti-homonationalism movements, especially in ‘pinkwatching’ which is an 
international movement challenging Israel’s pinkwashing (Puar and Mikdashi 2012). In 
an article by Puar and Mikdashi, they argue that pinkwatching reiterates the narrative of 
pinkwashing by focusing on sexuality, identity, homophobia and queer solidarity rather 
than pointing out the racism, colonialism and homonationalism in pinkwashing. 
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Pinkwashing produces endless questions about the status of gays, lesbians, and 
trans Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza, as well as in Israel. Pinkwatching 
in the United States not only produces these very same questions, but it also 
responds to them citing the presence of Arab and Palestinian activist groups and 
individuals in the Middle East as proof that there are native and authentic LGBT 
activists in the Arab world. In this way, the relationship between pinkwashing and 
pinkwatching produces a call and response feedback loop that stabilises the 
discourse that pinkwatching claims to critique. (Puar and Mikdashi 2012) 	
 
They regard pinkwatching’s ideas of sexuality as American-centrist, employing the terms 
‘queerness’ and homophobia in the United States sense, despite applying them to 
Palestinian contexts. In doing so, they insist that the pinkwatching movement, as well as 
pinkwashing itself, both promote globalisation of the term homophobia, which is ‘a 
purportedly transparent form of violence that all queers are subject to, regardless of 
geopolitical locations or historical, cultural, and economic variability’ (Puar and Mikdashi 
2012).  
 In addition, Puar and Mikdashi criticise the simplified narrative of pinkwatching, 
which isolates transnational sexual politics from other historical, political and cultural 
elements supporting US and Israeli colonialism. 	
	
Pinkwashing ignores the settler-colonialism of Israel. Unfortunately, 
pinkwatching ignores the settler-colonialism of the United States and its own 
entrenchment in homonationalism. More often than not, pinkwatchers in the 
United States rightly critique the structural violence of settler colonialism in 
Palestine, but do so without recognising the fact that they (we) are also settlers 
who live in a settler colony. Often, critique of the illegal settlements in Palestine 
is rendered through a disidentification with those settlers, rather than recognition 
of a common historical, political, and ongoing practice of settling the United 
States. 
The United States is Israel’s greatest benefactor – its diplomatic and military 
blank check. Without a critique of US complicity in Israel’s occupation of 
Palestine, queer solidarity efforts are reproducing homonationalist versions of 
queerness and colluding with US imperialism… 
 In addition to shared history and practice of settler colonialism, the United States 
and Israel are the largest benefactors of homonationalism, as it operates on three 
scalar registers: internal, territorial, and global. (Puar and Mikdashi 2012)	
	
Their intersectional critique of US and Israeli colonialism in terms of homonationalism 
is meaningful for the consideration of contemporary transnational sexual politics. 
However, their critique of homonationalism, which functions transnationally in their 
discussion, is almost always stuck in reflections on American politics, tracing these back 
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from the Israeli occupation of Palestine to the origins of US history as a settler nation. 
Here, the authors confine themselves to talking about US politics, while pinkwatching 
activists work for Palestine liberation and try to build a relationship with Palestinian 
activists.	
 In response to Puar and Mikdashi’s critique, Heike Schotten and Haneen Maikey, 
Palestinian and American anti-pinkwashing activists, criticise Puar and Mikdashi’s 
argument for relying too heavily on the conceptual framework of homonationalism and 
for coming dangerously close, in their criticisms, to a rehearsal of academic critique at 
the expense of contributing to movement building (Schotten and Maikey 2012). What is 
questionable in Puar and Mikdashi’s critique in this context is that their argument itself 
fails to fall outside of their critical target: US exceptionalism. In their criticism of 
homonationalism, they only discuss politics in the context of the West, especially US 
politics, even though they consider the politics of homonationalism to be expanding 
globally. Their overemphasis on the influence of US politics can be interpreted as part of 
US exceptionalism, causing other parts of the world to look like passive recipients or 
‘victims’ of American politics. Such a narrative is one of the most popular expressions of 
the Euro-American centrism already discussed in previous chapters: while European or 
American activism is constructed as authentic political subjects or as the true forebears 
of the globalisation of sexual politics, other cultures are treated as mere outgrowths of 
Euro-American politics, lacking agency of their own. Schotten and Maikey point out:  
 
Initially, pinkwatching activism was based on the dismantling of Palestinian 
erasure, the reclamation of international queer spaces, and the promotion of new 
queer Palestinian bodies, images and voices. Today, pinkwatching continues to 
uncover and make visible the racial, ethnic, and sexual violence that informs 
Zionist ideology.   
 For these reasons, the authors’ focus on ‘authenticity’ (sorry – at least one of us 
does not know how to articulate a non-authentic queer Palestinian voice) is limited 
by a critique of homonationalism that ignores the specificities of Palestine. This 
oversight may be read as slightly patronising, suggesting that Palestinian queers 
are either too naïve or lacking in enough critical insight to discern between activist 
commitments that are appropriate and those that tokenise them. More problematic 
still are the ways in which an emphasis on authenticity ultimately overlooks queer 
Palestinians’ strategic uses of recognition and visibility. (Schotten and Maikey 
2012) 
 
Puar and Mikdashi’s criticism, which too heavily emphasises homonationalism in the US 
context, ironically helps to erase the possibility of the queer Palestinian subject emerging. 
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 Puar and Mikdashi’s critique of pinkwatching soundly indicates the limits of 
Puar’s criticism of homonationalism as a global phenomenon. Her term 
‘homonationalism’ is fruitful for conceptualising the relationships between contemporary 
queer politics and a new form of emerging nationalism and imperialism in Western 
societies. However, the critique of homonationalism tends to discuss global sexual 
politics only within Western contexts, dwelling in self-criticism of the West while 
carefully rendering suspect the existence of sexual others in relation to the West, as if they 
were their own constructed others. Firstly, such scepticism forecloses an alternative way 
of recognising the others while consolidating self-awareness through continuous 
reflection. After all, this criticism results in constructing a new Euro-American centrism 
and erasing its others. Secondly, discourses focusing on self-criticism of the West fail to 
see where the narrative of American or Western sexual politics can interact with strategies 
of ‘local’ activism in the global age. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse global 
phenomena representing the sexual politics of homonationalism both from Euro-
American viewpoints and in other cultural contexts that seem to be politically influenced 
by it. 
 It is noteworthy that Puar’s argument on homonationalism was developed during 
the presidency of George W. Bush. Thus, the characteristic dichotomy in her analysis of 
homonationalism in the United States might reflect the narrative of George W. Bush 
administration on the War on Terror and their promotion of American exceptionalism. 
Thus, there is a question of how far her conceptual frame can be applicable to the policy 
of the Obama administration. 
 Michael Ignatieff (2005) points out three types of American exceptionalism: the 
Unites States exempts itself from international human rights and humanitarian law 
convention; the United States maintains double standards between their friends and 
enemies; and the United States denies jurisdiction to human rights laws within its own 
domestic law (p.3). He distinguishes types of explanations of American exceptionalism: 
realism, culture and institutions. Along with the US political and legal institutions and 
international power that enable the US to be ‘exceptional’ in the international community, 
Ignatieff points out American culture, which has a desire for moral leadership: ‘American 
presidents have articulated a strongly messianic vision of the American role in promoting 
rights abroad’ (Ignatieff 2005, p. 13). Similarly, Harold Hongju Koh relates, on American 
exceptionalism: 
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I must address a fifth, much-overlooked dimension in which the United States 
is genuinely exceptional in international affairs. Looking only at the half-empty 
part of the glass, I would argue, obscures the most important respect in which 
the United States has been genuinely exceptional, with regard to international 
affairs, international law, and promotion of human rights: namely, in its 
exceptional global leadership and activism. To this day, the United States 
remains the only superpower capable, and at times willing, to commit real 
resources and make real sacrifices to build, sustain, and drive an international 
system committed to international law, democracy, and the promotion of human 
rights. (Koh 2003, p.1487) 
 
In terms of LGBT rights, the Obama administration seems to find its exceptional role as 
being a world leader of humans rights rather than being a solely ‘exceptional’ nation of 
democracy and justice in the world. In the next section, I will analyse a narrative of ‘Gay 
Rights Are Human Rights’ as exemplifying the narrative of the subsequent Obama 
administration’s policy on LGBT human rights, and will then discuss the contemporary 
influence of American sexual politics in Japan. 	
	
2-4. The Narrative of ‘Gay Rights Are Human Rights’ and the Politics of Progress 
 
On 6 December 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered her 
speech ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ in Geneva in recognition of International Human 
Rights Day. Her speech and the presidential memorandum issued by President Obama 
and released on the same day are regarded as the historical landmark statements on LGBT 
rights and on the new US diplomatic policy, and were welcomed by international LGBT 
human rights groups as affirming the Obama administration’s vow to fight for LGBT 
people (Hudson 2011)43. The New York Times reported that her speech was symbolically 
important, like President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy emphasising human rights, 
although neither Obama nor Clinton specified how they might lead the world on this 
controversial issue even amongst US allies (Mayer & Cooper, 2011).  
Reading Secretary Clinton’s Geneva speech, it is notable that a narrative of ‘US 
sexual exceptionalism’, which critics of homonationalism stress, is rarely expressed. 
Rather, it is significant that the speech is carefully written to avoid asserting US 
superiority or cultural conflicts between the West and others, the only exceptional part 
                                                
43 For example, Pride London, and the global LGBT organisation Kaleidoscope Trust, 
honoured Hillary Clinton by offering the ‘World LGBT Award’ for her speech in 2012 
(Reid-Smith 2012). 
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being her declaration that the United States, and the millions of American people, 
supported LGBT men and women worldwide. The BBC report notes her denial of gayness 
as a Western invention:  
 
‘Gay people are born into and belong to every society in the world’, Mrs Clinton 
said in Geneva. ‘Being gay is not a Western invention. It is a human reality’. (The 
BBC 2011c)	
	
Her narrative, which begins with the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
tries to present human rights as universal values; therefore, in her speech, she tries to 
convince audiences that progress towards acceptance of human rights, including LGBT 
rights, is inevitable. Speaking against cultural relativism, she noted that human rights 
were universal and cut across all religious and cultural differences. Thus, progress, which 
actualises such universal values beyond ‘superficial’ differences in the world, is an 
essential concept in her speech. 	
Clinton defines progress in three domains: truth, politics and morality.  
Firstly, she establishes the principle that truth is superior to belief. Clinton says: 
‘Progress starts with honest discussion. Now, there are some who say and believe that all 
gay people are paedophiles, that homosexuality is a disease that can be caught or cured, 
or that gays recruit other to become gay. Well, these notions are simply not true’ (Clinton 
2011). She stresses that discussion allows people to reach understanding of these issues 
and change their ‘wrong’ beliefs. Although she focuses here on the importance of 
discussion and conversation, she presupposes that the truth will overcome ‘beliefs’ that 
are relevant to cultural and religious differences.  
Secondly, she insists that laws precede broader recognition of rights and have an 
educational effect: progress comes from a change in law. Her comments are intended to 
refute the opinion that a government should not act for LGBT rights when the people in 
the State are not ready for it. At the same time, however, she supports the idea that politics 
is the special domain in which progress emerges.  
Thirdly, morality, including such characteristics as sympathy and compassion, is 
characterised as the cognitive field in which one changes in the direction of progress. She 
says:  
 
Progress comes from being willing to walk a mile in someone else’s shoes. We 
need to ask ourselves, ‘How would it feel if it were a crime to love the person I 
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love? How would it feel to be discriminated against for something about myself 
that I cannot change?’ This challenge applies to all of us as we reflect upon deeply 
held beliefs, as we work to embrace tolerance and respect for the dignity of all 
persons, and as we engage humbly with those with whom we disagree in the hope 
of creating greater understanding. (Clinton 2011) 
 
These notions of truth, politics and morality are plain expressions of the ideas of 
the Enlightenment, while her notion of progress is deeply influenced by modern ideas of 
knowledge, politics and morality, such as those discussed by Jürgen Habermas. 
Characterising modernity as an unfinished project to ‘encourage the rational organisation 
of social relations’, he referred to the Marquis de Condorcet, who believed that the Arts 
and Sciences would promote ‘the understanding of self and world, the progress of 
morality, justice in social institutions, and even human happiness’ (Habermas 1997, p. 
45). 
 Indeed, Clinton’s vision of progress can be regarded as Eurocentric, as well as 
Colonialist, in its possible effects. She proclaims the universality of human rights of 
LGBT people as going beyond religious and cultural differences, then legitimates the 
political reforms that she regards as important with the notion of progress, including 
cultural and moral enforcements. As Gauri Viswanathan (1988) points out in the context 
of British colonialism in India, cultural assimilation was the most effective form of 
political action, while the figure of the ‘ideal’ man was a tool of colonialism and 
governance. She quotes the statement by a high-ranking British official in the Bombay 
administration:  
 
The Natives must either be kept down by a sense of our power, or they must 
willingly submit from a conviction that we are more wise, more just, more humane, 
and more anxious to improve their condition than any other rulers they could 
possibly have. (Viswanathan 1988) 
 
However, when we compare Clinton’s speech with the statement of the British official in 
the nineteenth century quoted above, it is characteristic that her speech denies national 
supremacy rather than claiming that her country is the best in the world. In the statement 
of the British official, what was at stake was the Indian people’s view of who would be 
the best ruler. By contrast, Clinton has repeatedly stressed the fact that the United States 
also has made many mistakes. She mentioned the sodomy law that existed until 2003 in 
the USA, as well as the violence and harassment that LGBT people currently face.  
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Hence, if we follow Puar’s critique of US sexual exceptionalism, it is possible to 
interpret Clinton’s narrative as constructing an exceptional image of the USA on the basis 
of its ability to acknowledge errors and to move towards progress even though it has made 
many mistakes, as other countries have. More importantly, however, what is distinctive 
in her speech is the fact that she mentions many countries outside the West, such as South 
Africa, Colombia, Argentina, Nepal and Mongolia, which have changed their laws to 
protect gay people. The universality of the US historical path and the legitimacy of US 
diplomatic policy for LGBT people are secured by such countries, which appear to be 
following the policy of the United States on human rights even though they do not share 
the same cultural and religious background.  
Just after Clinton’s speech in Geneva, gay news media, such as Advocate.com and 
Seattle’s LGBT News, reported positive reactions by women’s and LGBT rights activists 
from Asia, Russia, East Europe, South Africa and Africa (Anderson-Minshall 2011; 
Seattle’s LGBT News 2011). For justification of their political insistence on LGBT rights, 
not only Clinton’s narrative but also gay news media in the United States, gave 
importance to the third countries in the area of global sexual politics; that is, those which 
are neither the ‘West’ nor the countries strongly against LGBT rights, and which have 
been changing their social system as the West has done already. These third countries are 
used as representative of the historical path that Clinton called progress, and which the 
world must embark upon. The third countries can be characterised as follows: ‘even 
though they are culturally, politically, and historically different, they still agree with and 
follow us’. Through comparing and understanding their political changes for LGBT 
people in terms of changes in Western countries, the third countries will become the 
representatives of historical movements. 
This is the political dynamic that Puar’s critique of homonationalism, which 
focuses on radical differences in sexual politics between the US and others, or between 
the West and Islam, opts to miss. While US sexual exceptionalism certainly relies on the 
belief in US cultural and political supremacy, such a representation of supremacy always 
rests not only on others’ inferiority but also on others’ support, which seems to follow 
from supremacy. 	
In Clinton’s narrative, LGBT rights represent new progress in human rights. 
However, her narrative of progress produces oppositional effects as well. Firstly, 
Clinton’s narrative of progress characterised by truth, politics and morality already 
presupposes the notion of LGBT rights as they should be; as a result, it ironically indicates, 
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rather, the terrain of ignorance. According to a Pinknews report, Clinton told an audience 
at Syracuse University that many foreign leaders in Africa and Asia considered gay rights 
and women’s rights to be a ‘totally foreign concept’ (Park, 2012). Her comment is 
reported as a kind of joke about cultural differences rather than a political problem, 
although it was possible that the political leaders pretended to be ‘ignorant’ in order to 
avoid political intervention by the USA, or seemed ‘ignorant’ just because they did not 
agree with her ideas. Through the suggestion of ‘ignorance’, her concept of progress can 
disturb political dialogue by treating the denial of LGBT rights as a form of ignorance 
rather than as a political strategy. Secondly, even though Clinton tries to present the 
concept of progress as universal, her attitude towards other cultures undermines her 
universalism. As the Pinknews report is nuanced so as to suggest Western superiority 
towards other areas such as Asia and Africa, her universalism entails the local nationalism 
of the USA or Western European societies. Thirdly, the dichotomy between universality 
and cultural differences, or between progress and cultural backwardness, fails to pay 
attention to the complicated political negotiations between traditional culture and new, or 
foreign, culture in the local context. It can be represented simply as ‘Westernisation’, 
‘political success’ or ‘progress’, as in Secretary Clinton’s account. This narrative is not 
only a form of cultural imperialism, but also secures the idea that the West is the origin, 
even though Clinton tried to avoid such Euro-American centrism. 
The Euro-American centrism in the discourses on sexual politics is not a new 
subject at all in Sexuality Studies, especially when the topic is global LGBT politics, as 
Puar and Mikdashi (2012) already pointed out. Yet, considering the Gay Rights and 
Human Rights speech, it is characteristic that the US government starts to appropriate a 
Euro-American centric narrative for the language of LGBT politics itself. As LGBT 
politics has been increasingly considered an important political issue, major news media, 
both in Japan and in other countries, have gradually reported on LGBT conditions in 
Japan. Thus, the Euro-American centric narrative of LGBT politics now seems to affect 
not only ideas of sexuality, such as a category of identity or the discourses of academia 
and activism, but also the language of politics used by governments and global mass 
media. In the next section, I will analyse how the Euro-American centric narrative in 
governmental statements and major news media affects Japanese politics and its 
representations. 	
 
3. LGBT Rights: New American Values 
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3-1. American Democracy and the Representation of LGBT Politics in Japan by the News 
Media in the English Language 
 
As Clinton explicitly states, the discourses that represent the progress of human rights or 
democracy through LGBT liberation have emerged in public to a remarkable extent since 
the 2000s. For example, the legitimation of same-sex marriage, which symbolises the 
achievement of equality for gays and lesbians, is discussed in terms of democracy, with 
the legitimation of same-sex marriage considered representative of the progress of 
democracy itself. R. Claire Snyder writes: 
 
By the end of the book, I hope to convince the reader that the fundamental 
principles of American democracy not only allow, but also require the legalisation 
of same-sex marriage. While it may be true at this moment in time that the 
majority of American citizens oppose allowing lesbians and gays the equal right 
to marry, it is my position that democracy cannot be reduced to a process of 
majority rule; it requires a number of other principles as well. Most importantly, 
by definition democracy requires equality among citizens in order to exist. [Stress 
in original] (Snyder 2005, p. 2) 
	
Snyder discusses the legalisation of same-sex marriage as the symbol of equality and 
American democracy. Similarly, Michael Bloomberg writes in the Guardian online: 
‘Across Europe and the US support for same-sex marriage is growing, and for a simple 
reason: it is consistent with democracy’s promise of equal rights for all people’ 
(Bloomberg 2013). After the historic decisions of the US Supreme Court in cases of same-
sex marriage in 2013, the Defense of Marriage Act and California Proposition 8, Supreme 
Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg told the National Constitution Centre that acceptance 
of gay marriage reflects the genius of the US Constitution (The Washington Post 2013). 
In these discourses, the progress of gay rights, especially the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage, is regarded as the result of progress not merely of ‘democracy’ but of American 
democracy. 
 The American-centric narrative of gay liberation is employed in contemporary 
American news media to describe Japanese politics concerning sexual minorities. For 
instance, the news of the first elected openly gay male politicians, Ishikawa Taiga and 
Ishizaka Wataru, in Japan in April 2011 was widely reported compared to other LGBT-
related Japanese news by the news media in English. Interestingly, this news is interpreted 
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as showing Japan’s slow development as a modern democratic country in the context of 
gay politics, especially compared to American democracy. For example, The Huffington 
Post identifies the first Japanese openly gay politician as Harvey Milk, who was actually 
the first American openly gay politician 30 years ago (The Huffington Post 2011). The 
report stressed the politician’s intention to work for gay marriage, which is the symbol of 
gay rights currently spreading among ‘liberal’ states in the US, although he was elected 
as a member of a ward council in Tokyo that has no power to decide on same-sex marriage 
in the Japanese political system. This article presupposes that Japan is slowly treading the 
same path marked out by the United States, as expressed in Secretary Clinton’s narrative. 
On CNNGo, a reporter directly asked a new gay politician, Ishizaka Wataru, if he also 
thought that Japan was relatively advanced among Asian countries for its acceptance of 
gay people, but was still ‘behind’ much of the Western world (Robinson 2011). 
 This kind of teleological discourse, Clinton’s speech at Geneva being another 
example, is based on a narrative of the history of sexual minorities along the lines of 
premodern homoerotic sexuality becoming Westernised as ‘gay’, following which these 
gays would fight against the repression in their society and transform it into a modern, 
tolerant, multicultural society like that of America. However, the narrative in the news 
media, which aims to present American society or Western society as the model of the 
history of LGBT activism, misrepresented the situation of LGBT politics in Japan. The 
Huffington Post, CNNGo, PinkNews and AFP reported that Ishikawa Taiga is the first 
openly gay politician in Japan, elected in 2011, and many news media even failed to 
mention Ishizaka, who was elected at the same time, as one of the first openly gay male 
politicians 44 . Furthermore, in fact, there were already openly gay and transgender 
politicians in Japan before them: Otsuji Kanako, who was a member of the Osaka 
Prefectural Assembly, came out as a lesbian when she was in office in 2005, and 
Kamikawa Aya, a transgender politician, was elected as a member of a Ward Council in 
2003. Thus, in the news media in the English language, the legacy of Harvey Milk, the 
first American openly gay male politician, ironically functions to erase the achievement 
of female gay and transgender politicians in Japan, through the media’s attempt to report 
Japanese LGBT politics on the basis of American history. 
                                                
44 For example, the Huffington Post, PinkNews and AFP also did not mention Ishizaka 
Wataru as the first openly gay male politician.	
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Therefore, applying American LGBT history to Japanese LGBT activism is not 
only inappropriate but also actually misleading to the audience, as it misrepresents 
Japanese society. Analysing the narrative of the Japanese organiser of the LGBT news 
website in Japan, Gay Japan News, Suganuma (2012) points out the presence in the 
narrative of a ‘Japanese desire to be like the West’ (pp. 175-6)45. However, in the narrative 
of the news media reporting the earliest openly gay male politicians, there is rather the 
Western desire for Japan or Asia to be like the West. This desire further misrepresents 
Japanese LGBT politics and its history. 
	
4-2. Obama’s America: The ‘New’ Country which Protects LGBT Rights	
	
After Clinton’s speech ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’, it is remarkable that the Obama 
Administration has started to work internationally for improvements in LGBT rights. 
Focusing on Japanese-American relations, the government’s educational activities 
centring on LGBT rights and support for local LGBT groups, including Pride events in 
Tokyo, are distinctive in Japan46. These LGBT-related events, held by the US Embassy, 
are part of the Obama administration’s LGBT-friendly policy, as expressed in the ‘Gay 
Rights are Human Rights’ speech and President Obama’s Proclamation of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender Pride Month, released on 31 May 2011. In the Proclamation, 
he states: 
 
Because we recognise that LGBT rights are human rights, my Administration 
stands with advocates of equality around the world in leading the fight against 
pernicious laws targeting LGBT persons and malicious attempts to exclude LGBT 
organizations from full participation in the international system. We led a global 
campaign to ensure ‘sexual orientation’ was included in the United Nations 
resolution on extrajudicial execution – the only United Nations resolution that 
specifically mentions LGBT people – to send the unequivocal message that no 
matter where it occurs, state-sanctioned killing of gays and lesbians is indefensible. 
No one should be harmed because of who they are or who they love, and my 
Administration has mobilised unprecedented public commitments from countries 
around the world to join in the fight against hate and homophobia. (Obama 2011)	
	
                                                
45 I will discuss his argument of international cultural phenomena and LGBT politics in 
the context of Japan in the next chapter. 
46 The US Embassy supported and put up a booth at Tokyo Rainbow Pride in 2013 and 
has actively organised LGBT-related educational events for Japanese people since 2011. 
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As Obama makes clear in the Proclamation, the Obama administration had recognised 
LGBT rights as an international issue even before Clinton made the same commitment in 
her speech in Geneva. 
 In the Proclamation, Obama places the repeal of the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ 
policy at the head of his list of achievements for LGBT Americans, such as eliminating 
discrimination against LGBT Americans in Federal housing programs, prohibiting 
discrimination based on gender identity in the Federal workplace, establishing the right 
to visit partners in hospital, and appointing openly LGBT individuals to executive branch 
and judicial positions.	
	
Since taking office, my Administration has made significant progress towards 
achieving equality for LGBT Americans. Last December, I was proud to sign the 
repeal of the discriminatory ‘Don't Ask, Don't Tell’ policy. With this repeal, gay 
and lesbian Americans will be able to serve openly in our Armed Forces for the 
first time in our Nation’s history. Our national security will be strengthened and 
the heroic contributions these Americans make to our military, and have made 
throughout our history, will be fully recognized. (Obama 2011)	
	
In the political rhetoric of the Obama administration, as well illustrated by the 
Proclamation, improvements in LGBT rights are closely relevant to US national 
development, especially national security. 
 Such political representation of LGBT rights is utilised by the US Embassy in 
Japan as well. On 4 June 2012, the US Embassy held a reception celebrating LGBT Pride 
Month and invited around 150 people including Diet members, representatives of LGBT 
rights and other human rights organisations, business leaders, government officials, 
religious leaders, academics, students and artists in Japan. As Stars and Stripes, the 
American newspaper focusing on news of the US armed forces, reported, gay male 
soldiers in US Forces Japan were invited as well and Stars and Stripes introduced the 
words of one of these soldiers: 
 
‘I can’t believe I’ve been in the Air Force 23 years living in secret, hiding who I 
am’, Maschhoff said before heading to the reception, which was closed to the 
media, ‘and now I’m invited to a reception by the emissary of the president of 
the United States’. (Reed, 2012) 
 
The political change from a society in which homosexuals had to hide their sexuality to 
one which welcomes them is often utilised as a narrative representing the progress in 
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LGBT rights achieved by the Obama administration. On the new website of the US 
Embassy in Japan, Patrick Linehan, who is Osaka-Kobe Consul General and openly gay, 
is reported as saying: 
 
Osaka-Kobe Consul General Patrick Linehan spoke about the positive changes 
within the State Department since he became a Foreign Service Officer in 1984, 
when being gay was considered a security risk. ‘It made me feel unwelcome. But 
it never made me want to give up and leave. I knew I had earned my place in our 
diplomatic service, and I was determined not to be removed by bigotry. So I kept 
my head down, and I kept quiet for many years, but I remained true to myself and 
to my identity’. Today, he said, the State Department provides LGBT officers and 
their families the same respect and rights as all of their colleagues in the 
diplomatic service. (Embassy of the United States TOKYO 2012) 
  
However, the narrative of a change in American politics from the viewpoint of gay men 
effectively erases the fact that discriminatory US military regulations still practically 
prohibit transgender persons to serve (Kerrigan 2012).  
Moreover, in the context of Japanese-American relations, the US military in Japan 
is a more controversial subject than it is in the US context: while, traditionally, Japanese 
conservatives, especially in the Liberal Democratic party of Japan, which has been the 
ruling party for most of the time since 1955, have regarded the presence of the US military 
in Japan as essential for Japanese national security and the US-Japan Alliance, its 
presence also reiterates the negative legacy of the Japanese Empire47. Okinawa was 
incorporated by Japan in 1879 and now more than 70% of US Forces bases in Japan are 
concentrated in Okinawa, the place where the most severe ground battles in Japan took 
place during the Second World War and which belonged to the US until 1972. People in 
Okinawa have suffered from the noise, accidents, crimes and sexual violence of US troops. 
Thus, Okinawa has been in (post)colonial relations with both Japan and the United States, 
and the US troops in Okinawa are one of the symbolic institutions of Japanese history 
(Sarantakes 2000; Inose 2007). The political representation of improvements in LGBT 
rights through the American military, from the old institution, which repressed gay and 
lesbian people, to the new one which protects their rights, can function as an ideology 
justifying its existence in Japan as the ‘ideal’ institution, which shows and ‘teaches’ the 
Japanese people how to protect human rights, while hiding Okinawa’s continuing pain 
                                                
47 For more analysis of the Japanese national security agenda in the post-war era, see 
Hughes (2004).  
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caused by the military bases. In this case, the representation of LGBT rights can have 
postcolonial effects in Japanese society, similar to pinkwashing by the Israeli government. 
Considering the Obama Administration’s new policy on LGBT rights in 
international politics, the new representation of LGBT rights through the experiences of 
gay middle-class men working in the US government, and also often of white people, 
symbolises the change from the ‘old America’ to the ‘new America’ and is utilised as the 
model of new human rights, thus promoting American values as well as universal ones.  
 
4-3. LGBT Rights from the United States to Japan 
 
In April 2013, in the final year of his term as US Ambassador to Japan, John Roos 
contributed an Opinion entitled, ‘Seneca Falls, Selma and Stonewall: Civil rights and 
equality for all’ to The Asahi Shimbun, one of the biggest national newspapers. In the 
opinion, he remarks on the significance of gay rights in the context of the US history of 
improvements in civil rights. He writes: 
 
The inclusion of gay rights in this arc of civil rights struggles highlights Obama’s 
commitment to equality, for members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) community in the United States and also for LGBT persons throughout 
the world. As the president noted at the United Nations: ‘No country should deny 
people their rights because of who they love’. (Roos 2013) 
 
Then, he emphasises the US Embassy’s activities for LGBT rights in Japan during his 
term: 
 
Here in Japan, the US Embassy and our consulates have sponsored a number of 
activities to emphasise LGBT rights. I have hosted LGBT Pride Receptions at my 
home to underscore our continuing support of the gay community. Based on the 
‘It Gets Better’ campaign in the United States, the US Consulate General in 
Osaka-Kobe created an ‘It Gets Better’ video in Japanese and organized an event 
to discuss the prevention of bullying and youth suicide. The US Consulate in 
Fukuoka hosted a symposium on LGBT rights. And the embassy is now engaged 
with local LGBT leaders to support Tokyo Rainbow Week from April 27-May 6, 
during which we will join the effort to celebrate diversity, raise awareness of 
LGBT issues, and promote dialogue and inclusion among all members of society. 
(Roos 2013) 
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In the Opinion, LGBT rights characterise the progress of human rights in Japanese society, 
thanks to the United States, as well as his legacy as US Ambassador to Japan. Thus, he 
ends his opinion with an impressive phrase: 	
 
In recent years, LGBT persons have made great strides in the advancement of 
equality – yet hurdles remain. Let us remember the courage of those men and 
women at Seneca Falls, Selma and Stonewall, and let us continue to make clear 
that the struggle for gay rights is part and parcel of the long-term fight for civil 
rights that has made better places of America, Japan and the entire world. (Roos 
2013) 
 
As he traces the progress of human rights, embodied in the struggle for civil rights, from 
Seneca Falls, Selma and Stonewall to Japan and the entire world, the history of the United 
States becomes the centre of the global human rights narrative, interestingly as Puar and 
Mikdashi connect from American settler-colonialism to Israeli settler-colonialism when 
they trace the history of violence. And here, he effectively erases the local history of 
struggles for human rights and of LGBT activism in Japan. 
 Actually, the US Embassy’s promotion of LGBT rights seems to be gradually 
influencing Japanese politics at a policy level. On 1 September 2013, Yodogawa-ku, one 
of the 24 wards of Osaka, issued the ‘Proclamation of Supporting LGBT individuals 
(LGBT shien-sengen)’. Sakaki Masafumi, a director of Yodogawa-ku, relates: ‘It is 
government’s role to support the minority and protect their human rights’ (Endo 2013). 
According to the Maihichi Shimbum, a Japanese national newspaper, Sakaki arrived at 
the Proclamation through a lecture by the openly gay US Consulate General in Osaka-
Kobe, Patrick Linehan, delivered in Yodogawa-ku, and through listening to LGBT 
individuals’ stories in the ward (Endo 2013).	
 On 7 June 2013, the US Embassy held a reception at the Ambassador’s 
residence celebrating the start of LGBT Pride Month in the United States. On the night 
of the reception, Kamikawa Aya, a member of Setagaya ward council, posted pictures on 
Twitter of all the openly LGBT politicians in Japan, including the US Ambassador John 
Roos and the openly gay US Consul General Patrick Linehan. Kamikawa (2013) 
explained on Twitter that the room was the same place where Emperor Hirohito met 
General MacArthur after the Second World War and the picture was taken that later 
symbolised the Emperor’s Humanity Declaration and Japan’s post-war democracy. It 
might be a coincidence that they took the pictures in the place where the meeting of the 
Emperor and General MacArthur symbolised change in Japan; however, this coincidence 
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interestingly overlaps with the story of Japanese democracy, which the United States 
‘forcibly’ institutionalised through the Constitution of Japan as an occupation policy. As 
a result, the Constitution of Japan and Japanese democracy, famously opposed by 
Mishima Yukio, have been the target of Japanese nationalists in post-war Japan seeking 
to regain national pride. On the one hand, it is undeniable that support from the US 
Embassy can be politically powerful and helpful for the LGBT community and politics 
in Japan, especially when the Japanese government is not enthusiastic about LGBT 
human rights policies. On the other hand, however, US support can incidentally function 
to divorce the activism and politics of sexual minorities from Japanese society through 
the Americanisation of LGBT politics and human rights.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: From left to right: Ishikawa Taiga, a member of Toshima ward council in Tokyo; 
Ishizaka Wataru, a member of Nakano ward council in Tokyo; John Roos, the US 
ambassador; Kamikawa Aya, a member of Setagaya ward council in Tokyo; Otsuji 
Kanako, the first openly gay member of the Diet; and Patrick Linehan, the US consul 
general. Courtesy of Shimada Akira, photographer and documentary director. 
 
 There are two characteristics of the representations of LGBT matters by the US 
Embassy in Japan. 
 Firstly, human rights campaigns for LGBT people in Japan are utilised to justify 
and suggest the need for US influence in Japanese society, as if the presence of the United 
States in Japan, including the US military, will secure the improvement of LGBT human 
rights. Through the Americanisation of LGBT rights, the need for activism on behalf of 
sexual minorities, as well as LGBT people’s pain, is politically translated as the Japanese 
need for American influence. 
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 Secondly, the narrative of LGBT rights centred in the context of the United 
States effectively functions to erase the history of activism for, and by, sexual minorities 
in Japan. When the improvement in LGBT rights in Japan is discussed in comparison to 
that in American society, the history of the politics of sexual minorities in Japan is rarely 
mentioned. For example, although there is a wealth of arguments about coming out in the 
community in Japan, as discussed in Chapter 3, the US Embassy employed an ‘It Gets 
Better’ campaign in Japan derived from the US context, without considering the Japanese 
social context48 . As a result, the identities and lives of sexual minorities are again 
represented as something imported from the United States49. One of the earliest articles 
in The Huffington Post Japan, which was launched in association with The Asahi Shimbun 
on 6 May 2013, featured LGBT issues in Japan. The article was entitled ‘Does LGBT 
take root in Japan? (LGBT wa nihon ni neduku noka)’ and introduced the United States 
as ‘the leading country of LGBT’ (Huffington Post Japan 2013a). The title implies that 
there were no ‘LGBT’ people and activism in Japan before the concept of ‘LGBT’ was 
introduced from the United States. 
 The Euro-American centric narrative is not new at all in the field of Sexuality 
Studies in both the Japanese and English languages. However, these discourses are 
distinctive in respect of their political impact: perhaps for the first time in Japanese 
history, the US government politically and strategically supports the LGBT community in 
Japan, and the Euro-American centric narrative on LGBT activism in Japan is widely 
employed by major mass media in both languages and circulated through the Internet. 
Therefore, such discourses will be read by, and influence, far more people than could be 
reached by the discourses of academia and activism before the emergence of the Internet. 
In the last section, I will explore how the appearance and spread of the Euro-American 
centric political discourses on LGBT issues affect the contemporary politics of sexual 
minorities in Japan.	
	
5. Conclusion: the Globalisation of Sexual Politics and the Political Language of 
LGBT politics 
 
                                                
48 For the argument about the problems of the ‘It Gets Better’ campaign in the US 
context, see Puar (2012).  
49 For analysis of the discourses representing gei (gay) as an imported identity in Japan 
in the 1990s, see Chapter 3. 
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After the AIDS panic in the 1980s, which functioned to project homosexuality as 
something foreign outside Japan, the idea of Tohjisha emerged as a strategic term for 
homosexuals in Japan to promote their existence and specific problems in Japanese 
society. However, a decade later than Tohjisha became a popular term, both in academia 
and activism, it is also utilised to present same-sex desire as a private matter, not the 
desire that can radically question contemporary politics and social order. On the other 
hand, while Tohjisha is becoming de-politicised, ‘politics’ relating to LGBT people, 
which is also the movement integrating LGBT people into society for their private rights, 
rather than radically challenging heteronormativity, is introduced and represented as the 
‘foreign’ or Western value again. 
It is notable that the promotion of LGBT human rights is strategically conducted 
by the mainly Western governments as their important value of democracy. While LGBT 
issues are becoming international human rights issues, as promoted by the Obama 
Administration and the United Nations’ human rights campaigns, the problems of the 
political representation of LGBT rights are not discussed as often or, if they are, the 
discussion tends to consist of self-criticism of the West, as in the critiques of 
homonationalism. However, such self-criticism can itself reproduce Euro-American 
centrism and dwell in it. Because LGBT identities and activism are regarded as a Western 
idea, it results in disconnecting them from the history of activism of sexual minorities in 
Japan, and from Japanese society itself, as if their politics and demands are part of 
Americanisation following the path of American democracy, despite being centred on 
their own lives. What is ironic in this global phenomenon about LGBT issues is that the 
anti-homonationalism critiques in Queer Studies, which aim to counter the Euro-
American centrism and imperialism based on it, can serve for them. 
 In the last chapter, I will analyse the relationships and the political influence in 
Japanese society among neoliberalism, the idea of LGBT rights as a private issue, 
representations of LGBT politics as ‘Westernisation’, and Japanese new nationalism 
centred in politics in the 2010s, especially after the second Abe administration. 
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Chapter 6: Marriage in Relation to Nationalism, Neoliberalism and 
Globalised LGBT Rights in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I explored the representation of ‘global’ LGBT politics and the 
critique of it in the United States, especially regarding homonationalism from the late 
2000s to 2010s. During this period, Japanese society leaned towards nationalism and 
neoliberalism. Under the Koizumi cabinet (2001-2006), neoliberal policy was employed 
to overcome Japan’s notoriously deflationary economy, called ‘Japan’s lost generation’, 
while promoting nationalist rhetoric and gestures by domestic politicians aimed at 
smothering social discontent aroused by drastic reformation: for example, visiting the 
Yasukuni shrine, which honours Class-A war criminals from the Second World War along 
with the war dead, thus causing controversy with China and Korea. At the economic level, 
social inequality has been visibly widened, while national unity is emphasised at the 
cultural and political level. Japan has become a ‘divided society’, with Ryukogo-taisho, 
which awards a high-profile prize for the buzzwords of the year, symbolically choosing 
the phrase ‘kakusa shakai (an unequal society)’ in 2006 – although in the 1970s the 
Japanese had thought of Japan as the country of the ‘all-Japanese-are-middle-class 
mentality’, with approximately 90% of people identifying themselves as ‘middle-class’ 
(Chiavacci 2008).  
 On the other hand, while the Euro-American centric narrative of LGBT rights 
is prominent in Japan, this does not mean that the Japanese government has never done 
anything for LGBT people in Japan. It is certain that the Japanese government has 
improved its policy on LGBT issues since the 2000s, albeit at a slow pace. For instance, 
in 2003, the National Diet passed the Act on Special Cases in Handling Gender for People 
with Gender Identity (‘GID Act’), allowing an individual with GID to legally change his 
or her gender in the family registry, on the strict condition that he or she had already 
undergone sex reassignment surgery, was not married at the time, and had no children. In 
2008, the Diet changed the condition from ‘have no children’ to ‘have no minor children’. 
As Taniguchi Hiroyuki (2013) points out, the ‘GID Act’ appears to have helped in 
improving the quality of life for many transgender people living in Japan, although it 
contained critical problems, such as requiring an applicant to undergo sex reassignment 
surgery and to be unmarried, the latter condition being intended to prevent his or her 
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marriage status turning into same-sex marriage, which Japanese Family Law does not yet 
allow. In 2009, due to the Democratic Party of Japan taking power, defeating the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Japan, which had held power almost continually since 1955, the 
Justice Ministry changed its policy and agreed to provide the certificates necessary for 
Japanese citizens to marry same-sex foreign citizens overseas. Until then, the Ministry 
had rejected the issuance of such certificates to Japanese citizens seeking to marry same-
sex partners of foreign nationality, even when their partner’s country allowed same-sex 
marriage, because these marriages are not approved under domestic law in Japan. In 2012, 
when Patrick Linehan, the US Consul General in Osaka-Kobe, revealed in an interview 
with The Asahi Shimbun that he was married to his same-sex partner, the Japanese 
government issued a visa to his husband as a ‘diplomat’s spouse’, taking up the honorary 
position traditionally given to the Consul General’s wife (The Asahi Shimbun 2012a). At 
least the Japanese government exceptionally recognises the same-sex couple as ‘family’ 
in the case of diplomats50. 	
In the last chapter, I will explore how the globalisation of LGBT rights, also 
adopted by the Japanese government, along with neoliberalism and nationalism in the 
2010s, relate to each other in Japan and how they define Japanese sexual politics. 
Firstly, I will analyse arguments about the globalisation of sexual culture and 
politics in the context of Asian society and point out the undisputed premises of the 
discourses of global sexual culture and politics, especially those discourses that focus on 
the locality of movement of globalisation. Through this examination, I will show how the 
superiority of the West is constructed through arguments of globalisation. 
Secondly, I will explore the paradoxical progress of LGBT rights in Japan; while 
these rights are considered expanded	 in Japan, the security of privacy of sexually non-
normative people has actually been diminished for vulnerable people in Japan compared 
to the past. Through analysing the political situation, I will point out that LGBT rights in 
Japan are coming to be represented as part of the new lifestyle of the West, signifying the 
privileges of the cultural and economic elite. 
Finally, I will explore the political discussions of LGBT rights in Japan as 
stimulated by the introduction of ‘gay marriage’ in the Shibuya ward in Tokyo in 2015. I 
will investigate how, under the new Japanese nationalism of the Prime Minister Abe 
                                                
50 Minister of Justice Tanigaki Sadakazu answered, in the Legal Affairs Committee, that 
it was an exceptional measure applying only to diplomats. For details, see the 183rd 
Diet Legal Affairs Committee (2013). 	
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Shinzo, and international pressure for LGBT rights in anticipation of the Tokyo Olympics 
and Paralympics in 2020, ‘LGBT rights’ have been transformed within Japanese society.	
 
2. Discussions surrounding Globalisation and the Role of the Internet and 
Information 
 
2-1. Queries on Global Sexual Politics and Asian Local Contexts 
 
In their book Mobile Cultures: New Media in Queer Asia, published in 2003, its editors 
Chris Berry, Fran Martin and Audrey Yue insist that the recent emergence of gay and 
lesbian communities in Asia is closely correlated with the development of information 
technology in the region: ‘The fluidity and ubiquity of information, from storage and 
image to media markets, has increased with digitisation, making it more powerful and 
accessible. Information has crossed national boundaries, enabled global gay and lesbian 
coalitions, and formed new queer cultures incorporating Asian imaginaries’ (Berry, 
Martin and Yue 2003, p. 1). According to Berry, Martin and Yue, the new information 
technology creates two kinds of possibilities for Asian queer communities. Firstly, it 
contributes to these communities in Asia, allowing new kinds of connectivity and 
increasing self-awareness for queer people in Asia. Secondly, such globalisation of sexual 
cultures, enabled by the new media, redefines the locality of sexual cultures.  
With an emphasis on the new sense of locality following the emergence of 
globalisation by the new media, Berry, Martin and Yue point out the Eurocentrism present 
in discussions of globalisation, and challenge presumptions that ‘globalisation’ is 
synonymous with homogenisation in the realm of sexuality. Addressing discussions of 
globalisation by neo-Marxist theorists, such as Masao Miyoshi, Fredric Jameson, Michel 
Hardt, Antonio Negri and so on, Berry, Martin and Yue criticise their focus on global 
capitalism as ‘a homogenising view of cultural globalisation’ and ‘the erasure of cultural 
difference’ (Berry, Martin and Yue 2003, pp. 3-4) because, in neo-Marxist discussions, 
the process of globalisation is reduced to cultural ‘Americanisation’ (Jameson 2000) or 
the new ‘empire’ (Negri and Hadt 2000), which Berry, Martin and Yue regard as a highly 
Eurocentric notion. Rather, they insist that it is theoretically fruitful to contemplate the 
locality that mediates the effect of globalisation: 
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The more nuanced approach to the intricacies of cultural flow in the era of 
globalisation does not claim that cultural forms and identities emanating from the 
United States have now altogether ceased to act as a compelling influence in 
cultures worldwide. Rather, it asks that we recognise that Americanisation is not 
the only influence and that the effects of American culture are not felt equally or 
in the same way at every location. Such an approach, we believe, has much to 
contribute to the postcolonial project of ‘decentering the West’ by challenging 
narrowly Eurocentric forms of knowledge. [Stress in original] (Berry, Martin and 
Yue 2003, pp. 4-5) 
 
According to Berry, Martin and Yue, Eurocentric knowledge can be challenged by 
analysing the globalisation of sexuality while focusing on the locality, in order to 
emphasise the disjuncture and instability of the process, rather than describing it merely 
as Americanisation or Westernisation. 
 
2-2. Gay Politics and the Internet in Japan 
 
Suganuma Katsuhiko, a Japanese Queer Theorist, conceptualises the cross-cultural effect 
of globalisation, Berry, Martin and Yue note, as ‘contact moment(s)’, which refers to a 
‘certain historical moment (or a series of those moments) that allows us to imagine the 
discursive conditions and effects enabled by cross-culturation’ (Suganuma 2012, p. 18). 
Following Berry, Martin and Yue’s case for globalisation focusing on the locality, 
Suganuma analyses the Japanese gay news site in the 2000s through his concept of 
‘contact moment(s)’. Suganuma examines and recontexualises Japanese local LGBT 
discourses in cyberspace in the context of the globalisation of sexual cultures and politics. 
In his research, Suganuma focuses on the World Wide Web site Gay Japan News [GJN], 
launched in 2005 by the Japanese Mochizuki Hiroshi and his American partner, for the 
distribution of LGBT-related international news to a Japanese audience. In 2007, GJN 
was introduced as ‘Japan’s largest LGBT news site’, having ‘about 35 additional 
contributors located both in and outside of Japan’ (Keiser 2007).  
 Suganuma observes that GJN intends to ‘educate’ Japanese people, thus 
presupposing that Western gay culture is ‘advanced’. In the interview, the Japanese 
founder, Mochizuki, explains his personal motivation for the gay news site: 
 
I was always looking over my partner's shoulder while he was checking out 
English LGBT news sites. Overseas it's completely normal to have sites devoted 
to LGBT news, but there is very little information in Japan. At the time same sex 
marriage laws and partnership laws were in the news, and I thought that if that 
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information could be shared with people here, that might be a good way to help 
Japan start to change. (Keiser 2007) 
 
Suganuma also pays attention to his words, as a chief editor of GJN, in an article in the 
web version of the English daily, The Japan Times: ‘we are trying to educate Japanese 
people about the advances in gay rights around the world’ (Larkin 2006; Suganuma 2012, 
p. 159). Suganuma stresses that the articles in GJN are mainly about homosexuality-
related news throughout the world, and are translated and edited into the Japanese 
language from various sources in English, while less attention is paid to local issues in 
Japan. He reports: 
 
Undeniably, the writing varies article by article according to the translators’ 
abilities and individual style, yet each article follows the conventions of 
journalistic writing. That is, while GJN’s stated aim is to ‘educate Japanese people’ 
by providing ‘advanced’ knowledge about homosexuality overseas, the articles 
themselves are often written in an objective style. Yet the composition and design 
of the portal page can be read as a reflection of GJN’s intent and purpose. The 
homepage mainly foregrounds international news as ‘Today’s Headlines’ which is 
far more frequently updated than a small section of local (Japanese) ‘information’ 
that is located at the bottom of the page. It can be interpreted that the composition 
of the website strictly follows the editorial commentary quoted above whereby 
Western gay culture is deemed as ‘advanced’ and ‘mobile’ whereas Japan’s queer 
culture is ‘backward’ and ‘static’. (Suganuma 2012, p. 160) 
 
 In addition, Suganuma shows how the representations of ‘gay liberation’ in the 
website are marked by class and race. For example, he indicates an advertisement for fee-
paying ‘English lessons’, which reads ‘GJN English lessons aim to provide a gay-friendly 
English learning environment while studying about homosexual [cultures] around the 
world’ accompanied by an image of a smiling white male teacher (ibid., p. 160). 
Suganuma interprets such representations of a mixture of English-speaking ability and 
gay-friendliness as ‘the implication that it is only via a white English-speaker that 
Japanese gay men can find such an “open environment” for obtaining global queer 
knowledge, which symbolises GJN’s use of the West as a sort of imagined fantasy space’ 
(ibid., p. 160). Similarly, Suganuma analyses an advertisement for the ‘first gay charity 
ski event in Japan’, organised by GJN, the profit from which is to be used for an LGBT 
community centre in Japan. The photo of the advertisement shows a white man clad in 
ski-wear, shirtless and with buttocks half-exposed, despite ‘the fact that the charity event 
itself will be held in Japan and participants will presumably be predominantly Japanese’ 
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(ibid., p. 161). Suganuma argues that, through GJN’s usage of a white male model for the 
gay charity ski event in Japan, ‘the mobility and access (in the context of commodified 
spatiality) embodied by middle class white men who reside in Western Europe and North 
America have acted as a metonym for “ultimate liberation” and “freedom”’ and ‘an 
invitation to imagine Japanese gay men as being like Western gay men: all members of 
the global gay citizenry’; thus, it represents ‘the fantasy or desire of “being like the 
West”’(ibid., pp. 162-3). 
 Suganuma interprets GJN’s representations of Western society as the ‘advanced 
gay society’, not merely as proof of the global dissemination of Western gay identity and 
culture in the Internet age, but as a fantasy of the Japanese, which produces the side-effect 
of recognising the reality of Japanese queer culture. Referring to Rebecca Suter’s reading 
of the Japanese novelist Murakami Haruki, Suganuma writes: 
 
For Murakami, the fictive West functions as a fantasy with which to contact the 
reality of Japan, or expose the relationship between the self and the conditions of 
its reality. What is more, as is central to Jackson’s contention, the process of 
finding reality through fantasy is not to consolidate reality, but to seek reality’s 
discursive limits. In other words, such a dialogic comparison allows us to see the 
constructed nature of each reality in which we live. Although working in a 
different context, I find Suter’s reading of Murakami’s work helpful in discussing 
GJN’s use of the image of the West. In particular, the idea that the use of foreign 
reference is a device for realising the local culture, as well as its constructedness, 
is central to my reading of GJN. GJN’s friendly reference to the West can be read 
as analogous to the ways in which Murakami appropriates things ‘Western’. 
Furthermore, Suter argues that Murakami’s work is not only self-serving in terms 
of fulfilling his own personal concerns, but provides readers with the opportunity 
to imagine different worlds through which to put their own identities and lives 
into different contexts. (ibid., p. 167) 
 
Furthermore, Suganuma examines ways of recognising queer situations in Japanese 
society and of constructing Japanese queer identity in cyberspace, as reflected by GJN’s 
appropriation of Western society. 
 Recalling audience interactivity in cyberspace, Suganuma intriguingly draws 
attention to audience feedback on GJN’s Bulletin Board System (BBS). For instance, he 
mentions a thread entitled ‘fukkatsu! Gei japan nyusu ni tsukkomi o ireru sure (Revival! 
A thread for those who have a “word” to say to Gay Japan News)’, in which a reader 
accuses GJN of being too Euro-American centric. He also refers to polemics criticising 
the Euro-American centric narrative of GJN in the threads entitled ‘doseikon ni tsuite 
(About same-sex marriage)’ and ‘hinon no gei wa reberu ga hikuika? (Is the level of 
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Japanese gays low?)’. Through these polemics, emerging as the problematisation of the 
West/non-West binary, Suganuma shows how readers ‘rediscover’ the queer history of 
Japanese society and redefine the localness of Japan’s queer culture. What is important in 
his reading of the multi-layered discourses on the BBS is that the local queer identity has 
emerged through diverse voices, and that the interactivity that contributes to local 
queerness is not determined in advance, being open to the future: 
 
The binary of the West and Japan, ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’, was ubiquitous in 
GJN’s cyberspace. Yet this binary did not necessarily eradicate the local Japanese 
queer self in the context of globalisation. What was at stake was that the multiple 
forms of locality were recognised, then refined, challenged and transformed. GJN 
can function as a space, like Murakami’s literature, for many users to realise the 
realities as well as the limits of Japan’s gay culture through imagining the West. 
(ibid., pp. 173-174) 
 
Suganuma’s perceptive reading of interactivity between a fantasy and desire directed 
towards the West and a local identity in cyberspace indicates the limits of the simplified 
narrative offered by critics of globalisation’s Euro-American centrism, especially in the 
Internet age. 
 
2-3. The Double Bind between Human Rights and Transcultural Identity 
 
Both Berry, Martin and Yue’s criticism of the Euro-American centric narrative within 
globalisation, and Suganuma’s alternative reading of Japanese local queer identity in 
cyberspace as reflected by globalisation, effectively reveal the limits of the critique of 
globalisation as the ‘Americanisation’ of the rest of the world. In particular, Suganuma’s 
study of localisation and the identification of Japanese queer culture, as inspired by the 
image of Western societies, shows the cultural dynamism that the globalisation of 
sexuality can create, and the way in which the criticism of globalisation as Euro-American 
centrism has overlooked it. Their studies, focusing on localness permeated by 
transcultural effects, reveal what general theorisations of globalisation can fail to grasp. 
However, both arguments present an intriguing assumption as the basis of their discussion 
of globalisation: while they treat political, economic and technological phenomena 
stemming from the West as ‘global’, cultural phenomena, especially identity and 
discourses emerging in Asia, are regarded as ‘local’. Here, I will analyse Suganuma’s 
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discussion of how the dualism between the global as Western and the local as Asian also 
contextualises relationships between the politics and culture of Japan.  
 Analysing the discourses inspired by GJN, Suganuma argues that references to 
the West paradoxically result in constructing Japanese identity. Suganuma writes: 
 
I asked myself whether a website such as GJN represents a desire to depart and 
move away from Japaneseness, or alternatively to stick to or invoke it? As I have 
pointed out in this chapter, at GJN an imperative to ‘become like the West’ is 
evident. At the same time, all the references to the West shed light, in return, on 
the domain of ‘not being the West’: Japan. Thus they can also be read as a mean 
to reflect back upon who queer Japan could be or wishes to become … As he [the 
Japanese creator of GJN] confessed in his interview, his fundamental motivation 
was his desire to bring change to Japan, and make progress within Japan. It is in 
this sense that it can be said that GJN, from its inception, is a very local, in other 
words, Japanese, project. Far from moving away from Japaneseness, Japanese 
queerness needed to be recognised in the ‘other’ in order to change itself. 
(Suganuma 2012, pp. 175-6) 
 
As he clearly formulates it, Suganuma considers that not only are projects related to Japan 
very local ones but that, in addition, the motive of the Japanese creator of GJN to change 
Japanese society is equivalent to a desire to ‘become like the West’. Yet, in Suganuma’s 
argument, the interpretation that he desires to ‘become like the West’ is based only on 
Suganuma’s reading of the photos of advertisements on the website and GJN’s 
appropriation of the discourse of Western gay liberation, whereas his ‘Japaneseness’ is 
regarded as an attribute of ‘not being the West’. Thus, in Suganuma’s argument, the 
dualism between the global and the local is exactly equal to the dualism between the West 
and the non-West, as if ‘to be or not to be like the West’ were the only important problem 
for Japanese queer people in the global age. 
 Ironically, due to his focus on the Japanese desire to ‘become like the West’, 
Suganuma overlooked the ‘local’ problems that queer people face politically in the global 
age. For example, in the interview that Suganuma refers to, Mochizuki, the Japanese 
creator, relates: 
 
‘Overseas it's completely normal to have sites devoted to LGBT news, but there 
is very little information in Japan. At the time same sex marriage laws and 
partnership laws were in the news, and I thought that if that information could be 
shared with people here, that might be a good way to help Japan start to change’. 
In addition, his experience as part of a bi-national couple personally confronting 
visa problems, Mochizuki saw the ways that politics directly impacted both him 
and his partner; this also fuelled his interest in news from abroad. (Keiser 2007) 
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Here, Mochizuki’s motivation in founding GJN stems not only from the desire, if any, to 
be like the West but also from the conditions of his own life with his partner in the face 
of political and legal problems caused by Japanese government policy, as he makes clear 
in the interview. At that time, the Japanese government refused to issue a key document, 
which states that a person is single and of legal age, to Japanese citizens wanting to enter 
into same-sex marriages or partnerships with same-sex foreign partners in the countries 
where such marriages or partnerships were legal, because, the government explained, 
Japan had not yet legalised same-sex marriage51. Therefore, Mochizuki’s motivation for 
political change in Japan must be understood as both very local and very global from the 
outset: the Japanese political problems caused by the Japanese government’s policy 
against international same-sex couples, together with its strict visa rules. 
As Mochizuki mentions, immediately following the sentences that Suganuma 
quotes, it is certain that Suganuma knew about Mochizuki’s personal, but also highly 
political, motivation. However, Suganuma interprets it not as a demand for political and 
institutional reform, but as a Japanese desire to be like the West, which is doomed to fail 
because the Japanese are not, in fact, the West. Thus, Suganuma’s reading of Japanese 
local identity in cyberspace contains two problematic presumptions regarding 
globalisation. Firstly, even though the political, legal or economic problems that sexual 
minorities face are not unique problems in Western societies but are generally common 
in many other societies, such problems and discussions of reform being understood as 
‘Western’ due to the political representations and discourses issuing from the West. 
Secondly, although institutional injustice against sexual minorities is originally a local 
problem, such localness is recognised and redefined within a Western political context. 
In other words, local issues outside the West are regarded as local from the perspective 
of the West, even in arguments that sharply criticise the Euro-American centrism of the 
globalisation of sexuality. 
In the previous chapter, I focussed on the representations of ‘global’ LGBT 
politics from the United States, pointed out a Western desire to become the others like the 
West and analysed the mechanism to transform the needs and political activities of LGBT 
people in Japan to the needs and activities of American influence and Americanisation. 
                                                
51 Japan started to issue the certificate for same-sex couples in 2009, as authorised by 
the new government of the Democratic Party of Japan.	
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On the other hand, as Suganuma shows, there are discourses within Asia to read the desire 
to be like the West in society. In this chapter, I will not discuss which view is right, nor 
which desire is stronger, but will explore social phenomena in the Japanese context that 
have emerged through the desires complementing each other.  
 
3. New Political Circumstances of Japanese LGBT Politics  
 
3-1. Political Gaps between LGBT Rights from the US and Japanese Non-normative 
Sexual Life 
 
It is becoming the case in Japanese society that more openly LGBT politicians are being 
elected and LGBT issues are gradually being treated as human rights issues, even by the 
Japanese government52. Through the narrative employed by the US government and the 
US embassy in Japan, and the analysis of Suganuma, these movements are understood to 
indicate Westernisation, the desire for it, the improvement of LGBT rights, and the growth 
of social tolerance towards minorities.  
However, that does not necessarily mean that the lives of sexually non-normative 
people have come to be accepted and protected in society. In 2009, the Japanese police 
investigated several sexual orgy parties and arrested some of the participants for ‘public 
indecency’, violating Section 174 of Criminal Code53. Even though the parties were held 
in a hotel room or on private property, such as at the house of one of the participants, and 
not actually in a public space, the Japanese police insisted that such a party is illegal, 
since public indecency in sexual activities takes place in the presence of people, no matter 
whether it is held behind closed doors (ZakZak 2009). Similarly, the Metropolitan Police 
Department (MPD) announced that they had charged two owners of hattenba, gay 
cruising spaces, in a residential area of Tokyo, in November 2011 with being accessories 
                                                
52 Kamikawa Aya was elected as an openly transgender politician in the Setagaya ward 
assembly Tokyo in 2003. Otsuji Kanako came out as lesbian in 2005 when she was a 
member of the Osaka Prefectural Assembly, and then became the nation's first openly 
homosexual member of the Diet in 2013 after her party member of the House resigned. 
In 2011, Ishikawa Taiga and Ishizaka Wataru were elected as openly gay male 
politicians for ward councils in Tokyo. 
53 Article 174 of the Japanese Criminal Code is: ‘A person who commits an indecent act 
in public shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 6 months, a 
fine of not more than 300,000 yen, misdemeanor imprisonment without work or a petty 
fine’. 
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to public indecency because customers were ‘free to move around an interior arranged 
like a maze and containing private rooms with peep holes and an open space called the 
“Mix Room”’ and engage in sexual activities, or ‘indecent acts’ (Okuda 2012). On 14 
February 2012, the police raided another hattenba in Osaka and charged an employee and 
customers with public indecency. According to The Asahi Shimbun, the police consider 
hattenba, gay cruising spaces, as problematic as they are associated with drug abuse and 
also increase the risk of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. However, there is no 
law for regulating gay cruising spaces, as the Japanese law that obliges sex businesses to 
report to the authorities applies to heterosexual services. The Asahi Shimbun cites the 
comment of an MPD official:  
 
An MPD official who supervises criminal investigations said: ‘Without the 
authority to enter, it was a difficult decision to charge them with being an 
accessory to public indecency, but we were afraid of them spreading STDs, not 
just drugs. We need some sort of regulation’. (Okuda 2012) 
 
Despite the police’s explanation for raiding the gay cruising spaces, there is no report that 
they found illegal drugs. In addition, the Japanese Police Department does not have the 
authority or the know-how to regulate the spread of STDs and improve public sexual 
health care. The operator of a gay cruising space is quoted as follows in the report: 
 
The operator of a hattenba in the Tokyo metropolitan area said: ‘The impact from 
this incident is huge. It's a matter of life or death. Most shops work hard to keep 
clean and try to make sure that nobody spreads STDs or brings in drugs’. (Okuda 
2012) 
 
As the operator suggests, the police’s action brought pressure on the hattenba business 
rather than regulating illegal drugs or preventing STDs among gays. 
 Matsuzawa Kureichi (2012), a writer, explains in his blog that the police 
announcement might have been intended to gain public understanding about raiding gay 
cruising spaces for the first time, by raising the illegal drugs matter. Furthermore, he 
warns that the police are suggesting a need in Japan for regulatory power over gay 
cruising spaces by making reference to STDs, which are not even the province of the 
police department. Sunagawa Hideki (2011a), an anthropologist and gay rights activist, 
also wrote in his blog about the police raiding the gay cruising space, having heard the 
rumour about it in advance of the official police announcement. He interprets the police’s 
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action in the context of the society of control. Sunagawa points out that, if the police can 
charge the owner of a gay cruising space with being an accessory to public indecency, all 
gay cruising spaces would be illegal in principle. He emphasises that the police have 
recently started to raid sexual orgies that are not conducted for business purposes but are 
held in a private space, such as a room in a hotel or in a personal dwelling. Furthermore, 
the police have also started to raid dance clubs and discos for violating Japan’s Adult 
Entertainment Laws, enacted in 1948, which forbid dancing after midnight. For a long 
time the law had been rarely enforced, but the police started enforcing it around 2010, 
presumably to regulate the abuse of drugs (Adelstein 2013). Sunagawa interprets these 
police actions as those of a society of control: 
 
It is important that a stream of police actions is based on the desire of many people: 
the desire which wants to strictly police the people who do not fit their values 
(morals), or the others who they cannot understand. (Sunagawa 2011a) 
 
Sunagawa pessimistically expected that it would now be more difficult for minorities to 
live in Japanese society (Sunagawa 2011b). 
 On the surface, there are contradictory phenomena surrounding LGBT lives in 
Japan: on the political and legal level, the recognition of LGBT human rights has 
advanced54; however, on the social level, the police have tightened up control over the 
lives of non-normative people who are not necessarily categorised as ‘LGBTs’. These 
phenomena might signal the fact that the Japanese political circumstances of sexual 
minorities have dramatically changed since the time when Kawaguchi, Kazama and 
Vincent argued about gay politics in Gei Studies (Gay Studies) in the late 1990s. As I 
argued in Chapter 3 and 4, their politics and theorisation of gay men’s situation in Japan 
were concerned with how gay men could rightfully speak in public, and how society’s 
view could be changed to establish homosexual men themselves as the politically 
appropriate people to speak out about their problems in society. They considered that the 
‘tolerance’ of homosexual activity in the private sphere in Japanese society, by such 
                                                
54 For example, in May 2013, the business magazine, Toyokeizai online (2013) featured 
Japanese National Diet members for LGBT rights who belonged to the Japan Liberal 
Democracy Party, which is traditionally conservative and supports ‘traditional family 
values’. Thus, ‘LGBT rights’ are becoming the new ‘human rights’ which even 
conservative politicians are starting to recognise in Japan. 	
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means as allowing gay bars and hattenba, functions to deter homosexuals from politically 
coming out in the public sphere. They write:  
 
It is because of cultural differences that Japan is described as ‘the country is 
tolerant of homosexuality’ when people compare the gay situations in between 
Japan and the United States. In Japan, there are few people who openly express 
hate towards homosexuality and the police won’t harass or bust gay bars nor 
hattenba. There is no religious activity against homosexuality. These things make 
many homosexuals in Japan believe that they are in a better situation than the 
homosexuals in the United States. (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent 1997, p. 
110) 
 
Ironically enough, now that the time has come for the political rights of LGBT people to 
be recognised in the public sphere in Japan, the security of the privacy of sexually non-
normative people is being undermined by the police. Furthermore, because ‘LGBT rights’ 
are represented as the political and legal ‘progress’ that the United States and Western 
European countries is currently promoting, by such means as the presentation of openly 
LGBT politicians and legalisation and recognition of same-sex marriage, the security of 
sexually non-normative people’s privacy is rarely regarded as one of the ‘problems of 
LGBT human rights’, since, as Matsuzawa (2012) notes, the police had been raiding the 
sex parties and events of straight people for public indecency, on the same grounds, before 
they started raiding hattenba.  
 
3-2. Are LGBT Rights a New Social ‘Class’ Privilege? 
 
While the Japanese government gradually started to recognise ‘LGBT rights’ and the 
political, economic and cultural phenomenon of ‘LGBT issues’ as something ‘important’ 
(Yanagisawa 2013), the lives of social minorities, including sexual minorities, as 
Sunagawa (2011b) warns, have become harder in Japanese society. On the one hand, some 
kinds of same-sex partnerships, those of people in high-ranking government jobs and the 
US military in Japan, are recognised as legitimate families but, on the other hand, the 
security of sexually non-normative people’s privacy is being technically undermined in 
Japanese society. What does this now mean politically for sexual minorities in Japan?  
 It is noteworthy that the representations of ‘LGBT rights’ in Japan are 
associated not only with the ‘West’ but also with the successful cultural and economic 
elite. 
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 Two different weekly business magazines coincidentally featured the ‘LGBT 
market’ in Japan in the same week in July in 2012 (Shukan Toyokeizai 2012; Shukan 
Diaond 2012). Both magazines emphasised the potential purchasing power of the LGBT 
community in Japan, as well as introducing the institutionalisation of LGBT rights in 
Western society. Therefore, their focus was on the activities of successful global 
companies, such as Apple, Goldman Sachs and IBM, on LGBT issues, rather than on 
economically disadvantaged LGBT people or on the lack of social care in addressing 
specific demands of LGBT people in Japan. In such magazines, action on LGBT issues 
firstly means institutionalising the means of recruiting elite LGBT people who can choose 
their positions from among global giant companies, such as Goldman Sachs or Apple, or 
improving the marketing strategies aimed at the LGBT community.   
The website of the business magazine Toyokeizai Magazine has, since 2012, 
featured a news series related to LGBT issues, entitled ‘LGBT frontline: Sexuality in the 
Changing World’, following a successful feature on the LGBT issue in the magazine. The 
first article of this series discussed the news that Oxford University has changed the laws 
detailing its strict academic dress code to allow transgender students to wear ceremonial 
clothing of their own choice (Zixi 2012). As the title of article, ‘“Sex revolution” starts 
from Oxford University’, suggests, the policy for LGBT people is relevant to the world-
famous, elite University of Oxford, although its strict academic dress code itself is not so 
much revolutionary as ‘queer friendly’. In the article, the United Kingdom is introduced 
as the ‘leading country (senshinkoku)’ on LGBT human rights issues, where pink money, 
that is, the purchasing power of the gay community, affects its economy (ibid). Then, the 
article refers to Oxford’s LGBT students’ next goal: working with students in Cambridge 
University, another elite British university, to install gender-neutral toilets in colleges. 
Finally, the article concludes with these words: 
 
Actually, it is told that an international student from Oxford University who had 
been involved with LGBT issues created an opportunity to establish an LGBT 
society of the University of Tokyo, which is famous for the best talent. Members 
of the LGBT society in the University of Tokyo take the change in Oxford 
University as ‘welcome news’. 
I hope the changes of Oxford University forge ahead and young LGBT students 
in Japan as well make any actions in universities. (ibid.) 
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The article presents the story about LGBT rights to emphasise that the change comes not 
only from the advanced West to Japan, as promoted by the US Embassy, but also from 
the top Western universities to the top Japanese university containing the ‘best talent’. 
 Considering LGBT activism in Japan as widely reported by the news media, 
especially since the 2010s, it is evident that the new LGBT rights are promoted hand-in-
hand with commercialism, especially that of global corporations from the United States 
and Europe55. At the beginning of March 2013, a few weeks before the oral argument 
about California Proposition 8 and the 1996 Defence of Marriage Act (DOMA) was 
conducted in the US Supreme Court, a lesbian couple ‘performed’ a wedding ceremony, 
not legally recognised in Japan, at the Tokyo Disney Resort, which had initially refused 
to allow the couple to hold the ceremony. This news was widely reported by Japanese 
news media and by those in the English language, such as The New York Times and the 
Guardian (Higuchi 2013; Tabuchi 2013; Hodgson 2012).  
In Japan, the performance of a private wedding ceremony by a same-sex couple 
themselves is not common, but nor is it a totally new phenomenon. As early as the 1970s, 
Togo Ken mentioned in his book a wedding ceremony conducted by a lesbian couple 
(Togo 1979, p. 80). Otsuji Kanako, the first openly lesbian politician, also performed a 
same-sex marriage ceremony and uploaded the video of the ceremony when running for 
election to the Upper House in 2007 (Shimada 2007). Furthermore, as Claire Maree 
(2004) points out, some same-sex couples undergo an adoption procedure (yoshien-gumi) 
to become a legal family, because, under Japanese law, it is possible for an adult to adopt 
another adult, whereby the two become parent and child enrolled on the same family 
register. Although entering into an adoptive parent/child relationship is a bypassing 
strategy, historically ‘adoption has been considered the only way to protect same-sex 
partnerships rights’ (Maree 2004, p. 543).  
Thus, legal commitments and marriage ceremonies of same-sex couples were not 
at all new in Japan, except in the place where the wedding ceremony was held: Tokyo 
Disney Resort. Boris Dittrich, a former Dutch parliamentarian and an advocacy director 
of the LGBT program of a global human rights group, interprets this event as a sign that 
the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Japan is near: 
 
                                                
55 For analysis of the growing and mainstreaming Gay market associated with activism 
in the United States, see Gluckman and Reed (1997), Penaloza (1996) and Chasin (2001).  
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Dittrich, who is married to a man, referenced the story of a Japanese lesbian couple 
who had a wedding ceremony at Disney Sea in March, as well as IBM Corp. 
supporting a gay couple who are going to have a similar ceremony in November. 
Dittrich said that with these situations, legal same-sex marriage in Japan is not 
something ‘far away’. (Hofilena 2013) 
 
In his view, the wedding ceremony at Tokyo Disney Resort, which costs approximately 
7.5 million yen ($75,000), together with international corporations’ support for gay 
marriage in Japan, symbolises the progress of Japanese LGBT politics. On the contrary, 
Nichi Hodgson, a freelance writer on sexual politics, still thinks the wedding at Tokyo 
Disney Resort will do little for LGBT political rights in Japan, not because she is sceptical 
about promotions of human rights through consumerism, but because she considers that 
Japanese ‘traditional morals’ cause people to perceive shame in publicly displaying their 
sexuality. She writes in the Guardian Online: 
 
In fact, Disney's decision probably says less about shifting Japanese attitudes to 
gay partnership and more about how a western corporation's diversity duty can be 
commandeered by an Asian company anxious not to offend national sentiment. 
The Tokyo Disney Resort is actually run by a Japanese entity called The Oriental 
Land Company, which licenses the name and characters from the Disney 
Corporation. Notably, international companies of Japanese origin that sponsor 
Pride events in the rest of the world have often refrained from doing so within 
Japan. Japanese morals, traditionally informed by Shinto, Buddhist and Confucian 
teachings, may not be burdened by a concept of homosexual sin, but public sexual 
display, whatever the orientation, is still generally perceived as shameful, hence 
the reluctance to publicly support LGBT events. (Hodgson 2012) 
 
She explains that public sexual display, which in this context means publicly supporting 
sexual politics, no matter what the orientation is, is regarded as shameful within Japanese 
‘traditional morals’, although, in fact, heterosexual marriage is still considered a social 
duty and the wedding industry is enormous in Japan as well (Lunsing 2001, Ch. 3). What 
is interesting in her argument is that she contrasts the diversity duty of Western 
international corporations that support LGBT people with Japanese ‘traditional morals’. 
While Japanese ‘traditional morals’ are regarded as something consistently sustaining 
Japanese society, diversity for LGBT people is regarded as the Western international 
corporations’ duty. 
 Similarly, the Tokyo SuperStar Awards, established in 2010 to promote 
increasing visibility for the LGBT community in Japan, set up the award for the best 
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corporation and, by 2012, had honoured only Western international corporations: Google, 
the Body Shop and IBM Japan.  
 One of the most remarkable forms of activism sponsored by international 
corporations that try to promote LGBT rights is probably Tokyo Rainbow Pride (TRP). 
Tokyo Rainbow Pride, established in 2011, is a new organisation managing the Pride 
Parade in Tokyo. It split from Tokyo Pride Parade (TPP), which had organised Pride 
Parades for a decade, due to a dispute over the event’s management. In an interview in 
their first year, TRP organisers pointed out that one of TPP’s problems was its financial 
structure (Ogiue 2012). According to Otsuka Kensuke, one of the TRP organisers, TPP 
had been too dependent financially – for example, for gay bar advertisements – on the 
gay community in ni-chome, Tokyo’s gay neighbourhood, famous for one of the highest 
concentrations of gay bars in the world. However, because of Japan’s long-lasting 
recession, such financial relationships between TPP and the gay community have become 
difficult. Thus, it is reported that TRP’s structure is financially minimised through 
recruitment of foreign members as its core workers, in order to acquire the know-how of 
overseas Pride Parades. As a result, its official sponsorship has changed in 2013 from that 
of TPP and, while visibility of gay bars in Tokyo is downplayed, Western international 
corporations, such as Alfa Romeo, Philips, Google, Armani Exchange, Audi, Volkswagen, 
Red Bull, Belvedere Vodka and so on, have become its official sponsors for ‘mutual 
benefits’ (TRP 2013). 
 In addition, it is characteristic that many foreign Embassies and tourist boards 
participated in TRP in 2013: embassies or tourist boards of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Brazil and Israel ran booths 
at TRP. According to TRP, this was the first time that foreign embassies had participated 
in the Pride Parade in Japan for promoting LGBT rights as human rights (ibid.).  
The promotion of LGBT rights by Western governments is also accented by 
economic advantages. On 28 April, Tim Hitchens, British Ambassador to Japan, attended 
Tokyo Rainbow Pride 2013 and delivered a speech to event participants in which he said 
that ‘the United Kingdom government is a proactive supporter of equal rights for lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender individuals’ (British Embassy 2013). Less than one month 
later, an article about IDAHO, International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, 
was posted on the blog of the British Embassy in both the English and Japanese languages. 
This article expresses the British Embassy’s support for the Japanese LGBT community. 
Tom Burn, head of the Embassy’s Media and Communication team, writes: 
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The situation is not nearly as bad here, of course, but Japan is still not an easy 
country to live in as an openly gay, bisexual or transgendered person. Though 
discrimination is not as extreme as in some countries, pressure to conform to 
social norms is strong, and public role models are limited. (Burn 2013) 
 
As he did in the earlier article about IDAHO in 2011, he again emphasises that 
opportunities to which LGBT people can harness their talents are limited outside the 
entertainment industry in Japan (Burn 2011, 2013). By contrast, British society is 
presented as an open society for talented LGBT individuals. Commenting on the British 
Embassy’s booth at TRP, he writes: 
 
Alongside a number of other Embassies, we organised a UK stall (together with 
the British business community), encouraging those attending the event to 
consider visiting the UK, as a liberal, welcoming destination for tourism and 
business. (Burn 2013) 
 
In describing the UK as ‘a liberal, welcoming destination for tourism and business’ in the 
article about the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, for protecting 
LGBT human rights, he implies that the article is written for LGBT people in Japan who 
have business talent and/or are socio-economically advantaged enough to support tourism 
in the UK. Through the British Embassy’s promotion of British society as a more LGBT-
friendly, ‘better society’ than the Japanese one for LGBT people, they also imply that the 
LGBT individuals who they welcome are the socially, economically and culturally 
advantaged ones. 
 Through spreading such representations of LGBT rights in the discourses of the 
Internet, mass media and activism, LGBT rights emerge in Japanese society as something 
you have to be in an advantaged position to enjoy, by, for example, graduating from an 
elite university or getting a job in a Western international corporation. Ironically, this is 
better defined as privilege than as human rights.  
In 2013, The Asahi Shimbum reported a new LGBT action organised by young 
university students who were planning an educational tour to New York City to acquire 
know-how about LGBT activism and rights (Yamamoto 2013). The article emphasises 
the organisers’ and participants’ experiences, leading to their recognition of the 
importance of LGBT issues and of the need to produce LGBT activists to solve LGBT 
problems in Japan through study in the United States and Canada. Jasbir Puar (2002) 
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argues that LGBT activist-tourism can function to create ‘queer cosmopolitan elites’ and 
establish global ‘queer solidarity’ based on privilege: 
 
Several diasporic activist organisations, often in conjunction with gay-friendly 
travel agencies, offer tours back to the homeland for the purposes of educating 
and engendering queer solidarity and support. These tours, ostensibly promoted 
to encourage ‘queer solidarity’, operate within a missionary framework of 
sameness and difference, assuming some rubric of queerness that is similar 
enough to create solidarity around but is different from and, as such, not quite on 
a par with metropolitan queerness. The insistence on educational exchange 
conveniently effaces the privileges determining which citizens can travel where 
to learn and transmit what information. (Puar 2002, p. 124) 
 
Puar discusses this activist-tourism in the context of economically and politically 
asymmetric relations between two nations, such as the United States and the homeland of 
the diasporic activists. Even though the relationship between the United States and Japan 
is relatively less asymmetric, economically and politically, than the ones Puar has in mind, 
the activist-tourism, which consists of travel to the United States from Japan, can 
constitute privilege among LGBT people. This privilege does not necessarily correspond 
to transnational power relationships among nations, as in the notion of ‘queer solidarity’ 
argued by Puar, because, in this case, the Japanese activists visiting the United States can 
be in socially and economically better positions, and have more mobility, than many 
activists in the United States. However, it does represent privilege among LGBT people 
in Japan. Activist-tourism can function to symbolise LGBT rights and activism as 
something you need to learn about by gaining access to the West, and especially by 
mastering the English language, even though you want to work to address Japanese 
situations in Japan.  
Through such representations, LGBT rights emerge as the rights of privilege for 
people possessing high economic and cultural capital in Japanese society, whether they 
want to enjoy these rights or work for them.  
 
4. Promoting LGBT Rights with the Nationalist Government: The Introduction 
and Discussion of Same-sex Partnership in Japan 
 
4-1. The New Nationalism of the Abe Administration and the Introduction of Same-sex 
Partnership in Japan 
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After three years of the government of the Democratic Party of Japan, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), led by Abe Shinzo, won a landslide victory in the Lower House 
election in 2012. Along with his neoliberal and aggressive monetary policy, referred to as 
‘Abenomics’, Prime Minister Abe has received a lot of attention for his nationalist 
ideology and revisionism. The Editorial Board of the International New York Times 
Online criticised him, saying ‘Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s brand of nationalism is 
becoming an ever more serious threat to Japan’s relations with the United States’; and ‘he 
also whitewashes the history of the war’ (The International New York Times 2014). What 
is significant in Abe’s brand of historical revisionism and nationalism is that he presents 
his ideology as new Japanese ideas, which have emerged from the fusion of contemporary 
society and traditions overlooked by post-war Japanese society, not as the mere revival 
of old ideology. Abe’s infamous slogans, such as ‘Departure from the post-war regime’ 
and ‘Bringing back Japan’, were understood as reflecting not only his intention to seek 
revision of the post-war pacifist Constitution, which symbolised post-war Japan, but also 
his ambition to establish the new role of Japan in international society (Scanlon 2014; 
Takahashi 2014).  
This new international role of Japan, as sought by the Abe administration, is 
called ‘kachikan gaiko’, an alliance based on Value and Interest among democratic 
nations, as opposed to China, the new rising state in Asia. In December 2012, the day 
after Abe formed his administration, he published his diplomatic policy on Project 
Syndicate, described as ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’. Warning that the South 
China Sea is becoming a ‘Lake Beijing’, or ‘what the Sea of Okhotsk was to Soviet 
Russia’, Abe promised: ‘Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean 
are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. 
Developments affecting each are more closely connected than ever. Japan, as one of the 
oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role in preserving the 
common good in both regions’ (Abe 2012). In his apparent expression of hostility to 
China, which he compares to the Soviet Union, he presents Japan as one of the oldest 
democratic nations that respect ‘universal values’: 
 
[T]o improve Sino-Japanese relations, Japan must first anchor its ties on the 
other side of the Pacific; for, at the end of the day, Japan’s diplomacy must 
always be rooted in democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. 
These universal values have guided Japan’s post-war development. I firmly 
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believe that, in 2013 and beyond, the Asia-Pacific region’s future prosperity 
should rest on them as well. (ibid.) 
 
Thus, in his domestic and international policies, there is a critical contradiction: on the 
one hand Abe attempts to re-value the Empire of Japan or pre-war Japan, and to redefine 
the meaning of the wars Japan waged and the regime of post-war Japan; on the other hand, 
when he confronts China, he promotes, for international consumption, an image of post-
war Japan’s democracy and human rights record, which have been built on the rejection 
of pre-war Japan.  
Promoting his new Japan as a democratic nation, in an effort to convince 
international society that his ideology is not merely a revival of the Empire of Japan that 
fought the United States, he symbolically utilises representations of women. As an aspect 
of his economic policies, or ‘Abenomics’, Abe introduced ‘womenomics’, a policy of 
reducing pay disparity by gender and expanding the number of female workers in the 
Japanese economy. His ‘womenomics’ is not merely part of his reformation of the 
stumbling Japanese economy, but a part of his international campaign. Just after his 
successful upper house election, Abe published an Opinion in The Wall Street Journal 
entitled ‘Unleashing the Power of “Womenomics”’. Introducing his ‘Womenomics’ as 
based on the policy suggested by a Goldman Sachs economist in 1999 (Matsui et al. 2005), 
he emphasises that his government represents a new political generation that can embrace 
a solution the Japanese government, including his own first administration in 2006-2007, 
has long ignored: ‘Fourteen years have elapsed since then, and the idea has finally entered 
Japan’s political lexicon. Womenomics will feature prominently in my address on 
Thursday at the United Nations General Assembly’ (Abe 2013). In addition, his 
promotion of ‘Womenomics’ is not only intended to bring a new solution to the troubled 
Japanese economy, but also represents a promise to bring change to Japan ahead of the 
Tokyo Olympics in 2020: 
 
The target year 2020 will coincide with the return of the Olympics to Tokyo. I 
am determined that by that time Japan's boardrooms will be enhanced by a 
greatly increased number of female directors. I will do all that I can to facilitate 
this change. (Abe 2013) 
 
In 2014, for his new cabinet, Abe appointed five women to the 18-member cabinet, the 
highest number of female ministers in Japanese history, thereby ‘sending the strongest 
message yet about his determination to change deep-seated views on gender and revive 
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the economy by getting women on board as workers and leaders (Kageyama 2014). Thus, 
for the Abe government, internationally regarded as nationalist, gender politics, and the 
appearance of an administration that empowers women, is an important factor in 
promoting his image of the new Japan, as well as confirming his historical Revisionism, 
which, for example, denies Japan’s crime involving ‘comfort women’ or sexual slavery 
in WWII. 
 His contradictory political strategy has brought trouble rather than successful 
promotion. A week after the formation of the government, three female senior politicians 
were criticised for their connections to the neo-Nazi party, the National Socialist Japanese 
Workers Party, or Zaitokukai, an anti-Korean ultra-nationalist group, in a report showing 
photographs of them posing with its leaders (McCurry 2014). At the same time, two other 
female ministers had to resign over alleged misuse of political funds. As Abe appointed 
female politicians who either had far-right leanings or were from political families (for 
example, an ex-prime minister’s daughter who lacked the ability to manage political 
funds), the female ministers sent a message more about Abe’s nationalist ideology and 
his privileged class, as he was also the offspring of a political family, than about reform 
of a gender-biased society. 
 The representations of LGBT rights are more complicated under the Abe 
administration. The administration was the government that immediately accepted the 
request by the US Department of Defense for benefits for same-sex couples in the US 
military in Japan. Following the US Supreme Court’s ruling in 2013 that the Defense of 
Marriage Act is unconstitutional, Japan, along with the UK and Spain, agreed with the 
United States that its treatment of same-sex couples of US military personnel in Japan 
would be equivalent to that of heterosexual married couples. Among the countries that 
agreed with the US on same-sex benefits just after the policy change by the US 
Department of Defense, Japan was the only country where same-sex marriage or 
partnership was not legal in domestic law (Harress 2014). The Abe administration itself, 
however, has never moved for LGBT rights in its domestic policies and has even openly 
expressed opposition to them. Replying to a survey by Rainbow Pride Ehime, a sexual 
minority advocacy group, for the general election in 2012, Abe’s LDP answered the 
question on ‘the need for measures to protect the human rights of sexual minorities’ as 
follows: ‘Measures are necessary for people with gender identity disorder but not for 
homosexuals’; although other major parties answered that they recognised that ‘Active 
enlightenment and measures are necessary’ (The Japan Times 2012). In the survey, the 
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LDP also replied that social security and inheritance benefits ‘should be intended for 
heterosexual couples’, not for same-sex couples, even though it allowed benefits for 
same-sex couples among US military personnel in Japan, without argument, in 2013. 
Similarly, in a survey for the general election in 2014, the LDP was again the only party 
to respond that LGBT issues did not need to be dealt with as human rights issues 
(Rainbow Pride Ehime 2014). While the Abe administration accepted the policy change 
on same-sex benefits for US military personnel in Japan, the LDP, led by Abe, also 
apparently expressed ignorant and homophobic views on LGBT issues during general 
elections. 
What is more confusing is that his wife, Abe Akie, the first lady of Japan, 
openly supports LGBT communities. In April 2014, she participated in a Tokyo Rainbow 
Pride event for the first time, sending the message: ‘I want to help build a society where 
anyone can conduct happy, enriched lives without facing discrimination’ (The Japan 
Times 2014). In December 2014, Tokyo SuperStar Awards, the awards honouring 
individuals or groups who were contributing to the advancement of equality and social 
acceptance for LGBT people, chose Abe Akie for its Community Award for her 
promotion of AIDS issues and LGBT rights, since her ‘brave activities brought hope to 
many LGBT people’ and she was ‘acting as a bridge between the LGBT community and 
society at large’ (TSSA 2014). While Prime Minister Abe is regarded as ‘without question, 
the most conservative Japanese leader in Japan’s post-war history’ and a historical 
revisionist (Takahashi 2014), his wife, known ‘for her liberal inclinations’ (The Japan 
Times 2014), was rewarded by the LGBT group for her activities.  
In February 2015, against this complicated political background, the Shibuya 
ward in Tokyo, one of the busiest and most famous fashion centres in Japan, announced 
that it was issuing certificates to same-sex relationships to strengthen gender equality and 
human rights for sexual minorities and to prevent discrimination against same-sex 
couples, when, for example, they were contracting to rent an apartment or visiting 
critically ill partners in hospital. In the following sections, I will analyse how the 
representation of LGBT rights – the rights of contemporary, Western, economically-
privileged people – and Japanese contemporary nationalism, disguised as the Japanese 
new ‘internationalism’ represented by the Abe administration, are related to each other, 
by analysing the discourses of the proposed recognition of same-sex couples in Shibuya, 
which is regarded as the progress of LGBT rights or ‘same-sex marriage’ equivalent to 
heterosexual marriage. 
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4-2. ‘LGBT-Friendly Japan’ for the Tokyo Olympics  
 
The announcement of Shibuya’s recognition of same-sex couples opened up the 
discussion about problems of LGBT rights and diversity in Japan, where the Tokyo 
Olympics are expected to be held in 2020. As the Winter Olympics held by Russia in 
Sochi drew international criticism and boycotts because of Russia’s ‘LGBT propaganda’ 
law, and the International Olympic Committee has moved to add an anti-discrimination 
clause including LGBT people following the embarrassment caused by the Sochi Winter 
Olympics, Japanese officials have also recognised the need to improve LGBT 
circumstances in Japan. Following Shibuya, 38 lawmakers from multiple parties 
organised a group on 17 March in 2015 to discuss the issues of discrimination against 
sexual minorities in advance of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Hase Hiroshi, who leads the 
group and is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party, which openly opposed the 
inclusion of LGBT rights as human rights in the general election in 2014, explains the 
purpose of the group as follows: ‘As it hosts the Olympic Games, there is no doubt that 
Japanese society will be questioned on how it treats its sexual minorities. We must 
substantiate the principles described in the basic plan of the Games’ (Nikaido 2015). 
LGBT activists also share the narrative of LGBT equality for the Tokyo Olympics in 2020. 
Oe Chizuka, a co-representative of Network for Partnership Law, calls for a Partnership 
Law resembling the PACS in France as one of the Japanese changes towards diversity, 
since ‘In terms of equality and human rights, as Japan needs to internationally show by 
Tokyo 2020 Olympics and Paralympics that Japan is the country where the society 
embraces diversity, I think Japan has to take some approach to issues of same-sex couples’ 
(Oe 2015). In this narrative, the Tokyo Olympics in 2020 is the event at which Japan must 
prove to the international community that it is a society that sufficiently respects diversity 
and human rights, especially of LGBT people. 
 Such a narrative overlaps that of the Abe administration on the Olympics. In 
his statement for the New Year in 2015, Abe redefines his commitment to historical issues, 
such as the Second World War, as contributing to a ‘new Japan’ and its international 
promotion: 
 
This year we mark the milestone of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War 
II. 
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    Throughout its post-war history, Japan has, based on feelings of deep 
remorse regarding World War II, walked the path of a free and democratic nation 
and of a consistently peace-loving nation, while contributing to global peace and 
prosperity. As we reflect on the past, in heading towards the 80th, 90th, and 100th 
anniversaries to come, what kind of nation will Japan be and what kinds of 
contributions will we make to the world? 
    Taking this opportunity, I wish to make this a year in which we send out to 
the world a message about the kind of country we aim to be and get off to a 
dynamic start towards building a ‘new Japan’. (Abe 2015) 
 
Recalling how the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 became the symbolic event for post-war 
Japan as a new, rising nation of growing economic power, Abe again associates the 
coming Olympics with a ‘new Japan’ of increasing economic and international power: 
 
Our predecessors accomplished rapid economic growth, making Japan one of the 
greatest powers in the world. There is no reason whatsoever that the Japanese of 
that era could achieve this but the Japanese of today cannot. 
    Now, as we mark the new year, I have renewed my determination to, together 
with the Japanese people, make Japan a country that once again shines on the 
world’s centre stage. (ibid.) 
 
In Abe’s narrative, the Tokyo Olympics of both 1964 and 2020 are the key events of a 
‘new Japan’, the rising nation of expanding economic and international power56. 
 On the surface, two images of the ‘new Japan’ seem very different: on the one 
hand, there is the image of a ‘new Japan’ where human rights and diversity are respected 
as in Western countries; while Abe’s ‘new Japan’, on the other hand, is a country that 
desires to regain economic and international power to secure Japan’s status in the 
international community. However, in the interview with lawmaker Hase Hiroshi, an LDP 
member and a leader of the multipartisan group on the issue of discrimination against 
sexual minorities, the gap between political movements for LGBT equality and diversity 
ahead of the Olympics, and movements for economic and international power, appears 
obscure. Admitting that he organised the group for LGBT equality and diversity for the 
Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Hase was asked how long it would take to achieve the group’s 
goals for LGBT equality and diversity. He replied: 
 
To answer the question, I think it would take about 10 years to change the 
society to socially accept sexual minorities. This issue should not be something 
                                                
56 For the relationship between the Olympics and Japanese national identity, see 
Nagayoshi (2006). 
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that politics mandatorily intervenes in. For frankly speaking, it is a part of 
politicians’ work that politicians get an earful from the people. So, we are rather 
waiting for the public sentiment like ‘why doesn’t the government recognise 
sexual minorities’ rights more?’ (Nikaido 2015) 
 
His answer, suggesting that it would take 10 years to achieve political reform on LGBT 
rights in time for the Olympics, when the Olympics are taking place in 5 years, exposes 
the lawmakers’ move to organise a multipartisan group for LGBT rights as more of a 
performance for the international media, to deter criticism of the LGBT situation in Japan 
ahead of the Olympics, than an effort to achieve actual change. Thus, the movement for 
LGBT equality and diversity is utilised by the majority party in the Diet for their political 
campaign as if the actual political change had already started in Japan, in advance of the 
Olympics and Paralympics. 
 Similarly, Hasebe Ken, a Shibuya ward assembly member who proposed the bill 
for recognition of same-sex couples, stated in the Symposium in 2012, when Tokyo was 
still a candidate for the 2020 Olympics and Paralympics, that the keyword for the next 
stage of urban development was ‘diversity’, and that LGBT issues could be harnessed for 
the purpose (Ecozzebria 2012). To promote his idea, Shibui Tetsuya reports that Hasebe 
Ken proposed to the ward mayor a plan to issue certificates to same-sex couples in the 
context of developing an international city that adopts ‘diversity’, because ‘to issue the 
certificate attracts LGBT people and they are going to move to Shibuya. Their sensibility 
will be a big factor to strengthen fashion and art scene’ (Shibui 2015). Coincidentally, in 
April 2015, Dentsu Diversity Lab, a market research report by Dentsu, the biggest 
advertising and public relations company in Japan, where Hasebe Ken worked before 
assuming public office, states that LGBT-identified people made up approximately 7.6% 
of the people surveyed and estimates that the LGBT market in Japan is worth as much as 
5.94 trillion yen (40 billion US dollars) (Dentsu 2015). These discourses suggest that 
LGBT rights are not only human rights that should be protected for the sake of Japan’s 
international reputation, but also present a big business opportunity. 
In early discussions about ‘gay and lesbian marketing’ and activism in the 
1990s in the United States, one of the important questions was whether consumerism, or 
the economic power of gay and lesbian people, could contribute to their activism and 
visibility in society or not, and what the ‘liberation’ of sexual minorities truly meant. In 
these arguments, while some activists like Andrew Sullivan adopted a marketing strategy 
for their purpose, critics from progressive movements also defined their political goals, 
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as eloquently expressed by Tony Kushner in The Nation: ‘But are officially sanctioned 
homosexual marriages and identifiably homosexual soldiers the ultimate aims of 
homosexual liberation? Clearly not, if by homosexual liberation we mean the liberation 
of homosexuals, who, like most everyone else, are and will continue to be oppressed by 
the depredations of capital until some better way of living together can be arrived at’ 
(Kushner 1994). Now, with Tokyo expecting the Olympics and Paralympics, and under 
international pressure on LGBT rights, mainstream politicians in Japan, whether 
belonging to conservative or liberal parties, discuss whether ‘diversity’ and ‘LGBT rights’ 
can contribute to Japan’s branding image for political and economic purposes, rather than 
to the minorities’ lives or political goals.  
 
4-3. Capitalist Diversity and the Exclusion of Homeless People 
 
Although the proposed bill for ‘same-sex marriage’ is intended only to publicly recognise 
same-sex couples as partners equivalent to those who are married, but does not offer the 
same level of legal protection and benefits for the couple, such as rights of inheritance, 
tax benefits, social insurance, and visa sponsorship57, it is regarded as a surprising move 
for LGBT people. The Japan Times reports the announcement of the Shibuya bill as if it 
offers great political hope for LGBT people in Japan: ‘Shibuya resident Koyuki Higashi, 
who is lesbian, said she was “over the moon” when she learned about the news’ (Osaki 
2014). In the article, openly gay politician Ishikawa Taiga also remarks that ‘cases 
overseas suggest that local municipalities’ move to grant same-sex couples more 
legitimate status sometimes affects national policies. So I’m very happy about it’ (ibid.). 
Indeed, as Ishikawa hoped, several local municipalities, such as Setagaya ward, 
Yokohama City and Takarazuka City, announced that they were considering similar 
recognition of same-sex couples, without benefits, following Shibuya’s announcement.  
On 31 March 2015, the Shibuya ward passed the bill, ‘an Ordinance for Gender 
Equality and Diversity’ and became the first local government to issue the certificate of 
same-sex relationships on its authority. Predictably, this move was compared to the 
situation in the United States rather than explained in the context of Japanese politics, or 
the history of LGBT politics in Japan. Reuters reports: ‘The vote by Tokyo's Shibuya 
                                                
57 For an explanation of the kind of legal rights and benefits for same-sex couples 
Shibuya’s ‘same-sex partnership’ can achieve, see Shimizu’s commentary (2015).  
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ward may seem insignificant compared to the United States, where gay marriage is legal 
in all but 13 states, but just proposing the statute set off an unprecedented discussion over 
equality, and is likely to pave the way for similar measures elsewhere in Japan’ (Lies 
2015). When comparing the Japanese LGBT situation to that of the United States, the 
latter must be presented as an LGBT friendly country, not the place where several States 
are trying to pass bills that allow discrimination against LGBT people on religious 
grounds, a move described by Human Rights Watch as ‘legally indulg[ing] prejudice 
based on their subjective interpretation of religion’ (Reid 2015).  
Although the international news media generally treat Shibuya’s recognition of 
same-sex marriage as a progressive step for LGBT rights as human rights in Japan, not 
all human rights groups in Japan were satisfied with the Shibuya proposal. Immediately 
after the announcement of the plan for the recognition of ‘same-sex marriage’ by Shibuya, 
human rights activists, including the LGBT group Rainbow Action, immediately 
expressed their concerns over Shibuya ward’s intentions for human rights and diversity, 
because the plan was announced just after the ward violently closed the public parks to 
remove about 200 homeless people and their support group at the year’s end and 
throughout the New Year holidays. As the support group, which had organised the soup 
service for the homeless in the public parks, criticised Shibuya ward’s decision, saying 
‘[s]hutting the parks obviously suggests the ward’s intention to deny the homeless their 
sleeping places and bar their entry altogether’ (Osaki 2014), Shibuya’s policy was 
understood as a sign of their contempt for the human rights of homeless people. In the 
political context of parks in Shibuya and the lives of homeless people, before Shibuya’s 
decision to close the parks in 2014, Shibuya ward sold the name of Miyashita Park to 
Nike and removed local homeless ‘squatters’, to renew the park for a fee in 2009. Thus, 
for 5 years previously, the municipality had been threatening the lives of homeless people 
in the city. 
In an article headlined ‘Is Shibuya using human rights differently?’, The Tokyo 
Shimbun reports the critique of Shibuya’s plan by a lesbian activist, Tsuchiya Yuki, who 
said: ‘I am not convinced by the fact that the municipality which has forced the homeless 
out launches a human rights measure. I think they find the value in LGBT issues for 
producing the “stylish Shibuya town” which is a centre of fashionable trends from the 
West, not LGBT issues as human rights’ (Sawada 2015). An LGBT group Rainbow Action 
noted that the idea of privatising the public park as Miyashita Park was proposed by 
Hasebe Ken, the same Shibuya ward assembly member who proposed the recognition of 
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same-sex marriage, and criticised the Shibuya ward on the grounds that their policy 
tactically utilises the terms ‘human rights’ and ‘diversity’ for their economic purposes and 
political image 58 . In its criticism, Rainbow Action clearly points out the economic 
connection between the ‘diversity’ implied by the recognition of same-sex couples and 
the exclusion of the homeless for privatisation of the public park. 
 Discussing diversity in academic institutions, Sara Ahmed points out that 
diversity has commercial and aesthetic values. She relates: 
 
Part of this appeal of diversity seems to be about newness. Using a newer word 
allows you to be aligned with the value system of the institution given that 
‘newness’ is often what is given value. ‘Diversity’ as a newer word is a 
buzzword: what we can hear might be the sound of its busy-ness. (Ahmed 2012, 
p. 61) 
 
Through ‘diversity’ as a new word, people are given the impression that something new 
is happening in institutions. However, what is distinctive in Ahmed’s view is that the use 
of diversity can actually function to maintain an old order rather than to bring 
transformation: 
 
What I want to note here is how in official language, the word ‘diversity’ 
derives its value from what is already valued. Diversity is incorporated as an 
official term insofar as it is made consistent with the organisation’s goal… The 
use of diversity as an official description can be a way of maintaining rather 
than transforming existing organisational values. [Stress in original] (ibid., p. 
57) 
 
In her analysis of the use of ‘diversity’ in contemporary society, diversity offers 
commercial and aesthetic value through conferring a brand of ‘newness’ while 
maintaining existing values in the organisations. 
 In the case of Shibuya’s recognition of ‘same-sex partnership’ for the sake of 
‘diversity’, it is noteworthy to focus on what has actually changed by the ordinance. Even 
though it is intended to expand diversity in the town, instead it resulted in inscribing 
discrimination against same-sex relationships into law. For recognition of ‘same-sex 
partnership’, the municipality demands that same-sex couples acquire notarised 
certificates from private legal advisers as assurance of their relationship, so that the 
Shibuya ward only officially describes the existing legal bonds of same-sex couples 
                                                
58 See their blog Rainbow Action (2015). 
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authorised by legal contract as ‘same-sex partnership’, equivalent to ‘marriage’. In 
addition, the ordinance gives a ward mayor the power to deny recognition to ‘same-sex 
partnership’ in case it harms ‘public order and morals’, although the Constitution of Japan 
(Article 24) recognises heterosexual marriage on the basis of consent alone, not on 
agreement by any authority. Thus, although the ordinance for recognition of ‘same-sex 
partnership’ was announced for the purpose of establishing LGBT rights, equality and 
diversity, and for combatting discrimination against LGBT people, it was actually 
accompanied by the discriminatory prejudice that public recognition of same-sex 
relationships can harm ‘public order and morals’ and should be differentiated from 
heterosexual marriage. 
 There is a distinctive difference when we compare Shibuya’s recognition of 
‘same-sex partnership’ with British legalisation on equal marriage of same-sex couples. 
In July 2013, the Cameron administration passed a bill for equal marriage with large 
support from opposition parties, including the Labour Party and the Green Party, although 
there was strong opposition within the Tories. With the introduction of same-sex marriage, 
the Cameron administration now calls itself a champion of equal rights, as ‘[o]ur historic 
introduction of gay marriage has helped drive forward equality and strengthened the 
institution of marriage’ (The Conservative Party 2015, p. 48). At the same time, in July 
2012, under their anti-immigrant policy, the Cameron administration introduced new 
regulations on marriage for British citizens, which demanded that British spouses prove 
that they have a disposable annual income of £18,600 if they want to sponsor a foreign 
spouse from outside the EU. According to The Guardian Online, the sum is not only just 
above the earnings of full-time workers receiving the national minimum wage but, indeed, 
would ‘exclude up to 47% of Britain's working population’ and ‘the government's own 
estimate is that the new rules will break up as many as 17,800 families every year’ 
(Nichols 2013). Thus, British reformation of ‘equal marriage’ under the Cameron 
administration does not expand equality among British citizens. Rather, it is a redefinition 
of marriage exclusion: from exclusion based on spouses’ gender to that based on their 
nationality and income. In the case of Shibuya’s recognition of ‘same-sex marriage’, there 
is no actual change in the legal status of same-sex couples; if anything, they face the cost 
of notarised certificates from private legal advisers to obtain their symbolic status from 
the municipality. It is not an expansion of LGBT rights or equality. Rather, it just changes 
the names: from ‘discrimination’ to ‘diversity’.  
 
  
223 
223 
4-4. Exclusion of Homosexuals from Legal Rights 
 
Although same-sex ‘partnership’ is regarded as acceptable in Shibuya, the centre of 
fashion and art in Tokyo, for its contribution to diversity, the national discussion by 
lawmakers appeared hostile to same-sex relationships. Responding to a question about 
same-sex marriage in the National Diet, Prime Minister Abe, who adopted same-sex 
benefits for the US military in Japan, said that same-sex marriage is ‘unconstitutional’ as 
‘the Constitution was written when same-sex marriage was not contemplated’, and 
expressed antagonism towards same-sex marriage on the grounds that ‘Constitutional 
revision in order to recognise same-sex marriage requires extremely careful discussion’ 
as it ‘concerns the foundation of how families in our country should be’ (Nikaido 2015). 
This was the first time that the Japanese Government had expressed its view on the 
problem of legalisation of same-sex marriage, although some local authorities had already 
rejected marriage registration by same-sex couples, basing its decision on the 
Constitution59. The Asahi Shimbun also reported that lawmakers on the committee for 
‘Preserving Families’ bond (kazoku no kuzuna wo mamoru tokumei iinkai)’ in the LDP 
expressed the same constitutional view, one of them adding that it amounted to 
discrimination against heterosexuals if only same-sex couples were allowed to form 
partnerships (Nikaido 2015).  
Article 24 of the Constitution states, ‘Marriage shall be based only on the 
mutual consent of both sexes’. Abe and the lawmakers in the LDP interpret the term ‘the 
mutual consent of both sexes’ as meaning that the Constitution allows marriage only 
between ‘both sexes’, a man and a woman. However, the Article was originally intended 
to protect equality between men and women in the family, as part of the democratisation 
of Japan through reform of the pre-war patriarchal family system, and has been 
understood as protection of individuals’, especially women’s, rights (not) to marry, free 
from intervention or arrangement of marriage by the head of the family. Thus, there are 
legal scholars who argue that the Article does not exclude same-sex couples from 
marriage and that, therefore, same-sex marriage is allowable under the Constitution of 
                                                
59 For example, in June 2014, a female same-sex couple tried to register their marriage 
in Aomori City; however, the City Hall rejected their registration on the basis of the 
Constitution (Josei 2014). As the couple did not bring the case to court, there is, as yet, 
no judicial opinion on same-sex marriage under the Constitution of Japan. 	
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Japan (Sakuma 2014; Shimizu 2008; Ohno 2009)60. Thus, Abe’s contention that the 
Constitution does not allow same-sex marriage in Japan reflects not the general 
interpretation of constitutional scholars but rather his personal view. While Shibuya’s 
ordinance of same-sex partnership hardly expands on any actual legal rights and benefits 
of same-sex couples, the Prime Minister now openly expresses his view that same-sex 
couples’ rights of marriage or partnership should be, and are, constitutionally excluded in 
Japan.  
This is one of the most ironic aspects of the ‘progress’ of Japanese LGBT rights 
as achieved by Shibuya’s ‘same-sex marriage’. The symbolic gesture of embracing LGBT 
rights for the sake of ‘diversity’ actually consolidates legal exclusions and divisions, even 
provoking the comment from the Prime Minister in the National Diet that LGBT rights 
are proscribed by the Constitution of Japan. From the proposal’s inception, Shibuya’s 
‘same-sex marriage’ has repeatedly been compared with the institutionalisation of same-
sex marriage in the West, such as that in the US or Europe. USA Today [online] reports 
on the subject as if this movement stemmed directly from American influence: ‘As the 
U.S. Supreme Court considers whether to sanction same-sex marriage across the United 
States, gay couples in Japan are belatedly making strides of their own’ (Spitzer 2015). 
Although, as I have indicated, it is at least 50 years since ‘gay movements’ began to try 
to change Japanese politics, their history can easily be erased by political specialists and 
used to feed US narcissism: 
 
Western influence may finally be propelling the issue here, said Gregory Noble, 
professor of comparative politics and public administration at the University of 
Tokyo's Institute of Social Science. ‘Just in the last six months or so I have 
noticed more attention paid to gay marriage, probably mostly because of 
developments in the U.S.’. (ibid.) 
 
Despite the erasure of the history of LGBT activism in Japan, such a political narrative – 
‘gay marriage movements have flourished in Japan thanks to Western influence’ – can 
indeed be true if applied to the way in which Japanese politicians act when facing the 
issue of same-sex marriage. For politicians promoting ‘same-sex marriage’, such as 
Hasebe who proposed it in Shibuya, it is not only a ‘human rights issue’ for LGBT people, 
but is also useful for branding Shibuya the ‘diversity town’: the town that opened up the 
                                                
60 Kimura Sota, a constitutional scholar, expressed the same view in a public forum 
(Watanabe 2015).	
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opportunity of ‘marriage’ for LGBT people for the first time in Japanese history, even 
though it offered hardly any actual legal benefits beyond the symbolic name. For 
opponents, such as Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, it is not a problem at all if foreign citizens 
who can bring benefits to Japan, such as diplomats and US military personnel, enjoy 
same-sex marriage in Japan, but it is unacceptable if the measure can force change upon 
the Japanese family system and society. What is tragicomic in this story is that these two 
political sides are not so different from each other. The introduction of same-sex marriage 
in Japanese politics was not an interpretation or translation into Japanese social contexts 
of the Western model of LGBT rights but, indeed, was an exact copy of the rights that 
Western governments have enthusiastically promoted in Japan: the new human rights with 
economic merits which LGBT people outside the West cannot yet enjoy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
When homosexuality was considered a desire that was outside ‘normal society’, Togo 
Ken (1979) utilised it to deny the existing institutions that reproduced social privileges. 
He talked about the relationship between the marriage system and Japan’s welfare system 
in the election broadcast for the upper house of the National Diet in 1977 on NHK, the 
national public broadcasting organisation: 
 
On the subject of welfare of our country, single people are in a disadvantaged 
position and they cannot be advantaged until they marry. Especially, women are 
in a vulnerable position. So I will make it work for the people who do not marry 
for life. (Togo 1979, p. 150) 
 
In his book, he explains this passage with a footnote: 
 
As the Constitution of Japan says in Article 24 that ‘Marriage shall be based only 
on the mutual consent of both sexes’ and supposes that all marriages are between 
man and women, neither homo nor lez is allowed to marry. If they can do, it means 
merely to make their relation official (seki wo ireru); but if we can conquer the 
commonsense that it is a shame if men and women are not married, we don’t need 
to think about marriage. So, this means that it makes it easier to be homosexuals 
if we abolish the marriage system. (Togo 1979, p. 150) 
 
In Togo’s policy during an electoral campaign for the upper house of the Diet, exclusion 
of homosexuals is seen as relevant to the social exclusion of singles, and especially of 
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women, from the welfare system. In Togo’s radicalism in the 1970s, politics for 
homosexuals also meant politics against the social exclusion of the poor. 
 Now, when LGBT rights have started to gain consideration within existing 
institutions, there is a tendency for ‘LGBT rights’ to mean economic and political benefits 
for Japan as a nation, rather than for actual LGBT people. At the same time, ironically, 
the security of the privacy of sexually non-normative people, such as those who engage 
in sexual activities with multiple partners or go to gay cruising spaces, has been 
undermined in Japanese society, and such rights of privacy are rarely regarded as ‘LGBT 
rights’ by the mass media and policy makers. In this sense, ‘LGBT rights’ in Japan now 
are not for the people Togo tried to represent. International LGBT rights and politics are 
now marked by the lives and culture of transnational elites and neoliberal consumerism. 
The actions on LGBT issues of Western governments, global corporations and elite 
universities are presented as a new political stream within the advanced culture. Thus, 
LGBT politics has become a new manifestation of the Western lifestyle, or something 
consumable for those with enough economic, social and cultural capital. This sort of 
‘LGBT politics’ fails to address the political issues of the security of people’s privacy, of 
the poor, and of gender and sexual normativity itself. 
 Ironically, however, such representation of international LGBT issues 
stimulates the motivation of Japanese politicians and makes it possible to advance LGBT 
rights even in a nationalistic political environment devoted to economic gains, as in the 
case of Shibuya – although part of the motivation comes from fear of international 
criticism from the West, such as Russia experienced, when the Tokyo Olympics are held. 
At the same time, due to the representation of LGBT issues as part of the new Western 
lifestyle of the privileged, the ‘progress’ of LGBT rights in Japan fails to protect their 
legal rights and lives and is reduced to commercialisation and promotion of the new 
lifestyle. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that even this symbolic, but small step forward, in 
LGBT rights does actually help some LGBT people, and can encourage Japanese society 
to accept them, and offers hope for further improvements of LGBT circumstances in 
future. However, the price of LGBT rights as the new lifestyle is to forget the history of 
queer politics in Japan and to rediscover LGBT people as if they were a new species 
imported from the West. 
Conclusion: Sexual Politics and Political Contradictions in Postwar Japan 
 
1. The Question of Modernity and Sexuality from a Non-Western View 
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In this study, I have examined how a sense of cultural differences defines and limits sexual 
politics in Japan. Views of modernity and sexuality, or discourses of power and 
knowledge in Queer Theory, of which a large proportion of the related disciplines have 
been developed in Anglophone academia and activisms, are culturally and geographically 
marked. While the ‘modernity’ and new emergence of sexuality in modern society are 
regarded as universal and a product of the ‘West’, non-Western modernisation (some of 
which was developed in the same period as the modernisation of Western countries) is 
marked as ‘local’ or the result of ‘Westernisation’. At the same time, sexuality before 
modernisation and outside of the West is sometimes considered the alternative, against 
the impasse of modern sexuality which endlessly produces power and knowledge, as seen 
in Michel Foucault’s famous praise of pleasures, the sphere of ars erotica (Foucault 1980). 
I called such discourses ‘the Westernisation of modern sexuality’. In this sense, Queer 
Studies is not the exceptional subject based on ‘the formation of discourse of “the West 
and the Rest”’ that was designated by Stuart Hall, in his influential article ‘The West and 
the Rest: Discourse and Power’ in Formations of Modernity (Hall 1992). 
 In Japan as well, the issue of modernity has been one of the most discussed 
topics during the institutionalisation of Sexuality Studies, especially after the publication 
of a translation of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality Volume I in 1986. As Foucault 
revealed the production of power and knowledge through sexuality in modern Western 
society, Sexuality Studies in/about Japan have explored the relationship between Japanese 
modernity and Japanese sexuality, asking: how has Japanese modernisation transformed 
Japanese sexuality; how far has the sexuality of the Japanese been westernised; and what 
are the characteristics of Japanese sexuality compared to that of the West? Reflecting the 
relations between Japanese modernity and sexuality, Sexuality Studies in/about Japan 
have been divided between three popular narratives on Japanese modern sexuality. A first 
narrative notes that Japanese sexuality is westernised by virtue of its modernisation; as 
Furukawa Makoto (1994) influentially formulated it, discourses of sexuality had changed 
between the federal era and modern era, from the nanshoku (male eroticism) code to the 
hentai-seiyoku (perverse sexual desire) code. The second narrative rather focuses on 
Japan as the alternative to Western modern sexuality, as Mark McLelland, for example, 
strongly argues: 
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It is not the case that Japan is simply one among many sites for the elaboration 
of a kind of homogenised, international queer culture; rather, Japan is home to 
an alternative sexual modernity, a modernity produced by hybrid globalising 
process as much as by the continuation of identities, practices and mentalities 
inherited from the past. (McLelland 2005, p. 222) 
 
According to this view, Japanese modern sexual culture is not simply the westernised and 
‘homogenised’ one influenced by modernity, but the alternative one ‘inherited’ from the 
premodern past. The third narrative, as notably developed by Keith Vincent (2012) and 
Suganuma Katsuhiko (2012), pays attention to the ‘cultural hybridity’ of Japanese 
modernity and regards Japanese modern sexuality as the result of cultural hybridity 
between Japan and the West. 
 In this study, I asked: why do these contradictory narratives continue to exist 
side by side and how do they function in Japanese society? Although these narratives 
contradict each other, they are based on the same assumption: We can clearly mark the 
differences between Japanese and Western modern cultures as if they exist separately and 
independently, and modern Japan has somehow been heading towards Westernisation, 
from the past to the present. Thus, each narrative asks a question about Japanese identity 
as opposed to the West, indeed an identity that is ethnocentric and can become xenophobic, 
and about how Japanese modernisation has dealt with cultural differences and has 
changed Japanese society and its people.  
As I pointed out in the Introduction, these narratives contain two problems. 
Firstly, representations of cultural differences between Japan and the West over gender 
and sexuality are incoherent and often contradictory, and more importantly, they have 
changed historically. For example, heteronormativity is regarded as the result of 
Westernisation, while the heteronormative family system is often insisted on and 
politically sustained as a Japanese ‘tradition’. On the one hand, homosexual relations can 
be referred back to Western culture and lifestyle, but in another context, homosexual 
conduct can recall the Japanese tradition of nanshoku. What is important is that all these 
discourses have been produced in modern Japanese society, rather than being relics of 
premodern Japan. Thus, their presumptions of clear and coherent differences between 
Japanese and Western cultures are inadequate, if not inaccurate, in regard to discourses in 
modern Japan. Secondly, they also fail to analyse the dynamism of sexual politics in 
postwar Japan: how (non)normative genders and sexualities would be attached to the 
national in some contexts, and what would be excluded when some expressions of gender 
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and sexuality were accepted or normalised in Japanese society. What is problematic in 
the narratives presupposing the projection of Japanese modernisation as Westernisation 
is that they reduce the dynamism of sexual politics in Japan to a struggle between 
Japanese ‘indigenous’ tradition and Western modernity; portraying it as either the result 
of Westernisation or as a residue that Westernisation has left unchanged. By this approach, 
these essential questions are left as collateral ones in sexual politics in Japan: how have 
Japanese people defined ‘Japanese culture’ in some contexts, or what features are counted 
in describing their sense of national boundaries and ethnicity? In other words, the question 
of the scope and limits of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983) in discourses of 
gender and sexual politics, and the facts of their dramatic changes in modern Japan, have 
been underestimated. 
When analysing sexual politics with close attention to what is political in their 
movements in Japanese society in each context, Japanese sexual politics appear plural, 
even in conflict with each other. I have examined how the sense of cultural differences 
between Japan and the West is variably shaped, with sexual politics having largely 
contributed to it in postwar Japan and vice versa. Instead of employing the narrative of a 
historical trajectory towards the modernisation/Westernisation of Japan, I rather focused 
on the way a sense of cultural differences and national borders in Japanese society has 
shifted according to changes in Japanese society and the environments of the international 
community, and how that has characterised discourses of gender and sexuality in Japan. 
When analysing how the discourses of Japan’s national self-image define and limit sexual 
politics in Japanese society, at the same time following those discourses as they have 
shifted through history, the history of sexual politics of male homosexuals in postwar 
Japan appears discontinuous, which would not fit a single historical narrative of, for 
example, ‘progress’, ‘modernisation’, ‘Westernisation’, ‘tradition’, or ‘inheritance from 
the past’, because the meaning and social contexts of sexual politics have also altered. 
Some, for example Mishima Yukio (Ch.1), recalled cultural nationalism for his sexual 
politics, while others referred to Western cultural authority for their political purposes. 
On the other hand, neither the narrative of simply swaying between Japanese tradition 
and the new Westernisation, nor a hybrid of the two, is accurate, because the possible 
meanings of ‘Japanese tradition’ or ‘the West’ have not been consistent. In this study, 
following Eve K. Sedgwick’s strategy in Epistemology of the Closet (1990), I emphasised 
the power dynamism emerging from contradictory discourses of gender, sexuality and 
national identity in postwar Japan, rather than constructing a universal narrative that 
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would rationalise these discursive contradictions and the resulting dynamic shifts of 
sexual politics, within which it is, I assume, impossible to find an internal logic.  
 
2.  Sexual Politics and Japanese National Figures 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 discussed the sexual politics of Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, who were 
often referred to as homosexuals in Japan before the emergence of ‘Westernised gay 
identity’ (McLelland 2005). Mishima transformed homoeroticism into nationalist passion 
and a spirit of loyalty to the Emperor through his identification with the samurai and 
those fallen in war. Translating homosexuality in postwar Japan’s economically emerging 
society into a passionate love for the Emperor during the period of Japan’s war crisis, 
through his creative talent for literature and art, he recharacterised homoeroticism as close 
to the patriotism of the past. His performances representing Japanese patriotism as a 
passionate love for the Emperor reappropriated national tragic figures such as the samurai 
and the war dead, who were abandoned by Japanese modernisation and the war regime, 
i.e., the Japanese emperors, thus also recalling the situation of male homosexuals who 
were neglected in contemporary society. The element of homoeroticism in Mishima’s 
politics, which was intended to reconstruct Japanese ‘tradition’ and revive national pride, 
has contextualised homoerotic desire into Japanese masculinity and national frames. As 
a result, Mishima, whose performances retrospectively look ‘camp’, that is, exhibitionist 
and awkwardly hyper-masculine, is now regarded as one of the most important ‘gay’ 
artists in Japan prior to the appearance of ‘Westernised gay identity’. On the other hand, 
Togo Ken regards homosexuals as victims under the Emperor System and challengers of 
social norms associated with the Emperor. By contrast with Mishima, who loved to act 
like a national hero resembling the samurai and the war fallen, Togo rather performed 
and embodied the stereotypical ‘shameful’ image of homosexuals, emphasising the 
femininity and gender fluidity of homosexual men in nightclub culture. Whilst Mishima 
tried to implant homoeroticism into men’s national pride, Togo politically utilised the 
shame ascribed to homosexuality to oppose social norms. For Togo, homosexuality is far 
from akin to the passionate loyalty of national heroes to the Emperor; instead it is sexual 
desire which is repressed and shamed in the society of the Emperor system.  
 Although there are enormous differences between Mishima and Togo – the 
former a popular and respected novelist committed to a far-right political movement 
aimed at restoring politics centred on the Emperor, the latter an owner of a gay bar who 
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continued to violently reject the Emperor System in public and was never elected to public 
office, it is fruitful to pay attention to their similarities and then to clarify what it is that 
makes their political attitudes different. Indeed, their political characterisation of 
homosexual desire in Japanese society had attitudes in common: they regarded 
homosexual desire as universal among men and contextualised it in relation to the 
Emperor System of Japan. Both of them were passionately in favour of anarchism and 
utilised homosexual desire to challenge the social norms of postwar Japan, whose 
normative masculinity was heterosexual and devoted to economic success. In this sense, 
Mishima and Togo are political pioneers who situated homosexuality within a national 
politics and characterised it as a political force with which to challenge contemporary 
Japanese society and create an alternative society.  
What made their political attitudes different is their respective views of a 
national order which excludes homosexuality and their strategies for change. Mishima 
understood postwar Japan’s pacifism as the order he had to challenge, and he constructed 
the idea of the Emperor System to justify his denial of it. In this characterisation by 
Mishima of Japan’s contemporary problems, his homoeroticism appeals to the past, 
before the introduction of postwar Japan’s pacifism. As the Emperor had formerly 
embodied Japanese masculinity, Mishima’s homoeroticism, which involved the 
romanticisation of the Emperor, was also supposed to provide a proper Japanese 
masculine model in his discourses. By contrast, Togo regarded the Emperor System as 
the foundation of heterocentrism and social hierarchy in Japan and his political purpose 
was to remove that system’s centrality from Japan. Thus, Togo’s image of homosexuality 
recalls the social outsiders of the social hierarchy at that time, including transgendered 
people, sex workers and disabled people. For Togo, homosexuality represents male 
femininity as opposed to the Japanese masculinity associated with the Emperor. In light 
of their shared views of homosexuality alongside their different ways of politically 
challenging the social order which excludes their sexuality, the view of the national 
emerges to define their sexual politics and its limitations.	  
 However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, through the AIDS crisis the 
connection between homosexual desire and the nation, often represented by the Emperor, 
was loosened and homosexuality came to represent Western society as diseased. New 
discourses have emerged as if to comply with a demand that Japan must be defended 
against such disease and its global effects: homosexuality is now the problem of modern 
Western society, and rarely related to Japanese masculinity, with homosexuals 
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individualised and isolated in Japanese society. Responding to new discourses of 
homosexuality and the disease sent from the West, gay movements – also influenced by 
AIDS activism in the US – had to face the political need to recontextualise their issues 
within Japanese society. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Tohjisha approach was one of the 
most popular and politically effective ones for Japanese homosexuals to use to reclaim 
their own issues as Japanese people within Japanese society.  
What is surprising in this discursive shift of homosexuality in Japan is not the 
shift itself but the fact that it was often dismissed, even forgotten, in the later history of 
sexual politics in Japan. The Sexuality Studies which regarded gay activism after the 
1980s as based on a ‘Westernised’ or ‘Americanised’ gay identity failed to observe the 
social changes in political circumstances created by the fear of AIDS and the relation 
between the national imaginary and sexuality (including heterosexuality). Rather than 
analysing the discursive discontinuity of the national imaginary and sexuality, it 
confirmed the cultural and national binary between Japanese and Western sexuality which 
emerged with the AIDS crisis. As discussed in Chapter 3, Mark McLelland (2005) and 
Wim Lunsing (2005) discussed Japanese sexual politics in the 1980s and 1990s in terms 
of the dualisms between ‘Americanised’ gay masculinity and Togo’s embodied Asian 
femininity in the 1970s, and between activism based on the ‘Westernised’ and 
individualised gay identity and the Japanese sexuality that preceded it. What complicates 
the discussion of Japanese sexual politics is that criticism of identity politics from Queer 
Theory is also often appropriated to reinforce the discourses about Japanese (Asian) 
sexuality apart from the identity aspect – an approach which can represent both an 
Orientalist view within the Western context, and a culturally narcissistic one within the 
Japanese social context, when differentiated from the West. Through reaffirming the 
dualism of sexual politics as between Japanese and Western sexuality, what is efficiently 
repressed is the issue of sexual minorities who are neither Japanese nor Western in 
Japanese society, which can be related to the history of the Japanese Empire and its 
colonisation. In this sense, to construct a new relation between the national imaginary and 
sexuality is not only to secure the national normality of gender and sexuality but also to 
whitewash the inconvenient Japanese past. 
When the approach of Tohjisha incorporated the discourse of individualised 
homosexuality, rather than universal desire, and emphasised the self-determination of 
minorities who are differentiated from others, especially from people considered as a 
majority, it prepared two styles of activisms: the representative gay male politics and the 
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gay male politics of self-liberation. These two kinds of activisms are still influential 
following the discourses of individualised sexual minorities, including discourses of 
sexual orientation and sexual identity, which have now been widely accepted. However, 
when Tohjisha loses its original political context and comes to refer simply to ‘Japanese-
middle-class-gay-men-in-a-big-city’, the term is easily associated with the representation 
of specific gay activities in the private realm, without challenging the Japanese politics 
and social norms that marginalise several social groups, including women, foreigners and 
ethnic minorities. When normative Japanese men have become the ‘gay people in Japan’ 
representing the individualisation of homosexuality which is associated with Japanese 
ethnocentrism and exceptionalism, as in the ‘characteristics of Japanese gay desire and 
community’ (Moriyama 2012), the term Tohjisha in the gay culture can rather reiterate 
and even enforce the conventional boundaries of gender and sexuality, while suspending 
political approaches to the nation and its heteronormativity. I call such gay ‘activism’ the 
Japanese homonormativity. What is ironic in Tohjisha discourse is that, although it was 
originally invented and utilised within very political contexts, such contexts have come 
to be regarded as the ‘old style of movements’ or have merely been forgotten, so that it 
has contributed to the ‘new’ idea that homosexual issues are a private matter, and prepared 
the context in which sexual politics is associated with neoliberalism after the 2000s. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I discussed the new Americanisation of narratives of sexual 
politics and the emergence of LGBT rights in Japan. Whilst Tohjisha discourse prepared 
the ground for a ‘new political movement’ within which each gay man pursues his desire 
and enjoys his private life (Fushimi 2007), a new global political phenomenon 
surrounding sexual minorities appears, especially after the birth of the Obama 
administration in the US: LGBT rights. Now, sexual politics refers not to the domestic 
political situation in relation to the Emperor, as in the work of Mishima Yukio and Togo 
Ken, nor to a repoliticisation through Tohjisha discourse, as in the work of Keith Vincent, 
Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi, and Ino Shinichi, but to something else, which is 
contextualised within the US history of sexual minorities. As both John Roos and 
Caroline Kennedy, the US ambassadors to Japan appointed by President Obama, 
commonly characterise LGBT rights, even in Japan, in the context of American Civil 
Rights Movements (Roos 2013; Kennedy 2016), the Americanisation of LGBT rights is 
promoted not only by Japanese mass media but also by narratives of the US government.  
What is distinctive in the influence of LGBT rights discourses is the indication 
of a new political field for sexual minorities: that of economic activities. In contemporary 
  
234 
234 
Japan, which looks forward to the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics in 2020, new LGBT 
neoliberal rights discourses appeal to the Japanese government and corporations by 
promising these interests a new way of marketing and representing LGBT rights as 
something each private company should contribute to, rather than indicating how the 
government must act to change the system for equality and justice. Thus, the 
Americanisation of the narrative of LGBT rights works as part of the commercialisation 
of new movements/markets. Whilst it erases the Japanese history of sexual minorities’ 
political movements since Mishima Yukio – many of which opposed capitalism and 
Japanese economic nationalisms, it introduces and promotes a new, American political or 
business style which cares about ‘LGBT rights’ vis-à-vis ‘LGBT markets’.  
As a result, a new Japanese national self-image and history of Japanese 
sexuality are retrospectively constructed in relation to the ‘new’ LGBT rights discourses 
issuing from the US. That is, although Japan lacks understanding of LGBT rights and 
modern institutions supporting them when compared to the US, Japan was originally an 
LGBT-friendly country before its Westernisation61. In such a Japanese national self-image, 
the Japanese ‘ignorance’ of LGBT rights has two functions. On the one hand, it indicates 
a better future when Japanese people will know about LGBT rights in contrast to today’s 
ignorance. On the other hand, ‘ignorance’ also denotes Japanese ‘innocence’ regarding 
LGBT issues in contemporary Japan: that is, because the Japanese do not know about 
LGBT issues, which are supposedly an originally ‘Western’ idea, the existence of 
discrimination against LGBT people and a discriminatory social system are not 
intentional, but merely the result of such Japanese ‘ignorance’. The Americanisation of 
the narrative of LGBT issues ironically functions to preserve and excuse discrimination 
against LGBT people in Japan. 
 
3. A Coherent History and the Functions of Knowledge/Forgetfulness of 
Contradictory Discourses 
 
Investigating the relations between Japanese national figures and ideas of gender and 
sexuality through history, we see that contradictory discourses about homosexuality have 
contributed not only to constructing normative Japanese identity and images but also to 
transforming them. As the normative Japanese national figure and its gender and sexuality 
                                                
61 See the report about LGBT issues in Japan by the Liberal Democratic Party (2016).  
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have often changed, sexual minorities’ politics which have challenged the social norms 
of each period have been nullified and depoliticised, even perceived as ‘outdated’. 
Japanese heteronormative society will be protected by transforming the normative 
Japanese national figure and its gender and sexuality and labelling sexual minorities’ 
activisms and their identity as ‘outdated’ or ‘non-Japanese’, here utilising the image of 
the West.  
What is notable in the transformation of Japanese normative national figures is 
that the temporality of sexual politics also shifts as the national figure has changed. For 
example, Mishima Yukio formed his politics by leaning towards the past. He found a 
place for his homoerotic desire in the past which contemporary Japan is denying, and 
utilised his interpretation of Japan’s traditional culture and its past for his oddly 
homoerotic but reactionary far-right politics. On the other hand, under the influence of 
discourses of sexual politics issuing from Western society, bringing concepts such as 
‘LGBT’ issues, sexual politics often represent themselves as ‘new’ movements, reflecting 
their transferral from Western society. Thus, a more productive way to analyse sexual 
politics in Japan is not to ask whether they form a ‘Japanese’ traditional movement or a 
Western one, but to analyse the way they contextualise themselves within Japanese 
history and society, what political effects they have on Japanese society, and what kind of 
temporality they present in the society. 
Though my interests have focused on changes in the discourses of gender, 
sexuality, and the national imaginary, and on the discontinuity in the history of Japanese 
sexual politics, rather than on constructing a universal narrative and theory to explain 
political phenomena in modern Japan, I have also tried to show the effects of attempts at 
unifying a historical and cultural story which constitutes a linear history and a simplifying 
narrative. This is what I called the functions of knowledge/forgetfulness of contradictory 
discourses of sexual politics. 
A historical narrative based on the stable and successive national figures of 
Japan poses a question as to whether some aspects of sexual politics and culture are 
authentic or not in Japanese culture, and enquires whether it would fit the narrator’s view 
of Japan or of the West. However, such questions are not only historically inappropriate 
but also reinforce an idea of normativity, as they function to marginalise social minorities 
who are considered outside that which is ‘authentically Japanese’. For example, as I 
discussed in Chapter 3, some critics and homosexuals dismissed gay activists in the 1990s 
because they regarded their ‘gei’ identity as being influenced by the US and of little 
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relevance to Japanese society. Here, the question is whether some sexual politics and 
culture are authentic or not, as the Japanese actually worked against the call for gay 
people’s dignity in Japan and sought, on the basis of sexuality, to erase some people’s 
identity from the ‘authentic’ Japanese culture. 
Constructing a national image of Japan based on contradictory discourses about 
gender and sexuality constitutes a double bind imposed on the sexual politics of male 
homosexuals. What is political in contradictory discourses about gender and sexuality in 
the context of Japanese nationalism is that the discursive contradictions are often utilised 
to disqualify sexual politics which fail to fit in with a certain national figure, without 
referring to the contradictions or plurality of that national figure. For example, as I 
discussed in the Introduction, when some activists challenge discrimination against 
sexual minorities in contemporary Japan, the Japanese ‘tradition’ of nanshoku or 
onnagata – homosexual customs or transgender cultures in theatre before the 
modernisation – which is supposed to represent a ‘Japanese national figure’ in this context, 
can be recalled to deny their claims. In another context, when new LGBT movements 
emerged and it was understood that they could contribute to the Japanese economy, thus 
representing a ‘Japanese national figure’ in this context, sexual minorities’ activisms of 
the past which challenged capitalism and Japanese economic nationalism, such as the 
activism of Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, can be easily erased. This strategy serves not 
only to veil contradictions in the national imaginary shared by the people, but also to 
establish the nation as a political goal which sexual politics must adapt to and follow. 
What is tragic for social minorities in such characterisations of the nation as a political 
goal is that efforts to conform to the national image never succeed, any more than efforts 
to catch a mirage can succeed, since contradictory discourses endlessly create different 
national ideals and social practices. 
To expose the shifts in representations of Japanese national figures and the 
contradictions which sexual politics in Japan must always have faced, it is useful to 
investigate discursive shifts in the past, as this study has shown. What is also important 
in reviewing history is to focus on the problems and limits of sexual politics which have 
dealt with national norms or utilised people’s admiration for the West. Many activisms, if 
not all, have tried, consciously or unconsciously, to appeal to national norms to gain 
recognition in Japanese society whilst the national norms themselves been revised 
through the constant reinvention of new norms for gender and sexuality.  
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4. Problems of Material and Historical Conditions for Politics in Japan 
 
Japanese national identity – like all national identities – is constructed through the body 
and desire. Thus, the contradictions that exist between Japanese nationalism and 
Westernisation are politically negotiated by constructing and transforming ‘Japanese’ 
bodies. It is essential to pay attention to both normative and non-normative bodies to 
analyse Japanese nationalism and national identity. 
 It is true that my research relies on the already existing large volume of male 
discourses concerned with their desire and sexuality in Japan. However, there are 
considerable differences between studies of male homosexuality and those of female 
homosexuality in terms of accessibility and the number of academic publications. 
Research on Japanese female sexuality is very limited compared with that of male 
homosexuality in Japan, due to the history of women’s limited access to education and 
publication, women’s economic disadvantage, women’s social difficulties in gaining 
independence and securing privacy, and the neglect and undervaluing of female desire 
and sexuality as social issues. Despite the existence of several innovative studies of 
female discourses on same-sex desire and identity in Japan since the 2010s (Akaeda 2011; 
Horie 2015; Iino 2008; Koyama, Akaeda, and Imada 2014; Takemura 2002, 2012, 2013), 
it is still more difficult to access the historical archive of female homosexuality than to 
access the research and archive of/about male homosexuality. This study is not 
exceptional in reflecting and being limited by the asymmetric material conditions of men 
and women in Japanese society.  
 My purpose in this study was to expose the political dynamisms created by 
contradictory discourses concerning definitions of hetero/homosexuality and 
Japanese/Western cultural differences in Japan, and to explore how sexual minorities, 
especially male homosexuals, have tried to constitute themselves as political subjects 
within Japanese politics. Although each social minority is marginalised in a different way 
in Japanese society, homosexual men are relatively easier to present as political in the 
Japanese political domain than other gendered minorities. Firstly, this is because of the 
treatment of gender relations in Japanese politics, which have been dominated by men. 
Such gender relations have reflected sexual politics conducted by men. As discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken represented themselves as the political 
within the Japanese public domain by distinguishing themselves from women; 
politicising themselves by depoliticising women’s positions. Also, the social assumption 
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of the male public identity was also unquestioned in the strategy of gay men coming out 
in the 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 3. Secondly, female sexuality and desire may not be 
politically visible in the national imaginary as male sexuality and desire are. As I 
discussed in the Introduction and when considering the case of Mishima Yukio, it is 
possible for male homosexuality to find its ‘antecedents’ in history, not as a few 
exceptional people hidden in the past but as a common custom followed by historic heroes 
who are highly respected and regarded as models of masculinity. Thus, Japanese 
homosexual men have the political choice of justifying their sexuality in the context of 
‘Japanese’ culture and tradition, though such a strategy will not necessarily succeed. By 
contrast, for feminism and female same-sex sexuality, it is more difficult to find similar 
‘antecedents’ in Japanese ‘formal’ history that is widely shared among people. In this 
sense, I share the hypothesis proposed by Eve K. Sedgwick that the question of gender 
and the question of sexuality are not the same question, and that it is more fruitful to 
carefully distinguish one mechanism of social marginalisation from another (Sedgwick 
1990, pp. 27-39).  
 
5. Political Possibilities of Non-Western-centric Queer Studies  
 
The limitation of this study suggests that there are different mechanisms of national 
inclusion/exclusion, and different material conditions for gender and sexual politics in 
Japan for women, from the ones Japanese homosexual men have faced. Thus, this study 
only revealed a part of the political dynamisms that have emerged through the national, 
gender, and sexuality. In particular, it would need to investigate the material conditions 
of gender and sexual politics in Japan: not only how some discourses are excluded from 
or integrated within the national as this study examined, but also how the material 
conditions for politics are formed; who can rightfully gain access to political resources 
and who cannot. In regard to the aspect of this study that focuses on the cultural relations 
between sexual politics and the national, although I have discussed the national in 
connection with economic success in postwar Japan, rather than the material conditions 
and their maldistribution, which often undermines the voices of people experiencing 
economic and social disadvantage, this study does not overcome the criticism of Queer 
Studies that it focuses too heavily on culture rather than on the economic structure. Nancy 
Fraser (2013) insists that Judith Butler’s critique of heterosexism fails to recognise the 
dynamism of capitalism which no longer needs heterosexism and that Butler’s 
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deconstruction of the economic and cultural structures undermines the advantages of 
Fraser’s theoretical distinction between recognition and redistribution (Ch. 7)62. From 
Fraser’s critical viewpoint which opposes cultural critiques, this study also focuses too 
much on the politics of recognition and does not pay enough attention to the problem of 
redistribution. This is a weakness I acknowledge and wish to develop further in future 
research. 
 At the same time, however, Fraser’s dualism between economics and culture, 
or the politics of redistribution and recognition, fails to recognise the problem that the 
views of both economics and culture in contemporary society are marked by the history 
of modernity, in which Western centrism is disguised as a universal model. As a response 
to Postcolonial Theory, Queer Theory has also criticised Western centrism and has sought 
alternative narratives, especially about how other parts of the world should be theorised 
in relation to the West. Yet, the efforts to overcome Western centrism faces the theoretical 
dilemma that Western centrism itself is a product of a combination of Western 
universalism and particularism. Sakai Naoki (1997) points out a paradox of the 
connection between Western particularity and universality, observing that ‘the West must 
represent the moment of the universal under which particulars are subsumed’ (p. 155). In 
the double movement of universalism and particularism and the shift of the centre from 
Western Europe to the United States, Sakai notes that universality and the particularity of 
modernity have now been closely woven together with American nationalism. What is 
problematic in the paradox of US exceptionalism and universalism is that it is not only 
utilised to establish the US supremacy employed by US government narratives such as 
Hillary Clinton’s ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ address, but it is also found in critiques 
of US exceptionalism and universalism, such as the critique of homonationalism. As I 
pointed out in Chapter 5, both homonationalism and the criticism of homonationalism 
treat American society and history as the place where global politics emerge, and 
reproduce US exceptionalism, whilst political subjects in other regions are either erased 
or reduced to the effects of US politics.  
 The double movement of US universalism and exceptionalism is of the same 
coin as Japanese nationalism; it can be expressed as a narcissistic self-identity of Japanese 
uniqueness or sometimes as a motive for holding global leadership. In his critique of 
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Western universalism, Sakai not only portrays the relationship between the West and the 
non-West as still following a master/slave formula, but also suggests that efforts to 
challenge the universalism of the West can fall into the very universalism which critiques 
try to overcome. From reading the discussions of Japanese philosophers of the Kyoto 
school in the 1930s who tried to establish a new philosophy to overcome the limits of 
Western modernity, and seeing how similar efforts of postmodernism ironically resulted 
in the ideology of the Empire of Japan during the Second World War (Harootunian 2002), 
Sakai reveals that their desire was to bring themselves to the centre of world history, 
serving the Japanese nationalism which drove the country to war: 
 
What they were opposed to was the fact that, in that Eurocentric arrangement 
of the world, the putative unity of the Japanese happened to be excluded from 
the centre. They want to change the world so that the Japanese would occupy 
the position of the centre and of the subject that determines other particularities 
in its own universal term. (Sakai 1997, p. 170) 
 
The double-movement between universalism and particularism is not only the foundation 
of Western superiority over other regions but is also sometimes the motivation for 
criticism of it which asserts the other regions’ own supremacy. 
 Through the study of Japanese sexual politics, I wanted to suggest that it can 
be more productive to focus on discursive contradictions and power relations emerging 
in them between the West and others, or Western universalism and nationalistic 
particularism, rather than challenging Western-centric universalism itself or seeking a 
new kind of universalism. It is impossible, and unproductive even if possible, to try to 
establish a theoretical ground which will easily resolve the dualisms between Japan and 
the West, and between heterosexism and queer counterparts, so as to establish one 
coherent narrative. The approach focusing on discursive contradictions and power 
relations may not directly solve all problems emerged by Western-centric views and their 
nationalistic counterparts in politics and cultures. But it is still a better approach not only 
to analyse the social phenomena created by the double-bind of Western-centric 
universalism and counter-discourses against it, but also to avoid reproducing Western-
centric universalism, as the anti-homonationalist critiques and Japanese philosophers of 
the Kyoto school ironically did. As the history of sexual politics in Japan against 
normativity and for social change has been a series of discontinuities and self-
redefinitions, what is needed to understand such history and society is not to establish a 
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universal theory which covers the discontinuity, but to examine what is happening behind 
the desire for universalism. 
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